Pownal Ctr Community Church v. Pownal
Pownal
Court
Unknown Court
Decided
July 9, 2025
Importance
34%
Practice Areas
Case Summary
Vermont Superior Court Filed 07/02/25 Bennington Unit VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Bennington Unit Case No. 25-CV-01511 207 South St Bennington VT 05201 802-447-2700 www.vermontjudiciary.org Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, raa Vermont Municipality ENTRY REGARDING MOTION Title: Motion to Dismiss (Motion: 1) Filer: Robert M. Fisher Filed Date: May 07, 2025 This case involves a dispute over title of the Property at 495 Center Street in Pownall, Vermont, known as the Pownal Center Community Church. Plaintiff Pownal Center Community Church (Church) filed a Complaint on April 4, 2025, against Defendant Town of Pownal (Town). Church seeks an order of quiet title on theories of having legal title, acquiring title through adverse possession, and acquiring a prescriptive easement to continue using the Property. Town filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 7, 2025, pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Church responded with Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on June 5, 2025, a asserting, among other things, that Town's Motion to Dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment. On June 13, 2025, Town filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. The ruling on the motion, for the reasons herein, is: 1. Town's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Standard Town's Motion to Dismiss comes pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a motion to dismiss should be granted where it is "beyond doubt that there exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Kaplan v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2009 VT 78, J 7, 186 Vt. 605. In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts assume the truth of factual allegations asserted in the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences that may follow, and focus their inquiry "on the absence of any facts, reasonable factual inferences, and legal bases for recovery alleged in the complaint, attachments thereto, or to matters the court may judicially notice." Sprague v. Nally, 2005 VT 85, § 2, 178 Vt. 222 J (quoting Gilman v. Maine Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2003 VT 55, 20, 175 Vt. 554 (mem.) (internal quotations omitted)). The "purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the law of the claim, not the facts which support it." Powers v. Office of Child Support, 173 Vt. 390, 395 (2002) (citing Levinsky v. Diamond, 140 Vt. 595, 600 (1982)). Motions under Rule 12(b)(6) are not favored and rarely granted. Endres v. Endres, 2006 VT 108, 1 4, 180 Vt. 640. Entry Regarding Motion Page 1 of 5 25-CV-01511 Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, a Vermont Municipality Facts The following facts from Church’s Complaint are accepted as true. On January 28, 1760, Province of New Hampshire Governor Benning Wentworth chartered the Town of Pownal on behalf of King George II of Great Britain, wherein a Glebe was set aside for the Church of England. Around 1790, a congregation in Pownal raised funds and built a church at the Property. Around 1849, the Town of Pownal voted to raise funds to repair the church structure. There is no report examining title to the Property. Subsequently, around 1905, Ward E. Niles conveyed to several parties and the Trustees for Church a portion of the Property known as the “carriage shed” premises. Around 1991, Town stopped using the basement story of the church building on the Property for town and Freeman’s meetings. Church has maintained and insured the Property since 1951 and 1980, respectively. Since its inception, the Property has operated as a religious site of worship. Town has not taken any affirmative action to retain ownership of some, or all, of its perpetual lease lands that it may have. Discussion 1. Town’s Motion to Dismiss is not a motion for summary judgment. 2. Church baldly insists that this Court must treat Town’s Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. The Court disagrees. V.R.C.P. 12(b) provides that: If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are prese
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Vermont Superior Court Filed 07/02/25 Bennington Unit
VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Bennington Unit Case No. 25-CV-01511 207 South St Bennington VT 05201 802-447-2700 www.vermontjudiciary.org
Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, raa Vermont Municipality
ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion to Dismiss (Motion: 1) Filer: Robert M. Fisher Filed Date: May 07, 2025
This case involves a dispute over title of the Property at 495 Center Street in Pownall,
Vermont, known as the Pownal Center Community Church. Plaintiff Pownal Center Community Church (Church) filed a Complaint on April 4, 2025, against Defendant Town of Pownal (Town). Church seeks an order of quiet title on theories of having legal title, acquiring title through adverse possession, and acquiring a prescriptive easement to continue using the Property. Town filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 7, 2025, pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Church responded with Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on June 5, 2025, a
asserting, among other things, that Town's Motion to Dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment. On June 13, 2025, Town filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.
The ruling on the motion, for the reasons herein, is:
1. Town's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Standard
Town's Motion to Dismiss comes pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Vermont Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides that a motion to dismiss should be granted where it is "beyond doubt that there exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Kaplan v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2009 VT 78, J 7, 186 Vt. 605. In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts assume the truth of factual allegations asserted in the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences that may follow, and focus their inquiry "on the absence of any facts, reasonable factual inferences, and legal bases for recovery alleged in the complaint, attachments thereto, or to matters the court may judicially notice." Sprague v. Nally, 2005 VT 85, § 2, 178 Vt. 222 J (quoting Gilman v. Maine Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2003 VT 55, 20, 175 Vt. 554 (mem.) (internal quotations omitted)). The "purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the law of the claim, not the facts which support it." Powers v. Office of Child Support, 173 Vt. 390, 395 (2002) (citing Levinsky v. Diamond, 140 Vt. 595, 600 (1982)). Motions under Rule 12(b)(6) are not favored and rarely granted. Endres v. Endres, 2006 VT 108, 1 4, 180 Vt. 640. Entry Regarding Motion Page 1 of 5 25-CV-01511 Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, a Vermont Municipality Facts The following facts from Church’s Complaint are accepted as true. On January 28, 1760, Province of New Hampshire Governor Benning Wentworth chartered the Town of Pownal on behalf of King George II of Great Britain, wherein a Glebe was set aside for the Church of England. Around 1790, a congregation in Pownal raised funds and built a church at the Property. Around 1849, the Town of Pownal voted to raise funds to repair the church structure. There is no report examining title to the Property. Subsequently, around 1905, Ward E. Niles conveyed to several parties and the Trustees for Church a portion of the Property known as the “carriage shed” premises. Around 1991, Town stopped using the basement story of the church building on the Property for town and Freeman’s meetings. Church has maintained and insured the Property since 1951 and 1980, respectively. Since its inception, the Property has operated as a religious site of worship. Town has not taken any affirmative action to retain ownership of some, or all, of its perpetual lease lands that it may have.
Discussion
1. Town’s Motion to Dismiss is not a motion for summary judgment.
2.
Church baldly insists that this Court must treat Town’s Motion to Dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment. The Court disagrees. V.R.C.P. 12(b) provides that:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are prese
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Status
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Date Decided
July 9, 2025
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