State v. H. C.
Court
Wisconsin Supreme Court
Decided
June 3, 2025
Jurisdiction
S
Case Summary
2025 WI 20 STATE OF WISCONSIN, Petitioner-Respondent, v. H.C., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. No. 2023AP1950 Decided June 3, 2025 REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals Milwaukee County Circuit Court (Joseph R. Wall, J.), No. 2022TP86 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ZIEGLER, HAGEDORN, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined. ¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. Under WIS. STAT. § 48.426(2) (2021–22), the circuit court’s prevailing consideration during the 1 dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding is the “best interests of the child.” The statute makes no mention of a burden of proof placed on the State or any other party. Appealing an order terminating her parental rights, H.C. argues the Due Process Clause of the 1All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021–22 version unless otherwise indicated. STATE v. H.C. Opinion of the Court Fourteenth Amendment2 and public policy considerations require the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence—or at least a preponderance of the evidence—that termination is in the best interests of the child. We reject H.C.’s arguments and affirm the court of appeals’ mandate, which leaves the circuit court’s TPR order undisturbed. ¶2 The circuit court determined it was in the best interests of the child to terminate H.C.’s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed, identifying no error in the circuit court’s exercise of “ultimate discretion in the decision to terminate parental rights.” Nonetheless, the court of appeals asserted that during the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding, due process requires a child’s best interests be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and the burden of proof is shared by all parties. ¶3 While we agree the circuit court’s order to terminate H.C.’s parental rights should be affirmed, we hold the best interests of the child governing the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding constitutes a discretionary determination by the circuit court and the statute places no burden of proof on a particular party. Neither the Due Process Clause nor applicable statutory law impose a burden of proof during the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding.3 I ¶4 Since birth, H.C. has not addressed her son John’s4 exceptional medical, developmental, behavioral, and emotional needs, which stem from global development delays, seizures, abnormal brain activity, dysplasia, optic nerve pallor, failure to thrive, congenital cysts, microcephaly, and autism, among other conditions. The record is replete with instances of H.C.’s failure to seek and provide the specialized care John 2“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 3 We affirm the court of appeals because we reach the same conclusion regarding this case’s disposition: the circuit court committed no error when it terminated H.C.’s parental rights. Because the court of appeals’ due process analysis was flawed, however, we reject it. 4 John is a pseudonym used for H.C.’s son because he shares her initials. 2 STATE v. H.C. Opinion of the Court required. Additionally, by John’s second birthday, he had suffered numerous incidents of physical abuse and neglect at the hands of H.C. ¶5 H.C. also endured her own abuse and neglect. As an at risk youth subject to a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) order, H.C. lived in a group home while John was an infant, battled drug addiction, and suffered numerous mental health disorders. She was often reported to leave her group home and sleep in abandoned houses. She has a history of being sex trafficked. ¶6 After numerous unsuccessful attempts by Division of Milwaukee Child Protective Services workers to help H.C. adequately care for John, the circuit court ordered that John be taken into custody at the age of two. After John was removed from H.C.’s care, he was found to be in need of protection or services and the court entered a CHIPS dispositional order. Numerous conditions required H.C. to address her addiction and mental health before regaining custody of John. ¶7 Just after John’s fourth birthday, the State filed a petition to terminate H.C.’s parental rights, stating continuing CHIPS and a fail
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Decided
Date Decided
June 3, 2025
Jurisdiction
S
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federal
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2025 WI 20
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
H.C.,
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
No. 2023AP1950
Decided June 3, 2025
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Milwaukee County Circuit Court (Joseph R. Wall, J.), No. 2022TP86
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the
Court, in which ZIEGLER, HAGEDORN, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined.
¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. Under WIS. STAT. § 48.426(2)
(2021–22), the circuit court’s prevailing consideration during the 1
dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding is the “best interests of the child.” The statute makes no mention of a burden of proof placed on the State or any other party. Appealing an order terminating her parental rights, H.C. argues the Due Process Clause of the
1All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021–22
version unless otherwise indicated. STATE v. H.C. Opinion of the Court
Fourteenth Amendment2 and public policy considerations require the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence—or at least a preponderance of the evidence—that termination is in the best interests of the child. We reject H.C.’s arguments and affirm the court of appeals’ mandate, which leaves the circuit court’s TPR order undisturbed.
¶2 The circuit court determined it was in the best interests of the
child to terminate H.C.’s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed, identifying no error in the circuit court’s exercise of “ultimate discretion in the decision to terminate parental rights.” Nonetheless, the court of appeals asserted that during the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding, due process requires a child’s best interests be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and the burden of proof is shared by all parties.
¶3 While we agree the circuit court’s order to terminate H.C.’s
parental rights should be affirmed, we hold the best interests of the child governing the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding constitutes a discretionary determination by the circuit court and the statute places no burden of proof on a particular party. Neither the Due Process Clause nor applicable statutory law impose a burden of proof during the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding.3
I
¶4 Since birth, H.C. has not addressed her son John’s4
exceptional medical, developmental, behavioral, and emotional needs, which stem from global development delays, seizures, abnormal brain activity, dysplasia, optic nerve pallor, failure to thrive, congenital cysts, microcephaly, and autism, among other conditions. The record is replete with instances of H.C.’s failure to seek and provide the specialized care John
2“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 We affirm the court of appeals because we reach the same conclusion
regarding this case’s disposition: the circuit court committed no error when it terminated H.C.’s parental rights. Because the court of appeals’ due process analysis was flawed, however, we reject it.
4 John is a pseudonym used for H.C.’s son because he shares her initials.
2
STATE v. H.C. Opinion of the Court
required. Additionally, by John’s second birthday, he had suffered numerous incidents of physical abuse and neglect at the hands of H.C.
¶5 H.C. also endured her own abuse and neglect. As an at risk
youth subject to a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) order, H.C. lived in a group home while John was an infant, battled drug addiction, and suffered numerous mental health disorders. She was often reported to leave her group home and sleep in abandoned houses. She has a history of being sex trafficked.
¶6 After numerous unsuccessful attempts by Division of
Milwaukee Child Protective Services workers to help H.C. adequately care for John, the circuit court ordered that John be taken into custody at the age of two. After John was removed from H.C.’s care, he was found to be in need of protection or services and the court entered a CHIPS dispositional order. Numerous conditions required H.C. to address her addiction and mental health before regaining custody of John.
¶7 Just after John’s fourth birthday, the State filed a petition to
terminate H.C.’s parental rights, stating continuing CHIPS and a fail
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Case Details
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Status
Decided
Date Decided
June 3, 2025
Jurisdiction
S
Court Type
federal
Legal Significance
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Metadata
Additional information
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