Ludwig Laab v. Cedarwood Condominium Owners Assoc., Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 63 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MERVINA KAUKINI MAMO CASH-KAEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUY K. BARRETT; RONETTE BARRETT, Defendants-Appellants, DUSTIN K. BARRETT; SHEENA ANN BARRETT; RICHARD BARRETT; LEZLEY K. BARRETT aka LEZLEY BRADBURY, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAI‘ANAE DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.) Defendants-Appellants Guy K. Barrett and Ronette Barrett (collectively, the Barretts) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district court)1 May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. They raise three points of error, contending that the district court abused its discretion when: 1 The Honorable Darolyn H. Lendio entered the Judgment for Possession. The Honorable Michelle N. Comeau presided over the April 26, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Mervina Kaukini Mamo Cash-Kaeo's (Cash- Kaeo) motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (1) "it defaulted [the Barretts] for [their] non[-]appearance [at the MSJ hearing] where the facts show [the Barretts had] defended themselves in this action by retaining counsel" who "made eight court appearances at hearings in defense of [the Barretts]"; (2) "it applied the extreme sanctions methodology" by entering default judgment against the Barretts "for the failure of their counsel to appear at the hearing on [Cash- Kaeo's] [MSJ]"; and (3) "it allowed the hearing on [Cash-Kaeo's] [MSJ] to proceed without first addressing [counsel's] non[- ]appearance at this hearing." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the Barretts' appeal as follows. The Barretts contend that the district court entered default judgment against them pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 55. The record reflects, however, that the district court entered the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession against the Barretts because Cash-Kaeo demonstrated she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under DCRCP Rule 56. Pursuant to DCRCP Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawaiʻi 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The Barretts point to no evidence in the record indicating a genuine issue of material fact disputing that Cash- Kaeo is the sole surviving lessee of the subject property, and that Cash-Kaeo is therefore entitled to judgment of possession against the Barretts as a matter of law. The Barretts also cite no authority indicating the district court was required to address their counsel's non-appearance at the MSJ hearing before it could grant the MSJ. Even if the district court was required to do so, the Barretts fail to identify any legal theory or issue of fact that could have or would have been presented in opposition to the MSJ to defeat the motion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting the MSJ, and affirm the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 20, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Presiding Judge Barry L. Sooalo, for Defendants-Appellants. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge Jay T. Suemori, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge

08/08/2025 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON April 23, 2025 Session SHIRLEY JEAN CUPPLES BLANKENSHIP v. CHARLES GARY BLANKENSHIP SR. AND CHARLES GARY BLANKENSHIP II v. SHIRLEY JEAN CUPPLES BLANKENSHIP Appeal from the Chancery Court for Gibson County No. H6329, H6634 Michael Mansfield, Chancellor ___________________________________ No. W2024-01248-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ This appeal arises from the death of the husband during a divorce proceeding. While the divorce was pending, the spouses sold real property they owned as tenants by the entirety and deposited the proceeds with the clerk of the court pursuant to an agreed order. Subsequently, the husband died and the wife filed a motion to dismiss the case and to distribute the proceeds. The chancery court determined that the husband’s death abated the divorce proceedings and that the proceeds had been owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety. Thus, the court granted the motion to dismiss and determined that the wife was entitled to distribution of the proceeds as the surviving tenant by the entirety. The spouses’ son, acting as administrator of the husband’s estate, appeals. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed. CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KENNY W. ARMSTRONG and VALERIE L. SMITH, JJ., joined. Michael R. Flynn, Germantown, Tennessee, for the appellants, Charles Gary Blankenship II and Probate Advance, LLC. Jonathan O. Steen, Nicholas B. Latimer, and Sara E. Barnett, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship. OPINION I. Facts and Procedural History Charles Gary Blankenship Sr. (“Husband”) and Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship (“Wife”) were married on August 22, 1981, in Jackson, Tennessee. One child was born of the marriage, Charles Gary Blankenship II (“Son”). Son is serving as the administrator of Husband’s estate and is one of the appellants in this matter. During the marriage, the spouses obtained the following pieces of real property in Humboldt, Tennessee: 157 Pleasant Hill Road, 3855 East End Drive, and a lot adjacent to the 3855 East End Drive property (collectively “the Properties”). The spouses owned the Properties as tenants by the entirety. On March 6, 2020, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Madison County Chancery Court. The spouses later agreed for the case to be transferred to the Gibson County Chancery Court. Litigation ensued, and on September 30, 2022, Husband filed a motion requesting that a guardian ad litem be appointed on his behalf. The motion was granted by order entered on January 20, 2023. The guardian ad litem subsequently submitted a report explaining that Husband had experienced several health issues and recommended that Son be appointed as conservator over Husband’s person and that a certified public accountant be appointed as conservator over his property. On January 5, 2023, an “Agreed Order” was entered in which the spouses agreed that the proceeds derived from the sale of any marital property would be paid to the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court of Gibson County. Although it is unclear from the record when this occurred, the spouses subsequently sold the Properties. The proceeds derived from the sale of the Properties were deposited with the Gibson County Clerk and Master. On August 15, 2023, Husband died prior to a final decree of divorce having been entered. Wife filed a “Motion to Dismiss and for Distribution of Funds” on September 8, 2023, in which she asserted that Husband’s death abated the divorce proceedings. Wife also claimed that the proceeds derived from the sale of the Properties had been owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety and thus the proceeds had “vested” in her upon Husband’s death as the surviving tenant by the entirety. Meanwhile, on October 27, 2023, Son filed a verified complaint in his capacity as the administrator of Husband’s estate in the Chancery Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee.1 The complaint alleged that the funds being held by the Gibson County Clerk and Master were assets of Husband’s estate. Son further sought an order enjoining Wife from obtaining the funds pending resolution of the complaint. This case was eventually transferred to the Gibson County Chancery Court. Subsequently, the court entered an order consolidating the divorce proceeding, the above- described action filed by Son, and a “Probate Action” Son had also filed in the Hamilton County Chancery Court. The court determined that all three cases were predicated on the disposal of a single issue: “who is entitled to receive disburse

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 08:58 AM Dkt. 63 OGMD NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR NEW CENTURY ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-ALT2, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL JOSEPH SPENCE; ELAINE DUMLAO SPENCE, Defendants-Appellants, and WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR EASTERN SAT TRUST; MILILANI TOWN ASSOCIATION, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-50; JANE DOES 1-50; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-50; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-50; DOE ENTITIES 1-50; and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-50, Defendants. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CIVIL NO. 1CC141000573) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka, Wadsworth, JJ.) Upon consideration of the Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot filed by Plaintiff-Appellee U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for New Century Alternative Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-ALT2 on June 6, 2025, the response filed by Defendants- Appellants Daniel Joseph Spence and Elaine Dumlao Spence on June 13, 2025, and the record, it appears that: 1. On April 29, 2025, we temporarily remanded this appeal to the Circuit Court in accordance with Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Domingo, SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX & SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX,  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 2023 WL 2017392 (Haw. Feb. 15, 2023) (mem. op.) to determine whether the Property at issue in the foreclosure proceeding had been sold to a good-faith purchaser; 2. The Circuit Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and, on May 23, 2025, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as to Third-Party Purchasers' Good Faith Purchaser Status in Accordance with Temporary Remand to Circuit Court; 3. The Circuit Court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous, see Est. of Klink ex rel. Klink v. State, 113 Hawai i 332, 351, 152 P.3d 504, 523 (2007); 4. The Circuit Court's conclusions of law were right, see Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB v. Domingo, 155 Hawai i 1, 9, 556 P.3d 347, 355 (2024); 5. The Circuit Court's conclusion that "(1) Mark Nicholas Chin and Jeanie Chi Hyon Chin, as tenants by the entirety; (2) Properinvest, LLC; (3) Kelakela 1069 LLC; (4) Zenith Realty Group, LLC; and (5) Small Pond Partners, LLC), were and are good faith purchasers of the Property under Hawai i law" was supported by its findings of fact and reflected an application of the correct rule of law, Domingo, 155 Hawai i at 9, 12, 556 P.3d at 355, 358; and 6. The Spences' appeal is moot, Bank of New York Mellon v. R. Onaga, Inc., 140 Hawai i 358, 370, 400 P.3d 559, 570 (2017) (holding that if no stay is obtained and the foreclosed property is sold to a good faith purchaser, the appeal should be dismissed as moot). 2

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS § AUSTIN BHARADWAJA and RYAN BHARADWAJA, § No. 08-24-00075-CV Appellants/Cross-Appellees, § Appeal from the v. § County Court at Law No. 7 MICHAEL HAYS; ELIZABETH HAYS; § of El Paso County, Texas and PANDA PAL PROPERTY, MANAGEMENT, LLC, § (TC# 2023-CCV00813) Appellees/Cross-Appellants. § JUDGMENT The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part. We therefore (1) reverse the trial court’s award of a reduction in the Bharadwajas’ rent; (2) reverse the trial court’s award of $10,000 in attorney’s fees and render judgment for the Bharadwajas in the amount of $23,468; (3) render judgment of a civil penalty in favor of the Bharadwajas on each repair or remedy claim in the total amount of $6,600; and (4) reverse the trial court’s award of contingent appellate fees in favor of the Bharadwajas. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. We remand the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.  We further order that Appellants recover from Appellees and their sureties, if any, for performance of the judgment and all costs of appeal, for which let execution issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.5. This decision shall be certified below for observance. IT IS ORDERED this 19th day of June 2025. MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice Before Salas Mendoza C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.