Dept. of Human Services v. M. E.

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS UNPUBLISHED June 24, 2025 10:20 AM In re CD, Minor. No. 371098 Crawford Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 21-004622-NA Before: MARIANI, P.J., and MALDONADO and YOUNG, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent-mother appeals by right the order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, CD, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to parent’s home). In a scant, two-paragraph argument on appeal, respondent-mother asserts only that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of a separate personal protection order (PPO) case between herself and CD’s father, who was not a respondent in this matter, and that there was no need to terminate her parental rights because she was jailed for violating the PPO. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND This case was commenced approximately a month after respondent-mother’s home was raided by a police drug taskforce following three controlled purchases of prescription drugs from respondent-mother, during which the police found and confiscated a dangerous butane-based THC extraction lab from her garage. The minor child, CD, was placed in the care of his father in an ex parte custody order entered in a custody case between the father and respondent-mother. The father was simultaneously granted a PPO against respondent-mother. The same judge presided over this case, the custody case, and the PPO proceedings.1 The trial court took judicial notice of the PPO proceedings in a contempt hearing in this case without objection by respondent-mother’s 1 The trial court also issued another PPO against respondent-mother while this case was pending. -1- attorney. Respondent-mother also was charged criminally, and a different judge presided over her criminal cases. Almost three years after the raid and more than two years after the order of adjudication, the trial court issued a lengthy written opinion that summarized the voluminous testimony in this case. The trial court found that respondent-mother’s noncompliance with petitioner, continued impulsivity and history of defiance, and lack of benefit from services showed that CD would likely be harmed if returned to her care. The trial court then found that respondent-mother’s dishonesty, lack of insight, lack of accountability, and questionable judgment in recently marrying a felon showed that termination was in CD’s best interests. The trial court noted that it had no assurance that CD would be kept safe through custody orders in the parallel custody proceeding because respondent-mother’s conduct throughout this case and as reflected in the PPO case showed that she could not be trusted to follow any such orders. II. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES A respondent must object in the trial court to the trial court’s use of evidence. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). Respondent-mother expressly declined to do so when the trial court directly asked if she had any objection to the trial court taking judicial notice of the PPO matters at a contempt hearing in this case. Waiver does not require any particular language, but it “must be explicit, voluntary, and made in good faith.” In re MJC Minor, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 365616); slip op at 3. A party waives an issue by expressly declining a trial court’s invitation to object to a matter. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000); People v McDonald, 293 Mich App 292, 295; 811 NW2d 507 (2011). If an issue is waived, there is no right to appeal. People v Flores, 346 Mich App 602, 608; 13 NW3d 668 (2023). However, “[o]ut of an abundance of caution,” we will treat this issue “as merely forfeited rather than affirmatively waived.” See Flores, 346 Mich App at 608-609. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW An unpreserved error in a termination-of-parental-rights case is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29 & n 13; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). Under that standard, a clear or obvious error must have occurred, the error must have affected the outcome of the

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00031-CV ___________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF E.T., A.T., AND E.T., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 231st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 231-745808-24 Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach  MEMORANDUM OPINION Father appeals from the trial court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor children on the grounds that Father had “executed before or after the suit [wa]s filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by Chapter 161” of the Texas Family Code and that termination was in the children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(K), (b)(2). We affirm. Father’s appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in cases terminating parental rights), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). The brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. Further, Father’s counsel (1) provided Father with a copy of the Anders brief, (2) informed Father of his right to file a pro se response, and (3) advised Father of his right to access the appellate record and provided to him a form motion for effectuating that purpose. 1 1 Father’s counsel did not inform Father of his pro se right to seek discretionary review of our opinion should we declare his appeal frivolous, a function that an appointed lawyer who files an Anders brief must fulfill in a criminal appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 48.4; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). An appointed 2 Father did not file a response, and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services declined to file a brief. When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Our examination should consider the record, the briefs, and any pro se response. In re L.B., No. 02-19-00407-CV, 2020 WL 1809505, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). After careful review, we agree with Father’s counsel that there are no arguable grounds for appeal in this case. We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights. Father’s counsel remains appointed in this case through any proceedings in the Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved of these duties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016; In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order). /s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice Delivered: June 19, 2025 appellate attorney in a termination appeal has no such obligation, however, because his representation does not end in our court. See In re C.W., No. 02-21-00340-CV, 2022 WL 1155908, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 19, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 3

No. 538 June 11, 2025 299 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON D. R. H., Petitioner-Appellant, v. SETH THOMAS HOLBROOK, Respondent-Respondent. Yamhill County Circuit Court 22SK02713; A182668 Cynthia Kaufman Noble, Judge. Submitted February 4, 2025. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant. No appearance for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce, Judge. JOYCE, J. Affirmed. 300 D. R. H. v. Holbrook JOYCE, J. Petitioner appeals from a judgment denying her petition for a permanent stalking protective order (SPO) against respondent, her ex-husband.1 She contends that the trial court erred in finding that her evidence did not satisfy the requirements for an SPO. On appeal, we review “the evi- dence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition.” H. L. P. v. Jones, 309 Or App 108, 109, 481 P3d 415 (2021). Doing so, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the SPO, where it was not persuaded by petitioner’s evidence, regardless of whether that evidence would have supported an SPO had the court found the facts differently. Accordingly, we affirm. Petitioner and respondent were married for sev- eral years, and they had two children. Petitioner sought an SPO against respondent after a series of incidents in which respondent came to her home, engaged in conversation with her, and, on at least two occasions, would not leave when told. Petitioner testified that respondent’s visits caused her “alarm” and made her feel “very unsafe” because she “didn’t know what he was going to do next.” Petitioner also testi- fied that when she and respondent were married, he was “emotionally” and “psychologically” abusive and displayed “controlling behaviors, possessiveness, [and] erratic anger.” For example, on several occasions when respondent had become angry while driving her and their son, respondent had accelerated to unsafe speeds and had refused to relin- quish control of the vehicle. Although petitioner testified that respondent was never physically abusive toward her, she stated that respondent was physically abusive toward their son. According to petitioner, respondent had been “dis- proportionate with his discipline” and that “there was actu- ally a time where [their son] did get bruised from spanking.” After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered a judgment denying the SPO. In its letter opinion, the court stated that “based on [its] credibility and demeanor find- ings, [it had] a number of concerns about many aspects of the testimony and the record made in this case.” The court 1 Respondent does not appear on appeal. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 299 (2025) 301 did not specify, beyond that statement, what credibility or demeanor findings it had made. Ultimately, the court con- cluded that “[p]etitioner has failed to meet the burden to satisfy the elements for the continuance of the Stalking Protective Order.” Petitioner appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that she failed to meet her burden to sat- isfy the requirements for an SPO. In particular, petitioner contends that the record regarding respondent’s visits to her home was sufficient to establish that he made two unwanted contacts that subjectively alarmed her and that her alarm was objectively reasonable. See ORS 30.866(1)(a) - (c) (to obtain an SPO, a petitioner must prove that the respondent engaged in “repeated and unwanted contact[s]” that sub- jectively alarmed the petitioner as to the threat of physical injury, and that the alarm was objectively reasonable). The problem with petitioner’s argument is that we do not understand the trial court to have ruled on the suffi- ciency of the evidence. Instead, it appears to us that the court simply was not persuaded by petitioner’s evidence. Given that, it is immaterial whether the evidence, if believed, was sufficient to support the issuance of an SPO. Our standard of review requires us to review “the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the trial court’s dis- position.” H. L. P., 309 Or App at 109. Where, as here, the trial court did not make any express findings of fact, we “presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion as long as there is evidence in the record to support those implicit findings.” M. A. B. v. Buell, 366 Or 553, 565, 466 P3d 949 (2020) (inter- nal q

114 June 4, 2025 No. 500 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of T. J. L., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. D. L., Jr., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 21JU04755; A185700 (Control) In the Matter of N. J. F. L., aka B. G. C., aka N. L., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. D. L., Jr., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 22JU03067; A185701 Valeri L. Love, Judge. Submitted April 30, 2025. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Elena C. Stross, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 114 (2025) 115 TOOKEY, P. J. Affirmed. 116 Dept. of Human Services v. J. D. L. TOOKEY, P. J. In this consolidated juvenile dependency case, father appeals judgments changing the permanency plans for his two children from reunification to permanent guardianship. Both children are members of the Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umpqua, and Siuslaw Indians, making the case subject to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC §§ 1901-1963, and the Oregon Indian Child Welfare Act, Or Laws 2020, ch 14, §§ 1-66 (Spec Sess 1) (codifying new pro- visions at ORS chapter 419B.600 to 419B.665 and amending various sections of ORS chapters 350, 418, 419A, and 419B). The juvenile court changed the plans after deter- mining that, although the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) made “active efforts,” father failed to make sufficient progress toward reunification. See ORS 419B.476(5)(k)(A) (requiring “active efforts” on the part of ODHS to facilitate an Indian child’s safe return home); ORS 419B.645 (defining “active efforts”). On appeal, father raises four assignments of error, two with respect to each child. In his first and second assignments of error, father contends that the juvenile court “erred in ruling that the department’s efforts to reunify [children] qualified as ‘active efforts.’ ” In his third and fourth assignments of error, father contends that, as a result, the juvenile court “erred in ruling to change [children]’s permanency plans away from reuni- fication to guardianship.” For the reasons explained below, we affirm. Father has not requested de novo review, and this is not an exceptional case in which de novo review is war- ranted. ORS 19.415(3)(b) (providing that de novo review is a matter of discretion when the appeal is not from a proceed- ing for the termination of parental rights); Dept. of Human Services v. J. G., 260 Or App 500, 502, 317 P3d 936 (2014) (“[T]here is a presumption against granting de novo review, and we do so only in exceptional cases.”). Absent de novo review, we “review the juvenile court’s legal conclusions for errors of law” and “we defer to the juvenile court’s findings of fact if there is any evidence in the record to support them.” Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B., 372 Or 133, 136, 546 P3d 255 (2024). Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 114 (2025) 117 To change the permanency plan for an Indian child to something other than reunification, the juvenile court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that “active efforts as described in ORS 419B.645 were provided to make it possible for the Indian child to safely return home[.]” ORS 419B.476(5)(k)(A).1 “Active efforts” involve a heightened standard that “obligates [O]DHS to do more than create a reunification plan and require the client to execute it independently.” Dept. of Human Services v. M. D., 266 Or App 789, 793, 340 P3d 86 (2014), rev den, 356 Or 767 (2015) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted); see also ORS 419B.645(3) (“Active efforts require a higher standard of conduct than reasonable efforts.”). ODHS “must assist the [parent] through the steps of a reunification” in a manner that reflects the particular circumstances of the case. M. D., 266 Or App at 793 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ORS 419B.645(4) (listing requirements for “active efforts” by ODHS). We address father’s assignments of e

158 June 4, 2025 No. 513 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of A. P., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. P., Appellant. Clackamas County Circuit Court 24JU01576; A185671 Todd L. Van Rysselberghe, Judge. Submitted April 30, 2025. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Kyle Sessions, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. JOYCE, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 158 (2025) 159 JOYCE, J. In this juvenile dependency case, father appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment asserting jurisdiction over his child A based, in part, on father’s mental health issues and pattern of impulsive behavior.1 Father raises three assignments of error, all of which reduce to the argu- ment that the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) failed to prove that father exposed A to a nonspecu- lative threat of serious loss or injury as a result of father’s mental health issues and impulsivity. We affirm. Absent de novo review, which father does not seek, when reviewing the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction, “[w]e view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favor- able to the juvenile court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit the outcome.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App 708, 709, 425 P3d 775 (2018). Juvenile court depen- dency jurisdiction is authorized under ORS 419B.100(1)(c) when a child’s condition and circumstances expose them to a current threat of serious loss or injury that will likely be realized. Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or App 391, 397-98, 342 P3d 174 (2015). ODHS bears the burden of prov- ing a nexus between the allegedly risk-causing conduct and probable harm to the child. Id. at 398. We conclude that the record before the juvenile court at the July 2024 jurisdiction trial was sufficient to sup- port its determination that then-four-month-old A would be exposed to a nonspeculative threat of serious loss or injury without dependency jurisdiction. Preceding A’s birth, ODHS and the juvenile court had already been involved with father’s family for about two years, in relation to parents’ older child J and two of moth- er’s other children. Father’s relationship with ODHS was contentious and combative, with father frequently sending rambling, hostile, and threatening messages to ODHS staff. The ODHS caseworker believed that father did not perceive 1 Mother did not appeal the jurisdiction judgment and is not a party to this appeal. 160 Dept. of Human Services v. M. P. reality like others, that he did not recognize the concerns that DHS had presented, and that he was unable to discuss his children’s needs. A was born prematurely, in March 2024, and was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and placed on a CPAP machine to address his respiratory dis- tress. While spending time with A in the NICU, father’s behavior was “unusual,” with him making “strange hand and body movements” and talking rapidly to himself, the wall, or someone who was not there. When a doctor and nurses explained that A was in respiratory distress and needed the CPAP machine to assist him with breath- ing, father did not acknowledge what was being said and appeared to not understand, continuing to insist that the CPAP machine was not safe. Father attempted to remove the CPAP machine, but hospital staff stopped him, deter- mined that he should not be left alone with A, and reported the incident to ODHS. Father and mother did not visit A after he was discharged from the hospital into ODHS’s tem- porary custody in April 2024. There is also evidence in the record that the apart- ment where father and mother had been living was unsafe. There was garbage throughout the apartment, including rotting food and used feminine hygiene products, and a thick layer of sawdust from the pallets they broke down and burned for heat covered much of the kitchen. At the jurisdiction trial, father frequently inter- rupted the proceedings, reacting to arguments from the parties and the testimony of witnesses and speaking to him- self or t