Cash-Kaeo v. Barrett

RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1311-MR KHALIL COLEMAN APPELLANT APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00759 KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Khalil Coleman appeals from the Franklin Circuit Court’s order dismissing his complaint against Appellee, the Kentucky General Assembly. Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND Khalil Coleman, a state inmate, filed a pro se lawsuit seeking a declaration regarding certain sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. He named the General Assembly of Kentucky as the sole defendant. The General Assembly moved to dismiss the action, arguing Coleman failed to state a claim, and alternatively, if Coleman had stated a claim, the General Assembly is shielded by legislative immunity under Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Franklin Circuit Court granted the General Assembly’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and declined to assess the immunity defense. Coleman now appeals. ANALYSIS We review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Davenport Extreme Pools and Spas, Inc. v. Mulflur, 698 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Ky. App. 2024). Trial courts must construe pleadings “in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky. App. 1987) (citing Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1960)). In response to a pleading, a party to an action may present the defense of a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by a pre-answer motion. CR1 12.02(f). The General Assembly presented that defense, arguing Coleman’s complaint “does not state any cognizable legal theory related to the General Assembly and alleges no sufficient facts to support one. In fact, the Complaint 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -2- does not even allege any action or inaction by the General Assembly as a body or by its individual members.” (Record (R.) at 55.) Coleman argues his “declaration of rights petition did in fact state several claims, which should have rendered right to relief.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4.) However, even on appeal, Coleman fails to state any claims against the General Assembly. As he did before the Franklin Circuit Court, he again argues that certain statutes are unconstitutional but does not aver in his brief before this Court sufficient facts that would allow the General Assembly to respond with a rational, cogent answer. He asserts no specific wrongdoing by the General Assembly. Rather, he requests that this Court “evoke legislative intent [and] redact statute [sic] of controversy affecting [his] rights.” (Appellant’s Br. at 6.) Although the General Assembly did not submit an Appellee’s Brief, we take that non- response as an expression of its belief there is nothing warranting a response on appeal. While we respect Coleman’s activism, bringing an action against the General Assembly is not a means by which such change can be effectuated. Existence of an actual controversy is a fundamental component of an action. “The court will not decide speculative rights or duties which may or may not arise in the future, but only rights and duties about which there is a present actual controversy presented by adversary parties, and in which a binding judgment concluding the -3- controversy may be entered.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Veith v. City of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. 1962)). “An actual controversy . . . does not involve a question which is merely hypothetical or an answer which is no more than an advisory opinion.” Barrett v. Reynolds, 817 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ky. 1991). Coleman’s request that the Court redact certain statutes is not an actual controversy. Neither is his request that the Court actually issue an advisory opinion, which we are prohibited from rendering. Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Ky. 2007) (citations omitted) (“It is a fundamental tenet of Kentucky jurisprudence that courts cannot decide matters that have not yet ripened into concrete disputes. Courts are not permitted to render advisory opin

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 08:58 AM Dkt. 63 OGMD NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR NEW CENTURY ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-ALT2, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL JOSEPH SPENCE; ELAINE DUMLAO SPENCE, Defendants-Appellants, and WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR EASTERN SAT TRUST; MILILANI TOWN ASSOCIATION, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-50; JANE DOES 1-50; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-50; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-50; DOE ENTITIES 1-50; and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-50, Defendants. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CIVIL NO. 1CC141000573) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka, Wadsworth, JJ.) Upon consideration of the Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot filed by Plaintiff-Appellee U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for New Century Alternative Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-ALT2 on June 6, 2025, the response filed by Defendants- Appellants Daniel Joseph Spence and Elaine Dumlao Spence on June 13, 2025, and the record, it appears that: 1. On April 29, 2025, we temporarily remanded this appeal to the Circuit Court in accordance with Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Domingo, SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX & SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX,  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 2023 WL 2017392 (Haw. Feb. 15, 2023) (mem. op.) to determine whether the Property at issue in the foreclosure proceeding had been sold to a good-faith purchaser; 2. The Circuit Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and, on May 23, 2025, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as to Third-Party Purchasers' Good Faith Purchaser Status in Accordance with Temporary Remand to Circuit Court; 3. The Circuit Court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous, see Est. of Klink ex rel. Klink v. State, 113 Hawai i 332, 351, 152 P.3d 504, 523 (2007); 4. The Circuit Court's conclusions of law were right, see Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB v. Domingo, 155 Hawai i 1, 9, 556 P.3d 347, 355 (2024); 5. The Circuit Court's conclusion that "(1) Mark Nicholas Chin and Jeanie Chi Hyon Chin, as tenants by the entirety; (2) Properinvest, LLC; (3) Kelakela 1069 LLC; (4) Zenith Realty Group, LLC; and (5) Small Pond Partners, LLC), were and are good faith purchasers of the Property under Hawai i law" was supported by its findings of fact and reflected an application of the correct rule of law, Domingo, 155 Hawai i at 9, 12, 556 P.3d at 355, 358; and 6. The Spences' appeal is moot, Bank of New York Mellon v. R. Onaga, Inc., 140 Hawai i 358, 370, 400 P.3d 559, 570 (2017) (holding that if no stay is obtained and the foreclosed property is sold to a good faith purchaser, the appeal should be dismissed as moot). 2

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-24-00248-CV Big Creek Construction, LTD., Appellant v. Jerry Steele Fagan, Individually and on behalf of the Estate of Jimmie Edward Fagan, Nikkie Marchant, and Lisa Daves, Appellees On appeal from the 82nd District Court of Robertson County, Texas Judge Rex Davis, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 21-01-21174-CV CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Big Creek Construction, LTD., appealed from the trial court’s interlocutory "Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendant Big Creek Construction, Ltd.'s Amended Motion for No Evidence and Traditional Summary Judgment." On January 3, 2025, the Court was advised that the parties had reached a settlement and requested an abatement in order to execute the terms of the settlement. This proceeding was stayed upon the request of the parties on January 7, 2025. On May 16, 2025, by letter from the Clerk of this Court, the appellant was advised that it “must provide the Court with either a motion to dismiss or a status report within 14 days of the date of this letter or the appeal may be dismissed for want of prosecution.” Further, the appellant was notified that the failure to respond to the Clerk’s letter would constitute an independent ground for the dismissal of the appeal. No motion to dismiss or other response has been received by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b), (c). Accordingly, we dismiss this interlocutory appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b), (c). MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 18, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Appeal dismissed CV06 Big Creek Construction, LTD. v. Fagan Page 2

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS § IN RE NATURAL GAS SERVICES No. 08-25-00157-CV GROUP, INC. and CHARLES A. PEREZ, § AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING Relators. § IN MANDAMUS § § MEMORANDUM OPINION Relators Natural Gas Services Group, Inc. and Charles A. Perez filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this proceeding indicating that the controversy between the parties has been resolved and the original proceeding is therefore moot. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of the legal proceedings[.]”). Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed and dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus as moot. LISA J. SOTO, Justice June 17,2025 Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS IN RE § 08-25-00147-CV RITA ELIZABETH JONES, § AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING INDIVIDUALLY and ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF ESTELA TIBUNI § IN MANDAMUS ROMANO, DECEASED, A/K/ ESTELLA TIBUNI ROMANO, STELLA TIBUNI § ROMANO § Relator. JUDGMENT The Court has considered this cause on the motion to dismiss. We grant the motion and dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus. We further order Relator to pay all costs of this appeal and this decision to be certified below for observance. IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of June 2025. MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox, J., and Rodriguez, C.J. (Ret) Rodriguez, C.J. (Ret.) (Sitting by Assignment)