State ex rel. Savage v. Tone

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-24-00357-CR Jamison Whitaker, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 443rd District Court of Ellis County, Texas Judge Cynthia Ermatinger, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 49332CR JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Jamison Whitaker appeals from his conviction for the offense of terroristic threat. After finding him guilty, the jury assessed punishment at forty years of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice— Institutional Division. In his sole issue, Whitaker contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.  BACKGROUND Because he was angry at his coworkers at Liberty Tire Recycling in Midlothian, Whitaker confronted a supervisor in the parking lot, saying “I got something for you,” while pointing his finger like a gun. He then went to his car, picked something up, put it back down, and returned to continue yelling at the supervisor. The next day, Whitaker showed a coworker, Frank Byers, an assault rifle he had in the back of his vehicle. Whitaker said he was going to “shoot the place up” and “kill these Mexicans” and the supervisor. Byers reported the threat to his superiors, and they called the police. Although police answered a call regarding a person in possession of a firearm who was making threats, Whitaker was arrested on outstanding traffic warrants. They did not search his vehicle. A tow truck was sent to tow Whitaker’s vehicle for safekeeping, but the towing company took the wrong vehicle. After Whitaker was removed from the premises, Pedro Garcia, the regional vice president for Liberty Tire Recycling, took the firearm from Whitaker’s vehicle and placed it in his office for safekeeping. The police returned about thirty minutes after arresting Whitaker. Garcia then gave the rifle to police. Whitaker was indicted for the offense of terroristic threat. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress the rifle. He asserted that Garcia committed Whitaker v. State Page 2 burglary of a vehicle when he took the rifle and therefore it is inadmissible. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found Whitaker guilty, and this appeal ensued. MOTION TO SUPPRESS In his sole issue, Whitaker asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Garcia unlawfully obtained the rifle. He argues that Garcia committed the offense of burglary of a motor vehicle, making the evidence inadmissible. Standard of Review We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We afford almost total deference to the trial court's express or implied determination of historical facts and the trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, especially when those determinations are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor. Id; State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We review pure questions of law, as well as mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an assessment of credibility and demeanor, on a de novo basis. Torres, 666 S.W.3d at 740-41. Thus, we review de novo the trial court's application of the law of seizure to the facts. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590. The trial court is the sole factfinder at a suppression Whitaker v. State Page 3 hearing, and it may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's conclusion and reverse only if the trial court's decision is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d at 590. We will sustain the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Id. We do not view motions to suppress in isolation, but in the context of the entire record. Douds v. State, 472 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); State v. Hopper, 842 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no pet.). Applicable Law Texas code of criminal procedure article 38.23(a) provides that evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of law is inadmissible in a trial of any criminal case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a). A person commits the offense of burglary of a vehic

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00240-CR Bradley Oliver, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Thomas C. West, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2021-499-C1 JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant appeals from a judgment revoking community supervision which was imposed on May 15, 2025 and signed by the trial court on that same date. Appellant wrote a pro se letter to the trial court asking to appeal the judgment which was mailed on July 16, 2025 and filed by the trial court clerk on July 18, 2025. Appellant was represented by court-appointed counsel prior to the imposition of sentence, and nothing in the clerk’s record indicates that his attorney withdrew from his representation of Appellant after his sentence was imposed. The trial court appointed appellate counsel for Appellant on July 25, 2025, and counsel promptly filed a notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal. However, a motion for extension of time may be granted only if it is filed within 45 days of the imposition of sentence. Therefore, the pro se notice of appeal filed by Appellant on July 18, 2025 and later motion to extend and amended notice of appeal were not timely and this Court is unable to grant the motion for extension of time because we lack jurisdiction to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1), 26.3. See also Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. See id. Appellant’s motion to extend time to file the notice of appeal is dismissed. STEVE SMITH Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: August 14, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Appeal dismissed; motion dismissed Do not publish CR25 Oliver v. State Page 2

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas JUDGMENT No. 04-25-00056-CR Alicia Angelita ARREDONDO, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022CR11898 Honorable Catherine Torres-Stahl, Judge Presiding BEFORE JUSTICE RIOS, JUSTICE VALENZUELA, AND JUSTICE BRISSETTE In accordance with this court’s memorandum opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED. SIGNED August 6, 2025. _________________________________ Irene Rios, Justice

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAOT-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:59 AM Dkt. 5 ODSLJ NO. CAOT-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I JASON FLETCHER, Petitioner, v STATE OF HAWAI I, Respondent. ORDER (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka, Wadsworth, JJ.) Upon review of the record, the court finds that self- represented Petitioner Eric Fletcher's (Fletcher) April 25, 2025 Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody appears to seek affirmative relief in the nature of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, which this court lacks jurisdiction to decide. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that case No. CAOT-XX-XXXXXXX is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to Fletcher seeking relief from the appropriate court having jurisdiction. Dated: Honolulu, Hawai i June 20, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Acting Chief Judge /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth Associate Judge

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 63 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MERVINA KAUKINI MAMO CASH-KAEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUY K. BARRETT; RONETTE BARRETT, Defendants-Appellants, DUSTIN K. BARRETT; SHEENA ANN BARRETT; RICHARD BARRETT; LEZLEY K. BARRETT aka LEZLEY BRADBURY, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAI‘ANAE DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.) Defendants-Appellants Guy K. Barrett and Ronette Barrett (collectively, the Barretts) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district court)1 May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. They raise three points of error, contending that the district court abused its discretion when: 1 The Honorable Darolyn H. Lendio entered the Judgment for Possession. The Honorable Michelle N. Comeau presided over the April 26, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Mervina Kaukini Mamo Cash-Kaeo's (Cash- Kaeo) motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (1) "it defaulted [the Barretts] for [their] non[-]appearance [at the MSJ hearing] where the facts show [the Barretts had] defended themselves in this action by retaining counsel" who "made eight court appearances at hearings in defense of [the Barretts]"; (2) "it applied the extreme sanctions methodology" by entering default judgment against the Barretts "for the failure of their counsel to appear at the hearing on [Cash- Kaeo's] [MSJ]"; and (3) "it allowed the hearing on [Cash-Kaeo's] [MSJ] to proceed without first addressing [counsel's] non[- ]appearance at this hearing." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the Barretts' appeal as follows. The Barretts contend that the district court entered default judgment against them pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 55. The record reflects, however, that the district court entered the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession against the Barretts because Cash-Kaeo demonstrated she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under DCRCP Rule 56. Pursuant to DCRCP Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawaiʻi 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The Barretts point to no evidence in the record indicating a genuine issue of material fact disputing that Cash- Kaeo is the sole surviving lessee of the subject property, and that Cash-Kaeo is therefore entitled to judgment of possession against the Barretts as a matter of law. The Barretts also cite no authority indicating the district court was required to address their counsel's non-appearance at the MSJ hearing before it could grant the MSJ. Even if the district court was required to do so, the Barretts fail to identify any legal theory or issue of fact that could have or would have been presented in opposition to the MSJ to defeat the motion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting the MSJ, and affirm the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 20, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Presiding Judge Barry L. Sooalo, for Defendants-Appellants. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge Jay T. Suemori, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge