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06/04/2025 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE April 16, 2025 Session ROBERT BATES, ET AL. v. CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, ET AL. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County No. 23C159 Kyle E. Hedrick, Judge No. E2024-00857-COA-R3-CV This appeal involves statutory construction. Robert Bates and Laurel Diane Bates (“Mr. Bates” and “Ms. Bates,” “Plaintiffs” collectively) sued the City of Chattanooga, Individually and d/b/a the Brainerd Golf Course (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), alleging personal injuries, loss of services, and loss of consortium stemming from Mr. Bates’ fall on Defendant’s golf course. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment relying on the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101, et seq., which provides immunity to landowners who open their property to recreational use. The Trial Court held that Defendant, the landowner, was immune under the TRUS because Mr. Bates was on Defendant’s property to play golf, and golf is comparable to the non-exclusive list of recreational activities found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. No exception to the TRUS was found to apply. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that golf is not an activity like those listed at Section 102 of the TRUS. Plaintiffs argue further that the fact Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course means Defendant is not entitled to immunity. We hold, inter alia, that golf is sufficiently comparable to Section 102 enumerated activities, particularly hiking, sightseeing, and target shooting, such that Defendant is entitled to immunity under the TRUS. In addition, the fact that Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course is not dispositive because the TRUS has no applicable consideration exception. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined. Richard A. Schulman, Eric J. Oliver, and Louis J. Bernsen, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellants, Robert Bates and Laurel Diane Bates. Andrew S. Trundle, Azarius “Zack” Yanez, Gregory E. Glass, and Christopher McKnight, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, the City of Chattanooga, Individually and d/b/a the Brainerd Golf Course. OPINION Background On September 23, 2022, Mr. Bates was a paying patron at Brainerd Golf Course, a golf course owned by the City of Chattanooga. While patronizing the golf course, Mr. Bates fell down some steps. In January 2023, Plaintiffs sued Defendant in the Trial Court. Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Bates suffered personal injuries because of Defendant’s negligence in upkeep and maintenance of the course. Plaintiffs also alleged loss of services and loss of consortium with respect to Ms. Bates. Defendant filed an answer in opposition asserting the TRUS, Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101, et seq. “The TRUS provides an affirmative defense to a landowner when a person is injured while engaging in a recreational activity on the landowner’s property.” Beckham v. City of Waynesboro, No. M2023-00654-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 2153536, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2024), perm. app. denied Sept. 12, 2024. In April 2024, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, again arguing it was entitled to immunity under the TRUS. Defendant cited Section 102 of the TRUS, which provides as relevant: (a) The landowner, lessee, occupant, or any person in control of land or premises owes no duty of care to keep such land or premises safe for entry or use by others for such recreational activities as hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, water sports, white water rafting, canoeing, hiking, sightseeing, animal riding, bird watching, dog training, boating, caving, fruit and vegetable picking for the participant’s own use, nature and historical studies and research, rock climbing, skeet and trap shooting, sporting clays, shooting sports, and target shooting, including archery and shooting range activities, skiing, off-road vehicle riding, and cutting or removing wood for the participant’s own use, nor shall such landowner be required to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such land or premises to any person entering on such land or premises for such purposes, except as provided in § 70-7-104. Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102(a) (West eff. April 6, 2015). Golf is not a listed activity. Nevertheless, it was and remains Defendant’s position that golf is comparable to the non- exclusive list of activities contain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS FILED State of West Virginia ex rel. West Virginia Department of Human Services, June 4, 2025 released at 3:00 p.m. Petitioner C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS v.) No. 24-582 (Berkeley County CC-02-2014-CIG-3) OF WEST VIRGINIA The Honorable Catie Delligatti,1 Judge of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County; Jill B., Petitioner Below and Party in Interest; and William Prentice Young, Guardian ad Litem of the child A.B.,2 Respondents MEMORANDUM DECISION Petitioner, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”),3 seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of Berkeley County from enforcing its September 26, 2024 order directing the DHS to pay $10,353.00 in vision care expenses for a child, A.B., who is not in the DHS’s physical or legal custody, is not the subject of any currently pending abuse and neglect 1 After the DHS filed this proceeding, the circuit court judge assigned to the case changed; the presiding judge is now the Honorable Catie Delligatti. Accordingly, the Court has substituted the proper party pursuant to Rule 41(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure. 2 The DHS lists as respondents to its petition only the circuit court judge and Jill B. The child A.B. is a real party in interest to this petition for writ of prohibition, which relates to an underlying guardianship proceeding. As such, we include A.B., by his guardian ad litem, as a respondent to this proceeding. 3 Petitioner appears by Attorney General John B. McCuskey and Assistant Attorney General Kristen E. Ross. Because a new Attorney General took office while this proceeding was pending, his name has been substituted as counsel. Respondent Jill B. is self-represented, and the guardian ad litem for A.B. is William P. Young. Additionally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 5F-2-1a, the agency formerly known as the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources was terminated. It is now three separate agencies—the Department of Health Facilities, the Department of Health, and the Department of Human Services. See W. Va. Code § 5F-1-2. For purposes of abuse and neglect proceedings, the agency is now the Department of Human Services. 1 proceeding, has guardians who were appointed by the circuit court in a private guardianship proceeding, and does not qualify for a subsidized guardianship.4 We find that this case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure for issuance of a memorandum decision rather than an opinion. For the reasons set forth below, we grant the requested writ of prohibition. The private guardianship proceeding underlying this original jurisdiction action was initiated by A.B.’s court-appointed guardians, Jill and Thomas B.5 To provide context for the circuit court’s decision that the DHS seeks to prohibit, we briefly describe the factual circumstances that led to Jill and Thomas B.’s court-appointed guardianship over A.B. Because of the limited record for this matter, the following facts are gleaned from the court’s order, the parties’ briefs, and the DHS’s “Objection to and Motion to Reconsider the Circuit Court’s June 12, 2024, Order,” that it filed in the circuit court. The tragic circumstances that ultimately led to A.B.’s guardianship began when he was conceived. A.B.’s mother, P.B., became pregnant at twelve years old after a family friend raped her. P.B.’s mother became aware of and reported the pregnancy when P.B. was about seven-and- a-half months pregnant. The DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition naming A.B.’s father as an offending parent and identifying his four children, including A.B., as abused and neglected children. P.B. was named in the abuse and neglect petition, but only as A.B.’s non-offending parent, and the court appointed counsel for her. A.B.’s father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to his children, including A.B. The DHS did not file an abuse and neglect petition against P.B.’s mother, S.B., because it determined that S.B. took appropriate action after learning of P.B.’s pregnancy by contacting police, cooperating with the investigation, and preventing contact between P.B. and her assailant. During P.B.’s pregnancy, she met Jill B. through a support program for teenage mothers. After A.B.’

No. 24-ICA-269 – Union Carbide Corporation, a subsidiary of the Dow Chemical Company v. Christina Dearien (decedent) and Thomas Dearien (dependent) FILED June 4, 2025 WHITE, Judge, concurring: ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA I wholeheartedly concur with the majority’s opinion and its application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel espoused in State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). In the workers’ compensation system, a “claims administrator” is an insurance company employee who, whilst ostensibly applying West Virginia’s workers’ compensation laws and regulations to rule on a claimant’s claim, is also focused on protecting the interests of the insurance company and, indirectly, those of the claimant’s employer. The majority opinion deftly notes that a claims administrator “is not bound by the traditional rules operative to an adversary system” and does not issue decisions remotely on par with “a quasi-judicial determination of an administrative agency.” ___ W. Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (Slip. Op. at 9). Hence, to put the majority’s ruling succinctly: a ruling, assessment, decision, or any other pronouncement by a claims administrator cannot form the basis for collateral estoppel under Miller. This Court recognizes that its authority is limited to what is expressly provided by the Legislature. See W. Va. Code § 51-11-4 (2024). In line with the Legislature’s limitations, the majority opinion constrains its application of Miller and, upon establishing that Miller’s collateral estoppel rule does not apply to claims examiner decisions and that the lower tribunal’s decision was correct, it ends its analysis. 1  What leaves me troubled, however, is that this is the second time in a year that collateral estoppel has arisen at the appellate level in the context of workers’ compensation rulings. It also is the second time in a year that application of the collateral estoppel doctrine has been rejected. In our ruling today, we rejected an employer’s attempt to use an adverse claims administrator’s ruling against a living claimant to later preclude the claim of a dependent seeking benefits for the work-related death of that claimant. In Ruble v. Rust-Oleum Corporation, 250 W. Va. 324, 902 S.E.2d 873 (2024), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) found, under the collateral estoppel guidelines of Miller, that a tortfeasor in a lawsuit could not use an adverse ruling against a workers’ compensation claimant to subsequently preclude the lawsuit by the claimant against the tortfeasor for injuries the claimant sustained on the job. The SCAWV found that because a workers’ compensation claim uses legal standards and procedural rules that are “substantially different from those in a courtroom,” a final ruling by a workers’ compensation judge does not have preclusive effect in a lawsuit. Id. at 326, 902 S.E.2d at 875. I write separately to underscore that, in cases like the one at bar, where there has been an adverse ruling against a living claimant, that adverse ruling has no preclusive effect on a subsequent claim for death benefits by the deceased claimant’s dependents. West Virginia law is clear: an adverse workers’ compensation decision against a living claimant has no collateral estoppel effect, and no res judicata effect, on a later claim for dependent’s benefits arising from the claimant’s work-related death. None. There are two 2 independent and separate rights of recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act, both based on the same injury or disease: one for the worker during his or her lifetime, and another for the worker’s dependents after his or her death. The parties in the claims are different, the parties are not in privity, and their statutory rights are different. Put simply, the actions of an injured worker who litigates a workers’ compensation claim while alive will have no preclusive effect on the rights of the worker’s dependent survivors, should the worker die as a result of his or her work-related injury or disease. This is not just my opinion. For eight-and-a-half decades, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) has found that a claim for workers’ compensation disability benefits by a living claimant, and a claim for death benefits by a deceased claimant’s dependents, “are not the same, nor is a claim for the latter

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA FILED Spring 2025 Term June 4, 2025 _____________________ released at 3:00 p.m. ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS No. 24-ICA-269 OF WEST VIRGINIA _____________________ UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, a subsidiary of THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, Employer Below, Petitioner, v. CHRISTINA DEARIEN (Decedent) and THOMAS DEARIEN (Dependent), Claimant Below, Respondent. ___________________________________________________________ Appeal from the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review JCN: 2022005028 AFFIRMED _________________________________________________________ Submitted: April 30, 2025 Filed: June 4, 2025 Timothy E. Huffman, Esq. R. Dean Hartley, Esq. Jackson Kelly PLLC Hartley Law Group, PLLC Charleston, West Virginia Wheeling, West Virginia Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Respondent JUDGE GREEAR delivered the Opinion of the Court. JUDGE WHITE concurs and reserves the right to file a separate opinion. GREEAR, Judge: Petitioner, Union Carbide Corporation, a subsidiary of the Dow Chemical Company (“Carbide”), appeals the May 30, 2024, order of the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (“Board”) granting fatal dependent’s benefits (“dependent benefits”) to Thomas Dearien, husband of Christina Dearien (“decedent”). On appeal, Carbide argues that the Board erred by granting Mr. Dearien such benefits, as his claim was barred by the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges’ (“OOJ”) final order affirming the rejection of the decedent’s claim for occupational disease benefits made during her lifetime. Further, Carbide contends that the Board’s final order was clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record. After our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Board’s May 30, 2024, order. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On March 11, 2019, the decedent filed an application for workers’ compensation benefits (“living claim”) against Carbide, claiming that she was diagnosed with colon cancer, an occupational disease, while employed by Carbide.1 A review of the decedent’s medical records was conducted, in relation to her living claim, by Mohammed Ranavaya, M.D. Dr. Ranavaya concluded that no credible or reliable evidence existed to establish that the decedent’s diagnosis of colon cancer was causally related to her 1 The decedent’s living claim was assigned claim number 2019020262-OD. While employed at Carbide, from 2006 to 2018, decedent worked in various job positions including a weighmaster, operator, and scheduling technologist. 1 employment at Carbide. Based upon the opinion of Dr. Ranavaya, the claim administrator (“CA”) denied the decedent’s living claim by order entered on June 5, 2020. The decedent timely filed a protest of this determination to the OOJ. On August 24, 2021, counsel for the decedent submitted a request to withdraw the protest due to the decedent’s death on June 2, 2021. By Order dated August 27, 2021, the OOJ dismissed the protest based upon the motion to withdraw.2 On September 10, 2021, Mr. Dearien filed an application for dependent benefits, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-10 (2010), and argued that the decedent “developed colorectal cancer as a result of her exposure to toxic chemicals” while employed by Carbide.3 On September 24, 2021, the CA rejected Mr. Dearien’s application for dependent benefits based on Dr. Ranavaya’s prior report, which found no direct causal connection between the decedent’s diagnosis of colon cancer and her employment with Carbide. Further, the CA concluded that the dependent’s claim was barred by the principle of collateral estoppel. According to the CA, the OOJ’s August 27, 2021, final order dismissing the protest of the decedent’s living claim constituted a final resolution to the 2 In its Order Dismissing Protest, the OOJ found that upon consideration of the decedent’s motion to withdraw

For Publication IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS BRUCE W. STREIBICH S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0043 Appellant/Defendant ) Re: Super. Ct. Civ. No. 459/1995 y )) (STI) CHARLES A. KAPLANEK, III, ) Appellee/Plaintiff, and ) WARREN STRYKER AND MARGARET ) STRYKER Appellees/Intervening Plaintiffs, ) ) ARTHUR SCHMAUDER, ELIZABETH MCGUIRE, AND BLUE WATERS RETREAT ) LLC, ) Intervening Defendants. ! ) On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Thomas & St. John Superior Court Judge: Hon. Renee Gumbs Carty Argued: April 8, 2025 Filed: June 4, 2025 Cite as: 2025 VI 13 BEFORE RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice, HON. MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and HON. HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS, Associate Justice APPEARANCES Carol Ann Rich, Esq. (Argued) Malorie Winne Diaz, Esq Dudley Rich LLP St. Thomas, U.S.V.1 Attorney for Appellant/Defendant, Matthew J. Duensing, Esq. (Argued) Joseph D. Sauerwein, Esq Law Offices of Duensing & Casner St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorney for Appellee/Plaintiff and Appellees/Intervening Plaintiffs ' The intervening defendants in the underlying lawsuit are not parties in this appeal Streibich v. Kaplanek, et al 2025 VI 13 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0043 Opinion of the Court Page 2 of 22 OPINION OF THE COURT WILLOCKS, Associate Justice q1 Appellant Bruce W. Streibich (hereinafter “Streibich”) appeals from the June 25, 2024 order of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands (hereinafter “Superior Court”) holding Streibich in contempt for violating the Superior Court’s April 29, 2024 order and declaratory judgment I. BACKGROUND? 42 The lengthy history of this litigation began in June 1995 when Karen R. Underwood (hereinafter “Underwood” filed a complaint against Streibich and Katharine H. Streibich* for a declaratory judgment of an easement in connection with Underwood’s property located at Parcel No. 4-27, Estate Tabor and Harmony, Nos. 5 & 6 East End Quarter, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands (hereinafter “Parcel No. 4-27”) and Streibich and Katharine H. Streibich’s property located at Parcel No. 4-26.° The gravamen of the lawsuit was whether an easement exists across Parcel No. 4-26 for the benefit of Parcel No. 4-27. While Underwood referenced several maps in her complaint, of relevance here is the PWD B9-31-T5S7 map (hereinafter “T57 Map’) which depicts the planned subdivision of the property that resulted in, inter alia, Parcel Nos. 4-26 and 4-27, and 2 This Court will recite only those facts and procedural history relevant to this instant appeal. To construct a more comprehensive and accurate background, this Court takes judicial notice of other courts’ dockets and papers. See Cianci v. Chaput, 64 V.I. 682, 690 n.2 (V.I. 2016) (recognizing that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' dockets and papers); cf King v. Appleton, 61 V.1. 339, 348 (V.I. 2014) (“[T]he Superior Court may take judicial notice of the existence of a document that has been filed with it in another proceeding.”’) (quotation marks and citation omitted) 3 On March 4, 2022, the Superior Court entered an order in which it found that Underwood's son Charles Anthony Kaplanek, III (hereinafter “Kaplanek”) was the real party in interest with respect to Parcel No. 4-27 since “Underwood deeded her interest in the property to him on June 30, 2016, by deed recorded as Document No. 2016004645” and thus, the court substituted Kaplanek in place of Underwood as the plaintiff but ordered that “the original Plaintiff's name shall remain” in the caption. For the sake of clarity and accuracy, this Court will refer to Kaplanek (owner of Parcel No. 4-27) instead of Underwood as the appellee in this appeal to reflect the proper party * Katharine H. Streibich passed away in February 1999 > Unless otherwise noted, all parcels referenced herein are located at Estate Tabor and Harmony, Nos. 5 & 6 East End Quarter, St. Thomas, U.

06/03/2025 DA 24-0610 Case Number: DA 24-0610 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2025 MT 117N 360 RECLAIM, LLC, a Montana limited liability company, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM M. RUSSELL, an individual, and MOUNTAIN VIEW INVESTMENTS, L.C., an Idaho limited liability company, Defendants and Appellees, v. WILLIAM M. RUSSELL, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. 360 RECLAIM, LLC, a Montana limited liability company, Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, Third-Party Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM M. RUSSELL, Counter-Defendant and Appellee, and U.S. TREASURY by and through the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Third-Party Defendants. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV-19-305(A) Honorable Amy Eddy, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Kristin L. Omvig, Benjamin J. Hammer, Omvig Hammer Law, P.C., Kalispell, Montana For Appellee William M. Russell: William M. Russell, Self-Represented, Pocatello, Idaho For Appellee Mountain View Investments, L.C.: Nicholas J. Lofing, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, Montana Submitted on Briefs: April 9, 2025 Decided: June 3, 2025 Filed: ,,.._...6.--if __________________________________________ Clerk 2 Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 360 Reclaim, LLC, (360 Reclaim) appeals the Eleventh Judicial District Court’s, Flathead County, October 1, 2024 Order and Rationale on Remand and on Various Motions that granted Mountain View Investments, L.C.’s (MVI) request for summary judgment, finding William Russell had sufficiently redeemed his property after certain credits were applied to the redemption price. We affirm. ¶3 Russell owned a 20-acre parcel of land near Columbia Falls, Montana. Russell defaulted on loan payments, and 360 Reclaim purchased the property at a foreclosure auction on June 1, 2018. The ensuing events have led to multiple proceedings before this Court. See KS Ventures, LLC v. Russell, No. DA 18-0238, 2019 MT 4N, 2019 Mont. LEXIS 8 (KS Ventures); Russell v. 360 Reclaim, LLC, No. DA 18-0677, 2019 MT 178N, 2019 Mont. LEXIS 285 (Russell I); 360 Reclaim, LLC v. Russell, No. DA 19-0450, 2020 MT 136N, 2020 Mont. LEXIS 1533 (Russell II); 360 Reclaim, LLC v. Russell, 2023 MT 250, 414 Mont. 328, 540 P.3d 1046 (Russell III). ¶4 On June 3, 2019, Russell attempted to redeem the property by tendering $117,000 to 360 Reclaim through lender MVI. Russell calculated the price by including $100,000 for the purchase price, one year’s interest at 7.5% of $7,500, taxes of $7,243.58, and an 3 added safety margin of $2,256.42. 360 Reclaim disputed this amount. Subsequently, a legal battle ensued in which the issue focused on whether 360 Reclaim could claim cleanup costs as “maintenance expenditures” under § 25-13-802, MCA, as part of the redemption value. 360 Reclaim removed some scrap metal from the property as part of its cleanup and wished to add the cost of cleanup to the redemption price. Ultimately, the District Court found a redemption value of $119,480.51, not including the cleanup costs. The District Court determined cleanup costs could be included in the redemption price as maintenance expenditures, and therefore Russell’s payment was not sufficient to redeem the property. A more detailed explanation of the underlying facts and history between the parties can be found in Russell III, ¶¶ 1-12. ¶5 Russell appealed, and this Court reversed and remanded back to the District Court. We held maintenance expenditures must be for maintenance of the real property, not maintenance of the redemptioner’s personal property located on the real property. Russell III, ¶ 17. We found 360 Reclaim could not pursue cleanup costs of personal property as part of the redemption price. We remanded for determination of what credits, if any, Russell was entitled to against the redemption price and if Russell’s

Maryland Department of Health v. Jeffrey Boulden, et al., Nos. 534, 581, 582, 641, 643, 996 & 1291, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Graeff, J. CONSTRUCTIVE CIVIL CONTEMPT — STATUTORY SANCTIONS Where the court finds an individual to be incompetent to stand trial (“IST”) and dangerous, the Maryland Department of Health (the “Department”) is required, under Md. Code Ann., Criminal Procedure (“CP”) § 3-106(c)(4) (2024 Supp.), to admit the defendant to a designated health facility within ten business days of the commitment order. If the Department does not admit the defendant to a Department facility within that time period, the defendant can seek to compel compliance by filing an action for constructive civil contempt or an action for statutory sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4). Constructive civil contempt requires a finding, based on evidence, of a willful failure to comply with the court’s commitment order. In the Dorchester County case, the only evidence presented in support of the contempt petition was that the Department had taken action to alleviate the bed shortage in its facilities, but there were still not enough beds to comply with the court’s commitment order. Without evidence that the Department could have done more to comply with the order, the mens rea element of constructive civil contempt, i.e., willfulness, is not satisfied. Because the record does not support the finding that the Department willfully failed to comply with the Dorchester County commitment order, the court’s finding in this regard was clearly erroneous, and it abused its discretion in holding the Department in contempt. In addition to a contempt finding, a court can impose sanctions on the Department pursuant to CP § 3-106. To find a violation of CP § 3-106(c)(2), the court needs to determine only that the Department failed to admit the defendant to a designated health facility within the statutorily required ten-day period. Evidence that the Department could not comply with commitment orders due to the unavailability of beds does not categorically preclude sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4). If the court finds a failure to timely admit a defendant, the statute provides for the imposition of sanctions “reasonably designed to compel compliance.” Although the statute does not define the term “reasonably designed to compel compliance,” the legislative history makes clear that the intent of the General Assembly in enacting CP § 3-106(c)(4) was to impose a deadline for admission, with sanctions to enforce compliance. Given the increasing problem of a failure to timely admit defendants, it was reasonable for the courts to believe that large statutory sanctions would encourage the Department to explore all options to resolve this continued problem. That two of the defendants, Glenn D. Hawkins and Kennard Jacobi Goins, had been admitted to a Department facility prior to the sanctions hearing did not prohibit the court from imposing sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4). The statute does not contain any language stating that reimbursement or other sanctions cannot be imposed once the patient has been admitted to a Department facility. Construing the statute to limit sanctions, including reimbursement to detention centers, when the Department has already admitted a defendant to a facility prior to the sanctions hearing would add words to the statute and frustrate the legislature’s express intent to allow for reimbursement to the detention center for costs incurred in housing defendants that should be in a Department facility. In the Kent County case involving Jeffrey Boulden, and in the Baltimore County cases involving William Damond Lomax, Malik T. Jackson, Mr. Goins, Mr. Hawkins, and Steven R. Kauffman, the court did not abuse its discretion in its decision to impose sanctions. With respect to the amount of sanctions, however, we construe the statute to authorize the calculation of daily sanctions beginning on the 11th business day from the date of the commitment order. In the Baltimore County cases involving Mr. Lomax, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Goins, and Mr. Hawkins, the court did not calculate the daily sanctions beginning on the 11th business day. We reverse those orders and remand for a new calculation regarding the amount of sanctions. Circuit Court for Kent County Case Nos. C-14-CR-21-000044, C-14-CR-23-000050, C-14- CR-23-000146 Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case Nos. C-03-CR-24-000015, C-03-CR-24-000251 C-03-CR-23-002969, C-03-CR-23-003449 C-03-CR-23-003775 Circuit Court for Dorchester County Case No. C-09-CR-23-000286 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND Nos. 534, 581, 582, 641, 643, 996, 1291 September Term, 2

Case: 24-10308 Document: 63-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-10308 FILED June 3, 2025 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Raymond Vuoncino, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Forterra, Incorporated; United States Pipe Fabrication, L.L.C.; Jeffrey Bradley; William Kerfin, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:21-CV-1046 ______________________________ Before Jones and Oldham, Circuit Judges, and Hendrix, District Judge. * Per Curiam: Raymond Vuoncino was a corporate-finance professional who worked for U.S. Pipe Fabrication, LLC. After Fabrication implemented new accounting practices to record inter-company sales, Vuoncino objected to those practices as potentially fraudulent. Vuoncino was soon fired from his _____________________ * United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Case: 24-10308 Document: 63-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 24-10308 position at Fabrication by an executive of Fabrication’s parent company, Forterra, Inc. Vuoncino sued Fabrication, Forterra, and two Forterra executives for violating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s anti-retaliation provision. The district court dismissed Vuoncino’s first amended complaint for failure to state a claim, denied Vuoncino’s motion for leave to amend his complaint, and denied reconsideration of those orders. Vuoncino challenges those decisions on appeal. Because the complaint stated a plausible claim for relief as to the defendant Fabrication, we REVERSE IN PART the order dismissing the first amended complaint and REMAND for further proceedings. We AFFIRM in all other respects. I. A. Because this appeal stems from an order granting motions to dismiss, “we accept all well-pl[ed] facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” See Richardson v. Axion Logistics, LLC, 780 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 146 (5th Cir. 2010)). Vuoncino is a corporate-finance professional who, in 2013, “was retained as a consultant by” U.S. Pipe (USP) “to evaluate USP’s fabrication business.” Later that year, Vuoncino became a “direct employee of USP” and took the title General Manager for USP Fabrication, LLC (Fabrication). Fabrication and another entity, USP Pipe and Foundry Company (Foundry) are subsidiaries of USP Holdings, Inc. (Holdings). In late 2015, Vuoncino was “promoted to Vice President of Corporate Development for USP.” In 2016, Forterra, Inc. acquired Holdings. In the resulting corporate structure, Forterra wholly owned Holdings, which in turn wholly owned Fabrication and Foundry. After the acquisition, William Kerfin—Forterra’s President of Water Pipe & Product, as well as Foundry’s President— 2 Case: 24-10308 Document: 63-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 24-10308 promoted Vuoncino to Vice President of Operations for Fabrication. In that role, Vuoncino reported to the Senior Vice President of Operations for Fabrication. At the time of the acquisition, Forterra was privately held. Following the acquisition, though, Forterra intended to go public, and Forterra’s management wanted to increase earnings. But Fabrication’s earnings disappointed Forterra’s CEO, Jeffrey Bradley, who told Vuoncino that Fabrication was falling short by $25 to $35 million in yearly revenues. Forterra went public in October 2016. In October and November, Vuoncino met with Kerfin and other Fabrication executives to discuss Fabrication’s business plan. Kerfin decided to implement a plan to increase Fabrication’s projected earnings by $12 million, which would be accomplished by altering the mechanics of inte

Case: 24-30761 Document: 49-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-30761 FILED June 3, 2025 Summary Calendar ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Marcus J. Ross, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:24-CR-91-1 ______________________________ Before Jolly, Jones, and Willett, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Marcus J. Ross pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after a felony conviction and was sentenced to 84 months of imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. On appeal, he renews his contention that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, on its face, under the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-30761 Document: 49-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-30761 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Government has moved without opposition for summary affirmance or, alternatively, for an extension of time to file its brief. Ross is correct that his argument is foreclosed. See United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 18, 2025) (No. 24-6625). Because the Government’s position “is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case,” summary affirmance is appropriate. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time is DENIED. 2

Case: 24-50307 Document: 78-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-50307 FILED ____________ June 3, 2025 Lyle W. Cayce United States of America, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Jacob Wayne Peek, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:22-CR-131-1 ______________________________ Before Stewart, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * A jury convicted defendant Jacob Wayne Peek of four counts of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). He was ultimately sentenced to 300 months, and he now challenges only the sentence and not the convictions. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM. Following the verdict, the presentence report (PSR) calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of 151–188 months, which the PSR _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-50307 Document: 78-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-50307 recommended to impose concurrently. The Government argued that the Guidelines range should be 292–365 months, but Peek argued it was 70–87 months. The district court decided to defer to Peek but to impose the sentence consecutively, not concurrently: Mr. Peek, I’m going to give you some benefit of the doubt . . . . [T]he court is going to find that the proper Guideline range, and give you every benefit of the doubt, is 70 to 87 months. Okay. However, the court also finds that you were convicted of four different crimes. The court finds that you are not entitled to the low end of the Guidelines because that’s for people who accept responsibility. So the court is going to sentence you to 75 months on each count, and those will run consecutively for a total of 25 years or 300 months. District courts have “discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 to depart upwardly [from the Guidelines range] by running sentences consecutively, even when U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 would otherwise mandate that the sentences run concurrently.” United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298, 309 n.41 (5th Cir. 2005). Given the Guidelines range adopted by the district court, the parties agree that the 300-month sentence was an upward variance, not within the Guidelines. The district court, however, characterized the sentence as “within the guideline range” on its written statement of reasons. Peek argues that the court did not explain why it imposed an upward variance. A district court procedurally errs when it “fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see United States v. Nguyen, 854 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Perkins, 99 F.4th 804, 817–21 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding that district court “egregious[ly] and clear[ly]” erred where it imposed consecutive sentences and did not provide “an explanation with specific reasons why an upward variance was justified”). 2  Case: 24-50307 Document: 78-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-50307 At the sentencing hearing, Peek failed to object to the upward variance or to the district court’s alleged lack of an explanation. Thus, he concedes that our review is for plain error, and we agree. Under plain error review, “three conditions . . . must be met before a court may consider exercising its discretion to correct the error”: there must be (1) an error that is (2) clear or obvious and that (3) affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Rosales– Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134 (2018). To satisfy the third condition, “the defendant ordinarily must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 134–35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “On

Case: 24-30388 Document: 69-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED June 3, 2025 No. 24-30388 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Jaylon Deshon Brumfield, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:23-CR-187-3 ______________________________ Before Wiener, Douglas, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* Jaylon Deshon Brumfield challenges the district court’s application of a bodily injury sentencing enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We AFFIRM. I Brumfield pleaded guilty to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-30388 Document: 69-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-30388 violence. According to the presentence report (PSR) prepared by the United States Probation Office, on April 22, 2022, Brumfield and two co-defendants drove a stolen truck to Market Max in Kentwood, Louisiana, where they “threatened two victims with fear and violence,” stole their vehicle, and shot at one of them. The defendants robbed two other stores and another victim at gunpoint the following week. The PSR assigned Brumfield a criminal history category of I and a total offense level of 22 for the conspiracy, resulting in a guideline sentencing range of 41 to 51 months. U.S.S.G. Ch.5 Pt.A (Sentencing Table). The offense level included a two-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) because a victim had sustained bodily injuries during the Market Max robbery. The minimum prison term prescribed by statute for the possession-of-a-firearm offense was five years in prison, to run consecutively to any other sentence imposed. See id § 2K2.4(b); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Brumfield objected to the application of the bodily injury adjustment. He argued that he was not present during the Market Max robbery, did not know of the robbery in advance or participate in its planning, and did not receive any proceeds from it. The Government objected because the PSR did not include a two-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for an obstruction of justice. At sentencing, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent testified that during the Market Max robbery, one of the masked defendants approached a store maintenance worker and told him he was being robbed. “They eventually g[ot] into a physical altercation, and Brumfield end[ed] up taking the gun from the [worker].” The worker “took off running” and “Brumfield . . . discharged the firearm towards the [worker].” The agent testified that law enforcement identified Brumfield as the individual who took 2 Case: 24-30388 Document: 69-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-30388 the gun from and shot at the worker based on statements provided by a co-defendant. Brumfield denied that it was him. Based on this testimony, the district court applied an obstruction of justice adjustment, and overruled Brumfield’s objection to the bodily injury adjustment. This increased the total offense level for the conspiracy to 24, resulting in a guideline range of 51 to 63 months. The district court sentenced Brumfield to a within-Guidelines sentence of 60 months, to be followed by three years of supervised release, for the conspiracy, and to a consecutive sentence of 60 months, to be followed by five years of supervised release, for the possession of a firearm. Brumfield appeals. II We review preserved challenges to the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and

Case: 24-40221 Document: 82-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-40221 ____________ FILED June 3, 2025 consolidated with Lyle W. Cayce _____________ Clerk No. 24-40295 _____________ United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Jordan Rashaud Banks, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC Nos. 1:22-CR-115-2, 1:22-CR-115-2 ______________________________ Before Wiener, Douglas, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-40221 Document: 82-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 24-40221 c/w No. 24-40295 Defendant-Appellant Jordan Rashaud Banks pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and was sentenced to 168 months of imprisonment. Before sentencing, the district court issued a preliminary order of forfeiture, and after sentencing it issued a final order of forfeiture which stated that it would be a part of Banks’s judgment and sentence. Banks appeals from his judgment and from the final order of forfeiture. The Government has filed an opposed motion to dismiss for lack of standing. For the reasons explained below, we GRANT the Government’s motion as to the appeal from the final order of forfeiture, and we AFFIRM Banks’s judgment without affecting the district court’s authority to correct any clerical errors therein. I. In November 2022, a grand jury indicted Banks and fifteen co- defendants in a ten-count indictment. Banks was charged only in Count One with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and distribution of cocaine HCL and methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The indictment included a notice of the Government’s intent to seek criminal forfeiture of cash proceeds totaling $4,659,720.00, of which Banks was responsible for $8,975.00. 1 On May 3, 2023, Banks pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to Count One of the indictment. However, on May 18, 2023, the Government filed a motion for preliminary order of forfeiture, stating that “[a]s part of the plea agreement with the United States, [Banks] consented to the forfeiture of $8,975.00 in U.S. Currency and all interest and proceeds traceable thereto.” The next day, the district court entered a preliminary order of _____________________ 1 In April 2023, the Government amended the notice of intent to seek forfeiture, but the amendment made no changes to Banks’s responsibility. 2 Case: 24-40221 Document: 82-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 24-40221 c/w No. 24-40295 forfeiture. The preliminary order repeated the inaccurate statement that Banks agreed to forfeit $8,975.00 pursuant to a plea agreement with the Government. It further provided that it “shall become final as to [Banks] at the time of sentencing and shall be made part of the sentence and included in the judgment, pursuant to [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32.2(b)(4).” At sentencing, there was no mention of forfeiture. Nor was forfeiture included in the written judgment entered shortly thereafter. Banks timely appealed from the judgment. After Banks filed notice of appeal from the judgment, the Government moved the district court for a final order of forfeiture, which the court obliged. The final order of forfeiture ordered Banks to forfeit $8,975.00, along with “all interest and proceeds traceable thereto,” and stated that the order “shall be made part of the sentence and included in the judgment, pursuant to [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32.2(b)(4).”

Case: 24-60413 Document: 43-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 24-60413 June 3, 2025 Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce ____________ Clerk Claudia Evelyn Sosa-Espinal; Dailyn Gabriela Romero- Sosa, Petitioners, versus Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. ______________________________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency Nos. A208 901 655, A208 901 656 ______________________________ Before Barksdale, Stewart, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* Claudia Evelin Sosa-Espinal and Dailyn Gabriela Romero-Sosa, her minor daughter, natives and citizens of Honduras, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of Sosa-Espinal’s application for asylum, which listed Romero-Sosa as _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-60413 Document: 43-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-60413 a derivative beneficiary, and their separate applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). (Romero-Sosa’s separate application was premised on the same facts and evidence introduced in Sosa-Espinal’s case. Accordingly, any subsequent reference to Sosa-Espinal (Sosa) refers to the lead petitioner.) Sosa asserts she has established entitlement to relief from removal based on her former partner’s acts of domestic violence in her native country of Honduras. Our court reviews the BIA’s decision and considers the IJ’s decision only to the extent it influenced the BIA. Agustin-Matias v. Garland, 48 F.4th 600, 601 (5th Cir. 2022). The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence; its legal conclusions, de novo. Id. Findings of fact, including an applicant’s eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT, are reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard. E.g., Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006). Under this standard, our court will not disturb the BIA’s decision unless the evidence “compels” a contrary conclusion. E.g., Revencu v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). To prevail on a claim for asylum or withholding of removal, an alien must establish, inter alia, that she suffered, or will suffer, persecution at the hands of the “government or forces that a government is unable or unwilling to control”. Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910, 914 (5th Cir. 1992). Along that line, an alien seeking withholding of removal must show it is “more likely than not” that officials would be unable or unwilling to protect her from persecution if she is repatriated. Jaco v. Garland, 24 F.4th 395, 401, 406–07 (5th Cir. 2021). Because withholding “is a higher standard than asylum”, one who fails to show eligibility for asylum likewise fails to show eligibility for withholding. Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 2002). 2 Case: 24-60413 Document: 43-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-60413 Where the persecutor is a non-government actor—as is the case here—the applicant must show that the government condoned the persecution or “demonstrate[d] complete helplessness” in combatting it. Sanchez-Amador v. Garland, 30 F.4th 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). An applicant’s failure to report the persecution to authorities is not necessarily dispositive of whether he or she can show a government’s inability or unwillingness to control private behavior, see Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (BIA 2000), but it is a relevant factor in determining whether the applicant has satisfied the requisite burden. E.g., Tesfamichael, 469 F.3d at 113 (outlining burde

Case: 24-60186 Document: 60-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-60186 FILED June 3, 2025 Summary Calendar ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Rodrigo Linares-Rivas, Petitioner, versus Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. ______________________________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A078 605 137 ______________________________ Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and King and Graves, Circuit Judges. Jennifer Walker Elrod, Chief Judge: Rodrigo Linares-Rivas has been ordered removed from the United States to Mexico. He now petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision to uphold the immigration judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Binding precedent requires us to DISMISS the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary denial of Linares-Rivas’s application for  Case: 24-60186 Document: 60-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-60186 cancellation of removal. 1 We DENY the petition in part as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim not initially raised before the BIA. I Linares-Rivas, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1996. In 2016, while in state custody for driving without a license with prior convictions, Linares-Rivas was subjected to removal proceedings. He conceded removability as charged. Linares-Rivas then applied for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1), claiming that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his two sons, who are United States citizens. Linares-Rivas’s application included no supporting documentation and upon objection from the government, the immigration judge requested that evidence be submitted by January 2018. The immigration judge scheduled a hearing for April 2018. Linares-Rivas’s initial counsel submitted supplemental evidence for the claims in March 2018. This evidence was untimely, but the immigration judge still considered it. Thereafter, Linares-Rivas’s initial counsel ceased work on his case. At the April hearing, Linares-Rivas appeared with new counsel who had been hired about ten days earlier. Counsel indicated that he was ready to proceed with the case but sought a continuance to file additional evidence supporting Linares-Rivas’s application, even though the deadline to do so had passed, and faulted previous counsel for missing the filing deadlines and failing to provide evidence. The immigration judge admitted the evidence that had been submitted in March without objection from the government, but he did not grant the continuance. Determining that Linares- _____________________ 1 To the extent that Linares-Rivas raises claims about the agency’s application of the statutory eligibility requirements, those arguments are futile, as explained below. 2 Case: 24-60186 Document: 60-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-60186 Rivas did not satisfy the requirements for making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the immigration judge proceeded with the hearing. Linares-Rivas was the sole witness and testified about the hardship his family would face upon his removal. The immigration judge found Linares- Rivas credible and accepted his characterization of the facts. But the immigration judge denied Linares-Rivas’s application, concluding that “there are negative factors that argue against the favorable exercise of discretion.” Linares-Rivas had two DWI convictions, admitted to frequently driving without a license for many years, and did not provide evidence that he had paid taxes during his lengthy time living in the United States. Linares-Rivas appealed to the BIA, raising a number of issues, including ineffective assistance of counsel and the denied continuance. 2 Before any bri

Case: 24-20260 Document: 67-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 24-20260 June 3, 2025 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Ashley Guillard, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus SHF 1 Metro at Greenway L.L.C.; Simpson Housing L.L.P.; Nationwide Compliant L.L.C.; Judge David Patronella, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:23-CV-2013 ______________________________ Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and King, and Graves, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Ashley Guillard, pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of her action asserting various claims against her landlord, SHF 1 Metro at Greenway LLC, Simpson Housing LLP, Nationwide Compliant LLC, and Justice of the Peace Judge David Patronella stemming from her eviction from an apartment in Houston, Texas. After consideration of the _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-20260 Document: 67-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-20260 briefs, record, and the applicable law in this matter, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED. See 5th Cir. R. 47.6. 2

Case: 24-40662 Document: 47-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-40662 FILED June 3, 2025 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Ricky Allen Frosch, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Colton Alsobrook, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:22-CV-236 ______________________________ Before Stewart, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Plaintiff Ricky Frosch sues Corporal Colton Alsobrook for excessive use of force. The district court denied Alsobrook’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Frosch, Alsobrook slammed Frosch’s head into a wall while Frosch was compliant and restrained. Then, when Frosch later became unconscious, Alsobrook used his body weight to take Frosch to the ground. _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.  Case: 24-40662 Document: 47-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-40662 These uses of force resulted in a head laceration and broken collar bone. Accepting the district court’s conclusions as to the genuineness of the factual disputes, Alsobrook used excessive force, and Alsobrook is not entitled to qualified immunity. We AFFIRM. I. Factual Background Officers were called to Frosch’s home on a domestic disturbance call. The officers handcuffed and arrested Frosch. Frosh did not go quietly—he head butted and kicked the officers during the arrest, and during the ride to the station, he threatened the officers. The officers notified the jail that they were transporting a “combative” inmate. Once they arrived at the jail, the officers gave Alsobrook a rundown of Frosch’s behavior. Alsobrook helped move Frosch from the car to the jail during the booking process. Frosch was fully compliant and restrained during this process. 1 He did not threaten anyone, nor did he resist the officers. When Alsobrook ordered Frosch to face the wall, Frosch did so. Alsobrook then pushed Frosch’s head against the wall, causing a head wound. While pressed against the wall, Alsobrook and other officers raised Frosch’s hands above his head, restricting Frosch’s breathing. Frosch explained, “I couldn’t breathe and I was trying to gasp for air . . . and the lights went out and I was out.” He woke up laying on the ground in the booking area. He later learned that while he was unconscious, Alsobrook _____________________ 1 Alsobrook has a different recollection of the events. However, this is an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment, so the district court was required to resolve all disputed factual questions in Frosch’s favor, Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 2014), and we must accept the district court’s conclusions as to the genuineness of a material factual dispute, Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000). 2 Case: 24-40662 Document: 47-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-40662 used his 300 pounds of body weight to take Frosch to the ground, breaking Frosch’s collarbone. Frosch sued Alsobrook, along with several other defendants, asserting, among other claims, excessive use of force. Alsobrook moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion as to all claims aside from the excessive-use-of-force claim, relying in part on a declaration filed by Frosch. Alsobrook now appeals. II. Jurisdiction We have jurisdiction to review an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity. Davis v. Hodgkiss, 11 F.4th 329, 332 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). This comes with jurisdiction to review the admissib

Case: 24-51017 Document: 28-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-51017 Summary Calendar FILED ____________ June 3, 2025 Lyle W. Cayce Rudy Castaneda, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Planet Fitness, Incorporated; John Hensley, Area Director; Uriel LNU, Unit Manager; John Doe, Clerk, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:24-CV-509 ______________________________ Before Davis, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Plaintiff-Appellant Rudy Castaneda, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued Planet Fitness, Inc. and several of its employees for refusing him access to their gym(s) and for terminating his membership. His suit arises under several civil-rights statutes and seeks damages and unspecified injunctive relief. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.  Case: 24-51017 Document: 28-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-51017 who recommended the case be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The district judge accepted the recommendation and dismissed the case. After careful review of the record, we agree with the district court and AFFIRM its judgment. Castaneda alleges he was denied access to Planet Fitness after he tried to workout in socks and sandals, rather than athletic shoes, to accommodate his diabetic peripheral neuropathy. He concedes he argued with the Planet Fitness clerk who advised him of the athletic-shoe policy, and that he threatened the clerk with a water bottle. In Castaneda’s words, he “motioned his water bottle towards the Clerk and made an empty threat with his bottle . . . as an intimidation.” We address his claims seriatim. First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addresses employment discrimination. Castaneda has not alleged an employment relationship with Planet Fitness or its employees, so he fails to state a viable Title VII claim. Second, the due-process provisions of the Texas and U.S. Constitutions generally govern state actors, not private ones like Planet Fitness and its employees. 1 Castaneda hasn’t alleged any state action or facts suggesting an exception to this general rule. Third, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) require proof of a race-based conspiracy. 2 Castaneda offers no allegation about race, aside from mentioning two disabled “Anglo” gym members. We note the magistrate judge gave Castaneda an opportunity to make a more definite statement on _____________________ 1 See Manhattan Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 808–810 (2019) (discussing state-action doctrine); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. 1997) (holding Texas’s Constitution regulates state conduct). 2 Bryan v. City Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 2000). 2  Case: 24-51017 Document: 28-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-51017 this claim, but he merely reiterated his prior allegations in response. He has not delineated an actionable race-based conspiracy under § 1985(3). Finally, Castaneda’s claim under the ADA’s Title III fails for two reasons. For one, Castaneda’s allegations suggest his membership was terminated because he physically threatened, or was perceived to have threatened, a Planet Fitness clerk, negating any connection between his disability and the revocation of his gym membership. Second, Castaneda initially sought only monetary relief, which is unavailable under Title III of the ADA. 3 When he was permitted to make a more definite statement, Castaneda responded he wanted injunctive relief “so that others do not come across equal distress.” He doesn’t explain what action

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED June 03, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellee, 1:38 PM v No. 370216 St. Joseph Circuit Court MICHAEL ALLEN GRASSNICK, LC No. 21-024078-FH Defendant-Appellant. Before: PATEL, P.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i), carrying a concealed weapon (pistol), MCL 750.227, resisting or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and possession of a firearm when committing a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b(1).1 The trial court sentenced defendant to 2 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the methamphetamine conviction, seven months in jail for the concealed weapon conviction, two months in jail for the resisting-and-obstructing conviction, and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case arises out of a traffic stop of a truck in which defendant was a passenger. Officer Jared Diekman was working road patrol when he saw a pickup truck with an “exhaust pipe that was defective and hanging down, not properly secured to the vehicle.” Diekman ran the truck’s license plate through the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN). LEIN indicated the truck was uninsured, so he conducted a traffic stop. The driver could not provide her driver’s license, and Diekman determined at the scene that her license was suspended. Defendant told 1 The jury acquitted defendant of another carrying a concealed weapon charge (knife), as well as another resisting-and-obstructing charge pertaining to a second officer at the scene. -1- Diekman that he owned the truck but had not gotten the title yet and was still using the previous owner’s registration and plate. Defendant was also unable to provide proof of insurance. At this point, Diekman noticed defendant appeared to be trying to hide a bag from Diekman’s view. Diekman asked defendant to exit the truck because, as an uninsured vehicle, it needed to be impounded. Defendant refused to comply. After a protracted physical altercation, defendant was removed from the truck. Diekman then conducted an inventory search and found methamphetamine, mushrooms, ammunition, a knife, a pistol, two methamphetamine pipes, and mail addressed to defendant. Defendant was arrested and charged as noted. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found from the inventory search, arguing Diekman did not have a valid reason to conduct the traffic stop, and averring that the stop was pretextual. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant was convicted as noted. While this appeal to this Court was pending, defendant moved for a new trial arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to emphasize the statutory language behind the loose tailpipe and failing to argue that the Secretary of State’s provision of the insurance information to law enforcement violated the separation of powers. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. Defendant now appeals. II. UNREASONABLE SEIZURE Defendant first argues that Diekman did not have a valid basis for his traffic stop. We disagree. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress for clear error. People v Mathews, 324 Mich App 416, 424; 922 NW2d 371 (2018). “To the extent that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court’s “ultimate decision on a motion to suppress[]” is also reviewed de novo. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). B. ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” US Const, Am IV; see also Const 1963, art 1, § 11. “Under the Fourth Amendment, stopping a vehicle and detaining the occupants amounts to a seizure.” People v Simmons, 316 Mich App 322, 326; 894 NW2d 86 (2016). “A traffic stop is justified if the officer has an articulable and reasonable

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED June 03, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:42 PM v No. 369221 Kent Circuit Court KENYATTA LAMAR WEAVER, LC No. 20-009016-FH Defendant-Appellant. Before: PATEL, P.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals, by leave granted,1 his convictions and sentences of assault by strangulation, MCL 750.84(1)(b), and aggravated assault, MCL 750.81a(2), as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12. The trial court, after accepting defendant’s nolo contendere plea, sentenced defendant to 108 to 240 months’ imprisonment for his assault-by-strangulation conviction, and 365 days in jail for his aggravated-assault conviction. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case arises out of defendant’s assault and strangulation of his half sister. Defendant initially rejected the prosecution’s plea deal, but later pleaded nolo contendere on the second day of his jury trial in exchange for an agreement that he would not be remanded that day. After the trial court imposed its sentence, defendant moved to withdraw his plea or for resentencing, arguing (1) his plea was not knowing or voluntary because defense counsel failed to adequately advise him of his minimum sentencing guidelines range; (2) the trial court erroneously assessed points for Offense Variables (OV) 10 and 19, and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object; and (3) defendant’s speedy-trial rights were not waived by his nolo contendere plea, and were violated. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, and defendant now appeals. 1 People v Weaver, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 9, 2024 (Docket No. 369221). -1-  II. MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA Defendant first argues his plea was not knowing or voluntary and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the correct sentencing guidelines range. We disagree. A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW After a plea has been accepted by the trial court, there is no absolute right to withdraw. People v Haynes, 221 Mich App 551, 558; 562 NW2d 241 (1997). “When a motion to withdraw a plea is made after sentencing, the decision whether to grant it rests within the discretion of the trial court.” Id. “That decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Pointer-Bey, 321 Mich App 609, 615; 909 NW2d 523 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Generally, whether a defendant had the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law.” People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Questions of fact are reviewed for clear error, while questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous if this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 227-28; 966 NW2d 437 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). B. ANALYSIS “A defendant seeking to withdraw his or her plea after sentencing must demonstrate a defect in the plea-taking process.” People v Brown, 492 Mich 684, 693; 822 NW2d 208 (2012). A trial court cannot accept a nolo contendere plea “unless it is convinced that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate.” MCR 6.302(A). Moreover, before the trial court may accept a defendant’s plea, it must advise the defendant of “the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense and any mandatory minimum sentence required by law,” MCR 6.302(B)(2), as well as the rights and claims that are given up if the plea is accepted, MCR 6.302(B)(3)-(5). Criminal defendants have the right to effective assistance during plea negotiations in order to ensure that they have “the ability to make an intelligent and informed choice from among [their] alternative courses of action.” People v White, 331 Mich App 144, 148; 951 NW2d 106 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, defense counsel should “properly

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS UNPUBLISHED June 03, 2025 2:13 PM In re GRAUMAN/COOK/ARNDT, Minors. No. 372411 Allegan Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 18-060195-NA Before: PATEL, P.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, MG, RC, SA, and LA. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND All four of respondent’s children were taken into protective custody on the basis of allegations that respondent-mother was using methamphetamine, misusing prescription medication, and had locked the children in their bedrooms or forced them to take cold showers while fully clothed as a form of corporal punishment. MG’s biological father took custody of her. RC was placed in a relative placement, and SA and LA were placed together in a separate relative placement. Throughout the two-year proceedings, respondent-mother was mostly uncooperative with drug screenings, inconsistent in her attendance and behavior at supervised parenting times, largely did not follow her case service plan, and did not maintain secure employment, housing, or transportation. The trial court terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights, finding that it was in the children’s best interests to do so. Respondent-mother now appeals. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW We review a trial court’s best-interests determination for clear error. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Miller, 347 Mich App 420, 425; 15 NW3d 287 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -1-  III. BEST INTERESTS Respondent-mother contends that the trial court clearly erred in finding it was in the children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. We disagree. “The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated” if the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) “establishe[s] a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and [the trial court] finds from a preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best interests.” White, 303 Mich App at 713. “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best interests.” Id. This Court focuses on the child—not the parent—when determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). When determining best interests: [A] court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] The trial court also “has a duty to decide the best interests of each child individually.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “[I]f the best interests of the individual children significantly differ, the trial court should address those differences when making its determination of the children’s best interests.” White, 303 Mich App at 715 (emphasis omitted). Throughout the proceedings, respondent-mother struggled to comply with her treatment plan; she participated in about half of her required drug screenings, tested positive for illicit substances on at least seven occasions, failed to maintain adequate housing, and had inconsistent employment. Respondent-mother was also inconsistent with parenting time and struggled to appropriately par

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS FOR PUBLICATION June 03, 2025 10:46 AM In re C. S. ALEXANDER, Minor. Nos. 369324; 369325 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2004-433556-NA Before: MARIANI, P.J., and RIORDAN and FEENEY, JJ. RIORDAN, J. In these consolidated appeals,1 respondents appeal as of right the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to CSA under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) (abandonment). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Petitioners were appointed as the legal guardians of CSA on July 31, 2019.2 In September 2022, petitioners filed a permanent custody petition requesting that the trial court assume jurisdiction over CSA pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(6)(A) (the parent, having the ability to support the child, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide regular and substantial support 1 On January 17, 2024, this Court entered an order consolidating these two appeals. In re C S Alexander, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 17, 2024 (Docket Nos. 369324 & 369325). 2 We note that there are discrepancies in the lower court record as to when petitioners’ guardianship of CSA was originally established, presumably because multiple orders of guardianship were entered due to issues surrounding the identity of CSA’s true father. However, as the referee took judicial notice of the record arising out of the accompanying probate-court proceedings, and she determined that petitioners’ guardianship was first established on July 31, 2019, that is the date we have cited. -1- for the child for two years or more before the filing of the petition), and (B) (the parent, having ability to visit, contact, or communicate with the child, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected, without good cause, to do so for two years or more before the filing of the petition),3 and enter an order terminating the parental rights of respondent-mother and respondent-mother’s husband4 to CSA under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). Petitioners presumably listed respondent-mother’s husband as the minor child’s legal father, as opposed to respondent-father, due to their marital relationship, and because respondent-mother’s husband was listed as the father on CSA’s birth certificate. When petitioners filed the aforementioned petition, it appears that petitioners were unaware that in February 2022, the Wayne Probate Court entered an order revoking the paternity of respondent-mother’s husband regarding four of respondent-mother’s children, including CSA, and vacated all orders of filiation, child support, and other related items, because DNA testing results revealed that respondent-mother’s husband was not the biological father of the four cited children.5 Accordingly, in February 2023, the trial court entered an order dismissing petitioners’ September 2022 permanent custody petition because respondent-mother’s husband was improperly listed as CSA’s father, and “Mother has identified a man as the biological father of [CSA], but no notice has been submitted to him by this court or the Probate Court[,]” referring to respondent-father. The trial court further ordered petitioners to return to the probate court to “seek a new consent order and give notice to biological father of the same.” On April 19, 2023, the probate court entered an order for authority to adopt and granted petitioners the authority to file a petition for the adoption of CSA. On May 15, 2023, petitioners filed a permanent custody petition requesting that the trial court assume jurisdiction over CSA pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(6)(A) and (B),6 and enter an order terminating respondents’ parental rights to CSA under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). The petition detailed that a guardianship order placing CSA in petitioners’ custody was entered on February 2, 2023,7 and the petition further identified respondents as the parents of CSA. On May 18, 2023, the trial court authorized the petition. On 3 The petition erroneously cites MCL 712A.2(b)(5) as the statutory ground for jurisdiction, but the featured language is from MCL 712A.2(b)(6). 4 It is unclear wheth

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS CHAD ATHERTON and THADINE ARONOVICH, UNPUBLISHED also known as BRITT ARONOVICH, also known as June 03, 2025 BRITT THADINE ARONOVICH, 1:47 PM Plaintiffs-Appellants, v No. 368977 Kent Circuit Court JARRED SPER, SARA SPER, SUMMIT COURT LC No. 23-003012-CB HOLDINGS LLC, DREAMERS AND DOERS 3981 LLC, KYLE SISCHO, and DETACH LLC, Defendants-Appellees. Before: PATEL, P.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM. In this property dispute regarding a right of first refusal, plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order denying their motion for reconsideration, in part. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Defendants Jarred and Sara Sper (the Spers) owned a large tract of mostly undeveloped property in Rockford, Michigan. In 2017, plaintiffs bought a home and 10 acres of the property from the Spers. The purchase agreement included an addendum stating: “Buyers to have first right of refusal to purchase any additional land that the seller owns surrounding [plaintiffs’ property].” In the following years, plaintiffs and the Spers became friends and often socialized with each other. The parties sometimes had informal discussions about whether plaintiffs were interested in buying more of the Spers’ land, but plaintiffs believed the Spers’s asking price was too high. In 2022, the Spers executed a quitclaim deed for approximately 50 acres of their property— a portion of which was adjacent to plaintiffs’ property—to defendant Summit Court Holdings, LLC (Summit), for $0. Jarred was the sole voting member involved with Summit, and stated the -1- transfer was for liability purposes.1 The next week, Summit executed a memorandum of a land contract selling the 50-acre parcel to defendant Dreamers and Doers 3981, LLC (Dreamers and Doers), for $419,000—a price that was much lower than the price, per acre, the Spers previously discussed with plaintiffs. Jarred owned Dreamers and Doers in equal part with his brother, Stephen, and friend, defendant Kyle Sischo. The land contract included a lease agreement to allow defendant Detach, LLC (Detach) to operate a campground on the land, which had been a longtime goal of Dreamers and Doers’ members. When plaintiffs learned about the transfer after the fact, they filed suit for breach of contract. Plaintiffs sought specific performance or monetary damages, but emphasized that the most appropriate remedy was specific performance. After a bench trial, the trial court found the transaction did not trigger plaintiffs’ right of first refusal because it was not an “arm’s-length transaction.” The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs now appeal. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW “We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration.” Masrur v Regents of Univ of Mich, 344 Mich App 102, 110; 999 NW2d 55 (2022). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Ickes v Korte, 331 Mich App 436, 440; 951 NW2d 699 (2020). A trial court also “necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 274; 884 NW2d 257 (2016). For cases concerning equitable relief, “an appellate court will set aside a trial court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous, but whether equitable relief is proper under those facts is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo.” McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 460 Mich 191, 197; 747 NW2d 811 (2008). “Questions involving the proper interpretation of a contract or the legal effect of a contractual clause are also reviewed de novo.” Id. III. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred when it determined their right of first refusal was not triggered by Summit’s sale of the 50-acre parcel to Dreamers and Doers. We agree. “A right of first refusal, or preemptive right, is a conditional option to purchase dependent on the landowner’s desire to sell.” Randolph v Reisig, 272 Mich App 331, 336; 727 NW2d 388 (2006). It “empowers its holder with a preferential right to purchase property on the same terms offered by or to a bona fid

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 21-816V LINDA GARCIA, Chief Special Master Corcoran Petitioner, Filed: May 2, 2025 v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent. Michael A. Baseluos, Baseluos Law Firm, PLLC, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner. Meghan Murphy, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1 On January 28, 2021, Linda Garcia filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) after receiving an influenza vaccination on October 26, 2020. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters. On January 28, 2025, a ruling on entitlement was issued, finding Petitioner entitled to compensation for her SIRVA. On April 30, 2025, Respondent filed a proffer on award of compensation (“Proffer”) indicating Petitioner should be awarded $138,615.70, representing $135,000.00 for actual pain and suffering and $3,615.70 for past unreimbursable expenses. Proffer at 1-2. In the Proffer, Respondent represented that 1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018). Petitioner agrees with the proffered award. Id. Based on the record as a whole, I find that Petitioner is entitled to an award as stated in the Proffer. Pursuant to the terms stated in the attached Proffer, I award Petitioner a lump sum payment of $138,615.70, to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement to Petitioner. This amount represents compensation for all damages that would be available under Section 15(a). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this decision.3 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Brian H. Corcoran Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master 3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice renouncing the right to seek review. 2  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS ) LINDA GARCIA, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) No. 21-816V v. ) Chief Special Master Corcoran ) ECF SECRETARY OF HEALTH ) AND HUMAN SERVICES, ) ) Respondent. ) ) RESPONDENT’S PROFFER ON AWARD OF COMPENSATION On January 28, 2021, Linda Garcia (“petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation (“Petition”) under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to - 34 (“Vaccine Act” or “Act”), as amended, alleging that she suffered from a right shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccination she received on October 26, 2020. Petition at 1. On May 12, 2023, respondent filed his Rule 4(c) Report asse

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 21-1896V ANN PETREA CRAWFORD, Chief Special Master Corcoran Petitioner, v. Filed: May 2, 2025 SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent. James H. Cook, Jsc Legal, Cedar Falls, IA, for Petitioner, for Petitioner. Alexis B. Babcock, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. DECISION ON ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1 On September 23, 2021, Ann Petrea Crawford filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq. 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration following an influenza vaccine she received on October 2, 2019. Petition, ECF No. 1. On October 29, 2024, I issued a decision awarding compensation to Petitioner based on the parties’ stipulation. ECF No. 45. 1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other inf ormation, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If , upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material f rom public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section ref erences to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018).  Petitioner has now filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, requesting an award of $12,789.36 (representing $11,692.25 in fees plus $1,097.11 in costs). Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Motion”) filed January 3, 2025. ECF No. 49. Furthermore, counsel for Petitioner represents that Petitioner incurred no personal out-of-pocket expenses. Respondent reacted to the motion on January 6, 2025, indicating that he is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case but deferring resolution of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. Motion at 2-4, ECF No. 50. Petitioner filed no reply thereafter. I have reviewed the billing records submitted with Petitioner’s request. In my experience, the request appears reasonable, and I find no cause to reduce the requested hours or rates. Furthermore, Petitioner has provided supporting documentation for all claimed costs. ECF No. 52-1. Respondent offered no specific objection to the rates or amounts sought. I find the requested costs reasonable and hereby award them in full. The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for successful claimants. Section 15(e). Accordingly, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s Motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner is awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of $12,789.36 (representing $11,692.25 in fees plus $1,097.11 in costs) to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement. In the absence of a timely-filed motion for review (see Appendix B to the Rules of the Court), the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this decision. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Brian H. Corcoran Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master 3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by f iling a joint notice renouncing their right to seek review. 2

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 23-1217V JOCELYN VAZQUEZ, Chief Special Master Corcoran Petitioner, Filed: May 2, 2025 v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent. Jeffrey S. Pop, Jeffrey S. Pop & Associates, Beverly Hills, CA, for Petitioner. Eleanor Hanson, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. DECISION ON ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1 On August 2, 2023, Jocelyn Vazquez filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq. 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration following a hepatitis B vaccine she received on October 12, 2021. Petition, ECF No. 1. On September 26, 2024, I issued a decision awarding compensation to Petitioner based on the parties’ stipulation. ECF No. 24. 1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018).  Petitioner has now filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, requesting an award of $20,542.19 (representing $19,080.50 in fees plus $1,461.69 in costs). Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Motion”) filed January 29, 2025, ECF No. 29. Furthermore, Petitioner filed a signed statement representing that no personal out-of-pocket expenses were incurred. ECF No. 29-4. Respondent reacted to the motion on January 30, 2025, indicating that he is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case but deferring resolution of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. Motion at 2-4, ECF No. 30. Petitioner filed no reply thereafter. I have reviewed the billing records submitted with Petitioner’s request. The rates requested for work performed through the end of 2024 are reasonable and consistent with our prior determinations. Petitioner has requested the same hourly rate of $575.00 for 2025 work performed by attorney Jeffrey Pop and the same hourly rate of $460.00 for 2025 work performed by Alexandra Pop. I find the proposed rates to be reasonable and hereby award them herein. And all time billed to the matter was also reasonably incurred. Furthermore, Petitioner has provided supporting documentation for all claimed costs. ECF No. 29-3 at 2-23. Respondent offered no specific objection to the rates or amounts sought. I find the requested costs reasonable and hereby award them in full. The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for successful claimants. Section 15(e). Accordingly, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s Motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner is awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of $20,542.19 (representing $19,080.50 in fees plus $1,461.69 in costs) to be paid through an ACH deposit to petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement. In the absence of a timely-filed motion for review (see Appendix B to the Rules of the Court), the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this decision. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Brian H. Corcoran Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master 3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice renouncing their right to seek review. 2

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 19-1859V MARIA CRISTINA NARGI, Chief Special Master Corcoran Petitioner, v. Filed: May 2, 2025 SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent. Matthew F. Belanger, Faraci Lange LLP, Rochester, NY, for Petitioner. Lynn C. Schlie, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. DECISION ON ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1 On December 9, 2019, Maria Cristina Nargi filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq. 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration after receiving a vaccination on January 5, 2017. Petition, ECF No. 1. On December 26, 2024, I issued a decision awarding compensation to Petitioner based on the Respondent’s proffer. ECF No. 54. 1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other inf ormation, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If , upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material f rom public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section ref erences to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018).  Petitioner has now filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, requesting an award of $29,373.25 (representing $28,659.00 in fees plus $714.25 in costs). Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Motion”) filed January 28, 2025. ECF No. 61. Furthermore, Petitioner filed a signed statement representing that she incurred no personal out-of- pocket expenses. ECF No. 61-3. Respondent reacted to the motion on January 30, 2025, indicating that he is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case but deferring resolution of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. Motion at 2-4, ECF No. 62. Petitioner filed no reply thereafter. I have reviewed the billing records submitted with Petitioner’s request. In my experience, the request appears reasonable, and I find no cause to reduce the requested hours or rates. Furthermore, Petitioner has provided supporting documentation for all claimed costs. ECF No. 61-4. Respondent offered no specific objection to the rates or amounts sought. I find the requested costs reasonable and hereby award them in full. The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for successful claimants. Section 15(e). Accordingly, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s Motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner is awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of $29,373.25 (representing $28,659.00 in fees plus $714.25 in costs) to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement. In the absence of a timely-filed motion for review (see Appendix B to the Rules of the Court), the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this decision. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Brian H. Corcoran Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master 3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by f iling a joint notice renouncing their right to seek review. 2

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0270n.06 No. 24-1761 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Jun 03, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) RANDY SCOTT RADER, DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) ) Before: GRIFFIN, LARSEN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges. GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. After defendant Randy Rader violated his supervised-release conditions by testing positive for cocaine and failing to reside at a residential reentry center for four months, the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment. Rader now appeals the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the violations and the resulting sentence. We affirm. I. Rader pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine and cocaine base and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. For these crimes, the district court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment followed by eight years of supervised release. Shortly after Rader began supervised release, he admitted to using controlled substances, including cocaine, on two separate occasions, so the district court twice revoked his supervised release, sentenced him to brief periods No. 24-1761, United States v. Rader of incarceration, and ordered him to participate in additional terms of supervised release. After the second revocation and re-imposition of supervised release, the district court imposed a special condition that Rader reside at a residential reentry center (RRC) for four months. When Rader first began living at the RRC, he stayed only a few weeks because he continually tested positive for marijuana, in violation of the RRC’s policies. The district court then issued an order for his re-admission to the RRC, clarifying that the center need not test him for marijuana unless the center deemed it necessary. A few weeks later, Rader arrived at the RRC to serve his four months. However, due to Rader’s “combative” and “disrupt[ive]” behavior, the RRC refused to admit him. According to the center’s staff, Rader arrived with several personal belongings—many of which were likely prohibited—strewn “all over the place” and blocking the check-in area. His belongings impeded staff from breathalyzing and searching incoming residents and thus “pose[d] a security issue.” And when the RRC’s program manager informed Rader that he was subject to the same check-in procedures as other residents, including a urine test for marijuana, he “raised his voice” and claimed to be exempt from marijuana testing. Because the situation got “a little out of control” and caused “commotion with other residents,” RRC staff decided not to admit him that day. Rader thus gathered his belongings and left the facility. Three weeks after the RRC incident, Rader participated in a routine urine analysis as part of his supervised release; his urine preliminarily tested positive for cocaine, among other substances. The probation office then sent the sample to a toxicology laboratory, which confirmed the results of the preliminary testing. Despite these results, Rader denied using cocaine, opining that the positive result “c[a]me from some trace [of] something,” like a joint he had smoked “or a piece of money” he had handled. -2- No. 24-1761, United States v. Rader Based on Rader’s failure to reside at the RRC and use of controlled substances, Rader’s probation officer notified the court of these two potential supervised-release violations. The district court held a three-days-long violation hearing wh

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0271n.06 No. 24-1710 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 03, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) KATHLEEN ANN MATTESON, DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) Before: MOORE, GRIFFIN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges. GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Defendant Kathleen Ann Matteson was a long-time assistant at a wealth-management firm and then at a bank that acquired the firm. She abused her position of trust by diverting client funds for her own benefit for over ten years, which the bank discovered only after she retired. Ultimately, a jury convicted her of five crimes: one count of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1); two counts of embezzlement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656; and two counts of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A). Citing only one case (the Supreme Court’s seminal decision concerning appellate review of jury verdicts for sufficiency of the evidence, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)), Matteson claims the government did not offer sufficient proof to sustain her convictions. In her view, “the evidence presented at trial does not prove her guilt and there is a strong possibility that someone else could have committed these acts and the jury misapplied the evidence by convicting No. 24-1710, United States v. Matteson her of all counts.” She offers no other legal authorities, discusses none of the elements of the charges against her, and details no specific evidence deduced at trial that could undermine the jury’s verdict. Defendants claiming insufficient evidence typically set forth the facts presented at trial and then argue why such facts were insufficient to satisfy the government’s burden of proof for one or more elements of the crimes charged. Matteson makes no attempt to do so. She instead baldly asserts—without evidence—that someone framed her. We deem her skeletal argument abandoned. See, e.g., United States v. Persaud, 866 F.3d 371, 385 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Our case law makes clear that it is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to put flesh on its bones.” (alterations and citation omitted)). And even if it were not abandoned, we see no reason to disturb the jury’s verdict. We normally review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges de novo under Jackson’s “high bar,” see id. at 380, but when a defendant—like Matteson here—fails to move for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29, our review is even more deferential to the jury’s verdict, see United States v. Woods, 14 F.4th 544, 555 (6th Cir. 2021). We apply the “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard and will overturn a conviction only “if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Devoid it was not. Indeed, defendant takes no issue with significant financial crimes being committed. She does not contest that the government established that over $100,000 were diverted from the bank’s trust accounts into another account she managed, which were ultimately used to pay down her credit cards. Rather, she suggests that someone else did it and framed her, but ample evidence presented at trial demonstrated Matteson was the sole actor in this scheme. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment. -2-

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0269n.06 No. 24-5958 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT SARAH CORDLE, by and through her next ) ) friend Dorothy Cordle, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ENOVIS CORPORATION; COLFAX ) KENTUCKY CORPORATION; DJO GLOBAL, INC.; DJO, ) LLC, ) OPINION Defendants-Appellees. ) ) Before: THAPAR, READLER, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Sarah Cordle alleges that she suffered severe injuries when her prescribed knee brace slipped and malfunctioned while she was playing softball. Through her mother, she sued various companies she claims were involved in designing, manufacturing, and distributing this purportedly defective knee brace. The district court concluded that Cordle, even after filing an amended complaint, failed to demonstrate that the court had personal jurisdiction over one of the defendants and failed to plausibly allege that each defendant took part in causing her injury. So it dismissed her case against all defendants. In this appeal, Cordle challenges the personal jurisdiction ruling and argues that the district court should have allowed her to amend her complaint a second time. We affirm. No. 24-5958, Cordle v. Enovis Corp., et al. BACKGROUND In her original complaint, Cordle sued Enovis Corporation and DJO Global, Inc., in Kentucky state court for defective “design, assembly, manner of manufacturing, and distribution” of a knee brace (called the “Donjoy”) that her doctor had prescribed.1 Compl., R. 1-1, PageID 16. She says the defendants represented that the brace could provide support during “normal daily activities including competitive athletic events,” but that the brace allegedly “broke, slipped, bent and mal-functioned” despite her wearing it as intended. Id. at PageID 15–16. The brace’s malfunction caused knee injuries that required multiple surgeries, physical therapy, medication, and follow-up treatment. DJO Global removed the case to federal court. It then moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (b)(6). Before the district court ruled on the motion, Cordle—with a magistrate judge’s permission—amended her complaint. The amended complaint differed from the original in a few ways; mainly, it added DJO, LLC as a defendant (not to be confused with existing defendant DJO Global), described how Cordle’s doctor had prescribed this particular brace, and stated that the defendants’ representations induced her to take part in physical activities she otherwise would have avoided. DJO Global moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the same grounds as before. The district court concluded that it had personal jurisdiction over DJO Global. But, after examining Kentucky precedent interpreting the state’s product liability statute, the district court determined that Cordle had not stated a claim under the statute because she had not plausibly alleged “how the 1 Cordle also sued Colfax Corporation. But because the parties agree that Colfax Corporation changed its name to Enovis Corporation, and the two are in fact the same entity, we refer only to Enovis in this opinion. -2- No. 24-5958, Cordle v. Enovis Corp., et al. brace was defective.” Order, R. 27, PageID 289–90. It emphasized that Cordle had been made aware of the “potential for dismissal on this basis” through DJO Global’s first motion, but that she failed to address it when amending her complaint. Id. At the same time the district court dismissed the claims against DJO Global, it ordered Cordle to serve the amended complaint on Enovis and DJO, LLC, the two remaining defendants, who apparently had not yet been served. Both Enovis and DJO, LLC subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint for insufficient service of process, failure to comply with the service order, and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Enovis also moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted their motions to dismiss. Unlike with DJO Global, the district court concluded that i

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 25a0146p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ JAIME B. NORRIS, │ Plaintiff-Appellant, │ > No. 24-3930 │ v. │ │ COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, │ Defendant-Appellee. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. No. 1:23-cv-01540—David A. Ruiz, District Judge. Decided and Filed: June 3, 2025 Before: COLE, READLER, and RITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Eric S. McDaniel, Matthew J. Kasper, MALYUK MCDANIEL KASPER LLC, Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, for Appellant. Brian C. Baak, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. _________________ OPINION _________________ COLE, Circuit Judge. An administrative law judge denied Jaime Norris’s application for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income after finding that Norris could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The district court agreed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the decision. We affirm.  No. 24-3930 Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 2 I. In October 2020, Norris, who was thirty-nine years old, applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income. Norris asserted that he was disabled and limited in his ability to work because he suffers from several mental and physical disorders, including anxiety, depression, hereditary hemorrhagic telangiectasia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, post- traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, irritable bowel syndrome, migraines, and agoraphobia. The Social Security Administration denied Norris’s claim, prompting him to seek a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). During the hearing, Norris and a vocational expert testified. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision, concluding that Norris was not disabled under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Considering the expert’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Norris could successfully adjust to other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Norris appealed the denial to the Appeals Council, which denied his request for review, finalizing the ALJ’s decision. Norris then filed this civil action, seeking judicial review of the decision. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Norris timely appealed. II. We review whether the ALJ “applied the correct legal standards and whether the[ir] findings . . . are supported by substantial evidence.” Hargett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 964 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A finding is supported by substantial evidence if there is “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (cleaned up). We do not resolve conflicting testimony or evaluate credibility. Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001). We affirm an ALJ’s decision if their findings are “reasonably drawn from the record  No. 24-3930 Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 3 or supported by substantial evidence, even if that evidence could support a contrary decision.” Elam ex rel. Golay v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003). III. To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must be disabled under the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). An ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof during the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Com

06/03/2025 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE March 19, 2025 Session METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY ET AL. v. BILL LEE ET AL. Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 23-0336-I, 23-0395-III Patricia Head Moskal, Chancellor ___________________________________ No. M2024-01182-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ KENNY ARMSTRONG, dissenting in part. I write separately to address what I consider to be an erroneous reading of Article VII, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution (the “Article”), which provides, in relevant part: The legislative body shall not exceed twenty-five members . . . Any county organized under the consolidated government provision of Article XI, Section 9, of this Constitution shall be exempt from having a county or legislative body as described in this paragraph. (Emphases added). It is undisputed that Metro qualifies for the exemption contained in the Article. The obvious reason for exempting a consolidated government from the restriction on the size of its membership is to accommodate the far larger population of a consolidated government as compared to a single county or municipality. In reaching its conclusion that the General Assembly may limit Metro’s legislative body to 20 members, the majority, like the dissent in the trial court, incorrectly interprets the Article’s use of “exempt” to mean “does not apply” or “inapplicable” In construing a constitutional provision, “we begin by reading the plain language and giving terms ‘their ordinary and inherent meaning.’” McNabb v. Harrison, -- S.W.3d --, No. E2022-01577- SC-R11-CV, 2025 WL 730065, at *3 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2025) (quoting State v. Phillips, 159 Tenn. 546, 21 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tenn. 1929)). Therefore, we “construe a constitutional provision as it is written” and “[w]hen a constitutional provision has a clear meaning[,]” we do not apply another meaning or create an ambiguity. Id. (citations omitted). Here, the majority’s interpretation of the Article clearly indicates that it erroneously reads “exempt” as “inapplicable.” Respectfully, “inapplicable” and “exempt” do not denote the same thing. “Exempt” means “free or released from some liability or requirement to which others are subject,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2025) (www.merriamwebster.com (derived from Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 11th ed.)). “Inapplicable” means “not applicable [or] irrelevant.” Id. The “liability or requirement” at issue here is the cap on the number of members a legislative body may have. The restriction states that the membership will “not exceed twenty-five members.” In other words, the restriction contemplates that the legislative body may have any membership number from 0 to 25 but may not exceed 25. The Article specifically exempts a consolidated government, i.e., Metro, from this restriction. In this respect, the exemption works a benefit to Metro, i.e., Metro is relieved from limiting its legislative body to 25 members or less. Although the plain language of the Article relieves, i.e., exempts, Metro from the membership limit of 25 or less, the majority concludes that “Nothing in th[e] language [of the Article] [] indicates that other restrictions that derive outside of ‘this paragraph’ are prohibited. Nor does the plain language of this paragraph in any way circumscribe the power of the General Assembly to legislate the membership of metropolitan councils.” Respectfully, the plain language of the Article does limit the General Assembly’s power to hold Metro to 25 or fewer members because Metro is exempt from that restriction. The majority’s reading that there is nothing in the Article to curtail the General Assembly’s power to limit Metro to 20 members is a correct reading only with the substitute of “inapplicable” for “exempt.” If, as the majority clearly concludes, the Article is “inapplicable” to Metro, then I would agree that the General Assembly has the power to set Metro’s membership at any number it might choose (i.e., as the majority states, there would be “nothing in the language of the constitution to prevent the Tennessee General Assembly from imposing its own limit on the voting membership of a metropolitan council.”). However, the Article does not state that the restriction is inapplicable to Metro; it states that Metro is exempt from the restriction. Although the majority acknowledges the use of the term “exempt,” it does not give effect to the meaning of that word. Exempt means that Metro is “free from [this] requirement” to limit its membership to 25 or less So, while the Article contains no language to enjoin the General Assembly from limiting Metro’s legislative body to any number over 25, the Article clearl

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1614 Doc: 52 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 1 of 17 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-1571 GARTEN TRUCKING LC, Petitioner, and ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN PULP AND PAPER WORKERS, Intervenor, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. No. 24-1614 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN PULP AND PAPER WORKERS, Intervenor, v. GARTEN TRUCKING LC, Respondent. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1614 Doc: 52 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 2 of 17 On Petition for Review of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board. (10−CA−304929) Argued: March 20, 2025 Decided: June 2, 2025 Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges. Petition denied, and cross-petition for enforcement granted, by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion in which Judge Gregory and Judge Quattlebaum joined. ARGUED: King Fitchett Tower, WOODS ROGERS VANDEVENTER BLACK PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent. Gregory P. Lauro, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. ON BRIEF: Agnis C. Chakravorty, WOODS ROGERS VANDEVENTER BLACK PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent. Jennifer A. Abruzzo, General Counsel, Jessica Rutter, Deputy General Counsel, Peter Sung Ohr, Associate General Counsel, Ruth E. Burdick, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Kira Dellinger Vol, Supervisory Attorney, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. David A. Rosenfeld, WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD, Emeryville, California, for Intervenor. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1614 Doc: 52 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 3 of 17 WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: The petitioner challenges a decision made by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) that his rough response to a union flyer constituted an unfair labor practice. The NLRB found that because the petitioner’s message purported to tie wage increases to employees’ union activities, it was a coercive threat of reprisal. As such, the speech violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and was not protected under either the Act or the First Amendment. Because we find that the NLRB had substantial evidence to reach this conclusion with respect to one sentence of the petitioner’s post which recast his communication in a coercive light, we now uphold the Board’s decision. In doing so, however, we distinguish between this one coercive sentence and the remainder of the petitioner’s message. Indeed, we emphasize that employers are constitutionally and statutorily entitled to give their noncoercive opinion on union activities, especially in the midst of organizing campaigns, and that such unfettered exchange advances the democratic values of our nation’s labor systems. I. A. Petitioner Robert “Dizzy” Garten (“Garten”) owns and operates Garten Trucking LC (“Garten Trucking”), a company in Covington, Virginia specializing in the transportation of paper products and other such goods. In early June 2021, two Garten Trucking employees coordinated with Intervenor Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers (“Union” or “AWPPW”) to begin an organizing campaign to unionize 3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1614 Doc: 52 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 4 of 17 approximately 109 workers at Garten Trucking’s facilities. A union representation election was held between August 4-6, 2021, and AWPPW lost the election by a vote of 65-30. See J.A. 107; Garten Trucking, LLC, Nos. 10-CA-279843 et al., 2023 WL 2070300, slip op. at 1 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges). However, rather than spelling the end of the Union’s efforts, the election loss led to a series of bitter and lengthy disputes over Garten Trucking’s labor practices. This case thus comes before us amidst a continued organizing push, with both sides deeply entrenched in their positions and desirous of securing the favor of employees. Indeed, after its

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1086 Doc: 30 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 1 of 7 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-1086 MD SHIFUL ISLAM, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Defendant – Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (2:23-cv-06423-RMG) Submitted: February 12, 2025 Decided: June 2, 2025 Before KING, GREGORY, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Heytens joined. ON BRIEF: Brad Banias, BANIAS LAW, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, William C. Peachey, Director, Glenn M. Girdharry, Assistant Director, Alessandra Faso, Senior Litigation Counsel, Aaron S. Goldsmith, Senior Litigation Counsel, District Court Section, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1086 Doc: 30 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 2 of 7 GREGORY, Circuit Judge: In this case, a Bangladeshi citizen challenges the United States Citizenship & Immigration Services’ (“USCIS”) decision to revoke his approved visa petition without providing him notice. Because this is a procedural due process claim, it falls within the scope of the jurisdiction-stripping provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). We therefore lack subject matter jurisdiction to review Appellant’s claims and affirm the district court’s denial of Appellant’s request for injunctive relief. I. Plaintiff MD Shiful Islam (“MD”) is a Bangladeshi citizen who was lawfully admitted to the United States as a student in 2013. J.A. 6. In August 2020, his employer Island Subway filed a Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, which USCIS approved. J.A. 6–7. In October 2020, MD filed a Form I-485 application for adjustment of status. J.A. 7, 22. On August 28, 2023, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke (“NOIR”) to Island Subway with respect to the Form I-140 petition it had previously approved. J.A. 7–9. The NOIR explained that approval had been in error because Island Subway submitted the Form I-140 application after the underlying labor certification had expired. J.A. 8. USCIS did not issue MD a copy of the NOIR. J.A. 8, 23. Island Subway timely responded, but USCIS revoked the petition on October 4, 2023. J.A. 9, 14–17. 1 USCIS did not send MD a copy 1 Island Subway filed an administrative appeal, which was pending at the time of briefing. Resp. Br. at 14, 18. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1086 Doc: 30 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 3 of 7 of the revocation notice, and Island Subway did not give MD a copy of the notice in time for MD to appeal the revocation. J.A. 8–9, 24. Then on October 27, 2023, USCIS denied MD’s Form I-485 application on the grounds that it could not approve an application in the absence of an approved visa petition. J.A. 15, 18–21. MD filed suit against USCIS in December 2023 under the Administrative Procedure Act. J.A. 4. His first claim alleged that USCIS’s revocation decision violated its own regulations and MD’s procedural due process rights by not providing him with a copy of the NOIR. J.A. 9–11. He next alleged that USCIS’s denial of his Form I-485 application was unlawful, as it was based on the allegedly unlawful revocation of the underlying I-140 petition. J.A. 11–12. Finally, he alleged that USCIS violated his procedural due process rights by revoking his immigrant visa without providing him a copy of the various notices and giving him an opportunity to respond. J.A. 12–13. MD filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the legal effects of the revocation on the basis of his “first and/or third claim.” J.A. 28. USCIS contended that MD’s claims were barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). See J.A. 30–31. The district court found that it

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1571 Doc: 62 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 1 of 17 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-1571 GARTEN TRUCKING LC, Petitioner, and ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN PULP AND PAPER WORKERS, Intervenor, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. No. 24-1614 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN PULP AND PAPER WORKERS, Intervenor, v. GARTEN TRUCKING LC, Respondent. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1571 Doc: 62 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 2 of 17 On Petition for Review of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board. (10−CA−304929) Argued: March 20, 2025 Decided: June 2, 2025 Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges. Petition denied, and cross-petition for enforcement granted, by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion in which Judge Gregory and Judge Quattlebaum joined. ARGUED: King Fitchett Tower, WOODS ROGERS VANDEVENTER BLACK PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent. Gregory P. Lauro, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. ON BRIEF: Agnis C. Chakravorty, WOODS ROGERS VANDEVENTER BLACK PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent. Jennifer A. Abruzzo, General Counsel, Jessica Rutter, Deputy General Counsel, Peter Sung Ohr, Associate General Counsel, Ruth E. Burdick, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Kira Dellinger Vol, Supervisory Attorney, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. David A. Rosenfeld, WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD, Emeryville, California, for Intervenor. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1571 Doc: 62 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 3 of 17 WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: The petitioner challenges a decision made by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) that his rough response to a union flyer constituted an unfair labor practice. The NLRB found that because the petitioner’s message purported to tie wage increases to employees’ union activities, it was a coercive threat of reprisal. As such, the speech violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and was not protected under either the Act or the First Amendment. Because we find that the NLRB had substantial evidence to reach this conclusion with respect to one sentence of the petitioner’s post which recast his communication in a coercive light, we now uphold the Board’s decision. In doing so, however, we distinguish between this one coercive sentence and the remainder of the petitioner’s message. Indeed, we emphasize that employers are constitutionally and statutorily entitled to give their noncoercive opinion on union activities, especially in the midst of organizing campaigns, and that such unfettered exchange advances the democratic values of our nation’s labor systems. I. A. Petitioner Robert “Dizzy” Garten (“Garten”) owns and operates Garten Trucking LC (“Garten Trucking”), a company in Covington, Virginia specializing in the transportation of paper products and other such goods. In early June 2021, two Garten Trucking employees coordinated with Intervenor Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers (“Union” or “AWPPW”) to begin an organizing campaign to unionize 3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1571 Doc: 62 Filed: 06/02/2025 Pg: 4 of 17 approximately 109 workers at Garten Trucking’s facilities. A union representation election was held between August 4-6, 2021, and AWPPW lost the election by a vote of 65-30. See J.A. 107; Garten Trucking, LLC, Nos. 10-CA-279843 et al., 2023 WL 2070300, slip op. at 1 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges). However, rather than spelling the end of the Union’s efforts, the election loss led to a series of bitter and lengthy disputes over Garten Trucking’s labor practices. This case thus comes before us amidst a continued organizing push, with both sides deeply entrenched in their positions and desirous of securing the favor of employees. Indeed, after its