Ia v. Rm

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS UNPUBLISHED June 24, 2025 10:20 AM In re CD, Minor. No. 371098 Crawford Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 21-004622-NA Before: MARIANI, P.J., and MALDONADO and YOUNG, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent-mother appeals by right the order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, CD, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to parent’s home). In a scant, two-paragraph argument on appeal, respondent-mother asserts only that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of a separate personal protection order (PPO) case between herself and CD’s father, who was not a respondent in this matter, and that there was no need to terminate her parental rights because she was jailed for violating the PPO. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND This case was commenced approximately a month after respondent-mother’s home was raided by a police drug taskforce following three controlled purchases of prescription drugs from respondent-mother, during which the police found and confiscated a dangerous butane-based THC extraction lab from her garage. The minor child, CD, was placed in the care of his father in an ex parte custody order entered in a custody case between the father and respondent-mother. The father was simultaneously granted a PPO against respondent-mother. The same judge presided over this case, the custody case, and the PPO proceedings.1 The trial court took judicial notice of the PPO proceedings in a contempt hearing in this case without objection by respondent-mother’s 1 The trial court also issued another PPO against respondent-mother while this case was pending. -1- attorney. Respondent-mother also was charged criminally, and a different judge presided over her criminal cases. Almost three years after the raid and more than two years after the order of adjudication, the trial court issued a lengthy written opinion that summarized the voluminous testimony in this case. The trial court found that respondent-mother’s noncompliance with petitioner, continued impulsivity and history of defiance, and lack of benefit from services showed that CD would likely be harmed if returned to her care. The trial court then found that respondent-mother’s dishonesty, lack of insight, lack of accountability, and questionable judgment in recently marrying a felon showed that termination was in CD’s best interests. The trial court noted that it had no assurance that CD would be kept safe through custody orders in the parallel custody proceeding because respondent-mother’s conduct throughout this case and as reflected in the PPO case showed that she could not be trusted to follow any such orders. II. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES A respondent must object in the trial court to the trial court’s use of evidence. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). Respondent-mother expressly declined to do so when the trial court directly asked if she had any objection to the trial court taking judicial notice of the PPO matters at a contempt hearing in this case. Waiver does not require any particular language, but it “must be explicit, voluntary, and made in good faith.” In re MJC Minor, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 365616); slip op at 3. A party waives an issue by expressly declining a trial court’s invitation to object to a matter. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000); People v McDonald, 293 Mich App 292, 295; 811 NW2d 507 (2011). If an issue is waived, there is no right to appeal. People v Flores, 346 Mich App 602, 608; 13 NW3d 668 (2023). However, “[o]ut of an abundance of caution,” we will treat this issue “as merely forfeited rather than affirmatively waived.” See Flores, 346 Mich App at 608-609. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW An unpreserved error in a termination-of-parental-rights case is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29 & n 13; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). Under that standard, a clear or obvious error must have occurred, the error must have affected the outcome of the

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00031-CV ___________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF E.T., A.T., AND E.T., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 231st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 231-745808-24 Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach  MEMORANDUM OPINION Father appeals from the trial court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor children on the grounds that Father had “executed before or after the suit [wa]s filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by Chapter 161” of the Texas Family Code and that termination was in the children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(K), (b)(2). We affirm. Father’s appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in cases terminating parental rights), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). The brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. Further, Father’s counsel (1) provided Father with a copy of the Anders brief, (2) informed Father of his right to file a pro se response, and (3) advised Father of his right to access the appellate record and provided to him a form motion for effectuating that purpose. 1 1 Father’s counsel did not inform Father of his pro se right to seek discretionary review of our opinion should we declare his appeal frivolous, a function that an appointed lawyer who files an Anders brief must fulfill in a criminal appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 48.4; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). An appointed 2 Father did not file a response, and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services declined to file a brief. When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Our examination should consider the record, the briefs, and any pro se response. In re L.B., No. 02-19-00407-CV, 2020 WL 1809505, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). After careful review, we agree with Father’s counsel that there are no arguable grounds for appeal in this case. We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights. Father’s counsel remains appointed in this case through any proceedings in the Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved of these duties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016; In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order). /s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice Delivered: June 19, 2025 appellate attorney in a termination appeal has no such obligation, however, because his representation does not end in our court. See In re C.W., No. 02-21-00340-CV, 2022 WL 1155908, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 19, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 3

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED June 17, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3:38 PM v No. 370663 Wayne Circuit Court LORENZO JEROME MONTGOMERY, JR., LC No. 23-005497-01-FH Defendant-Appellee. Before: MALDONADO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ. PER CURIAM. In this domestic violence action, the prosecution appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order excluding as inadmissible statements made by the victim to law enforcement regarding her alleged assault by defendant, Lorenzo Jerome Montgomery, Jr. The trial court held that the victim’s statements were testimonial, making them inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, US Const, Am VI. We reverse and remand. I. BACKGROUND Defendant is charged with first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); intentionally discharging a firearm at a building, MCL 750.234b(1); assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder or by strangulation, MCL 750.84; second-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(3); carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; and domestic violence, 1 People v Montgomery, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 26, 2024 (Docket No. 370663). This Court also granted a stay of the trial court proceedings pending this appeal. See id. -1- MCL 750.81(2);2 stemming from an altercation between defendant and the victim during a custody exchange of their three-year-old child, BM. Defendant went to the victim’s home as agreed to retrieve BM, and on arrival, became upset because there was another male inside the home. Defendant began to bang and pound on the windows and doors until the victim opened the side door, handed BM to defendant, and closed the door. After the victim gave BM to defendant, defendant broke through the side door with a handgun, placed the victim in a chokehold, and dragged her into a bedroom. BM ran back into the house, and defendant picked up BM before firing his gun into the ceiling. Defendant carried BM outside to his vehicle, firing his gun a second time into the air from the front porch, before leaving with BM. Shortly after, the victim called her mother, Estella Hardy, crying, at which point Hardy drove to the victim’s home, arriving about 10 minutes after the telephone call. Hardy saw a contusion on the side of the victim’s head and asked the victim where BM was located. Hardy told the victim that they should call the police, and officers arrived in less than 15 minutes. Officer Drew Macaechren received a dispatch for a possible home invasion and domestic dispute. The victim gave Officer Macaechren defendant’s cellular phone number, and dispatch contacted defendant’s phone carrier service to locate defendant. Defendant was taken into custody at his home, and BM was located in an upstairs room. The victim did not testify at defendant’s preliminary examination; however, Officer Macaechren and Hardy testified about the events and statements made by the victim. After defendant was bound over, the prosecution moved to admit the victim’s statements to Officer Macaechren under MCL 768.27c (admissibility of statement by declarant relating to infliction or threat of physical injury). Defendant objected, arguing that the statements were testimonial and admitting them would violate his confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment. Relying on the preliminary examination testimony, the trial court found that the victim’s statements to Officer Macaechren were not made to assist with an ongoing emergency but rather were made to assist with prosecuting defendant, and as such, were testimonial. Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion. The prosecution then moved for a stay in the proceedings under MCR 6.126 (decision on admissibility of evidence), which the trial court denied on the basis that “an appeal would be frivolous because legal precedent is clearly against the prosecutor’s position.” This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION The Supreme Court has identified several factors that courts should consider when determining if statements to police are testimonial: The existence of an emergency or the parties’ perception that an emergency is ongoing is among the most important circumst

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-24-00318-CV Randell Donell Canady, Appellant v. Donna Marie Canady, Appellee FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 3 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 22-1521-FC3, THE HONORABLE DOUG ARNOLD, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Randell Donell Canady, appearing pro se, appeals from the trial court’s Order of Enforcement of Property Division (Order) finding that he had violated the agreed divorce decree that ended his marriage to Donna Marie Canady. 1 In the Order, the trial court found that Randell had failed to comply with a provision in the decree requiring him to either refinance the mortgage on the parties’ marital home (which had been awarded to him) or sell the home. The Order mandated that Randell list the property for sale with a licensed realtor by a specified date and cooperate with the realtor to “achieve a speedy sale.” For the following reasons, we affirm the Order. The trial court signed the agreed divorce decree on September 27, 2023. Among its provisions, the decree awarded the parties’ marital residence to Randell and required him to 1 Because the parties share the same surname, for clarity we refer to them by their first names. “assume the promissory note secured by the property and pay it timely, no later than fifteen (15) days after the due date.” It further required him to, within 180 days of the decree’s entry, “refinance the mortgage note” on the property. If he failed to “refinance the mortgage removing DONNA MARIE CANADY’s name from the note,” the decree required him to sell the residence “on the first day following” the expiration of said 180 days. 2 In February 2024, Donna filed a Petition for Enforcement of Property Division by Contempt, alleging that Randell was in contempt of the decree for failing to timely refinance the mortgage note. At the hearing on Donna’s petition, Donna’s attorney represented that they were no longer seeking a contempt judgment—they were asking only that Randell be required to sell the home—and thus the court stated that Randell was “not entitled to counsel” and could go forward pro se if he was prepared to do so, to which Randell responded affirmatively. The trial court asked Randell in open court whether he had refinanced or sold the home within 180 days of the decree, referring to those two choices to which he was ordered in the decree as “Option A or B,” respectively. Randell responded that he “applied for the refinance,” was approved for it, but that the “VA agent called” him and told him that he did not have to refinance the loan but could “assume the loan entirely” instead. The trial court characterized the VA agent’s suggestion as “Option C” and informed Randell that the decree did not permit a third party to “alleviate[] that responsibility for [Option] A or B.” The trial court informed Randell that Donna was now asking for Option B (that Randell sell the home), and Randell replied, “Sir, I accept B.” The trial court asked whether Randell could have the home ready to list by June 1, 2024, and whether that proposal would work for him, and he replied, 2 The decree alternatively required Randell to sell the home if, prior to timely refinancing, he “falls behind in the timely payment of the mortgage note secured by the property for a period of fifteen (15) days or more.” 2 “Yes, Your Honor.” The trial court then granted Donna’s enforcement petition, ordered Randell to sell the home by June 1, 2024, and requested that Donna’s counsel prepare an order accordingly, which it later signed. On appeal, Randell complains that the decree’s use of the term “refinance” is ambiguous and needs clarification, as he and Donna believe it means different things as to the method used to refinance the loan on the home. He contends that he may “assume” the loan as the “VA agent” suggested—which he argues would “remove” Donna’s name from the mortgage note—while Donna maintains (and the trial court determined) that a loan assumption is not the same thing as a refinance, which term the decree expressly employed. Randall prays that this Court reverse the Order requiring him to sell the home and either replace the term “refinance” with “language that include[s] the Assumption refinance through the VA-guaranteed loan program” or remand the case to the trial court with instructions that it so revise the decree. Randell’s appellate complaint fails for two reasons. First, Randell conceded in open court that he had neither refinanced the home nor sold it as required in the decree. He then agreed

No. 538 June 11, 2025 299 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON D. R. H., Petitioner-Appellant, v. SETH THOMAS HOLBROOK, Respondent-Respondent. Yamhill County Circuit Court 22SK02713; A182668 Cynthia Kaufman Noble, Judge. Submitted February 4, 2025. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant. No appearance for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce, Judge. JOYCE, J. Affirmed. 300 D. R. H. v. Holbrook JOYCE, J. Petitioner appeals from a judgment denying her petition for a permanent stalking protective order (SPO) against respondent, her ex-husband.1 She contends that the trial court erred in finding that her evidence did not satisfy the requirements for an SPO. On appeal, we review “the evi- dence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition.” H. L. P. v. Jones, 309 Or App 108, 109, 481 P3d 415 (2021). Doing so, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the SPO, where it was not persuaded by petitioner’s evidence, regardless of whether that evidence would have supported an SPO had the court found the facts differently. Accordingly, we affirm. Petitioner and respondent were married for sev- eral years, and they had two children. Petitioner sought an SPO against respondent after a series of incidents in which respondent came to her home, engaged in conversation with her, and, on at least two occasions, would not leave when told. Petitioner testified that respondent’s visits caused her “alarm” and made her feel “very unsafe” because she “didn’t know what he was going to do next.” Petitioner also testi- fied that when she and respondent were married, he was “emotionally” and “psychologically” abusive and displayed “controlling behaviors, possessiveness, [and] erratic anger.” For example, on several occasions when respondent had become angry while driving her and their son, respondent had accelerated to unsafe speeds and had refused to relin- quish control of the vehicle. Although petitioner testified that respondent was never physically abusive toward her, she stated that respondent was physically abusive toward their son. According to petitioner, respondent had been “dis- proportionate with his discipline” and that “there was actu- ally a time where [their son] did get bruised from spanking.” After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered a judgment denying the SPO. In its letter opinion, the court stated that “based on [its] credibility and demeanor find- ings, [it had] a number of concerns about many aspects of the testimony and the record made in this case.” The court 1 Respondent does not appear on appeal. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 299 (2025) 301 did not specify, beyond that statement, what credibility or demeanor findings it had made. Ultimately, the court con- cluded that “[p]etitioner has failed to meet the burden to satisfy the elements for the continuance of the Stalking Protective Order.” Petitioner appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that she failed to meet her burden to sat- isfy the requirements for an SPO. In particular, petitioner contends that the record regarding respondent’s visits to her home was sufficient to establish that he made two unwanted contacts that subjectively alarmed her and that her alarm was objectively reasonable. See ORS 30.866(1)(a) - (c) (to obtain an SPO, a petitioner must prove that the respondent engaged in “repeated and unwanted contact[s]” that sub- jectively alarmed the petitioner as to the threat of physical injury, and that the alarm was objectively reasonable). The problem with petitioner’s argument is that we do not understand the trial court to have ruled on the suffi- ciency of the evidence. Instead, it appears to us that the court simply was not persuaded by petitioner’s evidence. Given that, it is immaterial whether the evidence, if believed, was sufficient to support the issuance of an SPO. Our standard of review requires us to review “the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the trial court’s dis- position.” H. L. P., 309 Or App at 109. Where, as here, the trial court did not make any express findings of fact, we “presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion as long as there is evidence in the record to support those implicit findings.” M. A. B. v. Buell, 366 Or 553, 565, 466 P3d 949 (2020) (inter- nal q