Legal Case

Central Pastime, LLC v. OLCC

OLCC

Citation

342 Or. App. 391

Court

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided

August 6, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Importance

45%

Significant

Practice Areas

Administrative Law
Public Health Law
Licensing
Regulatory Compliance

Case Summary

No. 705 August 6, 2025 391 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of the Full-On Premises Sales License Held By CENTRAL PASTIME, LLC, dba Central Pastime, Petitioner, v. OREGON LIQUOR and CANNABIS COMMISSION, Respondent. Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission OLCCV024; A180094 Argued and submitted May 29, 2024. Joseph O. Huddleston argued the cause for petitioner. Also on the briefs were Kevin L. Mannix and Kevin L. Mannix, P.C. Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Pagán, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge.* SHORR, P. J. Affirmed. ______________ * O’Connor, J., vice Mooney, S. J. 392 Central Pastime, LLC v. OLCC SHORR, P. J. Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final order in a contested case in which the Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission (OLCC) found that petitioner had committed two violations of OLCC rules regarding masking precautions during the COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore suspended petitioner’s OLCC liquor license for 72 days. Petitioner chal- lenges the validity of the rules, advancing numerous argu- ments regarding agency rulemaking and the validity of pandemic guidance in light of executive powers. We affirm. Following a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), petitioner was found to have violated two OLCC rules: OAR 845-006-0345(15) (Dec 18, 2020), which prohib- ited a licensee from engaging in any activity that violated an order issued by the Governor, and OAR 845-006-0345(17)(a) (July 31, 2020), which prohibited a licensee from engaging in activity that violated the Oregon Health Authority’s (OHA) July 24, 2020, guidance on masking in public places.1 The violations occurred on December 2, 2020, when petitioner was found to have failed to require employees and custom- ers to wear masks or other face coverings as directed in the OHA July 24 guidance, and on March 27, 2021, when it again failed to require employees and patrons to wear masks at all times when not eating or drinking, contrary to the Governor’s Executive Order (EO) 20-66.2 Petitioner does not dispute any of the factual allegations made by OLCC, and instead limits its arguments to the validity and enforceability of the rules. Following the completion of briefing in this matter, we issued an opinion in Along Came Trudy LLC v. OLCC, 330 Or App 295, 543 P3d 751, rev den, 372 Or 588 (2024). In that case, we ruled on identical arguments to those raised 1 All subsequent references to the two subsections will be to the versions in effect at the time of the respective violations. 2 Because the ALJ found that petitioner had violated OAR 845-006-0345(15) on March 27, 2021, the ALJ dismissed an alternative allegation that petition- er’s March 27, 2021, actions violated OAR 845-006-0345(16) by violating a public health law. In its fourth assignment of error, petitioner asserts that, if the case is remanded, it should not be remanded for reconsideration of the dismissed alter- native allegation. Petitioner’s argument is not directed at any legal, procedural, factual, or other ruling, as required by ORAP 5.45. It is therefore not a proper assignment of error and we do not reach it. In any event, we affirm the ALJ’s final order and conclude that no remand proceedings are warranted. Cite as 342 Or App 391 (2025) 393 in petitioner’s first two assignments of error, regarding the enforceability of OAR 845-006-0345(15). We rejected the argument that OLCC could not establish a violation of the rule because the applicable Oregon Health Authority guid- ance was invalid. Id. Petitioner conceded at oral argument before us in this matter that its first two assignments of error were controlled by Along Came Trudy LLC. We agree, accept that concession, and therefore reject petitioner’s first two assignments of error. We write only to address the third assignment. In its third assignment of error, petitioner argues that OAR 845-006-0345(17)(a) could not be the basis for a violation because the OHA mask guidance referenced therein was not properly incorporated into that OAR and was not otherwise promulgated by OLCC as a rule, and had been replaced by updated guidance multiple times by the time of the alleged violation. We understand petitioner’s arguments to raise a challenge to the validity and enforceability of OAR 845- 006-0345(17). See ORS 183.482(1) (“Jurisdiction for judicial review of contested cases is conferred upon the Court of Appeals.”); ORS

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Case Details

Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

August 6, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Court Type

federal

Legal Significance

Case importance metrics

Importance Score
Significant
Score45%
Citations
0
Legal Topics
Oregon Liquor Control
COVID-19 Regulations
Administrative Rulemaking
Public health enforcement

Metadata

Additional information

AddedAug 16, 2025
UpdatedAug 16, 2025

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Case Summary

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Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Oregon Liquor Control
COVID-19 Regulations
Administrative Rulemaking
Public health enforcement

Case Information

Detailed case metadata and classifications

Court Proceedings

Date FiledAugust 6, 2025
Date DecidedAugust 6, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
0
Importance Score
0.5

Legal Classification

JurisdictionSA
Court Type
federal
Judicial Panel
Shorr
Opinion Author
Shorr

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Bong v. Dept. of Justice

341 Or. App. 283

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

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Lee v. DCBS

341 Or. App. 175

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

No. 517 June 4, 2025 175 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Kevin J. LEE, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SERVICES, Respondent. Department of Consumer and Business Services INS190008; A182238 Argued and submitted April 1, 2025. Kevin J. Lee argued the cause and filed the briefs pro se. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Hellman, Judge. HELLMAN, J. Affirmed. 176 Lee v. DCBS HELLMAN, J. Petitioner, appearing pro se, seeks judicial review of a final order of the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) that revoked his insurance licenses and assessed civil penalties. On judicial review, petitioner argues that the final order is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm. “We review an agency’s order in a contested case for errors of law, ORS 183.482(8)(a), substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c), and substantial reason.” Dorn v. Teacher Standards and Practices Comm., 316 Or App 241, 243, 504 P3d 44 (2021). “Substantial evidence exists to support a find- ing of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482. “Substantial reason exists where the agency has articulated a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclu- sion that the agency draws from them.” Dorn, 316 Or App at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Our review is restricted to the record.” Id. (citing ORS 183.482(7)); see also ORS 183.417(9) (defining “[t]he record in a contested case”). A detailed recitation of the facts would not benefit the bench, the bar, or the public. Petitioner held securities sales, insurance provider, and insurance consultant licenses in Oregon for several years. In 2017, the Federal Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) contacted petitioner to determine if he had violated any federal securities laws when he provided investment advice to his former neigh- bors. In 2018, petitioner filed a resident insurance license renewal application with the state and represented that he had not “been named or involved as a party in an adminis- trative proceeding, including FINRA sanction.” DCBS sub- sequently alleged that petitioner “act[ed] as a state invest- ment adviser in Oregon without a state investment license,” provided “misleading information” on his insurance license applications by not disclosing the FINRA investigation, and that he engaged in “fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest prac- tices.” At the contested hearing, the daughter of petitioner’s former neighbors, petitioner, and a DCBS financial enforce- ment officer testified, and the administrative law judge (ALJ) received into evidence numerous exhibits offered by Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 175 (2025) 177 each party. The ALJ ruled in favor of DCBS and issued a proposed order. DCBS adopted the ALJ’s proposed order as the final order. We have reviewed each of petitioner’s 18 separate arguments concerning the final order and conclude that petitioner presents no basis to reverse. Many of petitioner’s arguments dispute DCBS’s interpretation of the facts, but we do not reweigh evidence on appeal. See Gaylord v. DMV, 283 Or App 811, 822, 391 P3d 900 (2017) (“When in a review role, a court does not review for the better evidence.”). Many of petitioner’s arguments also depend on his testimony— which DCBS found not credible—and we do not revisit cred- ibility on appeal. See id. (“A substantial evidence review does not entail or permit the reviewing tribunal to reweigh or to assess the credibility of the evidence that was presented to the fact-finding body.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) And petitioner’s arguments do not establish that DCBS committed any legal error in its analysis. In sum, substan- tial evidence supports DBCS’s findings of fact, and the order provides substantial reason for its conclusions. Petitioner has not demonstrated any legal error on DCBS’s part. Affirmed.

Very Similar Similarity

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341 Or. App. 453

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

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