State v. F. S. S.

No. 542 June 11, 2025 307 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of S. P., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. S. P., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 24CC03731; A184975 Stephen W. Morgan, Judge. Submitted May 12, 2025. Christopher J. O’Connor and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. State v. E. K. C., 337 Or App 362, 562 P3d 1139 (2025).

278 June 11, 2025 No. 532 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of J. S., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. J. S., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 24CC02596; A184449 R. Curtis Conover, Judge. Argued and submitted March 20, 2025. Christopher J. O’Connor argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Multnomah Defenders, Inc. Joanna Hershey, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Pagán, Judge, and Walters, Senior Judge. SHORR, P. J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 278 (2025) 279 SHORR, P. J. Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment involun- tarily committing him to the Oregon Health Authority for up to 180 days on the basis that appellant has a mental dis- order that makes him a danger both to himself and others. He raises two assignments of error. First, he contends that the trial court erred by committing him on the basis that he was a danger to himself after the state had withdrawn that allegation. Second, he argues that the evidence was insuffi- cient for the court to find that he was either a danger to him- self or others at the time of his hearing. As we explain below, we do not reach appellant’s first assignment. We reject his second assignment to the extent that we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant’s com- mitment based on danger to others. As a result, we affirm. Neither party has requested de novo review, and this is not an exceptional case that justifies such review. See ORAP 5.40(8)(C) (we exercise discretion to review de novo “only in exceptional cases”). We therefore review the suffi- ciency of the evidence to support appellant’s civil commit- ment for legal error and are bound by the trial court’s fac- tual findings that are supported by evidence in the record. State v. C. M. C., 301 Or App 206, 207, 454 P3d 30 (2019). We view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition.” State v. T. Y., 285 Or App 21, 22, 396 P3d 986 (2017). Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background, we recite in our analysis only those facts necessary to explain our decision. In appellant’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred in determining that he was a danger to himself after the state had withdrawn that alle- gation, asserting that the court violated his due process rights in doing so. Before the trial court, appellant did not argue that it was error or a due process violation for the court to commit him on a theory—danger to self—that the state had declined to pursue. As a result, the state contends that appellant did not preserve his first assignment of error. We do not address the issue of preservation or the merits of appellant’s argument. Instead, we conclude that, because we affirm the trial court’s judgment on an alternative basis, 280 State v. J. S. we do not need to resolve the first assignment of error. We turn to that alternative basis and consider appellant’s argu- ment that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s civil commitment ruling. Appellant’s second assignment of error challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s determination that he was a danger to others, ORS 426.005 (1)(f)(A).1 The state responds that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that appellant was a danger to others. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there was legally sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to determine that appellant was a danger to others. “To permit commitment on the basis of dangerousness to others, the state must establish that actual future violence is highly likely.” State v. C. L., 313 Or App 539, 542, 495 P3d 748 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a person is a danger to others is deter- mined by his condition at the time of the hearing as under- stood in the context of his history. State v. D. L. W., 244 Or App 401, 405, 260 P3d 691 (2011). If a mentally ill person has “threatened others and has also carried out an overt violent act in the past against another person, those facts generally constitute clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to others.” Id. In the weeks leading up to hi

No. 525 June 4, 2025 211 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON SIRGIORGIO SANFORD CLARDY, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION, Respondent. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision A181462 Submitted on May 15, 2025. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Shawn Wiley, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the opening brief for peti- tioner. Sir Giorgio Sanford Clardy filed the supplemental brief pro se. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. 212 Clardy v. Board of Parole PER CURIAM Petitioner is an adult in custody who was sentenced as a dangerous offender to serve 300 months with a man- datory minimum of 75 months on multiple felony counts. Petitioner assigns error to the Board of Parole and Post- Prison Supervision’s (the board) order denying him release and deferring parole consideration for two years. He argues that the board applied improper standards to the deter- mination of whether he was eligible for release, and that the board’s determinations are unsupported by substantial evidence resulting in a final order that lacked substantial reason. The board argues that it applied the proper stan- dards to the release determination according to our prior decisions, and that its factual findings were based upon sub- stantial evidence in the record. We affirm. We review a board order “for legal error, substantial evidence, and substantial reason.” Bell v. Board of Parole, 283 Or App 711, 713, 391 P3d 907, rev den, 361 Or 645 (2017). First, we address petitioner’s argument that the board applied the wrong standard. When a person is sentenced as a dangerous offender, the trial court has made a finding that the person was suffering from a severe personality disorder that predis- posed them to commit crimes that seriously endangered the life or safety of another. We have previously determined, in a case not materially distinguishable from this one, that the test the board applied, including whether petitioner still suf- fered from a mental disorder that predisposed him to com- mit any crime, is appropriate. Guzek v. Board of Parole, 325 Or App 795, 804, 530 P3d 510, rev den, 371 Or 476 (2023). Similar to that case, we have considered the record, and determine that the board’s intermediate determinations that petitioner lacked remorse for the victims, failed to engage in mental health treatment, and resisted being supervised as a sex offender, are amply supported by evidence in the record, and petitioner’s own statements to the board—quoted in the board’s letter of deferral—reinforce our determination that the board considered the appropriate standard in denying release and deferring the next parole consideration hearing. We also find the psychologist’s finding that peti- tioner is currently suffering from antisocial personality Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 211 (2025) 213 disorder to be adequately supported by a preponderance of evidence in the record, despite problems associated with the Personality Assessment Inventory test. The board’s duty at the parole consideration hearing is to determine whether petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer dangerous at the time of the parole con- sideration hearing. Davis v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 442, 448, 144 P3d 931 (2006). Here, the board adequately con- nected its reasons for denial to evidence in the record, and it did not err. Affirmed.

No. 564 June 25, 2025 445 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of K. R. Z., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. K. R. Z., Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 24CC05786; A185675 Drew P. Taylor, Judge pro tempore. Submitted May 9, 2025. Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge. LAGESEN, C. J. Reversed. 446 State v. K. R. Z. LAGESEN, C. J. Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment committing her to the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days, as well as an order prohibiting the purchase or possession of firearms. The trial court entered that judg- ment and order after finding that appellant suffered from a mental disorder that caused her to be a danger to herself and others. See ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). We reverse.1 Appellant argues that the trial court plainly erred in proceeding with the commitment hearing on a citation that failed to include the specific reasons that she was believed to be a person with a mental illness, as required by ORS 426.090. The state concedes the error. Having reviewed the record, we agree with and accept the state’s concession. By failing to issue a citation that complies with ORS 426.090, the court failed to comply with the procedures governing civil commitments. State v. B. L. W., 335 Or App 639, 640-41, 560 P3d 766 (2024). There is no indication that appellant waived those procedural pro- tections. Id. at 641. Reversed. 1 As authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b), this matter is determined by a two-judge panel.

No. 565 June 25, 2025 447 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of T. L. P., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. T. L. P., Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 24CC06312; A185801 Cheryl A. Pellegrini, Judge. Submitted May 9, 2025. Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge. LAGESEN, C. J. Reversed. 448 State v. T. L. P. LAGESEN, C. J. Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment committing her to the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days. The trial court entered that judgment and order after finding that appellant suffered from a mental disorder that caused her to be unable to provide for her basic needs. See ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B). We reverse.1 In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court plainly erred in proceeding with the commitment hearing on a citation that failed to include the specific reasons that she was believed to be a person with a mental illness, as required by ORS 426.090. In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the court erred in detaining her after postponing the civil commitment hearing on the state’s motion. The state concedes that the trial court erroneously proceeded with the hearing on a citation that did not include the specific reasons that appellant was believed to be a per- son with a mental illness. Having reviewed the record, we agree with and accept the state’s concession. By failing to issue a citation that complies with ORS 426.090, the court failed to comply with the procedures governing civil commitments. State v. B. L. W., 335 Or App 639, 640-41, 560 P3d 766 (2024). There is no indication that appellant waived those procedural pro- tections. Id. at 641. Because we conclude that reversal of the civil com- mitment judgment is required based on appellant’s first assignment of error, we need not reach appellant’s second assignment of error. Reversed. 1 As authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b), this matter is determined by a two-judge panel.