AI-Powered Research

Legal Case Database

Search thousands of legal cases with AI-powered semantic search. Find relevant precedents, analyze case law, and streamline your legal research with professional-grade tools.

868
Total Cases
486
AI Processed
422
Searchable
0
Courts
AI-Powered Legal Search

Semantic search across thousands of legal cases

Popular legal searches:

Advanced Filters

NEW FEATURE

Agentic Research

Unlock the power of AI-driven legal research. Our advanced agentic system autonomously analyzes cases, identifies patterns, and delivers comprehensive insights in minutes, not hours.

AI-Powered Analysis
Precise Legal Research
10x Faster Results

Join 2,500+ legal professionals

Total Cases

Live

868

Cases in database

+12% this month

AI Processed

Live

486

56.0% processed

+486 cases

Searchable

Live

422

48.6% vectorized

Ready for AI search

SEO Ready

Live

839

96.7% optimized

Search engine ready

Processing Progress

AI enhancement and optimization status

AI Summary Generation
56.0%
486 cases
Vector Embeddings
48.6%
422 cases
SEO Optimization
96.7%
839 cases
Recent Additions (30 days)
+456
Top Courts

Case distribution by court type

Practice Areas

Most common legal specializations

Featured Cases

Landmark decisions and high-impact cases

Court: Supreme Court of The Commonwealth of The Northern Mariana Islands
Date decided:

E-FILED CNMI SUPREME COURT E-filed: Jun 25 2025 02:15PM Clerk Review: Jun 25 2025 02:15PM Filing ID: 76525598 Case No.: 2022-SCC-0016-CIV Judy Aldan IN THE Supreme Court OF THE Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands SECUNDINA UNTALAN PANGELINAN AND SELINA MARIE PANGELINAN, Plaintiff-Appellees, v. JOHN SABLAN PANGELINAN, Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0016-CIV ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING Cite as: 2025 MP 3 Decided June 25, 2025 ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE ROBERT J. TORRES, JR. JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE WESLEY M. BOGDAN Superior Court Civil Action No. 17-0067 Associate Judge Joseph N. Camacho, Presiding Pangelinan v. Pangelinan, 2025 MP 3 INOS, J.: ¶1 Appellant John Sablan Pangelinan (“Appellant” or “John”) petitions for rehearing, focusing primarily on our previous holdings that his quiet title action was barred by issue preclusion and that the lower court properly set aside the entry of default against Appellees Secundina and Selina Pangelinan (“Appellees”). For the below reasons, his petition is DENIED. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The full facts of this case and relevant probate decisions are detailed in Pangelinan v. Pangelinan, 2024 MP 5 and In re Estate of Norberto Eduardo Pangelinan, Civ. No. 15-0169 (NMI Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2016) (Decree of Final Distribution); In re Estate of Norberto Eduardo Pangelinan, Civ. No. 15-0169 (NMI Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2016) (Order Determining Heir and Approving the Lease and Sale of Real Property); In re Estate of Norberto Eduardo Pangelinan, Civ. No. 15-0169 (NMI Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2016) (Order Denying John S. Pangelinan’s Motions for Reconsideration). For purposes of this petition, we briefly summarize the relevant facts. In 2017, Appellees sued John in the Superior Court, claiming, among other things, damages for abuse of process based on John’s actions during the probate of Norberto Eduardo Pangelinan— Appellees’ husband and father, respectively, and John’s first cousin. ¶3 John responded by filing counterclaims, including a quiet title action to land subject to the probate of Norberto’s estate. Shortly thereafter, he amended his answer and counterclaim. In response, Appellees moved to dismiss the counterclaims, but filed their motion three days late, having miscalculated the deadline by relying on the date of the amended counterclaims, rather than the original counterclaims. Consequently, the clerk entered a default against them, and John moved for entry of default judgment. ¶4 Appellees moved to set aside the entry of default, which the court granted. The court also granted their motion to dismiss, holding that the quiet title claim was barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion. The case proceeded to a bench trial on the remaining claims, after which the court found John liable for abuse of process. The court later awarded Appellees $52,756.49 in damages against John. ¶5 John appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in setting aside the entry of default and dismissing his quiet title action on issue preclusion grounds. After briefing and oral argument, we affirmed the lower court’s decision in an opinion issued on September 23, 2024. John timely filed a petition for rehearing. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 A petition for rehearing “must state with particularity each point of law or fact that the petitioner believes the Court has overlooked or misapprehended and must argue in support of the petition. Oral argument is not permitted.” NMI SUP. CT. R. 40(a)(2). A party may not reassert previously raised arguments or raise new issues unless extraordinary circumstances exist. Commonwealth v. Reyes, 2020 MP 6 ¶ 7. Pangelinan v. Pangelinan, 2025 MP 3 III. DISCUSSION A. We did not overlook or misapprehend any point of law or fact in affirming the lower court’s decision to set aside the entry of default. ¶7 John first argues that Appellees’ default in answering his counterclaim cannot be set aside—an assertion that, if accepted, would require us to nullify Rule 55(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and contravene our test for setting aside entries of de

Impact score: 55%
0
Court: Supreme Court of Guam
Date decided:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM PEOPLE OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DUAYNE RICHARD PETERS, Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court Case No. CRA23-008 Superior Court Case No. CF0112-20 OPINION Cite as: 2025 Guam 1 Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam Argued and submitted on July 15, 2024 Hagåtña, Guam Appearing for Defendant-Appellant Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee Joshua D. Walsh, Esq. Christine Santos Tenorio, Esq. Razzano Walsh & Torres, P.C. Assistant Attorney General 139 Murray Blvd., Ste. 100 Office of the Attorney General Hagåtña, GU 96910 590 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 801 Tamuning, GU 96913 People v. Peters, 2025 Guam 1, Opinion Page 2 of 15 BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; and KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice. MARAMAN, J.: [1] Defendant-Appellant Duayne Richard Peters appeals his conviction for four counts of First-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (“CSC I”) and two counts of Second-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (“CSC II”), along with two Vulnerable Victim Special Allegations. Peters argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed his wife to plead guilty and testify against him pursuant to a plea agreement that placed her under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular manner. He argues that despite his wife admitting to abusing the victim, she “testified at the insistence of the Government . . . that the abuse was committed by Mr. Peters.” Appellant’s Br. at 9 (May 13, 2024). Peters also makes the claim he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND [2] A grand jury returned an indictment against Peters and his wife,1 N.P., for criminal sexual conduct committed against a girl related to N.P. Peters was initially charged with five counts of CSC I and three counts of CSC II. N.P. was charged with two counts of CSC I and two counts of CSC II under a theory of complicity. The criminal sexual conduct was alleged to have occurred when the victim was under the age of fourteen. N.P. was alleged to have admitted to police that there was an incident where Peters had sex with her and then with the victim, and another incident where she watched Peters penetrate the victim with a vibrator. Super. Ct. Case No. CF0112-20- 01 (Magis.’s Compl. at 5, Feb. 17, 2020).2 1 N.P. testified that she married Peters in 2017 and was still married to him at the time of trial. 2 Although outside the record of this appeal, we can properly take judicial notice of documents filed in N.P.’s case. See People v. Tedtaotao, 2023 Guam 21 ¶ 2 n.1. In our discretion and without request, we take judicial notice People v. Peters, 2025 Guam 1, Opinion Page 3 of 15 [3] Peters moved to sever, based in part on (1) his claim that N.P. had made incriminating statements which also implicated him and (2) his claim that while he denied the alleged acts had occurred, she had “admitted to it.” Record on Appeal (“RA”), tab 19 at 1–3 (Mot. Sever, Apr. 10, 2020). The unopposed motion was granted, and the prosecution against N.P. was captioned as CF0112-20-01. A jury was selected for N.P.’s trial, but before being empaneled, it appears N.P. reached a plea agreement with the People. See CF0112-20-01 (Min. Entry at 2, Dec. 16, 2020); Appellee’s Br. at 2 (June 12, 2024). N.P. agreed to plead guilty to Criminal Facilitation of First- Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (as a Third-Degree Felony). CF0112-20-01 (Plea Agreement at 2, Feb. 1, 2021). In exchange for her cooperation against Peters, N.P. was given immunity, all other charges were dropped, and the People agreed to a sentence of time served. Id. at 3–5. [4] N.P.’s plea agreement provided that “Defendant agrees to fully and truthfully cooperate with the Government of Guam Attorney General’s Office . . . .” Id. at 3. The agreement further stated that: Defendant agrees to testify truthfully at any Court proceeding, including grand jury, trial or any other hearing to which he [sic] is called to testify, specifically concerning her own case or those involving her co-actor pursuant to Guam Police Department Report No. 19-06305 and written statement and/or testimony against her co-actor,

Impact score: 55%
0
Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date decided:

FILED No. 24-27, Elaine Neidig, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Valley Health System June 10, 2025 released at 3:00 p.m. EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK ARMSTEAD, Justice, dissenting: SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA The West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act, West Virginia Code §§ 55-7B-1 – 12 (“MPLA”), is, by design, a broad and encompassing measure designed to govern civil actions arising from the provision, or failure to provide, adequate health care services to our citizens. The majority’s opinion in this case improperly limits the scope and coverage of the MPLA. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s answer to the certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit because I believe that, by following the majority’s opinion, a plaintiff may avoid application of the MPLA by utilizing artful pleading, a result that has previously been soundly rejected by this Court. Ms. Neidig creatively couches her claims as unfair and deceptive acts and practices pursuant to the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act (W. Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 – 110), breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. What the majority opinion fails to recognize is that the petitioner’s unfair and deceptive acts and practices, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment claims are all based upon a deviation from the standard of care for a mammogram. In other words, Ms. Nedig will, essentially, have to establish a medical negligence claim in order to prevail. The majority incorrectly centers its attention, not upon the nature of the petitioner’s factual allegations, but upon her characterization of the type of damages she seeks. Additionally, the petitioner’s breach of contract claim is an anchor claim that falls within the terms of the MPLA. As such, I firmly believe that the 1 United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia was correct in its decision that the petitioner’s claims fall squarely within the scope of the MPLA. Because the MPLA applies to this case and the allegations in the petitioner’s complaint fall outside the one-year statute of limitations governing the MPLA, the petitioner’s complaint should be dismissed. Accordingly, I would answer the Fourth Circuit’s original certified question in the affirmative. As noted by both the majority and Justice Walker’s concurrence, for the MPLA to apply, a cause of action must fall within the Act’s definitions of “medical professional liability” and “health care.” Under the Act, “medical professional liability” is defined broadly to mean: [A]ny liability for damages resulting from the death or injury of a person for any tort or breach of contract based on health care services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider or health care facility to a patient. It also means other claims that may be contemporaneous to or related to the alleged tort or breach of contract or otherwise provided, all in the context of rendering health care services. Id. § 55-7B-2(i) (emphasis added). The Legislature has defined the term “injury” to mean “injury or death to a patient arising or resulting from the rendering of or failure to render health care.” Id. § 55-7B-2(h). Finally, “health care,” is defined, in relevant part, as: Any act, service or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider or person supervised by or acting under the direction of a health care provider or licensed professional for, 2 to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s medical care, treatment or confinement, including, but not limited to, staffing, medical transport, custodial care, or basic care, infection control, positioning, hydration, nutrition, and similar patient services. Id. § 55-7B-2(e)(2). We have stated that a health care claim is the necessary anchor from which MPLA application flows: The “health care” claim is the “anchor;” it gets you in the door of MPLA application to allow for inclusion of claims that are “contemporaneous to or related to” that claim, but still must be in the overall context of rendering health care se

Impact score: 55%
0
Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date decided:

No. 23-569, Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corporation; Camden-Clark Health Services Inc.; West Virginia United Health System, Inc. d/b/a West Virginia University Health System; and West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc.; Marietta Memorial Hospital; and Marietta HealthCare Physicians,FILED Inc. June 11, 2025 released at 3:00 p.m. C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK BUNN, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part: SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA I concur with the majority’s answers to the first and second questions certified to this Court from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which recognize a cause of action for negligent supervision and define its elements. Yet, I dissent to the remainder of the majority’s opinion, which unnecessarily answers the district court’s third certified question and ultimately holds that intentional or reckless torts can form the basis for a negligent supervision claim. In answering the second certified question, the majority sets forth straightforward, easily applied elements of negligent supervision, making the majority’s answer to the third certified question unnecessary and superfluous. Likewise, the majority’s addition of a new syllabus point relating to the third certified question is unwarranted. Furthermore, while I concur in the majority’s determination of negligent supervision’s elements, I write separately to caution that negligent supervision is, in essence, a narrow subset of ordinary negligence, requiring the case-by-case factual analysis applicable to all negligence claims. I further emphasize that the factual circumstances in which an employer may be held liable to a plaintiff for negligent supervision, when the employee’s intentional tort caused the plaintiff harm, are likely quite rare. 1 A brief factual recitation and the underlying proceedings is helpful to provide context to my analysis. The respondents, the plaintiffs in the underlying action in federal court, alleged in relevant part1 that the petitioners, defendants in the underlying action, negligently failed to supervise their employees “in the pursuit and assistance in the pursuit” of a separate qui tam action against the respondents. In that negligent supervision count, respondents also asserted that the “initiation and pursuit of the qui tam action and the federal investigation consisted of tortious conduct.” The district court deferred ruling on the petitioners’ motion to dismiss the negligent supervision count and instead certified questions asking this Court whether negligent supervision is a cause of action in West Virginia, to set forth the elements of negligent supervision, and to determine whether a negligent supervision claim survives if the employee engages in an intentional or reckless tort. A. The Majority Erred By Answering Question Three The district court’s third certified question asks “[c]an intentional or reckless torts committed by an employee form the basis for a claim for negligent supervision against the employer?” I would have declined to answer this question, as the answer is unnecessary for the district court’s analysis in the underlying case given the Court’s answer to the second certified question. This Court recently explained, in City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., that a “certified question’s purpose is to ‘determine [the] 1 These allegations are taken from the Second Amended Complaint, the operative complaint in the case pending before the district court. 2 legal correctness’ of certain issues that are ‘critical’ to ‘determine the final outcome of a case.’” ___ W. Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d. ___, ___, 2025 WL 1367333, at *6 (W. Va. May 12, 2025) (quoting Bass v. Coltelli, 192 W. Va. 516, 520, 453 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1994), superseded by statute, W. Va. Code § 58-5-2, as recognized by Smith v. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd., 222 W. Va. 345, 664 S.E.2d 686 (2008)) (discussing certification of questions by a state court). This Court further held that when answering a certified question from a federal court, “the legal issue must substantially control the case.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, id. The majority’s answer to district court’s third question disregards those restrictions. The majority, in answering the second certified question, provides the district court enou

Impact score: 55%
0
Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date decided:
Oil and Gas Law
Contract Law

No. 23-522, Francis Kaess v. BB Land, LLC FILED June 6, 2025 Walker, Justice, dissenting, and joined by Justice Bunn: released at 3:00 p.m. C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA In this certified question proceeding, the majority opinion applies an implied duty to market to an oil and gas lease that contains an in-kind royalty provision. It goes on to hold that the requirements for the deductions of post-production expenses from Wellman1 and Tawney2 apply to the lease. With respect for my colleagues in the majority, I dissent. As explained below, the majority’s analysis does not withstand scrutiny primarily because it muddles the distinction between different types of leases. As a result, the majority effectively rewrites the leases to take money from the producers to give it to the royalty owners. But it is not the province of this Court to rewrite an oil and gas lease to 1 See Syl. Pt. 4, Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254 (2001) (“If an oil and gas lease provides for a royalty based on proceeds received by the lessee, unless the lease provides otherwise, the lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale.”). 2 See Syl. Pt. 10, Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., 219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006) (“Language in an oil and gas lease that is intended to allocate between the lessor and lessee the costs of marketing the product and transporting it to the point of sale must expressly provide that the lessor shall bear some part of the costs incurred between the wellhead and the point of sale, identify with particularity the specific deductions the lessee intends to take from the lessor’s royalty (usually 1/8), and indicate the method of calculating the amount to be deducted from the royalty for such post- production costs.”). 1 reflect the Court’s view of a fair bargain. We certainly would not go to such extreme measures to rewrite contracts in any other context.3 I would have held that for leases that contain an in-kind royalty provision, there is no implied duty to market arising from the lease/contract and the requirements of Wellman and Tawney for the deductions of post-production expenses are inapplicable. As explained below, an implied duty to market is only triggered when a royalty owner does not or cannot take physical possession of its royalty share of the production; when that occurs, the producer must market and sell the royalty owner’s share of the production to avoid waste and loss, and the producer may properly charge the royalty owner his share of any post-production costs. One of the most contentious legal issues in the oil and gas industry is the dispute concerning the deductibility of post-production costs from royalty payments owed to lessors.4 At the risk of oversimplification, most royalty clauses generally fall into one 3 When examining a contract in an employment dispute, this Court stated that: “Our task is not to rewrite the terms of contract between the parties; instead, we are to enforce it as written.” Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 69 v. City of Fairmont, 196 W. Va. 97, 101, 468 S.E.2d 712, 716 (1996). In the same way, we have held parties to a contract dispute involving an insurance policy to the plain language in the policy and noted that: “‘We will not rewrite the terms of the policy; instead, we enforce it as written.’” Auto Club Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Moser, 246 W. Va. 493, 500, 874 S.E.2d 295, 302 (2022) (quoting Payne v. Weston, 195 W. Va. 502, 507, 466 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1995)). 4 See William T. Silvia, Slouching Toward Babel: Oklahoma’s First Marketable Product Problem, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. 583 (Winter, 2013) (outlining the “minefield of judicial interpretations among the major oil and gas-bearing states[,]” including West Virginia); 2 of two broad categories: “proceeds” royalty provisions, which provide for the mineral owner to receive a royalty consisting of a monetary share of the proceeds the producer receives from the sale of the oil and gas produced under the lease, and “in-kind” royalty provisions, which provide for the mineral owner to receive a royalty consisting of a portion of the physical oil and gas produced, tendered at the wellhead. This Court has stated that

Impact score: 55%
Citation count: 21 citations
Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date decided:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA January 2025 Term FILED _____________________ June 11, 2025 released at 3:00 p.m. C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK No. 23-589 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA _____________________ JACKLIN ROMEO, SUSAN S. RINE, and DEBRA SNYDER MILLER, Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners, v. ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION, Defendant Below, Respondent. ___________________________________________________________ Certified Questions from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia The Honorable Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief Judge Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-88-TSK-MJA CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED _________________________________________________________ Rehearing Granted: December 31, 2024 Submitted Upon Rehearing: April 22, 2025 Filed: June 11, 2025 George A. Barton, Esq. W. Henry Lawrence, Esq. Barton and Burrows, LLC Amy M. Smith, Esq. Mission, Kansas Lauren K. Turner, Esq. Steptoe & Johnson PLLC L. Lee Javins II Esq. Bridgeport, West Virginia Taylor M. Norman, Esq. Bailey, Javins & Carter, L.C. Elbert Lin, Esq. Charleston, West Virginia Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP Richmond, Virginia Howard M. Persinger, III Daniel T. Donovan, Esq. Persinger & Persinger, L.C. Kirkland & Ellis LLP Charleston, West Virginia Washington, D.C. Counsel for Petitioners Counsel for Respondent CHIEF JUSTICE WOOTON delivered the Opinion of the Court. JUSTICE ARMSTEAD, deeming himself disqualified, did not participate in the decision of this case. JUDGE HARDY, sitting by designation. JUSTICE WALKER dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion. JUSTICE BUNN dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. “‘“A de novo standard is applied by this court in addressing the legal issues presented by a [sic] certified questions from a federal district or appellate court.” Syl. Pt. 1, Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 W.Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 (1998).’ Syllabus Point 2, Aikens v. Debow, 208 W.Va. 486, 541 S.E.2d 576 (2000).” Syl. Pt. 1, Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 227 W. Va. 142, 706 S.E.2d 63 (2010). 2. “If an oil and gas lease provides for a royalty based on proceeds received by the lessee, unless the lease provides otherwise, the lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale.” Syl. Pt. 4, Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254 (2001). 3. Except as may be specifically provided by the parties’ agreement, where an oil and gas lease contains an express or implied duty to market, the requirements of Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254 (2001), and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C., 219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006), extend to the point of sale, not just to the point of marketability or to the first available market. 4. Except as may be specifically provided by the parties’ agreement, royalties are payable to the mineral owner/lessor not only from the producer/lessee’s sale of wet gas i and residue gas but also from the lessee’s sale of any byproducts of the wet gas such as natural gas liquids. 5. “‘The general rule as to oil and gas leases is that such contracts will generally be liberally construed in favor of the lessor, and strictly as against the lessee.’ Syllabus Point 1, Martin v. Consolidated Coal & Oil Corp., 101 W.Va. 721, 133 S.E. 626 (1926).” Syl. Pt. 7, Est. of Tawney, 219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006). 6. “‘The question as to whether a contract is ambiguous is a questio

Impact score: 55%
0
Filters

Legal Cases

868 cases available

Marriage of Javanmard and Asgari CA6

Unknown Court
Jul 21, 2025
Family Law
Divorce
Child Custody
Standard
0

In re H.R. CA2/6

Unknown Court
Jul 21, 2025
Family Law
Juvenile Justice
Standard
0

In re D.W. CA5

Unknown Court
Jul 21, 2025
Family Law
Juvenile Justice
Standard
0

Brewer v. Impact Biomedicines CA4/1

Unknown Court
Jul 21, 2025
Biomedical Law
Intellectual Property
Corporate Governance
Standard
0

Timothy Fisher v. Nathalie Fisher

Unknown Court
Jul 21, 2025
Family Law
Divorce Proceedings
Standard
0

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zenger. Opinion by Recktenwald, C.J., Concurring in Part [ada].

Unknown Court
Jul 21, 2025
Legal Ethics
Disciplinary Proceedings
Standard
0

Com. v. Easter, T.

Unknown Court
Jul 18, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

Com. v. Dougherty, E.

Unknown Court
Jul 18, 2025
Criminal Law
Due Process
Standard
0

Com. v. Alhakim, Z.

Unknown Court
Jul 18, 2025
Criminal Law
Evidence Law
Standard
0

CHARLES J. BEARD v. WILLIAM ODOM

Unknown Court
Jul 18, 2025
Civil Litigation
Contract Law
Standard
0

Genoveva A. Garcia v. the State of Texas

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

Genoveva A. Garcia v. the State of Texas

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Constitutional Law
Administrative Law
Standard
0

David Matthew Smith v. the State of Texas

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

David Matthew Smith v. the State of Texas

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

City of Hidalgo, Individually and City of Hidalgo, Texas Municipal Facilities Corporation D/B/A Payne Arena v. Anita Saldana

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Municipal Law
Liability Law
Standard
0

City of Hidalgo, Individually and City of Hidalgo, Texas Municipal Facilities Corporation D/B/A Payne Arena v. Anita Saldana

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Municipal Law
Tort Law
Standard
0

State v. Levering

2025 UT App 111

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Criminal Law
Due Process
Standard
0

State v. Christian

2025 UT App 112

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

Mikhelson v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.

2025 Ohio 2524

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Administrative Law
Employment Law
Standard
0

In re T.R.

2025 Ohio 2531

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Juvenile Law
Family Law
Standard
0

COD Properties Ohio, L.L.C. v. Black Tie Title, L.L.C.

2025 Ohio 2519

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Real Estate Law
Insurance Law
Standard
0

114476

2025 Ohio 2525

Unknown Court
Jul 17, 2025
Civil Procedure
Jurisdictional Law
Standard
0

Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC

Unknown Court
Jul 16, 2025
Financial Law
Corporate Governance
Standard
0

Angel v. Strulovich

2025 NY Slip Op 04150

Unknown Court
Jul 16, 2025
Contract Law
Fiduciary Duty
Standard
0

Angel v. Strulovich

2025 NY Slip Op 04149

Unknown Court
Jul 16, 2025
Contract Law
Litigation
Standard
0

State v. Harper

2025 Ohio 2508

Unknown Court
Jul 16, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

State v. Cutright

2025 Ohio 2507

Unknown Court
Jul 16, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

Ridgeview Partners, LLC d/b/a Ravelle at Ridgeview v. Michelle Okoreeh-Baah Keister

Unknown Court
Jul 16, 2025
Contract Law
Business Law
Standard
0

State v. Guffie

2025 Ohio 2518

Unknown Court
Jul 15, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Evidence Law
Standard
0

People v. Godwin

2025 NY Slip Op 25161

Unknown Court
Jul 15, 2025
Criminal Law
Defense Law
Standard
0

Bell v. Kroger Co.

2025 Ohio 2495

Unknown Court
Jul 15, 2025
Negligence
Premises Liability
Standard
0

Barrett v. Wagenbrenner

2025 Ohio 2494

Unknown Court
Jul 15, 2025
Civil Procedure
Jurisdictional Law
Standard
0

State of Tennessee v. Alphonso Elexander

Unknown Court
Jul 15, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

People v. Chavarria

2025 NY Slip Op 51097(U)

Unknown Court
Jul 14, 2025
Criminal Law
Procedural Justice
Standard
0

Lingjun Steve Hou, V. Jie Yao Hou

Unknown Court
Jul 14, 2025
Family Law
Property Law
Standard
0

Juliana S. Straight, V. Ethan H. Straight

Unknown Court
Jul 14, 2025
Family Law
Divorce
Child Custody
+1 more
Standard
0

John Tennant, V. Dale Waddell

Unknown Court
Jul 14, 2025
Contract Law
Tort Law
Standard
0

TOWNSEND, CARLOS v. HENDRICKSON USA, LLC

2025 TN WC 43

Unknown Court
Jul 14, 2025
Workers' Compensation Law
Employment Law
Standard
0

Doe v. Farkas

Unknown Court
Jul 11, 2025
Personal Injury Law
Negligence Law
Standard
0

S.E. Satisfy v. BlueStar Alliance, LLC

Unknown Court
Jul 11, 2025
Contract Law
Business Law
Standard
0

Whitehead v. Universal Pictures

Unknown Court
Jul 11, 2025
Intellectual Property Law
Entertainment Law
Standard
0

Jun v. Cab East, LLC

Unknown Court
Jul 11, 2025
Transportation Law
Negligence Law
Standard
0

Doppelt v. Spectrum Exchange, LLC

Unknown Court
Jul 11, 2025
Securities Law
Investor Rights
Regulatory Compliance
Standard
0

Marvin v. Allen

Unknown Court
Jul 11, 2025
Contract Law
Negligence Law
Standard
0

People v. J.W.

2025 NY Slip Op 51095(U)

Unknown Court
Jul 10, 2025
Criminal Law
Procedural Law
Standard
0

People v. C.D.

2025 NY Slip Op 51094(U)

Unknown Court
Jul 10, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

Sanders, Brandy v. NORTHSHORE HEIGHTS ASSISTED LIVING

2025 TN WC 42

Unknown Court
Jul 10, 2025
Workers' Compensation
Employment Law
Standard
0

State v. Hovinghoff

2025 UT App 108

Unknown Court
Jul 10, 2025
Criminal Law
Procedural Law
Standard
0

State v. Francis

2025 UT App 104

Unknown Court
Jul 10, 2025
Criminal Law
Constitutional Law
Standard
0

Ream v. Ream

2025 UT App 105

Unknown Court
Jul 10, 2025
Family Law
Divorce Law
Standard
0