U.S. Bank National Association v. Spence

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 63 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MERVINA KAUKINI MAMO CASH-KAEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUY K. BARRETT; RONETTE BARRETT, Defendants-Appellants, DUSTIN K. BARRETT; SHEENA ANN BARRETT; RICHARD BARRETT; LEZLEY K. BARRETT aka LEZLEY BRADBURY, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAI‘ANAE DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.) Defendants-Appellants Guy K. Barrett and Ronette Barrett (collectively, the Barretts) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district court)1 May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. They raise three points of error, contending that the district court abused its discretion when: 1 The Honorable Darolyn H. Lendio entered the Judgment for Possession. The Honorable Michelle N. Comeau presided over the April 26, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Mervina Kaukini Mamo Cash-Kaeo's (Cash- Kaeo) motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (1) "it defaulted [the Barretts] for [their] non[-]appearance [at the MSJ hearing] where the facts show [the Barretts had] defended themselves in this action by retaining counsel" who "made eight court appearances at hearings in defense of [the Barretts]"; (2) "it applied the extreme sanctions methodology" by entering default judgment against the Barretts "for the failure of their counsel to appear at the hearing on [Cash- Kaeo's] [MSJ]"; and (3) "it allowed the hearing on [Cash-Kaeo's] [MSJ] to proceed without first addressing [counsel's] non[- ]appearance at this hearing." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the Barretts' appeal as follows. The Barretts contend that the district court entered default judgment against them pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 55. The record reflects, however, that the district court entered the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession against the Barretts because Cash-Kaeo demonstrated she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under DCRCP Rule 56. Pursuant to DCRCP Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawaiʻi 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The Barretts point to no evidence in the record indicating a genuine issue of material fact disputing that Cash- Kaeo is the sole surviving lessee of the subject property, and that Cash-Kaeo is therefore entitled to judgment of possession against the Barretts as a matter of law. The Barretts also cite no authority indicating the district court was required to address their counsel's non-appearance at the MSJ hearing before it could grant the MSJ. Even if the district court was required to do so, the Barretts fail to identify any legal theory or issue of fact that could have or would have been presented in opposition to the MSJ to defeat the motion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting the MSJ, and affirm the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 20, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Presiding Judge Barry L. Sooalo, for Defendants-Appellants. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge Jay T. Suemori, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge

No. 503 June 4, 2025 127 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, dba Christiana Trust, not individually but as Trustee for Pretium Mortgage Acquisition Trust, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Kent R. SEIDA, Sr., aka Kent R. Seida, aka Kent Seida, Defendant-Appellant, and THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, an agency of the government of the United States of America et al., Defendants. Lincoln County Circuit Court 132390; A181786 Marcia L. Buckley, Judge. Submitted May 13, 2024. Kent R. Seida argued the cause and filed the briefs pro se. Peter J. Salmon argued the cause for respondents. Also on the brief was Aldridge Pite, LLP. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. POWERS, J. Affirmed. 128 Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Seida POWERS, J. This is another chapter in a foreclosure action in which defendant Seida originally appealed from a general judgment of foreclosure and award of attorney fees. Initially, we affirmed without opinion, Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Seida, 321 Or App 212, 514 P3d 1207 (2022), and then we granted reconsideration, withdrew our former disposition, and remanded the case to the trial court for further pro- ceedings to consider the impact of COVID-19 legislation. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 322 Or App 161 (2022) (nonprec- edential memorandum opinion). Specifically, we concluded that the court did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the validity of the judgment in light of leg- islation involving temporary moratoria on foreclosures that passed while the foreclosure action was pending. Id. at 163. On remand, the court again entered a foreclosure judgment, and defendant now appeals from that judgment. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law because plaintiff, in his view, “intro- duced fraudulent and forged documents.” That is, defendant’s focus on appeal is a challenge to the court’s grant of sum- mary judgment, which we already affirmed in our earlier decision. The difficulty with that argument is that it runs straight into the “law of the case” doctrine, which prevents revisiting an issue already decided in the same proceeding. See, e.g., Hayes Oyster Co. v. Dulcich, 199 Or App 43, 53-54, 110 P3d 615, rev den, 339 Or 544 (2005) (explaining that the law of the case doctrine is involved “to preclude parties from revisiting issues that already have been fully considered by an appellate court in the same proceeding”); ILWU, Local 8 v. Port of Portland, 279 Or App 157, 164-65, 379 P3d 1172, rev den, 360 Or 422 (2016) (noting that the law of the case doctrine precludes “relitigation of an appellate court holding after remand and on subsequent appeal”). Because defen- dant already has received appellate review of the issue that he now raises in this appeal, it is not a basis to reverse the foreclosure judgment. Further, defendant does not contend on appeal that there are any newly discovered facts or that there is a change in the applicable law. Accordingly, the law Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 127 (2025) 129 of the case doctrine precludes defendant from revisiting the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Affirmed.