Union Carbide Corporation, a subsidiary of The Dow Chemical Company v. Christina Dearien (Decedent) and Thomas Dearien (Dependent) (Judge White, concurring)
Court
Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Decided
June 4, 2025
Jurisdiction
SA
Practice Areas
Case Summary
No. 24-ICA-269 – Union Carbide Corporation, a subsidiary of the Dow Chemical Company v. Christina Dearien (decedent) and Thomas Dearien (dependent) FILED June 4, 2025 WHITE, Judge, concurring: ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA I wholeheartedly concur with the majority’s opinion and its application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel espoused in State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). In the workers’ compensation system, a “claims administrator” is an insurance company employee who, whilst ostensibly applying West Virginia’s workers’ compensation laws and regulations to rule on a claimant’s claim, is also focused on protecting the interests of the insurance company and, indirectly, those of the claimant’s employer. The majority opinion deftly notes that a claims administrator “is not bound by the traditional rules operative to an adversary system” and does not issue decisions remotely on par with “a quasi-judicial determination of an administrative agency.” ___ W. Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (Slip. Op. at 9). Hence, to put the majority’s ruling succinctly: a ruling, assessment, decision, or any other pronouncement by a claims administrator cannot form the basis for collateral estoppel under Miller. This Court recognizes that its authority is limited to what is expressly provided by the Legislature. See W. Va. Code § 51-11-4 (2024). In line with the Legislature’s limitations, the majority opinion constrains its application of Miller and, upon establishing that Miller’s collateral estoppel rule does not apply to claims examiner decisions and that the lower tribunal’s decision was correct, it ends its analysis. 1 What leaves me troubled, however, is that this is the second time in a year that collateral estoppel has arisen at the appellate level in the context of workers’ compensation rulings. It also is the second time in a year that application of the collateral estoppel doctrine has been rejected. In our ruling today, we rejected an employer’s attempt to use an adverse claims administrator’s ruling against a living claimant to later preclude the claim of a dependent seeking benefits for the work-related death of that claimant. In Ruble v. Rust-Oleum Corporation, 250 W. Va. 324, 902 S.E.2d 873 (2024), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) found, under the collateral estoppel guidelines of Miller, that a tortfeasor in a lawsuit could not use an adverse ruling against a workers’ compensation claimant to subsequently preclude the lawsuit by the claimant against the tortfeasor for injuries the claimant sustained on the job. The SCAWV found that because a workers’ compensation claim uses legal standards and procedural rules that are “substantially different from those in a courtroom,” a final ruling by a workers’ compensation judge does not have preclusive effect in a lawsuit. Id. at 326, 902 S.E.2d at 875. I write separately to underscore that, in cases like the one at bar, where there has been an adverse ruling against a living claimant, that adverse ruling has no preclusive effect on a subsequent claim for death benefits by the deceased claimant’s dependents. West Virginia law is clear: an adverse workers’ compensation decision against a living claimant has no collateral estoppel effect, and no res judicata effect, on a later claim for dependent’s benefits arising from the claimant’s work-related death. None. There are two 2 independent and separate rights of recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act, both based on the same injury or disease: one for the worker during his or her lifetime, and another for the worker’s dependents after his or her death. The parties in the claims are different, the parties are not in privity, and their statutory rights are different. Put simply, the actions of an injured worker who litigates a workers’ compensation claim while alive will have no preclusive effect on the rights of the worker’s dependent survivors, should the worker die as a result of his or her work-related injury or disease. This is not just my opinion. For eight-and-a-half decades, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) has found that a claim for workers’ compensation disability benefits by a living claimant, and a claim for death benefits by a deceased claimant’s dependents, “are not the same, nor is a claim for the latter
Case Summary
Summary of the key points and legal principles
No. 24-ICA-269 – Union Carbide Corporation, a subsidiary of the Dow Chemical Company v. Christina Dearien (decedent) and Thomas Dearien (dependent) FILED June 4, 2025 WHITE, Judge, concurring: ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
I wholeheartedly concur with the majority’s opinion and its application of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel espoused in State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114
(1995). In the workers’ compensation system, a “claims administrator” is an insurance
company employee who, whilst ostensibly applying West Virginia’s workers’
compensation laws and regulations to rule on a claimant’s claim, is also focused on
protecting the interests of the insurance company and, indirectly, those of the claimant’s
employer. The majority opinion deftly notes that a claims administrator “is not bound by
the traditional rules operative to an adversary system” and does not issue decisions
remotely on par with “a quasi-judicial determination of an administrative agency.” ___ W.
Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (Slip. Op. at 9). Hence, to put the majority’s ruling succinctly:
a ruling, assessment, decision, or any other pronouncement by a claims administrator
cannot form the basis for collateral estoppel under Miller.
This Court recognizes that its authority is limited to what is expressly
provided by the Legislature. See W. Va. Code § 51-11-4 (2024). In line with the
Legislature’s limitations, the majority opinion constrains its application of Miller and, upon
establishing that Miller’s collateral estoppel rule does not apply to claims examiner
decisions and that the lower tribunal’s decision was correct, it ends its analysis.
1
What leaves me troubled, however, is that this is the second time in a year
that collateral estoppel has arisen at the appellate level in the context of workers’
compensation rulings. It also is the second time in a year that application of the collateral
estoppel doctrine has been rejected. In our ruling today, we rejected an employer’s attempt
to use an adverse claims administrator’s ruling against a living claimant to later preclude
the claim of a dependent seeking benefits for the work-related death of that claimant. In
Ruble v. Rust-Oleum Corporation, 250 W. Va. 324, 902 S.E.2d 873 (2024), the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) found, under the collateral estoppel
guidelines of Miller, that a tortfeasor in a lawsuit could not use an adverse ruling against a
workers’ compensation claimant to subsequently preclude the lawsuit by the claimant
against the tortfeasor for injuries the claimant sustained on the job. The SCAWV found
that because a workers’ compensation claim uses legal standards and procedural rules that
are “substantially different from those in a courtroom,” a final ruling by a workers’
compensation judge does not have preclusive effect in a lawsuit. Id. at 326, 902 S.E.2d at
I write separately to underscore that, in cases like the one at bar, where there
has been an adverse ruling against a living claimant, that adverse ruling has no preclusive
effect on a subsequent claim for death benefits by the deceased claimant’s dependents.
West Virginia law is clear: an adverse workers’ compensation decision against a living
claimant has no collateral estoppel effect, and no res judicata effect, on a later claim for
dependent’s benefits arising from the claimant’s work-related death. None. There are two
2
independent and separate rights of recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act, both
based on the same injury or disease: one for the worker during his or her lifetime, and
another for the worker’s dependents after his or her death. The parties in the claims are
different, the parties are not in privity, and their statutory rights are different. Put simply,
the actions of an injured worker who litigates a workers’ compensation claim while alive
will have no preclusive effect on the rights of the worker’s dependent survivors, should the
worker die as a result of his or her work-related injury or disease.
This is not just my opinion. For eight-and-a-half decades, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) has found that a claim for workers’
compensation disability benefits by a living claimant, and a claim for death benefits by a
deceased claimant’s dependents, “are not the same, nor is a claim for the latter
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Date Decided
June 4, 2025
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