Legal Case

State v. J. S.

Citation

341 Or. App. 278

Court

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided

June 11, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Importance

45%

Significant

Practice Areas

Mental Health Law
Civil Commitment
Criminal Law

Case Summary

278 June 11, 2025 No. 532 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of J. S., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. J. S., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 24CC02596; A184449 R. Curtis Conover, Judge. Argued and submitted March 20, 2025. Christopher J. O’Connor argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Multnomah Defenders, Inc. Joanna Hershey, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Pagán, Judge, and Walters, Senior Judge. SHORR, P. J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 278 (2025) 279 SHORR, P. J. Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment involun- tarily committing him to the Oregon Health Authority for up to 180 days on the basis that appellant has a mental dis- order that makes him a danger both to himself and others. He raises two assignments of error. First, he contends that the trial court erred by committing him on the basis that he was a danger to himself after the state had withdrawn that allegation. Second, he argues that the evidence was insuffi- cient for the court to find that he was either a danger to him- self or others at the time of his hearing. As we explain below, we do not reach appellant’s first assignment. We reject his second assignment to the extent that we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant’s com- mitment based on danger to others. As a result, we affirm. Neither party has requested de novo review, and this is not an exceptional case that justifies such review. See ORAP 5.40(8)(C) (we exercise discretion to review de novo “only in exceptional cases”). We therefore review the suffi- ciency of the evidence to support appellant’s civil commit- ment for legal error and are bound by the trial court’s fac- tual findings that are supported by evidence in the record. State v. C. M. C., 301 Or App 206, 207, 454 P3d 30 (2019). We view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition.” State v. T. Y., 285 Or App 21, 22, 396 P3d 986 (2017). Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background, we recite in our analysis only those facts necessary to explain our decision. In appellant’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred in determining that he was a danger to himself after the state had withdrawn that alle- gation, asserting that the court violated his due process rights in doing so. Before the trial court, appellant did not argue that it was error or a due process violation for the court to commit him on a theory—danger to self—that the state had declined to pursue. As a result, the state contends that appellant did not preserve his first assignment of error. We do not address the issue of preservation or the merits of appellant’s argument. Instead, we conclude that, because we affirm the trial court’s judgment on an alternative basis, 280 State v. J. S. we do not need to resolve the first assignment of error. We turn to that alternative basis and consider appellant’s argu- ment that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s civil commitment ruling. Appellant’s second assignment of error challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s determination that he was a danger to others, ORS 426.005 (1)(f)(A).1 The state responds that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that appellant was a danger to others. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there was legally sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to determine that appellant was a danger to others. “To permit commitment on the basis of dangerousness to others, the state must establish that actual future violence is highly likely.” State v. C. L., 313 Or App 539, 542, 495 P3d 748 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a person is a danger to others is deter- mined by his condition at the time of the hearing as under- stood in the context of his history. State v. D. L. W., 244 Or App 401, 405, 260 P3d 691 (2011). If a mentally ill person has “threatened others and has also carried out an overt violent act in the past against another person, those facts generally constitute clear and convincing evidence that the person is a danger to others.” Id. In the weeks leading up to hi

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Case Details

Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

June 11, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Court Type

federal

Legal Significance

Case importance metrics

Importance Score
Significant
Score45%
Citations
0
Legal Topics
Involuntary Commitment
Danger to Self and Others
Mental Illness Standards

Metadata

Additional information

AddedJun 17, 2025
UpdatedJun 17, 2025

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Case Summary

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Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Involuntary Commitment
Danger to Self and Others
Mental Illness Standards

Case Information

Detailed case metadata and classifications

Court Proceedings

Date FiledJune 11, 2025
Date DecidedJune 11, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
0
Importance Score
0.5

Legal Classification

JurisdictionSA
Court Type
federal
Judicial Panel
Shorr
Opinion Author
Shorr

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Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
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80% match
Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Jun 2025

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