In Re Natural Gas Services Group, Inc. and Charles A. Perez v. the State of Texas

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 63 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MERVINA KAUKINI MAMO CASH-KAEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUY K. BARRETT; RONETTE BARRETT, Defendants-Appellants, DUSTIN K. BARRETT; SHEENA ANN BARRETT; RICHARD BARRETT; LEZLEY K. BARRETT aka LEZLEY BRADBURY, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAI‘ANAE DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.) Defendants-Appellants Guy K. Barrett and Ronette Barrett (collectively, the Barretts) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district court)1 May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. They raise three points of error, contending that the district court abused its discretion when: 1 The Honorable Darolyn H. Lendio entered the Judgment for Possession. The Honorable Michelle N. Comeau presided over the April 26, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Mervina Kaukini Mamo Cash-Kaeo's (Cash- Kaeo) motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (1) "it defaulted [the Barretts] for [their] non[-]appearance [at the MSJ hearing] where the facts show [the Barretts had] defended themselves in this action by retaining counsel" who "made eight court appearances at hearings in defense of [the Barretts]"; (2) "it applied the extreme sanctions methodology" by entering default judgment against the Barretts "for the failure of their counsel to appear at the hearing on [Cash- Kaeo's] [MSJ]"; and (3) "it allowed the hearing on [Cash-Kaeo's] [MSJ] to proceed without first addressing [counsel's] non[- ]appearance at this hearing." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the Barretts' appeal as follows. The Barretts contend that the district court entered default judgment against them pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 55. The record reflects, however, that the district court entered the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession against the Barretts because Cash-Kaeo demonstrated she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under DCRCP Rule 56. Pursuant to DCRCP Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawaiʻi 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The Barretts point to no evidence in the record indicating a genuine issue of material fact disputing that Cash- Kaeo is the sole surviving lessee of the subject property, and that Cash-Kaeo is therefore entitled to judgment of possession against the Barretts as a matter of law. The Barretts also cite no authority indicating the district court was required to address their counsel's non-appearance at the MSJ hearing before it could grant the MSJ. Even if the district court was required to do so, the Barretts fail to identify any legal theory or issue of fact that could have or would have been presented in opposition to the MSJ to defeat the motion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting the MSJ, and affirm the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 20, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Presiding Judge Barry L. Sooalo, for Defendants-Appellants. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge Jay T. Suemori, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge

RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1311-MR KHALIL COLEMAN APPELLANT APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00759 KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Khalil Coleman appeals from the Franklin Circuit Court’s order dismissing his complaint against Appellee, the Kentucky General Assembly. Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND Khalil Coleman, a state inmate, filed a pro se lawsuit seeking a declaration regarding certain sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. He named the General Assembly of Kentucky as the sole defendant. The General Assembly moved to dismiss the action, arguing Coleman failed to state a claim, and alternatively, if Coleman had stated a claim, the General Assembly is shielded by legislative immunity under Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Franklin Circuit Court granted the General Assembly’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and declined to assess the immunity defense. Coleman now appeals. ANALYSIS We review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Davenport Extreme Pools and Spas, Inc. v. Mulflur, 698 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Ky. App. 2024). Trial courts must construe pleadings “in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky. App. 1987) (citing Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1960)). In response to a pleading, a party to an action may present the defense of a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by a pre-answer motion. CR1 12.02(f). The General Assembly presented that defense, arguing Coleman’s complaint “does not state any cognizable legal theory related to the General Assembly and alleges no sufficient facts to support one. In fact, the Complaint 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -2- does not even allege any action or inaction by the General Assembly as a body or by its individual members.” (Record (R.) at 55.) Coleman argues his “declaration of rights petition did in fact state several claims, which should have rendered right to relief.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4.) However, even on appeal, Coleman fails to state any claims against the General Assembly. As he did before the Franklin Circuit Court, he again argues that certain statutes are unconstitutional but does not aver in his brief before this Court sufficient facts that would allow the General Assembly to respond with a rational, cogent answer. He asserts no specific wrongdoing by the General Assembly. Rather, he requests that this Court “evoke legislative intent [and] redact statute [sic] of controversy affecting [his] rights.” (Appellant’s Br. at 6.) Although the General Assembly did not submit an Appellee’s Brief, we take that non- response as an expression of its belief there is nothing warranting a response on appeal. While we respect Coleman’s activism, bringing an action against the General Assembly is not a means by which such change can be effectuated. Existence of an actual controversy is a fundamental component of an action. “The court will not decide speculative rights or duties which may or may not arise in the future, but only rights and duties about which there is a present actual controversy presented by adversary parties, and in which a binding judgment concluding the -3- controversy may be entered.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Veith v. City of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. 1962)). “An actual controversy . . . does not involve a question which is merely hypothetical or an answer which is no more than an advisory opinion.” Barrett v. Reynolds, 817 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ky. 1991). Coleman’s request that the Court redact certain statutes is not an actual controversy. Neither is his request that the Court actually issue an advisory opinion, which we are prohibited from rendering. Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Ky. 2007) (citations omitted) (“It is a fundamental tenet of Kentucky jurisprudence that courts cannot decide matters that have not yet ripened into concrete disputes. Courts are not permitted to render advisory opin

No. 533 June 11, 2025 283 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Jill BONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and Oregon Attorney General, Defendants-Respondents. Douglas County Circuit Court 23CV45434; A185121 Jason R. Thomas, Judge. Submitted May 12, 2025. Jill Bong filed the briefs pro se. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondents. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. 284 Bong v. Dept. of Justice AOYAGI, P. J. In March 2023, petitioner filed a federal action that included claims against the former governor of Oregon and the former director of the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) in their individual and official capacities. A senior assistant attorney general (AAG) from the Oregon Department of Justice (DOJ) appeared on behalf of the former governor and the former OHA director in both their individual and official capacities. Petitioner challenged the AAG’s authority to appear for the defendants in their individual capacities. The federal court rejected that challenge. Petitioner then filed this state court action against the Oregon Attorney General and the DOJ, challenging their authority to defend former or current state officials, officers, or employees in their personal capacities in specified circumstances. The circuit court held a stipulated facts trial and ultimately dismissed the case on two grounds: (1) that petitioner lacked standing to object to what lawyer rep- resents her opponents in court, for reasons detailed at length in the court’s letter opinion, and (2) that any complaint about the qualifications or status of another party’s lawyer should be directed to the court in which that lawyer is appearing— here, to the federal court, which had already rejected petition- er’s challenge to the AAG’s representation—rather than being raised in a separate action in a different court. On appeal, petitioner contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing her state court action. In five assign- ments of error, she challenges the court’s ruling, arguing that she has standing, that the court misframed the issue, that the court improperly resurrected a waived claim-splitting defense, that the court’s second basis for dismissal was wrong, and that the court had authority to issue an injunc- tion in this case. The state responds that the circuit court properly dismissed the case, because petitioner met none of the elements of standing, and because the circuit court could not be required to direct proceedings in a federal dis- trict court as petitioner sought. Having reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments, we agree with the state that the trial court did not err in dismissing the action. Petitioner failed Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 283 (2025) 285 to establish standing, which is dispositive. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed.

No. 517 June 4, 2025 175 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Kevin J. LEE, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SERVICES, Respondent. Department of Consumer and Business Services INS190008; A182238 Argued and submitted April 1, 2025. Kevin J. Lee argued the cause and filed the briefs pro se. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Hellman, Judge. HELLMAN, J. Affirmed. 176 Lee v. DCBS HELLMAN, J. Petitioner, appearing pro se, seeks judicial review of a final order of the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) that revoked his insurance licenses and assessed civil penalties. On judicial review, petitioner argues that the final order is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm. “We review an agency’s order in a contested case for errors of law, ORS 183.482(8)(a), substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c), and substantial reason.” Dorn v. Teacher Standards and Practices Comm., 316 Or App 241, 243, 504 P3d 44 (2021). “Substantial evidence exists to support a find- ing of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482. “Substantial reason exists where the agency has articulated a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclu- sion that the agency draws from them.” Dorn, 316 Or App at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Our review is restricted to the record.” Id. (citing ORS 183.482(7)); see also ORS 183.417(9) (defining “[t]he record in a contested case”). A detailed recitation of the facts would not benefit the bench, the bar, or the public. Petitioner held securities sales, insurance provider, and insurance consultant licenses in Oregon for several years. In 2017, the Federal Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) contacted petitioner to determine if he had violated any federal securities laws when he provided investment advice to his former neigh- bors. In 2018, petitioner filed a resident insurance license renewal application with the state and represented that he had not “been named or involved as a party in an adminis- trative proceeding, including FINRA sanction.” DCBS sub- sequently alleged that petitioner “act[ed] as a state invest- ment adviser in Oregon without a state investment license,” provided “misleading information” on his insurance license applications by not disclosing the FINRA investigation, and that he engaged in “fraudulent, coercive, or dishonest prac- tices.” At the contested hearing, the daughter of petitioner’s former neighbors, petitioner, and a DCBS financial enforce- ment officer testified, and the administrative law judge (ALJ) received into evidence numerous exhibits offered by Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 175 (2025) 177 each party. The ALJ ruled in favor of DCBS and issued a proposed order. DCBS adopted the ALJ’s proposed order as the final order. We have reviewed each of petitioner’s 18 separate arguments concerning the final order and conclude that petitioner presents no basis to reverse. Many of petitioner’s arguments dispute DCBS’s interpretation of the facts, but we do not reweigh evidence on appeal. See Gaylord v. DMV, 283 Or App 811, 822, 391 P3d 900 (2017) (“When in a review role, a court does not review for the better evidence.”). Many of petitioner’s arguments also depend on his testimony— which DCBS found not credible—and we do not revisit cred- ibility on appeal. See id. (“A substantial evidence review does not entail or permit the reviewing tribunal to reweigh or to assess the credibility of the evidence that was presented to the fact-finding body.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) And petitioner’s arguments do not establish that DCBS committed any legal error in its analysis. In sum, substan- tial evidence supports DBCS’s findings of fact, and the order provides substantial reason for its conclusions. Petitioner has not demonstrated any legal error on DCBS’s part. Affirmed.

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-24-00248-CV Big Creek Construction, LTD., Appellant v. Jerry Steele Fagan, Individually and on behalf of the Estate of Jimmie Edward Fagan, Nikkie Marchant, and Lisa Daves, Appellees On appeal from the 82nd District Court of Robertson County, Texas Judge Rex Davis, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 21-01-21174-CV CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Big Creek Construction, LTD., appealed from the trial court’s interlocutory "Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendant Big Creek Construction, Ltd.'s Amended Motion for No Evidence and Traditional Summary Judgment." On January 3, 2025, the Court was advised that the parties had reached a settlement and requested an abatement in order to execute the terms of the settlement. This proceeding was stayed upon the request of the parties on January 7, 2025. On May 16, 2025, by letter from the Clerk of this Court, the appellant was advised that it “must provide the Court with either a motion to dismiss or a status report within 14 days of the date of this letter or the appeal may be dismissed for want of prosecution.” Further, the appellant was notified that the failure to respond to the Clerk’s letter would constitute an independent ground for the dismissal of the appeal. No motion to dismiss or other response has been received by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b), (c). Accordingly, we dismiss this interlocutory appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b), (c). MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 18, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Appeal dismissed CV06 Big Creek Construction, LTD. v. Fagan Page 2