Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County v. Bill Lee (Dissenting in part)

RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1311-MR KHALIL COLEMAN APPELLANT APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00759 KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Khalil Coleman appeals from the Franklin Circuit Court’s order dismissing his complaint against Appellee, the Kentucky General Assembly. Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND Khalil Coleman, a state inmate, filed a pro se lawsuit seeking a declaration regarding certain sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. He named the General Assembly of Kentucky as the sole defendant. The General Assembly moved to dismiss the action, arguing Coleman failed to state a claim, and alternatively, if Coleman had stated a claim, the General Assembly is shielded by legislative immunity under Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Franklin Circuit Court granted the General Assembly’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and declined to assess the immunity defense. Coleman now appeals. ANALYSIS We review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Davenport Extreme Pools and Spas, Inc. v. Mulflur, 698 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Ky. App. 2024). Trial courts must construe pleadings “in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky. App. 1987) (citing Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1960)). In response to a pleading, a party to an action may present the defense of a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by a pre-answer motion. CR1 12.02(f). The General Assembly presented that defense, arguing Coleman’s complaint “does not state any cognizable legal theory related to the General Assembly and alleges no sufficient facts to support one. In fact, the Complaint 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -2- does not even allege any action or inaction by the General Assembly as a body or by its individual members.” (Record (R.) at 55.) Coleman argues his “declaration of rights petition did in fact state several claims, which should have rendered right to relief.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4.) However, even on appeal, Coleman fails to state any claims against the General Assembly. As he did before the Franklin Circuit Court, he again argues that certain statutes are unconstitutional but does not aver in his brief before this Court sufficient facts that would allow the General Assembly to respond with a rational, cogent answer. He asserts no specific wrongdoing by the General Assembly. Rather, he requests that this Court “evoke legislative intent [and] redact statute [sic] of controversy affecting [his] rights.” (Appellant’s Br. at 6.) Although the General Assembly did not submit an Appellee’s Brief, we take that non- response as an expression of its belief there is nothing warranting a response on appeal. While we respect Coleman’s activism, bringing an action against the General Assembly is not a means by which such change can be effectuated. Existence of an actual controversy is a fundamental component of an action. “The court will not decide speculative rights or duties which may or may not arise in the future, but only rights and duties about which there is a present actual controversy presented by adversary parties, and in which a binding judgment concluding the -3- controversy may be entered.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Veith v. City of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. 1962)). “An actual controversy . . . does not involve a question which is merely hypothetical or an answer which is no more than an advisory opinion.” Barrett v. Reynolds, 817 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ky. 1991). Coleman’s request that the Court redact certain statutes is not an actual controversy. Neither is his request that the Court actually issue an advisory opinion, which we are prohibited from rendering. Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Ky. 2007) (citations omitted) (“It is a fundamental tenet of Kentucky jurisprudence that courts cannot decide matters that have not yet ripened into concrete disputes. Courts are not permitted to render advisory opin

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED August 12, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellee, 1:56 PM v No. 356714 Saginaw Circuit Court ADAM FERGUSON, also known as ADAM LC No. 91-004624-FC FERGERSON, Defendant-Appellant. Before: YATES, P.J., and YOUNG and WALLACE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Following a remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, defendant, Adam Ferguson,1 appeals as on leave granted an order denying a successive motion for relief from judgment. 2 He contends that his sentences violated the United States and Michigan Constitutions, that his sentences for drug offenses were improper, and that his waiver into adult court was unconstitutional. Ferguson argues that the sentencing court needed to consider the mitigating factors of youth and that Ferguson was improperly given a de facto life sentence for crimes he committed as a minor. We remand for resentencing. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This Court, in its 1997 opinion issued after Ferguson’s direct appeal of his convictions, set forth the crimes Ferguson committed and the sentences imposed: Defendant received concurrent sentences of six years, eight months to ten years in prison on the assault with intent to do great bodily harm convictions, 1 As then-appellate counsel mentioned in the 1994 Motion for New Trial, Ferguson’s name is Adam Fergerson but to be consistent with the trial court, we use “Ferguson” throughout these proceedings as well. 2 See People v Ferguson, 511 Mich 1020; 991 NW2d 576 (2023). -1-  twenty-five to fifty years in prison each for the armed robbery, kidnapping and conspiracy to commit murder and/or extortion convictions, thirteen to twenty years for extortion, as well as twenty to forty years on the delivery conviction and twenty to forty years on the possession with intent to deliver conviction, twenty to forty years on the conspiracy to deliver conviction, and . . . the mandatory two-year term on the felony-firearm conviction. The sentences for the delivery, possession with intent to deliver, and conspiracy to deliver convictions were to be consecutive to the concurrent terms on the other sentences as well as with each other. As required by statute, the sentence on the felony-firearm conviction was also consecutive, to be served prior to the remaining sentences. [People v Ferguson, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 10, 1996 (Docket No. 146333), p 1.] This Court affirmed Ferguson’s convictions but remanded for resentencing on one count, conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine. Id. at 4. At his earliest release date, Ferguson would be 74 years old.3 Ferguson was 17 years old when he committed the offenses at issue in this appeal. In 2020, after his first motion for relief from judgment was denied, Ferguson filed a successive motion for relief from judgment, asserting that his attorneys had been ineffective for failing to raise certain jurisdictional issues and also arguing that his sentences violated the constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles; he cited Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016).4 The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment, concluding that Ferguson had not established a retroactive change in the law to allow for a successive motion for relief from 3 Ferguson contends that if disciplinary credits are not considered, his earliest release date will actually be when he is 84 years old. Whether to consider disciplinary credits in a constitutional analysis of a sentence is a live question in our courts, particularly given the outcome in People v Nard, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d___ (2025) (Docket No. 369185), in which defendant’s parole status, afforded in part due to good time credits, led the Court to conclude that a 60-year minimum sentence was not a de facto life sentence. Here, appellant’s reply brief addresses this issue thoroughly, but we conclude that whether we consider good time credits or not, People v Eads (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 357332) would control and we

08/11/2025 THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE April 22, 2025 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROBERT JOSEPH ATKINS Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 117774 Steven Wayne Sword, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2024-00320-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Joseph Atkins, of delivery of a Schedule I controlled substance (acetylfentanyl) within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone and delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (fentanyl) within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by admitting his statements to law enforcement because new testimony at trial corroborated his claim that his statements were involuntary; (2) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the inference of casual exchange and the order of consideration; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm. Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER and KYLE A. HIXSON JJ., joined. Tyler Mark Caviness, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert Joseph Atkins. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; William C. Lundy, Assistant Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Teddy Ryan and Sean McDermott, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION The facts giving rise to the Defendant’s convictions stem from the death of Velma Smith, the victim in this case, on January 19, 2019. At the time of her death, the victim was living at “Beverly Park Place Health and Rehab Center.” On January 21, 2019, Lieutenant Heather Reyda of the Knox County Sheriff’s Office (KCSO) was assigned to a federal task force investigating drug-related overdose deaths. Based on information obtained from the victim’s cell phone and from family members, Lieutenant Reyda determined that the Defendant had provided the victim with drugs on the day she died. The Defendant was not located by law enforcement until February of 2020. On August 5, 2020, a Knox County grand jury charged the Defendant by presentment with four counts: one count of second-degree murder and three counts of delivery of a controlled substance. The State dismissed the fourth count of the presentment prior to trial. At trial, the jury acquitted the Defendant of the charge of murder in count one. The jury convicted the Defendant on the remaining two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. This appeal concerns only those two convictions. Suppression Hearing. On February 22, 2022, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement he made on February 10, 2020, to Lieutenant Reyda. He argued generally that his statement was involuntary under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. As factual grounds, he asserted that (1) he was incarcerated at the Knox County Detention Center on charges unrelated to this case; (2) because he was in custody he was “deprived of his freedom to not talk to detectives”; (3) he told detectives he did not want to talk to them; (4) he was tased and maced while in custody “which then caused him to be indicted for [Second] degree murder”; (5) at the time of the instant interview he had never been interrogated by law enforcement while in custody; and (6) although he was informed of his rights pursuant to Miranda, under the circumstances, he did not make a knowing and voluntary statement. He argued that the circumstances surrounding his interrogation with Lieutenant Reyda created a coercive environment that influenced his statements. In particular, he claimed that an altercation with correctional officers that occurred before his interrogation caused his statement to be involuntary. On July 12, 2022, the State filed a detailed response to the Defendant’s motion to suppress. The State alleged that on February 10, 2020, the Defendant was incarcerated on a separate charge in the Knox County Jail. He was transported to Visitation Booth 1 to speak to detectives. The Defendant became agitated and advised officers that he would not speak to anyone and wanted to be taken back to his cell. The Defendant then began kicking the door and windows in the visitation booth. The Defendant refused to comply with orders to stop. At 8:16 a.m., officers entered the visitation booth to restrain the Defendant. When officers entered the booth, the Defendant began fighting officers and resisting restraints. One officer maced the Defendant. When the Defendant continued

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED August 12, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellee, 1:56 PM v No. 356714 Saginaw Circuit Court ADAM FERGUSON, also known as ADAM LC No. 91-004624-FC FERGERSON, Defendant-Appellant. Before: YATES, P.J., and YOUNG and WALLACE, JJ. YATES, P.J. (concurring). Defendant was sentenced for a wide variety of crimes he committed in January 1991, when he was 17 years old. Defendant’s concurrent sentences for a collection of violent crimes were not especially lengthy, but his convictions for quotidian drug offenses resulted in consecutive terms of imprisonment that extended his earliest release date from prison to October 8, 2047. Because that aggregate term of imprisonment cannot withstand a challenge under the constitutional prohibition of “cruel or unusual punishment” in Const 1963, art 1, § 16, insofar as it is not “something that is reasonably possible for . . . defendant actually to serve,” People v Moore, 432 Mich 311, 329; 439 NW2d 684 (1989), I join my colleagues in affording relief to defendant. But I write separately to describe the perils of invoking the proscription of “cruel or unusual punishment” to set universally applicable limits on indeterminate sentences, which under established precedent must be tailored in each case to the offender and the offense. See, e.g., id. I. LEGAL BACKGROUND In most felony cases in Michigan, if incarceration is ordered, the sentencing court imposes either a jail term or an indeterminate prison sentence. To establish the lower and upper boundaries of an indeterminate prison sentence, the sentencing court must consider sentencing guidelines that our Legislature has prescribed in setting the minimum prison term, and then mechanically set the maximum term of imprisonment just as our Legislature has defined it. The minimum prison term selected by the sentencing court determines the defendant’s earliest release date from prison. Thus, the sentencing court has a great deal of latitude in choosing the minimum prison term, and thereby -1- dictating the defendant’s earliest release date, but virtually no discretion in setting the maximum term of imprisonment. A sentencing court does not have unfettered discretion in choosing a minimum prison term. First, a sentencing court must be informed by a correctly scored sentencing guidelines range, and an incorrect scoring decision on a sentencing guidelines variable ordinarily warrants resentencing. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89-91; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). Second, its sentence must satisfy the “principle of proportionality,” which mandates consideration of both the nature of the offense and the background of the offender. See People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 472-473; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). Third, because of a constitutional imperative, a sentencing court cannot impose a term of imprisonment that constitutes “cruel or unusual punishment.” See Const 1963, art 1, § 16. The universe of sentences characterized as “cruel or unusual punishment” expanded in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), which held that the imposition of a mandatory prison term of life without parole on a juvenile “violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” Id. at 465. Ten years after the ruling in Miller, our Supreme Court combined that holding with an analysis of the Michigan Constitution’s ban on “cruel or unusual punishment” and its own opinion in People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15; 485 NW2d 866 (1992),1 to hold that a term of imprisonment of life with the possibility of parole for second-degree murder imposed on a juvenile constitutes “cruel or unusual punishment” in contravention of Const 1963, art 1, § 16. See People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 307-308; 987 NW2d 85 (2022). Significantly, however, those cases did not involve indeterminate sentences like the one at issue in the instant case. Relying on the ruling in Stovall, this Court recently decided that an indeterminate sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder imposed upon a 16-year-old defendant was “invalid for two related but distinct reasons: it violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition of cruel or unusual punis

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00085-CR Ricardo Sanchez Enriquez, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Thomas C. West, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2008-1925 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Ricardo Sanchez Enriquez appeals from the trial court’s order that denied his “Constitutional Rights of Object and Right to Allocation Motion” in the above proceedings. By letter from the Clerk of this Court dated March 17, 2025, Appellant was notified that there did not appear to be a final, appealable order and instructed him to file a response to demonstrate jurisdiction. Enriquez has subsequently filed two motions but has not responded to the Clerk’s letter. Our review of the clerk’s record filed in this proceeding does not show an appealable order over which this Court has jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). All pending motions are denied. LEE HARRIS Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 18, 2025 Before Justice Smith, Justice Harris, and Senior Chief Justice Wright 1 Appeal dismissed Do not publish CRPM 1 The Honorable Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired) of the Eleventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas. Enriquez v. State Page 2