Wilson v. Milonas

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1733 Doc: 46 Filed: 08/08/2025 Pg: 1 of 14 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 23-1733 J.H., by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, Erica Chambers; E.H., by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, Erica Chambers; ERICA CHAMBERS, individually, Plaintiff - Appellees, v. HARFORD MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP, INC., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:21-cv-00856-LPA) Argued: March 18, 2025 Decided: August 8, 2025 Before HEYTENS and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and John A. GIBNEY, JR., Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ARGUED: William A. Bulfer, Asheville, North Carolina, Daniel Thomas Strong, TEAGUE CAMPBELL DENNIS & GORHAM, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. Coleman Cowan, LAW OFFICES OF JAMES SCOTT FARRIN, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Kaitelyn E. Fudge, LAW OFFICES OF JAMES SCOTT FARRIN, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1733 Doc: 46 Filed: 08/08/2025 Pg: 2 of 14 PER CURIAM: Erica Chambers was driving with her two minor children on the highway in North Carolina when they were hit by a truck owned by Big Boss Construction, Inc. After bringing suit against Big Boss and several other parties involved in the accident, Chambers filed a declaratory judgment action to establish that Big Boss’s $2 million commercial excess insurance policy—issued by Harford Mutual Insurance Group, Inc.—provided coverage for the accident. The district court sided with Chambers and concluded that the accident fell within the scope of the policy’s coverage. The district court further determined that Chambers and her children were entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest under the policy. We affirm both rulings. I. Background 1 On October 27, 2018, Erica Chambers and her children were severely injured in an automobile accident as they drove south on North Carolina Highway 49. A truck owned by Big Boss Construction, Inc. crossed the center of the highway and struck Chambers head on. The driver of the truck was unauthorized to operate a motor vehicle, as he lacked a valid driver’s license. The parties agree that at the time of the accident, the driver was an agent of Big Boss acting within the scope of his employment. The driver was on his way 1 In the litigation agreement discussed infra, the parties “agree[d] that all facts and conclusions of law pled in the Second Amended Complaint in the Underlying Litigation are deemed admitted” for the purpose of this declaratory judgment action. J.A. 207. We thus recite the facts as alleged in that complaint. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1733 Doc: 46 Filed: 08/08/2025 Pg: 3 of 14 to complete a job for a different company, NC Champions Construction, Inc., which was using the truck with Big Boss’s permission. Chambers and her children incurred astronomical medical bills as a result of the accident. Chambers spent 34 days in the hospital recovering from broken bones throughout her body. She endured multiple surgeries and remains under medical care for her injuries, some of which are permanent. One of Chambers’s children suffered a head injury and continues to experience memory problems. Her other child suffered a broken leg. In total, the family’s medical bills have exceeded $500,000. Chambers and her children (collectively, Chambers 2) filed suit in North Carolina state court against the driver, Big Boss, and NC Champions. The suit alleged, among other claims, that Big Boss was liable for negligently entrusting its truck to the driver. At the time of the accident, Big Boss carried multiple insurance policies, including a commercial excess umbrella policy (the Excess Policy) issued by Harford Mutual Insurance Group, Inc. The Excess Policy had a liability limit of $2 million. It co

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS DEBRA B. FORD, UNPUBLISHED June 20, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellant, 12:09 PM v No. 371805 Calhoun Circuit Court CITY OF MARSHALL, BAILEY EXCAVATING, LC No. 2020-000348-NO INC., LIBERTA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, doing business as CIOFFI & SON CONSTRUCTION, and GIVE-EM A BRAKE SAFETY, LLC, Defendants, and CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and REDFORD and MARIANI, JJ. BOONSTRA, P.J. (concurring). I fully concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to offer additional reasons to affirm the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Consumers Energy Company. Plaintiff continues to advance the argument that her claim against Consumers sounded in ordinary negligence. But whether plaintiff’s claim sounds in negligence or in premises liability is determined by considering the plaintiff's complaint as a whole, regardless of the labels attached to the allegations by the plaintiff. Jeffrey-Moise v Williamsburg Towne Houses Coop, Inc, 336 Mich App 616, 625; 971 NW2d 716 (2012).. And the nature of a claim (as either premises liability or ordinary negligence) is generally determined by the nature of the hazard itself. As we held in Ford -1- v City of Marshall, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 13, 2022 (Docket No. 355541) (Ford I), p 4: On appeal, plaintiff argues that her claim sounded in ordinary negligence rather than premises liability because Consumers lacked possession and control of the sidewalk on the date of plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. As already noted, the question of whether a claim sounds in premises liability or ordinary negligence hinges on the nature of the hazard. Buhalis, 296 Mich App at 692.[1] . . . [W]hether Consumers had possession and control of the sidewalk had no bearing on the nature of plaintiff’s claim, i.e., whether it sounded in ordinary negligence or premises liability. This Court has held that, in certain situations, a contractor whose negligent workmanship creates a hazardous condition on the land may be held liable not only to its contractee, but also in negligence to third parties who later incur foreseeable harm upon encountering the hazard. See Kapalczynski v Globe Construction Co, 19 Mich App 396, 403 n 10; 172 NW2d 852 (1969) (citing 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 385, p 293); Feaster v Hous, 137 Mich App 783, 789; 359 NW2d 219 (1984). This potential for liability arises after the contracted-for work has been completed and accepted by the premises possessor, and is based on the contractor’s negligent performance of a contractual duty. See Feaster, 137 Mich App at 789. By contrast, contractors who are currently engaged in contractual duties with respect to the land on behalf of the premises possessor/owner are “subject to the same liability, and enjoy[] the same freedom from liability, as though [they] were the possessor[s] of the land . . . .” Finazzo v Fire Equipment Co, 323 Mich App 620, 626; 918 NW2d 200 (2018).2 Effectively, the premises possessor has “loaned” possessory rights to the contractor. Id. at 627-628, citing Orel v Uni-Rak Sales, Co, Inc, 454 Mich 564, 567 n 2; 563 NW2d 241 (1997) and Quinlivan v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, Inc, 395 Mich 244, 269; 235 NW2d 732 (1972) (“This ‘loaning’ gives a quantum of ‘control and possession’ to another party.”). This Court in Finazzo noted that “our Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the principles underlying the rule set forth in 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, §384, p 289,” which provides: One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition on the land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom from liability, as though he were the possessor of the land, for physical harm caused to others upon and outside of the land by the dangerous character of the structure 1 Buhalis held that “If the plaintiff’s injury arose from an allegedly dangerous condition on the land, the action sounds in premises liability rather than ordinary negligence; this is true even when the plaintiff alleges that the premises possessor created the condition giving rise to the pla

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA FILED FRANK MAYER, June 27, 2025 Claimant Below, Petitioner ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA v.) No. 24-ICA-462 (JCN: 2023021874) CITY OF CLARKSBURG, Employer Below, Respondent MEMORANDUM DECISION Petitioner Frank Mayer appeals the October 30, 2024, order of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (“Board”). Respondent City of Clarksburg (“Clarksburg”) filed a response.1 Mr. Mayer did not reply. The issue on appeal is whether the Board erred in affirming the claim administrator’s order, which denied authorization for a right reverse total shoulder arthroplasty. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51- 11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the Board’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. On May 24, 2023, while employed by Clarksburg, Mr. Mayer was mowing when he slipped and fell, landing with his leg bent underneath him. Mr. Mayer was seen at the United Hospital Center Emergency Room on the date of the injury, with a chief complaint of left knee pain and right shoulder pain. The assessment was a patella fracture and right shoulder strain. Mr. Mayer filed an Employees’ and Physicians’ Report of Occupational Injury dated May 24, 2023, indicating that he suffered an injury to his right shoulder and left leg when he was cutting grass on a hillside, and he fell when the bank gave way. The physician’s portion was signed at United Hospital Center and notes an occupational injury to the right shoulder and left knee. On May 26, 2023, Mr. Mayer was seen by William Dahl, M.D., who assessed a rupture of the left quadricep, a closed fracture of the left patella, and an injury of the right shoulder. Dr. Dahl opined that Mr. Mayer would benefit from surgical fixation of the left 1 Mr. Mayer is represented by J. Thomas Greene, Jr., Esq., and T. Colin Greene, Esq. Clarksburg is represented by James W. Heslep, Esq. 1 quadriceps rupture. The claim administrator issued an order dated May 31, 2023, holding the claim compensable for a strain of muscle, fascia, and tendon involving the right shoulder and upper arm; a strain of the left quadriceps; and a closed fracture of the left patella. Mr. Mayer was seen by Joshua Sykes, M.D., on November 27, 2023, for a follow up subsequent to a left quadriceps repair performed on June 1, 2023. Mr. Mayer reported a constant sharp, burning, and throbbing pain that he rated 5/10, and is worse with activity; that he had numbness and tingling when sitting; that his knee continued to swell; and that he was progressing with physical therapy. On December 28, 2023, Mr. Mayer underwent a CT of his right shoulder, which had the impression of severe acromioclavicular and mild glenohumeral osteoarthritis, retracted tears of the supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendons, a suspected full thickness tear of the superior bundle of the subscapularis, and suspected extensive degenerative labral tearing. On January 23, 2024, Dr. Sykes assessed Mr. Mayer with status post tendon repair, rupture of left quadriceps, and right rotator cuff tear. Dr. Sykes noted that Mr. Mayer has had a work-related shoulder tear for over twenty years that had progressed from his previous MRI. On February 7, 2024, Mr. Mayer was evaluated by Kelly Agnew, M.D. Dr. Agnew noted that Mr. Mayer has a large retracted, irreparable right rotator cuff tear, that was documented in 2003, and that this tear was never repaired. Dr. Agnew opined that there was nothing on the recent CT scan with arthrogram of the right shoulder to suggest an acute injury and that all the changes were chronic. Dr. Agnew further opined that there was no evidence of a lingering strain and that the findings were expected from the chronic rotator cuff disruption. Dr. Agnew found that Mr. Mayer had reached maximum medical improvement from the shoulder and upper arm portion of his injury. Dr. Agnew noted that Mr. Mayer had been offered total shoulder arthroplasty by Dr. Sykes, and he opined that any such treatment would be for the underlying chronic pathology that dates back to 2003; and that arthroplasty could not possibly be ascribed to any identifiable injury involving the right shoulder from May 24, 2023. Mr. Mayer followed u

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 23-584V MARYA NEMEH, Chief Special Master Corcoran Petitioner, v. Filed: May 6, 2025 SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent. Jessica E. Choper, Britcher Leone and Sergio, LLC, Glen Rock, NJ, for Petitioner. Madylan Yarc, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. DECISION ON ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1 On April 26, 2023, Marya Nemeh filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq. 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she suffered a Table injury – a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration as a result of her July 7, 2020, meningococcal conjugate, meningococcal B, and hepatitis A vaccinations. Petition, ECF No. 1. On December 30, 2024, I issued a decision awarding compensation to Petitioner based on the parties’ stipulation. ECF No. 39. 1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other inf ormation, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If , upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material f rom public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section ref erences to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018).  Petitioner has now filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, requesting an award of $40,519.25 (representing $39,827.50 in fees plus $691.75 in costs). Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Motion”) filed January 22, 2025, ECF No. 44. Furthermore, Petitioner filed a signed statement representing that Petitioner incurred no personal out- of-pocket expenses. ECF No. 44 at 29-30. Respondent reacted to the motion on January 31, 2025, indicating that he is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case but deferring resolution of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. Motion at 2-4, ECF No. 45. Petitioner filed no reply thereafter. I have reviewed the billing records submitted with Petitioner’s request. In my experience, the request appears reasonable, and I find no cause to reduce the requested hours or rates. Furthermore, Petitioner has provided supporting documentation for all claimed costs. ECF No. 44 at 3-17. Respondent offered no specific objection to the rates or amounts sought. I find the requested costs reasonable and hereby award them in full. The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for successful claimants. Section 15(e). Accordingly, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s Motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner is awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of $40,519.25 (representing $39,827.50 in fees plus $691.75 in costs) to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement. In the absence of a timely-filed motion for review (see Appendix B to the Rules of the Court), the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this decision. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Brian H. Corcoran Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master 3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by f iling a joint notice renouncing their right to seek review. 2