In Re Smith Minors

E-FILED CNMI SUPREME COURT E-filed: Jun 25 2025 02:15PM Clerk Review: Jun 25 2025 02:15PM Filing ID: 76525598 Case No.: 2022-SCC-0016-CIV Judy Aldan IN THE Supreme Court OF THE Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands SECUNDINA UNTALAN PANGELINAN AND SELINA MARIE PANGELINAN, Plaintiff-Appellees, v. JOHN SABLAN PANGELINAN, Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0016-CIV ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING Cite as: 2025 MP 3 Decided June 25, 2025 ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE ROBERT J. TORRES, JR. JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE WESLEY M. BOGDAN Superior Court Civil Action No. 17-0067 Associate Judge Joseph N. Camacho, Presiding  Pangelinan v. Pangelinan, 2025 MP 3 INOS, J.: ¶1 Appellant John Sablan Pangelinan (“Appellant” or “John”) petitions for rehearing, focusing primarily on our previous holdings that his quiet title action was barred by issue preclusion and that the lower court properly set aside the entry of default against Appellees Secundina and Selina Pangelinan (“Appellees”). For the below reasons, his petition is DENIED. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The full facts of this case and relevant probate decisions are detailed in Pangelinan v. Pangelinan, 2024 MP 5 and In re Estate of Norberto Eduardo Pangelinan, Civ. No. 15-0169 (NMI Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2016) (Decree of Final Distribution); In re Estate of Norberto Eduardo Pangelinan, Civ. No. 15-0169 (NMI Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2016) (Order Determining Heir and Approving the Lease and Sale of Real Property); In re Estate of Norberto Eduardo Pangelinan, Civ. No. 15-0169 (NMI Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2016) (Order Denying John S. Pangelinan’s Motions for Reconsideration). For purposes of this petition, we briefly summarize the relevant facts. In 2017, Appellees sued John in the Superior Court, claiming, among other things, damages for abuse of process based on John’s actions during the probate of Norberto Eduardo Pangelinan— Appellees’ husband and father, respectively, and John’s first cousin. ¶3 John responded by filing counterclaims, including a quiet title action to land subject to the probate of Norberto’s estate. Shortly thereafter, he amended his answer and counterclaim. In response, Appellees moved to dismiss the counterclaims, but filed their motion three days late, having miscalculated the deadline by relying on the date of the amended counterclaims, rather than the original counterclaims. Consequently, the clerk entered a default against them, and John moved for entry of default judgment. ¶4 Appellees moved to set aside the entry of default, which the court granted. The court also granted their motion to dismiss, holding that the quiet title claim was barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion. The case proceeded to a bench trial on the remaining claims, after which the court found John liable for abuse of process. The court later awarded Appellees $52,756.49 in damages against John. ¶5 John appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in setting aside the entry of default and dismissing his quiet title action on issue preclusion grounds. After briefing and oral argument, we affirmed the lower court’s decision in an opinion issued on September 23, 2024. John timely filed a petition for rehearing. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 A petition for rehearing “must state with particularity each point of law or fact that the petitioner believes the Court has overlooked or misapprehended and must argue in support of the petition. Oral argument is not permitted.” NMI SUP. CT. R. 40(a)(2). A party may not reassert previously raised arguments or raise new issues unless extraordinary circumstances exist. Commonwealth v. Reyes, 2020 MP 6 ¶ 7.  Pangelinan v. Pangelinan, 2025 MP 3 III. DISCUSSION A. We did not overlook or misapprehend any point of law or fact in affirming the lower court’s decision to set aside the entry of default. ¶7 John first argues that Appellees’ default in answering his counterclaim cannot be set aside—an assertion that, if accepted, would require us to nullify Rule 55(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and contravene our test for setting aside entries of de

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM PEOPLE OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DUAYNE RICHARD PETERS, Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court Case No. CRA23-008 Superior Court Case No. CF0112-20 OPINION Cite as: 2025 Guam 1 Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam Argued and submitted on July 15, 2024 Hagåtña, Guam Appearing for Defendant-Appellant Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee Joshua D. Walsh, Esq. Christine Santos Tenorio, Esq. Razzano Walsh & Torres, P.C. Assistant Attorney General 139 Murray Blvd., Ste. 100 Office of the Attorney General Hagåtña, GU 96910 590 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 801 Tamuning, GU 96913 People v. Peters, 2025 Guam 1, Opinion Page 2 of 15 BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; and KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice. MARAMAN, J.: [1] Defendant-Appellant Duayne Richard Peters appeals his conviction for four counts of First-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (“CSC I”) and two counts of Second-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (“CSC II”), along with two Vulnerable Victim Special Allegations. Peters argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed his wife to plead guilty and testify against him pursuant to a plea agreement that placed her under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular manner. He argues that despite his wife admitting to abusing the victim, she “testified at the insistence of the Government . . . that the abuse was committed by Mr. Peters.” Appellant’s Br. at 9 (May 13, 2024). Peters also makes the claim he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND [2] A grand jury returned an indictment against Peters and his wife,1 N.P., for criminal sexual conduct committed against a girl related to N.P. Peters was initially charged with five counts of CSC I and three counts of CSC II. N.P. was charged with two counts of CSC I and two counts of CSC II under a theory of complicity. The criminal sexual conduct was alleged to have occurred when the victim was under the age of fourteen. N.P. was alleged to have admitted to police that there was an incident where Peters had sex with her and then with the victim, and another incident where she watched Peters penetrate the victim with a vibrator. Super. Ct. Case No. CF0112-20- 01 (Magis.’s Compl. at 5, Feb. 17, 2020).2 1 N.P. testified that she married Peters in 2017 and was still married to him at the time of trial. 2 Although outside the record of this appeal, we can properly take judicial notice of documents filed in N.P.’s case. See People v. Tedtaotao, 2023 Guam 21 ¶ 2 n.1. In our discretion and without request, we take judicial notice People v. Peters, 2025 Guam 1, Opinion Page 3 of 15 [3] Peters moved to sever, based in part on (1) his claim that N.P. had made incriminating statements which also implicated him and (2) his claim that while he denied the alleged acts had occurred, she had “admitted to it.” Record on Appeal (“RA”), tab 19 at 1–3 (Mot. Sever, Apr. 10, 2020). The unopposed motion was granted, and the prosecution against N.P. was captioned as CF0112-20-01. A jury was selected for N.P.’s trial, but before being empaneled, it appears N.P. reached a plea agreement with the People. See CF0112-20-01 (Min. Entry at 2, Dec. 16, 2020); Appellee’s Br. at 2 (June 12, 2024). N.P. agreed to plead guilty to Criminal Facilitation of First- Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (as a Third-Degree Felony). CF0112-20-01 (Plea Agreement at 2, Feb. 1, 2021). In exchange for her cooperation against Peters, N.P. was given immunity, all other charges were dropped, and the People agreed to a sentence of time served. Id. at 3–5. [4] N.P.’s plea agreement provided that “Defendant agrees to fully and truthfully cooperate with the Government of Guam Attorney General’s Office . . . .” Id. at 3. The agreement further stated that: Defendant agrees to testify truthfully at any Court proceeding, including grand jury, trial or any other hearing to which he [sic] is called to testify, specifically concerning her own case or those involving her co-actor pursuant to Guam Police Department Report No. 19-06305 and written statement and/or testimony against her co-actor,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA January 2025 Term FILED _____________________ June 11, 2025 released at 3:00 p.m. C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK No. 23-589 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA _____________________ JACKLIN ROMEO, SUSAN S. RINE, and DEBRA SNYDER MILLER, Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners, v. ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION, Defendant Below, Respondent. ___________________________________________________________ Certified Questions from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia The Honorable Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief Judge Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-88-TSK-MJA CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED _________________________________________________________ Rehearing Granted: December 31, 2024 Submitted Upon Rehearing: April 22, 2025 Filed: June 11, 2025 George A. Barton, Esq. W. Henry Lawrence, Esq. Barton and Burrows, LLC Amy M. Smith, Esq. Mission, Kansas Lauren K. Turner, Esq. Steptoe & Johnson PLLC L. Lee Javins II Esq. Bridgeport, West Virginia Taylor M. Norman, Esq. Bailey, Javins & Carter, L.C. Elbert Lin, Esq. Charleston, West Virginia Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP Richmond, Virginia Howard M. Persinger, III Daniel T. Donovan, Esq. Persinger & Persinger, L.C. Kirkland & Ellis LLP Charleston, West Virginia Washington, D.C. Counsel for Petitioners Counsel for Respondent CHIEF JUSTICE WOOTON delivered the Opinion of the Court. JUSTICE ARMSTEAD, deeming himself disqualified, did not participate in the decision of this case. JUDGE HARDY, sitting by designation. JUSTICE WALKER dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion. JUSTICE BUNN dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.  SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. “‘“A de novo standard is applied by this court in addressing the legal issues presented by a [sic] certified questions from a federal district or appellate court.” Syl. Pt. 1, Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 W.Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 (1998).’ Syllabus Point 2, Aikens v. Debow, 208 W.Va. 486, 541 S.E.2d 576 (2000).” Syl. Pt. 1, Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 227 W. Va. 142, 706 S.E.2d 63 (2010). 2. “If an oil and gas lease provides for a royalty based on proceeds received by the lessee, unless the lease provides otherwise, the lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale.” Syl. Pt. 4, Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254 (2001). 3. Except as may be specifically provided by the parties’ agreement, where an oil and gas lease contains an express or implied duty to market, the requirements of Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254 (2001), and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C., 219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006), extend to the point of sale, not just to the point of marketability or to the first available market. 4. Except as may be specifically provided by the parties’ agreement, royalties are payable to the mineral owner/lessor not only from the producer/lessee’s sale of wet gas i and residue gas but also from the lessee’s sale of any byproducts of the wet gas such as natural gas liquids. 5. “‘The general rule as to oil and gas leases is that such contracts will generally be liberally construed in favor of the lessor, and strictly as against the lessee.’ Syllabus Point 1, Martin v. Consolidated Coal & Oil Corp., 101 W.Va. 721, 133 S.E. 626 (1926).” Syl. Pt. 7, Est. of Tawney, 219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006). 6. “‘The question as to whether a contract is ambiguous is a questio

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT CAROLEEN JAKMIAN, : No. 266 EAL 2024 : Petitioner : : Petition for Allowance of Appeal : from the Order of the v. : Commonwealth Court : : CITY OF PHILADELPHIA AND : SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA : TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, : : Respondents : ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW, this 11th day of June, 2025, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED. Justice Dougherty files a concurring statement.

No. 23-569, Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corporation; Camden-Clark Health Services Inc.; West Virginia United Health System, Inc. d/b/a West Virginia University Health System; and West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc.; Marietta Memorial Hospital; and Marietta HealthCare Physicians,FILED Inc. June 11, 2025 released at 3:00 p.m. C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK BUNN, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part: SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA I concur with the majority’s answers to the first and second questions certified to this Court from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which recognize a cause of action for negligent supervision and define its elements. Yet, I dissent to the remainder of the majority’s opinion, which unnecessarily answers the district court’s third certified question and ultimately holds that intentional or reckless torts can form the basis for a negligent supervision claim. In answering the second certified question, the majority sets forth straightforward, easily applied elements of negligent supervision, making the majority’s answer to the third certified question unnecessary and superfluous. Likewise, the majority’s addition of a new syllabus point relating to the third certified question is unwarranted. Furthermore, while I concur in the majority’s determination of negligent supervision’s elements, I write separately to caution that negligent supervision is, in essence, a narrow subset of ordinary negligence, requiring the case-by-case factual analysis applicable to all negligence claims. I further emphasize that the factual circumstances in which an employer may be held liable to a plaintiff for negligent supervision, when the employee’s intentional tort caused the plaintiff harm, are likely quite rare. 1  A brief factual recitation and the underlying proceedings is helpful to provide context to my analysis. The respondents, the plaintiffs in the underlying action in federal court, alleged in relevant part1 that the petitioners, defendants in the underlying action, negligently failed to supervise their employees “in the pursuit and assistance in the pursuit” of a separate qui tam action against the respondents. In that negligent supervision count, respondents also asserted that the “initiation and pursuit of the qui tam action and the federal investigation consisted of tortious conduct.” The district court deferred ruling on the petitioners’ motion to dismiss the negligent supervision count and instead certified questions asking this Court whether negligent supervision is a cause of action in West Virginia, to set forth the elements of negligent supervision, and to determine whether a negligent supervision claim survives if the employee engages in an intentional or reckless tort. A. The Majority Erred By Answering Question Three The district court’s third certified question asks “[c]an intentional or reckless torts committed by an employee form the basis for a claim for negligent supervision against the employer?” I would have declined to answer this question, as the answer is unnecessary for the district court’s analysis in the underlying case given the Court’s answer to the second certified question. This Court recently explained, in City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., that a “certified question’s purpose is to ‘determine [the] 1 These allegations are taken from the Second Amended Complaint, the operative complaint in the case pending before the district court. 2 legal correctness’ of certain issues that are ‘critical’ to ‘determine the final outcome of a case.’” ___ W. Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d. ___, ___, 2025 WL 1367333, at *6 (W. Va. May 12, 2025) (quoting Bass v. Coltelli, 192 W. Va. 516, 520, 453 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1994), superseded by statute, W. Va. Code § 58-5-2, as recognized by Smith v. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd., 222 W. Va. 345, 664 S.E.2d 686 (2008)) (discussing certification of questions by a state court). This Court further held that when answering a certified question from a federal court, “the legal issue must substantially control the case.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, id. The majority’s answer to district court’s third question disregards those restrictions. The majority, in answering the second certified question, provides the district court enou