United States v. Teixeira Spencer
Court
Unknown Court
Decided
June 17, 2025
Importance
36%
Case Summary
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Criminal Action No. 21-145 (JDB) LUIS MIGUEL TEIXEIRA SPENCER, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER On March 9, 2023, this Court entered judgment sentencing Luis Miguel Teixeira Spencer for his participation in a drug conspiracy. Spencer did not appeal. One year and four months later, Spencer moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The motion came too late: time-barred by § 2255’s one-year statute of limitations, the motion is denied. Background From 2017 to 2020, Spencer used his proficiency with cryptocurrency and the dark web to facilitate and disguise a wide-ranging drug conspiracy. See Statement of Offense [ECF No. 30] at 1–5, 9–11. For this conduct, Spencer pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. See Plea Agreement [ECF No. 29] at 1; Judgment [ECF No. 54] at 1. Spencer’s charge carried a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A)(vi), and his sentencing guidelines range cashed out well above that at 210 to 262 months (seventeen and a half to almost twenty-two years), see Presentence Investigation Report [ECF No. 50] (“PSR”) at 21. The PSR explained that Spencer was ineligible for the “safety valve” that rewards some defendants with a lower guidelines range and an escape from otherwise-applicable mandatory minimum sentences. This was so for at least one reason, or maybe two: first, Spencer had not “debriefed with the government”; and second, according to the government, Spencer was “an 1 organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense.” PSR at 14; see U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(4)–(5); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4)–(5). Spencer and his counsel reviewed the PSR and did not object. See PSR at 29; Sent’g Tr. [ECF No. 65] at 2. As part of the plea, the government agreed to recommend a sentence well below Spencer’s guidelines—somewhere from ten years (the mandatory minimum) to fourteen. See Plea Agreement at 2. And because the plea came pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), if the Court accepted the plea it was bound to sentence within that range. See United States v. Ginyard, 215 F.3d 83, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The plea also waived a number of Spencer’s rights, including his right to appeal and to pursue collateral relief except, inter alia, on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Plea Agreement at 8–9. All involved upheld the bargain. The government urged the Court to sentence Spencer to fourteen years in prison. See Sent’g Tr. at 8. Spencer’s counsel asked for ten. Id. at 21. The Court landed somewhere in the middle at 150 months, or twelve and a half years. Id. at 29. In the process, the Court commented that Spencer was ineligible for the safety valve for the same reasons the PSR had recited: “in part because of his leadership involvement in this conspiracy, but also, perhaps more importantly, because he did not debrief with the government.” Id. at 6. After imposing the sentence, the Court alerted Spencer that he had fourteen days from the entry of judgment to file an appeal if he wished to do so. Id. at 34. The Court entered judgment on March 9, 2023. See Judgment at 1. 1 Spencer did not appeal, and his opportunity to do so expired fourteen days later, on March 23. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). 1 The sentencing occurred February 6, 2023, and the judgment is signed the following day. See Judgment at 1. However, the judgment seems not to have been posted to the docket until a month later (March 7) and not “entered” on the docket until two days after that (March 9). Which of these dates judgment was “entered” for purposes of 2 Approximately fifteen and a half months later, on July 9, 2024, Spencer filed the pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion now before the Court. See Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [ECF No. 63] (Mot.”) at 11. 2 The motion asserts that Spencer’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for (1) failing to pursue the safety valve and (2) failing to advise Spencer of the fourteen-day deadline to notice an appeal. Id. at 4–5. In Spencer’s view, neither of the two grounds for ineligibility was valid, as he was not a leader of the conspiracy and he did debrief with the government. As relief, Spencer requests an evidentiary hearing to determine his safety-valve eligibility. Id. at 11. After the government responded, see U.S.’s Opp’n to Mot. [ECF No. 69] (“Opp’n”), Spencer filed a new document styled a “final” § 2255 motion, see Submission of Final § 2255 Motion and Supporting
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Criminal Action No. 21-145 (JDB)
LUIS MIGUEL TEIXEIRA SPENCER,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
On March 9, 2023, this Court entered judgment sentencing Luis Miguel Teixeira Spencer
for his participation in a drug conspiracy. Spencer did not appeal. One year and four months later,
Spencer moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The motion came too late: time-barred by
§ 2255’s one-year statute of limitations, the motion is denied.
Background
From 2017 to 2020, Spencer used his proficiency with cryptocurrency and the dark web to
facilitate and disguise a wide-ranging drug conspiracy. See Statement of Offense [ECF No. 30] at
1–5, 9–11. For this conduct, Spencer pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. See Plea
Agreement [ECF No. 29] at 1; Judgment [ECF No. 54] at 1. Spencer’s charge carried a ten-year
mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A)(vi), and his
sentencing guidelines range cashed out well above that at 210 to 262 months (seventeen and a half
to almost twenty-two years), see Presentence Investigation Report [ECF No. 50] (“PSR”) at 21.
The PSR explained that Spencer was ineligible for the “safety valve” that rewards some
defendants with a lower guidelines range and an escape from otherwise-applicable mandatory
minimum sentences. This was so for at least one reason, or maybe two: first, Spencer had not
“debriefed with the government”; and second, according to the government, Spencer was “an
1
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense.” PSR at 14; see U.S.S.G.
§ 5C1.2(a)(4)–(5); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4)–(5). Spencer and his counsel reviewed the PSR and did
not object. See PSR at 29; Sent’g Tr. [ECF No. 65] at 2.
As part of the plea, the government agreed to recommend a sentence well below Spencer’s
guidelines—somewhere from ten years (the mandatory minimum) to fourteen. See Plea
Agreement at 2. And because the plea came pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(c)(1)(C), if the Court accepted the plea it was bound to sentence within that range. See United
States v. Ginyard, 215 F.3d 83, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The plea also waived a number of Spencer’s
rights, including his right to appeal and to pursue collateral relief except, inter alia, on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Plea Agreement at 8–9.
All involved upheld the bargain. The government urged the Court to sentence Spencer to
fourteen years in prison. See Sent’g Tr. at 8. Spencer’s counsel asked for ten. Id. at 21. The
Court landed somewhere in the middle at 150 months, or twelve and a half years. Id. at 29. In the
process, the Court commented that Spencer was ineligible for the safety valve for the same reasons
the PSR had recited: “in part because of his leadership involvement in this conspiracy, but also,
perhaps more importantly, because he did not debrief with the government.” Id. at 6. After
imposing the sentence, the Court alerted Spencer that he had fourteen days from the entry of
judgment to file an appeal if he wished to do so. Id. at 34.
The Court entered judgment on March 9, 2023. See Judgment at 1. 1 Spencer did not
appeal, and his opportunity to do so expired fourteen days later, on March 23. See Fed. R. App.
P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i).
1
The sentencing occurred February 6, 2023, and the judgment is signed the following day. See Judgment at
-
However, the judgment seems not to have been posted to the docket until a month later (March 7) and not “entered” on the docket until two days after that (March 9). Which of these dates judgment was “entered” for purposes of
2
Approximately fifteen and a half months later, on July 9, 2024, Spencer filed the pro se 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion now before the Court. See Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [ECF No. 63]
(Mot.”) at 11. 2 The motion asserts that Spencer’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
(1) failing to pursue the safety valve and (2) failing to advise Spencer of the fourteen-day deadline
to notice an appeal. Id. at 4–5. In Spencer’s view, neither of the two grounds for ineligibility was
valid, as he was not a leader of the conspiracy and he did debrief with the government. As relief,
Spencer requests an evidentiary hearing to determine his safety-valve eligibility. Id. at 11.
After the government responded, see U.S.’s Opp’n to Mot. [ECF No. 69] (“Opp’n”),
Spencer filed a new document styled a “final” § 2255 motion, see Submission of Final § 2255
Motion and Supporting
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Date Decided
June 17, 2025
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