Lee v. DCBS

No. 533 June 11, 2025 283 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Jill BONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and Oregon Attorney General, Defendants-Respondents. Douglas County Circuit Court 23CV45434; A185121 Jason R. Thomas, Judge. Submitted May 12, 2025. Jill Bong filed the briefs pro se. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondents. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. 284 Bong v. Dept. of Justice AOYAGI, P. J. In March 2023, petitioner filed a federal action that included claims against the former governor of Oregon and the former director of the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) in their individual and official capacities. A senior assistant attorney general (AAG) from the Oregon Department of Justice (DOJ) appeared on behalf of the former governor and the former OHA director in both their individual and official capacities. Petitioner challenged the AAG’s authority to appear for the defendants in their individual capacities. The federal court rejected that challenge. Petitioner then filed this state court action against the Oregon Attorney General and the DOJ, challenging their authority to defend former or current state officials, officers, or employees in their personal capacities in specified circumstances. The circuit court held a stipulated facts trial and ultimately dismissed the case on two grounds: (1) that petitioner lacked standing to object to what lawyer rep- resents her opponents in court, for reasons detailed at length in the court’s letter opinion, and (2) that any complaint about the qualifications or status of another party’s lawyer should be directed to the court in which that lawyer is appearing— here, to the federal court, which had already rejected petition- er’s challenge to the AAG’s representation—rather than being raised in a separate action in a different court. On appeal, petitioner contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing her state court action. In five assign- ments of error, she challenges the court’s ruling, arguing that she has standing, that the court misframed the issue, that the court improperly resurrected a waived claim-splitting defense, that the court’s second basis for dismissal was wrong, and that the court had authority to issue an injunc- tion in this case. The state responds that the circuit court properly dismissed the case, because petitioner met none of the elements of standing, and because the circuit court could not be required to direct proceedings in a federal dis- trict court as petitioner sought. Having reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments, we agree with the state that the trial court did not err in dismissing the action. Petitioner failed Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 283 (2025) 285 to establish standing, which is dispositive. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed.

30 June 4, 2025 No. 484 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Richard GRIFFITH and Reta Griffith, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Respondents, v. PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, Defendant-Respondent Cross-Appellant, and ALPINE ABATEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant. Wallowa County Circuit Court 22CV10452; A181951 Wes Williams, Judge. On appellants’ petition for reconsideration filed March 28, 2025, and respondent’s response filed April 2, 2025. Opinion filed March 19, 2025. 339 Or App 40, 566 P3d 1235 (2025). Kelly Vance for petition. Thomas M. Christ and Sussman Shank LLP for response. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. TOOKEY, P. J. Reconsideration allowed; former opinion modified and adhered to as modified. Cite as 341 Or App 30 (2025) 31 TOOKEY, P. J. Plaintiffs petition for reconsideration of our deci- sion in Griffith v. Property and Casualty Ins. Co. of Hartford, 339 Or App 40, 566 P3d 1235 (2025), asserting, among other reasons that we should reconsider our decision, that we “committed factual error in opining that all plaintiffs’ counsel did was file a complaint, which was contrary to the evidence.” Plaintiffs assert that “the trial court file shows far more activity than is depicted by the panel’s opinion.” We grant reconsideration, modify our previous opinion in two respects, and adhere to it as modified. First, in our opinion, we stated, “The complaint and Hartford’s answer were the only filings relating to Hartford in plaintiffs’ civil action. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs and Hartford executed a ‘Release and Settlement Agreement,’ under which the parties settled plaintiffs’ insurance and breach of contract claims ‘and all related controversies.’ ” Id. at 42. We modify those sentences to read, “After Vance filed the civil action, plaintiffs and Hartford executed a ‘Release and Settlement Agreement,’ under which the parties settled plaintiffs’ insurance and breach of contract claims ‘and all related controversies.’ ” Second, in our opinion, we stated, “Prior to the par- ties’ settlement and release, there was minimal litigation by plaintiffs’ counsel (the filing of a complaint) with respect to plaintiffs’ claims against Hartford.” Id. at 48. We mod- ify that sentence so that it reads, “Prior to the parties’ set- tlement and release, litigation by plaintiffs’ counsel with respect to plaintiffs’ claims against Hartford included fil- ing a complaint and amended complaint, filing a reply to Hartford’s affirmative defenses, filings related to summary judgment, and oral argument before the court.” We have also considered the other reasons that plaintiffs assert that we should reconsider our opinion and have determined that reconsideration is not warranted. Reconsideration allowed; former opinion modified and adhered to as modified.

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS § IN RE NATURAL GAS SERVICES No. 08-25-00157-CV GROUP, INC. and CHARLES A. PEREZ, § AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING Relators. § IN MANDAMUS § § JUDGMENT The Court has considered this cause on the motion to dismiss. We grant the motion and dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus as moot. This decision shall be certified below for observance. IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of June 2025. LISA J. SOTO, Justice Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS § IN RE 08-25-00148-CV § AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING RITA ELIZABETH JONES, IN MANDAMUS INDIVIDUALLY and ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF ESTELA TIBUNI ROMANO, § DECEASED, A/K/ ESTELLA TIBUNI ROMANO, STELLA TIBUNI ROMANO § Relator. § JUDGMENT The Court has considered this cause on the motion to dismiss. We grant the motion and dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus. We further order Relator to pay all costs of this appeal and this decision to be certified below for observance. IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of June 2025. MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox, J., and Rodriguez, C.J. (Ret) Rodriguez, C.J. (Ret.) (Sitting by Assignment)

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS § IN RE NATURAL GAS SERVICES No. 08-25-00157-CV GROUP, INC. and CHARLES A. PEREZ, § AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING Relators. § IN MANDAMUS § § MEMORANDUM OPINION Relators Natural Gas Services Group, Inc. and Charles A. Perez filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this proceeding indicating that the controversy between the parties has been resolved and the original proceeding is therefore moot. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of the legal proceedings[.]”). Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed and dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus as moot. LISA J. SOTO, Justice June 17,2025 Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.