U.S. Bank National Association v. Spence

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 63 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MERVINA KAUKINI MAMO CASH-KAEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUY K. BARRETT; RONETTE BARRETT, Defendants-Appellants, DUSTIN K. BARRETT; SHEENA ANN BARRETT; RICHARD BARRETT; LEZLEY K. BARRETT aka LEZLEY BRADBURY, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAI‘ANAE DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.) Defendants-Appellants Guy K. Barrett and Ronette Barrett (collectively, the Barretts) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district court)1 May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. They raise three points of error, contending that the district court abused its discretion when: 1 The Honorable Darolyn H. Lendio entered the Judgment for Possession. The Honorable Michelle N. Comeau presided over the April 26, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Mervina Kaukini Mamo Cash-Kaeo's (Cash- Kaeo) motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (1) "it defaulted [the Barretts] for [their] non[-]appearance [at the MSJ hearing] where the facts show [the Barretts had] defended themselves in this action by retaining counsel" who "made eight court appearances at hearings in defense of [the Barretts]"; (2) "it applied the extreme sanctions methodology" by entering default judgment against the Barretts "for the failure of their counsel to appear at the hearing on [Cash- Kaeo's] [MSJ]"; and (3) "it allowed the hearing on [Cash-Kaeo's] [MSJ] to proceed without first addressing [counsel's] non[- ]appearance at this hearing." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the Barretts' appeal as follows. The Barretts contend that the district court entered default judgment against them pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 55. The record reflects, however, that the district court entered the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession against the Barretts because Cash-Kaeo demonstrated she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under DCRCP Rule 56. Pursuant to DCRCP Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawaiʻi 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The Barretts point to no evidence in the record indicating a genuine issue of material fact disputing that Cash- Kaeo is the sole surviving lessee of the subject property, and that Cash-Kaeo is therefore entitled to judgment of possession against the Barretts as a matter of law. The Barretts also cite no authority indicating the district court was required to address their counsel's non-appearance at the MSJ hearing before it could grant the MSJ. Even if the district court was required to do so, the Barretts fail to identify any legal theory or issue of fact that could have or would have been presented in opposition to the MSJ to defeat the motion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting the MSJ, and affirm the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 20, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Presiding Judge Barry L. Sooalo, for Defendants-Appellants. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge Jay T. Suemori, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge

No. 503 June 4, 2025 127 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, dba Christiana Trust, not individually but as Trustee for Pretium Mortgage Acquisition Trust, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Kent R. SEIDA, Sr., aka Kent R. Seida, aka Kent Seida, Defendant-Appellant, and THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, an agency of the government of the United States of America et al., Defendants. Lincoln County Circuit Court 132390; A181786 Marcia L. Buckley, Judge. Submitted May 13, 2024. Kent R. Seida argued the cause and filed the briefs pro se. Peter J. Salmon argued the cause for respondents. Also on the brief was Aldridge Pite, LLP. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. POWERS, J. Affirmed. 128 Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Seida POWERS, J. This is another chapter in a foreclosure action in which defendant Seida originally appealed from a general judgment of foreclosure and award of attorney fees. Initially, we affirmed without opinion, Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Seida, 321 Or App 212, 514 P3d 1207 (2022), and then we granted reconsideration, withdrew our former disposition, and remanded the case to the trial court for further pro- ceedings to consider the impact of COVID-19 legislation. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 322 Or App 161 (2022) (nonprec- edential memorandum opinion). Specifically, we concluded that the court did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the validity of the judgment in light of leg- islation involving temporary moratoria on foreclosures that passed while the foreclosure action was pending. Id. at 163. On remand, the court again entered a foreclosure judgment, and defendant now appeals from that judgment. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law because plaintiff, in his view, “intro- duced fraudulent and forged documents.” That is, defendant’s focus on appeal is a challenge to the court’s grant of sum- mary judgment, which we already affirmed in our earlier decision. The difficulty with that argument is that it runs straight into the “law of the case” doctrine, which prevents revisiting an issue already decided in the same proceeding. See, e.g., Hayes Oyster Co. v. Dulcich, 199 Or App 43, 53-54, 110 P3d 615, rev den, 339 Or 544 (2005) (explaining that the law of the case doctrine is involved “to preclude parties from revisiting issues that already have been fully considered by an appellate court in the same proceeding”); ILWU, Local 8 v. Port of Portland, 279 Or App 157, 164-65, 379 P3d 1172, rev den, 360 Or 422 (2016) (noting that the law of the case doctrine precludes “relitigation of an appellate court holding after remand and on subsequent appeal”). Because defen- dant already has received appellate review of the issue that he now raises in this appeal, it is not a basis to reverse the foreclosure judgment. Further, defendant does not contend on appeal that there are any newly discovered facts or that there is a change in the applicable law. Accordingly, the law Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 127 (2025) 129 of the case doctrine precludes defendant from revisiting the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Affirmed.

08/08/2025 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON April 23, 2025 Session SHIRLEY JEAN CUPPLES BLANKENSHIP v. CHARLES GARY BLANKENSHIP SR. AND CHARLES GARY BLANKENSHIP II v. SHIRLEY JEAN CUPPLES BLANKENSHIP Appeal from the Chancery Court for Gibson County No. H6329, H6634 Michael Mansfield, Chancellor ___________________________________ No. W2024-01248-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ This appeal arises from the death of the husband during a divorce proceeding. While the divorce was pending, the spouses sold real property they owned as tenants by the entirety and deposited the proceeds with the clerk of the court pursuant to an agreed order. Subsequently, the husband died and the wife filed a motion to dismiss the case and to distribute the proceeds. The chancery court determined that the husband’s death abated the divorce proceedings and that the proceeds had been owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety. Thus, the court granted the motion to dismiss and determined that the wife was entitled to distribution of the proceeds as the surviving tenant by the entirety. The spouses’ son, acting as administrator of the husband’s estate, appeals. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed. CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KENNY W. ARMSTRONG and VALERIE L. SMITH, JJ., joined. Michael R. Flynn, Germantown, Tennessee, for the appellants, Charles Gary Blankenship II and Probate Advance, LLC. Jonathan O. Steen, Nicholas B. Latimer, and Sara E. Barnett, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship. OPINION I. Facts and Procedural History Charles Gary Blankenship Sr. (“Husband”) and Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship (“Wife”) were married on August 22, 1981, in Jackson, Tennessee. One child was born of the marriage, Charles Gary Blankenship II (“Son”). Son is serving as the administrator of Husband’s estate and is one of the appellants in this matter. During the marriage, the spouses obtained the following pieces of real property in Humboldt, Tennessee: 157 Pleasant Hill Road, 3855 East End Drive, and a lot adjacent to the 3855 East End Drive property (collectively “the Properties”). The spouses owned the Properties as tenants by the entirety. On March 6, 2020, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Madison County Chancery Court. The spouses later agreed for the case to be transferred to the Gibson County Chancery Court. Litigation ensued, and on September 30, 2022, Husband filed a motion requesting that a guardian ad litem be appointed on his behalf. The motion was granted by order entered on January 20, 2023. The guardian ad litem subsequently submitted a report explaining that Husband had experienced several health issues and recommended that Son be appointed as conservator over Husband’s person and that a certified public accountant be appointed as conservator over his property. On January 5, 2023, an “Agreed Order” was entered in which the spouses agreed that the proceeds derived from the sale of any marital property would be paid to the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court of Gibson County. Although it is unclear from the record when this occurred, the spouses subsequently sold the Properties. The proceeds derived from the sale of the Properties were deposited with the Gibson County Clerk and Master. On August 15, 2023, Husband died prior to a final decree of divorce having been entered. Wife filed a “Motion to Dismiss and for Distribution of Funds” on September 8, 2023, in which she asserted that Husband’s death abated the divorce proceedings. Wife also claimed that the proceeds derived from the sale of the Properties had been owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety and thus the proceeds had “vested” in her upon Husband’s death as the surviving tenant by the entirety. Meanwhile, on October 27, 2023, Son filed a verified complaint in his capacity as the administrator of Husband’s estate in the Chancery Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee.1 The complaint alleged that the funds being held by the Gibson County Clerk and Master were assets of Husband’s estate. Son further sought an order enjoining Wife from obtaining the funds pending resolution of the complaint. This case was eventually transferred to the Gibson County Chancery Court. Subsequently, the court entered an order consolidating the divorce proceeding, the above- described action filed by Son, and a “Probate Action” Son had also filed in the Hamilton County Chancery Court. The court determined that all three cases were predicated on the disposal of a single issue: “who is entitled to receive disburse

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1820 VH-Minneapolis South Inc, Respondent, vs. TGI Friday’s Inc., Defendant, Akaashaman LLC, Appellant. Filed August 11, 2025 Affirmed Reyes, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-20-12600 Patrick J. Rooney, Anna M. Swiecichowski, Fafinski Mark & Johnson, PA, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for respondent) Jeffrey M. Markowitz, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Adam L. Massaro (pro hac vice), Reed Smith, Denver, Colorado (for appellant) Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.  NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION REYES, Judge Appellant-easement holder challenges the district court’s award of monetary damages to respondent-property owner for nonpayment of easement expenses, arguing that respondent did not properly furnish expense invoices and failed to provide notice of default as required by the easement agreement. We affirm. FACTS This case arises from the nonpayment of expenses associated with a parking-lot easement. Appellant Akaashaman LLC owns a TGI Friday’s restaurant in Bloomington, and respondent VH-Minneapolis South (VH) owns a neighboring DoubleTree by Hilton hotel. VH’s property includes the parking lot immediately surrounding Akaashaman’s restaurant (the common area). Without an easement, Akaashaman would lack access to the parking lot. The Easement The prior owners of the properties entered into an easement agreement in 1989. The agreement grants the restaurant owner an easement that gives its guests and employees access to the entirety of the parking lot owned by the hotel owner. The easement is perpetual and nonexclusive, runs with the land, and is binding upon successors in interest. Under the agreement, the hotel owner is responsible for maintaining the common area, which includes keeping it safe, landscaped, insured, properly surfaced, adequately lit, and clean. In exchange, the restaurant owner must reimburse the hotel owner a pro rata share of approximately 16% of the costs “reasonably and directly expended” by the hotel 2 owner. To be reimbursed, the hotel owner “shall furnish . . . a statement” detailing the common-area expenses within 45 days of the end of “each one-half calendar period.” The hotel owner must keep records of the common-area expenses for at least 12 months following the delivery of each invoice. The restaurant owner, “subject to the right of reasonable verification,” is required to “pay the invoice within twenty . . . days of receipt.” Under paragraph seven of the agreement, a party is in default under the agreement if it fails to comply with “any of its obligations under [the] [a]greement,” provided that the noncompliance “continues for ten days after such party’s receipt of notice of default pursuant to paragraph 14.” Paragraph 14 states that “[n]otice may be given by . . . depositing written notice in the United States mail, certified mail” at the listed addresses “or such other address as may be designated from time to time by any party for itself.” (Emphasis added.) Initial Payment of Costs When Akaashaman, owned by Anil Yadav, purchased the restaurant property in December 2015, Bloomington Hotel Investors LLC (BHI) owned the hotel property. BHI’s director of finance, Russell Huhner, would send the biannual invoices to individuals associated with Yadav, including Tejal Chokshi, Kevin Kevorkian, and Terry Sayles. Chokshi is the controller and chief financial officer for Yadav Enterprises, owned by Anil Yadav. Kevorkian is counsel for Yadav. Sayles is an employee of Yadav Enterprises and the director of operations for a subsidiary of the company. Akaashaman initially made all payments required under the agreement. 3 Nonpayment Akaashaman failed to pay the common-area expenses for the first half of 2019 and failed to make any additional payments. In August 2019, Huhner sent an invoice for the first half of the year to Chokshi, Kevorkian, and Sayles. Huhner met with Sayles and Stacy Franklin, an employee of Yadav Enterprises, t

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS § AUSTIN BHARADWAJA and RYAN BHARADWAJA, § No. 08-24-00075-CV Appellants/Cross-Appellees, § Appeal from the v. § County Court at Law No. 7 MICHAEL HAYS; ELIZABETH HAYS; § of El Paso County, Texas and PANDA PAL PROPERTY, MANAGEMENT, LLC, § (TC# 2023-CCV00813) Appellees/Cross-Appellants. § JUDGMENT The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part. We therefore (1) reverse the trial court’s award of a reduction in the Bharadwajas’ rent; (2) reverse the trial court’s award of $10,000 in attorney’s fees and render judgment for the Bharadwajas in the amount of $23,468; (3) render judgment of a civil penalty in favor of the Bharadwajas on each repair or remedy claim in the total amount of $6,600; and (4) reverse the trial court’s award of contingent appellate fees in favor of the Bharadwajas. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. We remand the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.  We further order that Appellants recover from Appellees and their sureties, if any, for performance of the judgment and all costs of appeal, for which let execution issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.5. This decision shall be certified below for observance. IT IS ORDERED this 19th day of June 2025. MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice Before Salas Mendoza C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.