Legal Case

In Re C S Alexander Minor

Court

Michigan Court of Appeals

Decided

June 3, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Practice Areas

Family Law
Child Custody
Parental Rights
Child Welfare

Case Summary

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS FOR PUBLICATION June 03, 2025 10:46 AM In re C. S. ALEXANDER, Minor. Nos. 369324; 369325 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2004-433556-NA Before: MARIANI, P.J., and RIORDAN and FEENEY, JJ. RIORDAN, J. In these consolidated appeals,1 respondents appeal as of right the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to CSA under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) (abandonment). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Petitioners were appointed as the legal guardians of CSA on July 31, 2019.2 In September 2022, petitioners filed a permanent custody petition requesting that the trial court assume jurisdiction over CSA pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(6)(A) (the parent, having the ability to support the child, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide regular and substantial support 1 On January 17, 2024, this Court entered an order consolidating these two appeals. In re C S Alexander, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 17, 2024 (Docket Nos. 369324 & 369325). 2 We note that there are discrepancies in the lower court record as to when petitioners’ guardianship of CSA was originally established, presumably because multiple orders of guardianship were entered due to issues surrounding the identity of CSA’s true father. However, as the referee took judicial notice of the record arising out of the accompanying probate-court proceedings, and she determined that petitioners’ guardianship was first established on July 31, 2019, that is the date we have cited. -1- for the child for two years or more before the filing of the petition), and (B) (the parent, having ability to visit, contact, or communicate with the child, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected, without good cause, to do so for two years or more before the filing of the petition),3 and enter an order terminating the parental rights of respondent-mother and respondent-mother’s husband4 to CSA under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). Petitioners presumably listed respondent-mother’s husband as the minor child’s legal father, as opposed to respondent-father, due to their marital relationship, and because respondent-mother’s husband was listed as the father on CSA’s birth certificate. When petitioners filed the aforementioned petition, it appears that petitioners were unaware that in February 2022, the Wayne Probate Court entered an order revoking the paternity of respondent-mother’s husband regarding four of respondent-mother’s children, including CSA, and vacated all orders of filiation, child support, and other related items, because DNA testing results revealed that respondent-mother’s husband was not the biological father of the four cited children.5 Accordingly, in February 2023, the trial court entered an order dismissing petitioners’ September 2022 permanent custody petition because respondent-mother’s husband was improperly listed as CSA’s father, and “Mother has identified a man as the biological father of [CSA], but no notice has been submitted to him by this court or the Probate Court[,]” referring to respondent-father. The trial court further ordered petitioners to return to the probate court to “seek a new consent order and give notice to biological father of the same.” On April 19, 2023, the probate court entered an order for authority to adopt and granted petitioners the authority to file a petition for the adoption of CSA. On May 15, 2023, petitioners filed a permanent custody petition requesting that the trial court assume jurisdiction over CSA pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(6)(A) and (B),6 and enter an order terminating respondents’ parental rights to CSA under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). The petition detailed that a guardianship order placing CSA in petitioners’ custody was entered on February 2, 2023,7 and the petition further identified respondents as the parents of CSA. On May 18, 2023, the trial court authorized the petition. On 3 The petition erroneously cites MCL 712A.2(b)(5) as the statutory ground for jurisdiction, but the featured language is from MCL 712A.2(b)(6). 4 It is unclear wheth

Case Summary

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Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Termination of parental rights
Abandonment
Jurisdiction
Putative father
Best interests of the child
Child protective proceedings

Case Information

Detailed case metadata and classifications

Court Proceedings

Date FiledJune 3, 2025
Date DecidedJune 3, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
0

Legal Classification

JurisdictionSA
Court Type
federal
Judicial Panel
Michael J. Riordan
Philip P. Mariani
Kathleen A. Feeney
Opinion Author
Michael J. Riordan

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Dept. of Human Services v. M. P.

341 Or. App. 158

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

158 June 4, 2025 No. 513 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of A. P., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. P., Appellant. Clackamas County Circuit Court 24JU01576; A185671 Todd L. Van Rysselberghe, Judge. Submitted April 30, 2025. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Kyle Sessions, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. JOYCE, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 158 (2025) 159 JOYCE, J. In this juvenile dependency case, father appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment asserting jurisdiction over his child A based, in part, on father’s mental health issues and pattern of impulsive behavior.1 Father raises three assignments of error, all of which reduce to the argu- ment that the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) failed to prove that father exposed A to a nonspecu- lative threat of serious loss or injury as a result of father’s mental health issues and impulsivity. We affirm. Absent de novo review, which father does not seek, when reviewing the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction, “[w]e view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favor- able to the juvenile court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit the outcome.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App 708, 709, 425 P3d 775 (2018). Juvenile court depen- dency jurisdiction is authorized under ORS 419B.100(1)(c) when a child’s condition and circumstances expose them to a current threat of serious loss or injury that will likely be realized. Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or App 391, 397-98, 342 P3d 174 (2015). ODHS bears the burden of prov- ing a nexus between the allegedly risk-causing conduct and probable harm to the child. Id. at 398. We conclude that the record before the juvenile court at the July 2024 jurisdiction trial was sufficient to sup- port its determination that then-four-month-old A would be exposed to a nonspeculative threat of serious loss or injury without dependency jurisdiction. Preceding A’s birth, ODHS and the juvenile court had already been involved with father’s family for about two years, in relation to parents’ older child J and two of moth- er’s other children. Father’s relationship with ODHS was contentious and combative, with father frequently sending rambling, hostile, and threatening messages to ODHS staff. The ODHS caseworker believed that father did not perceive 1 Mother did not appeal the jurisdiction judgment and is not a party to this appeal. 160 Dept. of Human Services v. M. P. reality like others, that he did not recognize the concerns that DHS had presented, and that he was unable to discuss his children’s needs. A was born prematurely, in March 2024, and was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and placed on a CPAP machine to address his respiratory dis- tress. While spending time with A in the NICU, father’s behavior was “unusual,” with him making “strange hand and body movements” and talking rapidly to himself, the wall, or someone who was not there. When a doctor and nurses explained that A was in respiratory distress and needed the CPAP machine to assist him with breath- ing, father did not acknowledge what was being said and appeared to not understand, continuing to insist that the CPAP machine was not safe. Father attempted to remove the CPAP machine, but hospital staff stopped him, deter- mined that he should not be left alone with A, and reported the incident to ODHS. Father and mother did not visit A after he was discharged from the hospital into ODHS’s tem- porary custody in April 2024. There is also evidence in the record that the apart- ment where father and mother had been living was unsafe. There was garbage throughout the apartment, including rotting food and used feminine hygiene products, and a thick layer of sawdust from the pallets they broke down and burned for heat covered much of the kitchen. At the jurisdiction trial, father frequently inter- rupted the proceedings, reacting to arguments from the parties and the testimony of witnesses and speaking to him- self or t

Very Similar Similarity

Dept. of Human Services v. M. U.

341 Or. App. 206

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

206 June 4, 2025 No. 524 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of A. P. N. M., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. U., Appellant. Polk County Circuit Court 23JU00969; A185938 (Control) In the Matter of A. L. W. M., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. U., Appellant. Polk County Circuit Court 23JU00970; A185939 Rafael A. Caso, Judge. Argued and submitted April 30, 2025. George W. Kelly argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant. Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 206 (2025) 207 PER CURIAM Affirmed. 208 Dept. of Human Services v. M. U. PER CURIAM Mother appeals judgments terminating her paren- tal rights to two of her children, AL and AP. In four assign- ments of error, mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that she knew about and aided father’s sex- ual abuse of her stepchild, M, in determining that she was unfit to parent AL and AP, and in concluding that it would be in AL’s and AP’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental rights. We review de novo, ORS 19.415(3)(a), ORS 419A.200(6), and affirm.1 A parent’s rights can be terminated when a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is “unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimen- tal to the child,” that “integration of the child * * * into the home * * * is improbable within a reasonable time due to con- duct or conditions not likely to change[,]” and that termina- tion is in the “best interests” of the child. ORS 419B.500(1); ORS 419B.504; ORS 419B.521(1); State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 144-46, 36 P3d 490 (2001). “Evidence is clear and convincing when it makes the existence of a fact highly probable or when it is of extraordinary persuasive- ness.” Dept. of Human Services v. R. K., 271 Or App 83, 88, 351 P3d 68, rev den, 357 Or 640 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). In her first assignment of error, mother argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that she knew about and aided father’s sexual abuse of M. But mother reported father’s sexual abuse of M to police in April 2018, and, at the termination of parental rights (TPR) trial, M testified that mother knew about father’s sexual abuse. The detailed nature of mother’s report to the police supports its verac- ity. At the TPR trial, mother testified that her report to the police was false, but her account of why she lied to the police is implausible. In addition, the juvenile court found that mother’s testimony was not credible, and that some of M’s testimony about sexual abuse was corroborated and credi- ble. Even on de novo review, we give “considerable weight” 1 Also decided today is Dept. of Human Services v. M. D. M., 341 Or App 201, (Jun 4, 2025), in which we affirm judgments terminating father’s parental rights to the same two children. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 206 (2025) 209 to demeanor-based credibility findings, because the juve- nile court judge “had the opportunity to observe the wit- nesses and their demeanor in evaluating the credibility of their testimony.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. B., 294 Or App 514, 516, 432 P3d 343 (2018), rev den, 365 Or 556 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having reviewed the record de novo and giving due weight to the juvenile court’s demeanor-based credibility findings, we reject mother’s first assignment of error. In her second and third assignments, mother argues that the juvenile court erred in determining that she was unfit to care for AL and AP because she has kept father away from the farm for six years, she intends to continue doing so, and her other children will ensure that father has no contact with AL and AP. However, at the time of the TPR trial, mother was pregnant with her seventh child, and she acknowledged that father was the father. Reviewing the record de novo, it shows that mother is unable or unwill- ing to understand that father is a danger to the children. In addition, mother has not participated in services since 2021, she remains married to and dependent on father, and we

Very Similar Similarity

Dept. of Human Services v. M. D. M.

341 Or. App. 201

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

No. 523 June 4, 2025 201 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of A. P. N. M., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. D. M., Appellant. Polk County Circuit Court 23JU00971; A185936 (Control) In the Matter of A. L. W. M., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. D. M., Appellant. Polk County Circuit Court 23JU00972; A185937 Rafael A. Caso, Judge. Submitted April 30, 2025. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Holly Telerant, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. 202 Dept. of Human Services v. M. D. M. PER CURIAM Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 201 (2025) 203 PER CURIAM Father appeals judgments terminating his parental rights to two of his children, AL and AP. On appeal, father asserts that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights, because it “erred in ruling that terminating father’s parental rights was in [AL’s and AP’s] best inter- est.”1 On de novo review, ORS 19.415(3)(a), ORS 419A.200(6), we affirm.2 At the outset, we note that, in conducting our de novo review, we have given “considerable weight” to the demeanor-based credibility findings of the juvenile court, because the juvenile court judge “had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor in evaluating the credibility of their testimony.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. B., 294 Or App 514, 516, 432 P3d 343 (2018), rev den, 365 Or 556 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). A parent’s rights can be terminated when a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is “unfit by reason of a single or recurrent incident of extreme conduct toward any child” and that termination is in the “best interests” of the child. ORS 419B.500(1); ORS 419B.503; ORS 419B.521(1); State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 144, 36 P3d 490 (2001). “Evidence is clear and convinc- ing when it makes the existence of a fact highly probable or when it is of extraordinary persuasiveness.” Dept. of Human Services v. R. K., 271 Or App 83, 88, 351 P3d 68, rev den, 357 Or 640 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, father does not challenge the juvenile court’s determination that he is “unfit by reason of extreme conduct toward a child,” namely, that he “subjected two of his [other] children to sexual contact when each was under the age of 14 years old” and that that contact with the other children constituted “rape and at a minimum sexual abuse.” 1 Father also asserts that the juvenile court erred in “applying the incor- rect legal test by shifting the burden to parents to prove that terminating their parental rights was not in [AL’s] and [AP’s] best interest.” Having reviewed the juvenile court’s ruling, we reject that contention. 2 Also decided today is Dept. of Human Services v. M. U., 341 Or App 206 (2025), in which we affirm judgments terminating mother’s parental rights to the same two children. 204 Dept. of Human Services v. M. D. M. But, as noted above, father does challenge the juve- nile court’s best interest determination. The best interest inquiry is a “child-focused inquiry” that requires the court “to determine, from the evidence presented in the termina- tion proceeding, whether termination is in the child’s best interest.” Dept. of Human Services v. M. H., 306 Or App 150, 162, 473 P3d 1152 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, on appeal, father argues that “this court should conclude that given the children’s bond to their family members and, through them, their connection to their unique cultural background, the department failed to prove that the benefit to the children of terminating par- ents’ parental rights outweighed the magnitude of the loss that they would incur as a result.” In advancing that argu- ment, father asserts that the juvenile court “ignored the pos- sibility of providing the children ‘permanency’ and ‘finality’ through a permanent guardianship with [AL’s] and [AP

Very Similar Similarity

Dept. of Human Services v. M. E.

341 Or. App. 188

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

188 June 4, 2025 No. 520 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of W. O. A. IV, aka B. B. E., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. E., Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 24JU03934; A185889 Michele C. Rini, Judge. Submitted April 30, 2025. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Stacy M. Chaffin, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. JACQUOT, J. Reversed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 188 (2025) 189 JACQUOT, J. In this juvenile dependency case, mother appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment asserting jurisdiction over her infant son, W.1 She asserts that “the juvenile court erred in finding that [her] ‘pattern of criminal activities’ and ‘history of and current substance abuse’ posed a cur- rent threat of serious loss or injury warranting jurisdiction.” Specifically, mother asserts the juvenile court erred, because (1) there was no evidence that mother’s past criminal activi- ties involved children or evinced harm to children; (2) there was no evidence that W has been exposed to controlled sub- stances or that mother used controlled substances around him; (3) there was no evidence, even if mother had recently used controlled substances, that her use impaired her abil- ity to meet W’s basic needs; and (4) at the time of the juris- dictional hearing, mother was not as risk of incarceration while in Oregon. Consequently, in mother’s view, the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) did not prove that she exposed her child to a nonspeculative threat of serious loss or injury stemming from her criminal activities and substance abuse.2 ODHS responds that the court properly asserted jurisdiction because “mother’s substance abuse was active at the time of the trial, intertwined with her criminal activity, and combined with the use and possession of firearms, all of which posed a current and non-speculative risk to [W].” Because evidence presented at the time of the juris- dictional hearing did not support a conclusion that mother posed a current and nonspeculative risk to W under ORS 419B.100(1)(c), as further explained below, we reverse. For a juvenile court to take jurisdiction over a child, ODHS must present evidence “sufficient to support a con- clusion that the child’s condition or circumstances expose the child to a current threat of serious loss or injury that is likely to be realized.” Dept. of Human Services v. J. H., 292 Or App 733, 737, 425 P3d 791 (2018) (internal quotation 1 Father is deceased. 2 At the time of trial, W took the same position and asked that the case be dismissed. He does not appear on appeal. 190 Dept. of Human Services v. M. E. marks omitted). Specifically, ODHS “must establish the type, degree, and duration of the harm at issue,” and it must “establish a nexus between the allegedly risk-causing conduct and the harm to the child.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The risk of harm must be “nonspecula- tive”; that is, “there must be a reasonable likelihood that the threat will be realized.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). No party asks for de novo review, nor do we find this to be an exceptional case warranting it. In the absence of a de novo review, in reviewing a juvenile court’s determina- tion of jurisdiction in juvenile dependency proceedings, we: “(1) assume the correctness of the juvenile court’s explicit findings of historical fact if these findings are supported by any evidence in the record; (2) further assume that, if the juvenile court did not explicitly resolve a disputed issue of material fact and it could have reached the disposition that it reached only if it resolved that issue in one way, the court implicitly resolved the issue consistently with that disposition; and (3) assess whether the combination of (1) and (2), along with nonspeculative inferences, was legally sufficient to permit the trial court to determine that ORS 419B.100(1)(c) was satisfied.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. P., 257 Or App 633, 639-40, 307 P3d 444 (2013). In considering this case, we note that the juvenile court made adverse credibility findings against mother. Those findings are supported by the record, and we do not disturb them. Dept. of Human Services v. A. J. G., 304 Or App 221, 230, 465 P3d 293,

Very Similar Similarity

Dept. of Human Services v. R. C.

341 Or. App. 153

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

No. 512 June 4, 2025 153 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of A. S. C., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. R. C., Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 18JU01657; A183944 (Control) In the Matter of S. M. C., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. R. C., Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 18JU01658; A183945 Ann Marie Simmons, Judge. Submitted April 30, 2025. Aron Perez-Selsky and Michael J. Wallace filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. 154 Dept. of Human Services v. R. C. JOYCE, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 153 (2025) 155 JOYCE, J. Father appeals from a judgment granting durable guardianship over his two children, S and A. He assigns error both to that determination and to the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. We affirm. We begin with a threshold jurisdictional question, namely, whether the judgment establishing guardianship also constitutes a judgment denying father’s motion to dis- miss.1 It does. The judgment itself is entitled “Judgment Establishing Guardianship.” Yet the judgment incorporates the juvenile court’s letter opinion, which denies father’s motion to dismiss and grants the guardianship. “Generally speaking, incorporated writings are considered part of the writing in which they are incorporated.” State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Brown, 175 Or App 1, 10 n 4, 27 P3d 502, rev den, 332 Or 558 (2001). Thus, the judgment—by incorporating the letter opinion addressing both the motion to dismiss and the motion to establish guardianship—disposes of both those issues and creates an appealable judgment with respect to both. We turn to the merits. Father contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to dismiss juris- diction on the basis that the conditions that led to the chil- dren’s removal had been ameliorated. As the parties both note, in assessing a motion to dismiss, the court must first “determine whether the original bases for jurisdiction con- tinue to pose a current threat of loss or serious injury.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L., 279 Or App 673, 685, 379 P3d 741 (2016). If they do, the court must then “assess the likeli- hood that that risk will be realized.” Id. Where, as here, the permanency plan is something other than reunification, “a parent seeking dismissal of dependency jurisdiction must prove that the bases for jurisdiction no longer pose a current threat of loss or harm to the child that is reasonably likely to be realized, thereby overcoming the presumption created by the permanency plan that the child cannot return safely to parents.” Id. at 690. 1 ODHS raises the question whether the juvenile court entered a judgment with respect to the denial of the motion to dismiss but does not take a position on that question. Father has simply assumed that we have jurisdiction. 156 Dept. of Human Services v. R. C. The juvenile court concluded that the conditions that led to the children’s removal and juvenile court jurisdiction— father’s anger control problem and physical discipline that resulted in an impairment of the children’s well-being and functioning—had not been ameliorated: “Father’s behaviors continue at an observable level. He expresses frustration at the agency, his [older child], the caseworkers, his previous treatment providers, etc. He speaks about anger control, without seeming to understand his behaviors speak otherwise. He denies certain behav- iors, deflects and minimizes others, and attempts to con- trol the narrative of both his treatment work and the court case. * * * [The children] have suffered severe trauma, have for the second time begun making progress, but are at high risk to experience further trauma. The court concludes that the original bases of jurisdiction for father continue to represent a very real risk of both further loss and further injury, in fact, based on father’s current behaviors the court concludes reunification after a dismissal would almost cer- tainly result in further trau

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Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

June 3, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Court Type

federal

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0
Legal Topics
Termination of parental rights
Abandonment
Jurisdiction
Putative father
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AddedJun 4, 2025
UpdatedJun 4, 2025

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