Securities and Exchange Commission v. Harbor City Capital Corp.

No. 517 June 4, 2025 175 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Kevin J. LEE, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SERVICES, Respondent. Department of Consumer and Business Services INS190008; A182238 Argued and submitted April 1, 2025. Kevin J. Lee argued the cause and filed the briefs pro se. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Hellman, Judge. HELLMAN, J. Affirmed. 176 Lee v. DCBS HELLMAN, J. Petitioner, appearing pro se, seeks judicial review of a final order of the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) that revoked his insurance licenses and assessed civil penalties. On judicial review, petitioner argues that the final order is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm. “We review an agency’s order in a contested case for errors of law, ORS 183.482(8)(a), substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c), and substantial reason.” Dorn v. Teacher Standards and Practices Comm., 316 Or App 241, 243, 504 P3d 44 (2021). “Substantial evidence exists to support a find- ing of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482. “Substantial reason exists where the agency has articulated a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclu- sion that the agency draws from them.” Dorn, 316 Or App at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Our review is restricted to the record.” Id. (citing ORS 183.482(7)); see also ORS 183.417(9) (defining “[t]he record in a contested case”). A detailed recitation of the facts would not benefit the bench, the bar, or the public. Petitioner held securities sales, insurance provider, and insurance consultant licenses in Oregon for several years. In 2017, the Federal Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) contacted petitioner to determine if he had violated any federal securities laws when he provided investment advice to his former neigh- bors. In 2018, petitioner filed a resident insurance license renewal application with the state and represented that he had not “been named or involved as a party in an adminis- trative proceeding, including FINRA sanction.” DCBS sub- sequently alleged that petitioner “act[ed] as a state invest- ment adviser in Oregon without a state investment license,” provided “misleading information” on his insurance license applications by not disclosing the FINRA investigation, and that he engaged in “fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest prac- tices.” At the contested hearing, the daughter of petitioner’s former neighbors, petitioner, and a DCBS financial enforce- ment officer testified, and the administrative law judge (ALJ) received into evidence numerous exhibits offered by Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 175 (2025) 177 each party. The ALJ ruled in favor of DCBS and issued a proposed order. DCBS adopted the ALJ’s proposed order as the final order. We have reviewed each of petitioner’s 18 separate arguments concerning the final order and conclude that petitioner presents no basis to reverse. Many of petitioner’s arguments dispute DCBS’s interpretation of the facts, but we do not reweigh evidence on appeal. See Gaylord v. DMV, 283 Or App 811, 822, 391 P3d 900 (2017) (“When in a review role, a court does not review for the better evidence.”). Many of petitioner’s arguments also depend on his testimony— which DCBS found not credible—and we do not revisit cred- ibility on appeal. See id. (“A substantial evidence review does not entail or permit the reviewing tribunal to reweigh or to assess the credibility of the evidence that was presented to the fact-finding body.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) And petitioner’s arguments do not establish that DCBS committed any legal error in its analysis. In sum, substan- tial evidence supports DBCS’s findings of fact, and the order provides substantial reason for its conclusions. Petitioner has not demonstrated any legal error on DCBS’s part. Affirmed.

No. 705 August 6, 2025 391 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of the Full-On Premises Sales License Held By CENTRAL PASTIME, LLC, dba Central Pastime, Petitioner, v. OREGON LIQUOR and CANNABIS COMMISSION, Respondent. Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission OLCCV024; A180094 Argued and submitted May 29, 2024. Joseph O. Huddleston argued the cause for petitioner. Also on the briefs were Kevin L. Mannix and Kevin L. Mannix, P.C. Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Pagán, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge.* SHORR, P. J. Affirmed. ______________ * O’Connor, J., vice Mooney, S. J. 392 Central Pastime, LLC v. OLCC SHORR, P. J. Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final order in a contested case in which the Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission (OLCC) found that petitioner had committed two violations of OLCC rules regarding masking precautions during the COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore suspended petitioner’s OLCC liquor license for 72 days. Petitioner chal- lenges the validity of the rules, advancing numerous argu- ments regarding agency rulemaking and the validity of pandemic guidance in light of executive powers. We affirm. Following a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), petitioner was found to have violated two OLCC rules: OAR 845-006-0345(15) (Dec 18, 2020), which prohib- ited a licensee from engaging in any activity that violated an order issued by the Governor, and OAR 845-006-0345(17)(a) (July 31, 2020), which prohibited a licensee from engaging in activity that violated the Oregon Health Authority’s (OHA) July 24, 2020, guidance on masking in public places.1 The violations occurred on December 2, 2020, when petitioner was found to have failed to require employees and custom- ers to wear masks or other face coverings as directed in the OHA July 24 guidance, and on March 27, 2021, when it again failed to require employees and patrons to wear masks at all times when not eating or drinking, contrary to the Governor’s Executive Order (EO) 20-66.2 Petitioner does not dispute any of the factual allegations made by OLCC, and instead limits its arguments to the validity and enforceability of the rules. Following the completion of briefing in this matter, we issued an opinion in Along Came Trudy LLC v. OLCC, 330 Or App 295, 543 P3d 751, rev den, 372 Or 588 (2024). In that case, we ruled on identical arguments to those raised 1 All subsequent references to the two subsections will be to the versions in effect at the time of the respective violations. 2 Because the ALJ found that petitioner had violated OAR 845-006-0345(15) on March 27, 2021, the ALJ dismissed an alternative allegation that petition- er’s March 27, 2021, actions violated OAR 845-006-0345(16) by violating a public health law. In its fourth assignment of error, petitioner asserts that, if the case is remanded, it should not be remanded for reconsideration of the dismissed alter- native allegation. Petitioner’s argument is not directed at any legal, procedural, factual, or other ruling, as required by ORAP 5.45. It is therefore not a proper assignment of error and we do not reach it. In any event, we affirm the ALJ’s final order and conclude that no remand proceedings are warranted. Cite as 342 Or App 391 (2025) 393 in petitioner’s first two assignments of error, regarding the enforceability of OAR 845-006-0345(15). We rejected the argument that OLCC could not establish a violation of the rule because the applicable Oregon Health Authority guid- ance was invalid. Id. Petitioner conceded at oral argument before us in this matter that its first two assignments of error were controlled by Along Came Trudy LLC. We agree, accept that concession, and therefore reject petitioner’s first two assignments of error. We write only to address the third assignment. In its third assignment of error, petitioner argues that OAR 845-006-0345(17)(a) could not be the basis for a violation because the OHA mask guidance referenced therein was not properly incorporated into that OAR and was not otherwise promulgated by OLCC as a rule, and had been replaced by updated guidance multiple times by the time of the alleged violation. We understand petitioner’s arguments to raise a challenge to the validity and enforceability of OAR 845- 006-0345(17). See ORS 183.482(1) (“Jurisdiction for judicial review of contested cases is conferred upon the Court of Appeals.”); ORS

NUMBER 13-25-00119-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN RE TRISURA INSURANCE COMPANY ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron1 By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Trisura Insurance Company (Trisura) asserts that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by denying its motion to compel appraisal 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); id. R. 47.4 (explaining the differences between opinions and memorandum opinions). 2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number C-2095-24-C in the 139th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable J. R. “Bobby” Flores. See id. R. 52.2. of a property damage claim filed by the real party in interest, Angelita Cavazos. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. I. BACKGROUND On May 6, 2024, Trisura filed an original petition and claim for declaratory judgment against Cavazos. Trisura alleged that it insured Cavazos’s property, which reportedly sustained damage due to inclement weather on April 28, 2023. Cavazos submitted a claim regarding the alleged damage, and after investigation, Trisura determined that there was partial coverage for Cavazos’s damages under her insurance policy. Cavazos retained counsel and sent presuit notice and a demand letter to Trisura’s adjusters alleging that her claim was improperly adjusted and Trisura’s adjusters committed misconduct in handling her claim. Thereafter, Trisura, by and through its third- party claims administrator, Wellington Claim Service, LLC (Wellington), invoked Trisura’s right to appraisal under the insurance policy. In its original petition, Trisura thus sought, in relevant part, a declaratory judgment that Cavazos was required to submit her claims to appraisal pursuant to her insurance policy. On May 30, 2024, Cavazos filed an original answer including affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for declaratory relief. Thereafter, on December 3, 2024, Trisura filed a separate motion to compel appraisal. The insurance policy at issue provides in relevant part that: 8. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the actual cash value, amount of loss, or cost of repair or replacement, either can make a written demand for appraisal. Each will then select a competent, independent appraiser and notify the other of the appraiser’s identity within 20 days of receipt of the written demand. The two appraisers will choose an umpire. If they cannot agree upon an umpire within 15 days, you 2  or we may request that the choice be made by a judge of a district court of a judicial district where the loss occurred. The two appraisers will then set the amount of loss, stating separately the actual cash value and loss to each item. If the appraisers fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the umpire. An itemized decision agreed to by any two of these three and filed with us will set the amount of the loss. Such award shall be binding on you and us. Each party will pay its own appraiser and bear the other expenses of the appraisal and umpire equally. .... 12. Suit Against Us. No suit or action can be brought unless the policy provisions have been complied with. Action brought against us must be started within two years and one day after the cause of action accrues. The “Special Provisions Endorsement” of Cavazos’s insurance policy modifies these provisions, in part, but does not affect our analysis of the issue presented in this original proceeding. On January 3, 2025, Cavazos filed a first amended answer, again including a plea in abatement, affirmative defenses, and a counterclaim for declaratory relief. On January 6, 2025, Cavazos also filed a response in opposition to Trisura’s motion to compel appraisal. On January 13, 2025, the trial court denied Trisura’s motion to compel appraisal. This original proceeding ensued. By

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. Case No: 6:21-cv-694-CEM-DCI HARBOR CITY CAPITAL CORP., HARBOR CITY VENTURES, LLC, HCCF-1 LLC, HCCF-2 LLC, HCCF-3 LLC, HCCF-4 LLC, HCCF-5 LLC, HARBOR CITY DIGITAL VENTURES, INC., HCC MEDIA FUNDING, LLC, JONATHAN P. MARONEY, CELTIC ENTERPRISES, LLC and TONYA L. MARONEY, Defendants. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This cause comes before the Court for consideration without oral argument on the following motion: MOTION: Receiver’s Unopposed Twelfth Quarterly Fee Application for Order Awarding Fees and Reimbursement of Costs to Receiver and Her Professionals (Doc. 200) FILED: May 14, 2025 THEREON it is RECOMMENDED that the motion be GRANTED. I. Background Katherine Donlon, Esq. (the Receiver) has been appointed as receiver in this matter. Doc. 68. The scope of her powers was laid out by separate order. Doc. 72-1; accord Doc. 75. That order stated that Receiver was “given authority to retain Nicole D. Newlon of Johnson, Cassidy, Newlon & DeCort, as counsel.” Doc. 72-1 ¶ 2; accord Doc. 75. That order also provided that: 54. Subject to Paragraph 55 immediately below, the Receiver is authorized to solicit persons and entities (“Retained Personnel”) to assist Receiver in carrying out the duties and responsibilities described in this Order. Except for counsel retained by the Receiver pursuant to Paragraph 2 of this Order, the Receiver shall not engage any Retained Personnel without first obtaining an Order of the Court authorizing such engagement. 55. The Receiver and Retained Personnel are entitled to reasonable compensation and expense reimbursement from the Receivership Estates as described in the “Billing Instructions for Receivers in Civil Actions Commenced by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission” (the “Billing Instructions”) agreed to by the Receiver. Such compensation shall require the prior approval of the Court. Doc. 72-1 ¶¶ 54, 55; accord Doc. 75. To receive these fees, the order provided that: 56. Within forty-five (45) days after the end of each calendar quarter, the Receiver and Retained Personnel shall apply to the Court for compensation and expense reimbursement from the Receivership Estates (the “Quarterly Fee Applications”). At least thirty (30) days prior to filing each Quarterly Fee Application with the Court, the Receiver will serve upon counsel for the Commission a complete copy of the proposed Application, together with all exhibits and relevant billing information in a format to be provided by Commission staff. Doc. 72-1 ¶ 56; accord Doc. 75. Accordingly, Receiver filed her Twelfth Quarterly Fee Application, which is unopposed.1 Doc. 200 (the Motion). II. Standard Courts are required to utilize the lodestar approach to determine reasonable compensation. SEC v. Aquacell Batteries, Inc., No. 6:07-cv-608-Orl-22DAB, 2008 WL 276026, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2008). The lodestar figure is reached by “multiply[ing] the number of hours reasonably 1 The undersigned notes that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s lack of objection is a factor in the analysis. See S.E.C. v. Kirkland, 2011 WL 5985025, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2011) (“[T]he Court will consider the SEC's lack of objection as simply one factor in the analysis.”). expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson v. Grupo Indus. Hotelero, S.A., No. 07-22046, 2010 WL 750301, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2010). The party moving for fees has the burden of establis