J.H. v. Harford Mutual Insurance Group, Inc.

USCA11 Case: 24-14243 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 08/08/2025 Page: 1 of 2 [DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-14243 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus LAQUISHA MCFARLAND, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cr-00005-TKW-3 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-14243 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 08/08/2025 Page: 2 of 2 2 Opinion of the Court 24-14243 Before BRANCH, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: The government has moved to dismiss this appeal as un- timely. Laquisha McFarland’s notice of appeal, deemed filed on December 18, 2024, under the prison mailbox rule, is untimely to challenge the district court’s August 20, 2024, order striking her third reply to the government’s response to her motion for com- passionate release. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (providing that in criminal cases, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days after the entry of the judgment or order being appealed); United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1312-14 (11th Cir. 2009) (hold- ing that we must apply Rule 4(b)’s 14-day time limit when the gov- ernment objects to an untimely notice of appeal); Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison authorities, and absent contrary evidence, we assume that a prisoner delivers a filing on the date he signs it). Accordingly, the government’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED.

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 May 23, 2025 Before ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge No. 24-1524 CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY Appeal from the United States District Court OF AMERICA, for the Northern District of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, Eastern Division. v. No. 1:22-cv-01334 MULLINS FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Jorge L. Alonso, Defendant-Appellant. Judge. ORDER Plaintiff-Appellee, Citizens Insurance Company of America, filed a Petition for Rehearing on May 16, 2025. All members of the panel have voted to deny rehearing but to amend the opinion dated May 2, 2025, as follows: At page 2, first full paragraph, three lines from the bottom of the paragraph, immediately before the word “indemnify,” insert the words “potentially to”; At page 14, last paragraph, fourth line, again insert the words “potentially to” immediately before “indemnify”; At page 21, in the first and only paragraph of the main text, lines 5-6, replace “must also” with “may potentially be required to”; No. 24-1524 Page 2 At page 21, at the end of the same paragraph, insert the following sentence: “The duty to indemnify Mullins has not been briefed in this appeal and remains to be sorted out on remand.” At page 32, four lines from the bottom of the paragraph, insert the following sentence immediately prior to the sentence beginning “We therefore VACATE . . .”: “Also in the event the district court determines that timely notice was given to Citizens, the district court must resolve whether Citizens has a duty to indemnify Mullins.” The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MATTHEW BECKER; LAUREN No. 24-443 KUEHNE; ADAM CRISWELL; D.C. No. KRYSTAL CRISWELL; ALFEE DIXON; 3:21-cv-05185-JHC DONALD FINISTER Sr.; CHRISTOPHER HART; JASON KOVACK; RICKY LORENSIUS; HEATHER MAREK; MEMORANDUM* MICHAEL MARTIN; DAISEY MARTINEAR; GRACE MATEIAK; IAN MATEIAK; JOHN MELOPRIETO; TRAVIS NEUMAN; Doctor ARIEL NEUMAN; MICHELLE PAULINO; JOHN PAULINO; JAMES RAMPONI; LINDSEY RAMPONI; ERIC MCCANDLESS; PAIGE ROE; PAUL ROHRER; ANDREW SICAT; NICOYA SICAT; IAN LAUGHLIN; SHELLY LAUGHLIN; TAMMARA BOYLES; BOBBY BOYLES; LAIN SUPE; PETER BROWN; JEREMY SIERRA; ERICA SIERRA; DARIUS USMAN; KRISTEN ZABAGLO; DAVID WILSON, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. TIG INSURANCE COMPANY; UNITED SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign insurer, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.  Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John H. Chun, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 5, 2025** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges. Appellants (“Homeowners”) appeal the dismissal of their case with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b) and several interlocutory rulings. We affirm the dismissal and do not consider Homeowners’ other claims because the dismissal was proper, foreclosing review of interlocutory rulings. A dismissal under Rule 41(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Al- Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir.1996). “The trial court's dismissal will only be disturbed if there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court weighs five factors to decide whether dismissal for failure to ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2 24-443 prosecute or comply with a court order is proper. Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). They are: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. There must be “unreasonable delay” before dismissal is proper. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir.1994). “A reviewing court will give deference to the district court to decide what is unreasonable because it is in the best position to determine what period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Homeowners’ action. The district judge made detailed findings regarding each factor. Because the facts are familiar to the parties, we reference them only as they are relevant to the decision. The first factor—the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation— strongly favored dismissal. Homeowners exhibited a pattern of noncompliance with deadlines. Failure to comply with the court’s orders or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides grounds for dismissal under Rule 41(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Homeowners argue that they missed these deadlines in good faith, but a showing of bad faith is not required under the court’s inherent power to dismiss for lack of 3 24-443 prosecution under Rule 41(b). See Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). The second factor—the district court’s need to manage its docket—also strongly favored dismissal. Plaintiffs’ repeated failures to meet deadlines undermined efficient management of the district court’s docket. See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. The third factor—the risk of prejudice to Appellee TIG Insurance Company (“TIG”)—also strongly favored dismissal. TIG suffered prejudice because Homeowners interfered with

Case: 24-20386 Document: 102-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/10/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED June 10, 2025 No. 24-20386 Lyle W. Cayce ____________ Clerk In the Matter of National CineMedia, L.L.C. Debtor, Cinemark Media Incorporated; Cinemark USA, Incorporated, Appellants, versus National CineMedia, L.L.C., Appellee, __________________________________________________ In the Matter of National CineMedia, L.L.C. Debtor, Cinemark USA, Incorporated, Appellant, versus National CineMedia, L.L.C., Case: 24-20386 Document: 102-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/10/2025 Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC Nos. 4:23-CV-2414, 4:23-CV-2485 ______________________________ Before Jones, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * This court has carefully considered this appeal in light of the briefs, oral argument, and pertinent portions of the record. Having done so, we substantially adopt the analysis of the district court’s opinion, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rulings. 1 Accordingly, the Most Favored Nations (“MFN”) clause in Cinemark’s Exhibitor Services Agreements (“ESA”) with the debtor National CineMedia LLC (“NCM”) was not triggered by Regal’s entry into a Network Affiliate Transaction Agreement (“NATA”) with NCM. The MFN clause in Cinemark’s ESA provided it the right to match the terms of an “agreement, amendment or extension” between Regal and NCM “which amends any term” of Regal’s ESA. Regal, while itself a debtor in bankruptcy, terminated its ESA with NCM through a Termination Settlement Agreement (“TSA”). Regal then entered into the NATA with NCM. The TSA did not amend any term of Regal’s ESA because it _____________________ * Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4. 1 This court reviews the NCM bankruptcy court’s “Settlement Order” under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 for abuse of discretion. In re Moore, 608 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 2010). No abuse occurs unless the court made an error of law or clear error of fact. In re Yorkshire, LLC, 540 F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2008). Case: 24-20386 Document: 102-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/10/2025 terminated the ESA, whereas “amend” contemplates modification of an ESA’s term that nevertheless preserves the agreement’s existence. The NATA did not amend any term of Regal’s ESA because the TSA had terminated Regal’s ESA, and the ESA must exist for the NATA to amend any of its terms. The MFN clause in Cinemark’s ESA was not triggered. 2 The judgments of the bankruptcy and district courts are AFFIRMED. _____________________ 2 NCM and AMC, the other party to the appeal, agreed to dismiss the appeal as to AMC by a joint motion for dismissal.

Case: 24-11021 Document: 47-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/10/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED June 10, 2025 No. 24-11021 Lyle W. Cayce ____________ Clerk Ruth Torres, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Bonnie Lee Goldstein, In Official Capacity 44th District Court Judge Dallas; Raymond G. Wheless, In Official Capacity, Presiding Judge First Administrative Judicial Region; Robert D. Burns, In Official Capacity, Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals-Dallas; Amanda L. Reichek, In Official Capacity, Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals-Dallas; Ken Molberg, In Official Capacity, Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals- Dallas; Dennise Garcia, In Official Capacity, Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals-Dallas; Robbie Partida-Kipness, In Official Capacity, Justice Place 2 Fifth Court of Appeals-Dallas; Honorable Dale Tillery, In Official Capacity, 134th District Court Judge Dallas, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:24-CV-1843 ______________________________ Case: 24-11021 Document: 47-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/10/2025 No. 24-11021 Before Smith, Graves, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Ruth Torres, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint against several members of the Texas judiciary seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. Torres alleged that the defendants violated her constitu- tional rights by issuing improper rulings and orders in a lawsuit initiated against her in retaliation for being a whistleblower, as well as in related legal proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 915(e)(2)(B). Torres moves to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal, which constitutes a challenge to the district court’s certification that any appeal would not be taken in good faith because Torres will not present a nonfrivolous appellate issue. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). As an initial matter, Torres does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal regarding her contention that the district court failed to conduct de novo review as demonstrated by the court’s failure separately to provide find- ings and conclusions for overruling her objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Rather, the record reflects that in accepting the report and recommendation, the district court conducted the requisite de novo review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In addition, the district court’s decision to consider sua sponte the applicability of the judicial immunity doctrine does not present a non- frivolous issue for appeal. See Boyd v Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994). Further, Torres’s conclusory assertions, without more, that judicial immun- ity does not apply because the defendants’ actions were without jurisdiction _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 2 Case: 24-11021 Document: 47-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/10/2025 No. 24-11021 and they were disqualified “due to ultra-vires acts/or crime-fraud excep- tion,” does not arguably state a constitutional violation. See Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir. 1990). Rather, her allegations all stem from orders the defendants issued in litigation involving Torres. See Davis v. Tar- rant Cnty., 565 F.3d 214, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2009). Further, Torres does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that she could not bring a private criminal action against the defendants. Nor does she challenge the decision denying her leave to amend her complaint. Thus, these claims are deemed abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Torres also maintains that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for appointment of counsel. However, Torres’s numer- ous filings in the district court and this court indicate that she has the