Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County v. Bill Lee (Dissenting in part)

RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1311-MR KHALIL COLEMAN APPELLANT APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00759 KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Khalil Coleman appeals from the Franklin Circuit Court’s order dismissing his complaint against Appellee, the Kentucky General Assembly. Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND Khalil Coleman, a state inmate, filed a pro se lawsuit seeking a declaration regarding certain sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. He named the General Assembly of Kentucky as the sole defendant. The General Assembly moved to dismiss the action, arguing Coleman failed to state a claim, and alternatively, if Coleman had stated a claim, the General Assembly is shielded by legislative immunity under Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Franklin Circuit Court granted the General Assembly’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and declined to assess the immunity defense. Coleman now appeals. ANALYSIS We review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Davenport Extreme Pools and Spas, Inc. v. Mulflur, 698 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Ky. App. 2024). Trial courts must construe pleadings “in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky. App. 1987) (citing Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1960)). In response to a pleading, a party to an action may present the defense of a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by a pre-answer motion. CR1 12.02(f). The General Assembly presented that defense, arguing Coleman’s complaint “does not state any cognizable legal theory related to the General Assembly and alleges no sufficient facts to support one. In fact, the Complaint 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -2- does not even allege any action or inaction by the General Assembly as a body or by its individual members.” (Record (R.) at 55.) Coleman argues his “declaration of rights petition did in fact state several claims, which should have rendered right to relief.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4.) However, even on appeal, Coleman fails to state any claims against the General Assembly. As he did before the Franklin Circuit Court, he again argues that certain statutes are unconstitutional but does not aver in his brief before this Court sufficient facts that would allow the General Assembly to respond with a rational, cogent answer. He asserts no specific wrongdoing by the General Assembly. Rather, he requests that this Court “evoke legislative intent [and] redact statute [sic] of controversy affecting [his] rights.” (Appellant’s Br. at 6.) Although the General Assembly did not submit an Appellee’s Brief, we take that non- response as an expression of its belief there is nothing warranting a response on appeal. While we respect Coleman’s activism, bringing an action against the General Assembly is not a means by which such change can be effectuated. Existence of an actual controversy is a fundamental component of an action. “The court will not decide speculative rights or duties which may or may not arise in the future, but only rights and duties about which there is a present actual controversy presented by adversary parties, and in which a binding judgment concluding the -3- controversy may be entered.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Veith v. City of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. 1962)). “An actual controversy . . . does not involve a question which is merely hypothetical or an answer which is no more than an advisory opinion.” Barrett v. Reynolds, 817 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ky. 1991). Coleman’s request that the Court redact certain statutes is not an actual controversy. Neither is his request that the Court actually issue an advisory opinion, which we are prohibited from rendering. Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Ky. 2007) (citations omitted) (“It is a fundamental tenet of Kentucky jurisprudence that courts cannot decide matters that have not yet ripened into concrete disputes. Courts are not permitted to render advisory opin

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00085-CR Ricardo Sanchez Enriquez, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Thomas C. West, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2008-1925 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Ricardo Sanchez Enriquez appeals from the trial court’s order that denied his “Constitutional Rights of Object and Right to Allocation Motion” in the above proceedings. By letter from the Clerk of this Court dated March 17, 2025, Appellant was notified that there did not appear to be a final, appealable order and instructed him to file a response to demonstrate jurisdiction. Enriquez has subsequently filed two motions but has not responded to the Clerk’s letter. Our review of the clerk’s record filed in this proceeding does not show an appealable order over which this Court has jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). All pending motions are denied. LEE HARRIS Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 18, 2025 Before Justice Smith, Justice Harris, and Senior Chief Justice Wright 1 Appeal dismissed Do not publish CRPM 1 The Honorable Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired) of the Eleventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas. Enriquez v. State Page 2

Filed 6/25/25 P. v. Branner CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A167564 v. GABRIEL BRANNER, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 01-22-01292) Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Gabriel Branner appeals a final judgment following his convictions for robberies that were committed on the same day against two small businesses. The jury found true various enhancements, including that he was armed with a firearm. The trial court also found true various aggravating factors and found no mitigating factors. On appeal, Branner argues that the court abused its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence as to one of the robbery counts. Specifically, he contends that the court relied on two aggravating factors that were unsupported by the evidence—that the crime involved a threat of great bodily harm or a high degree of cruelty and that the victims were particularly vulnerable. We disagree and affirm. 1  I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History A felony information charged Branner with: (1) unlawful conspiracy to commit robbery with an uncharged co-conspirator (Pen. Code,1 § 182, subd. (a)(1); count 1); (2) second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 2 to 4); and (3) unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5). With respect to count 1, the information alleged that Branner personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and with respect to counts 2 and 4, that he was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The information also alleged, with respect to counts 1 to 3, that Branner suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e); 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)). Finally, the information alleged various aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421.2 Following trial, the jury found Branner guilty on all counts and found true the arming enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and the special allegation that he suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), which also constituted a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e); 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)). Branner waived his right to a jury trial as to the aggravating factors, and the trial court found true six aggravating factors, including that the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or a high degree of cruelty (rule 4.421(a)(1)) and that the victims were particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)). The court also found no mitigating factors. 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 Further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 2  The trial court sentenced Branner to an aggregate term of 18 years in prison. It designated count 4 (robbery of the first massage spa employee) as the principal term and imposed an aggravated term of five years, doubled to 10 years for the prior strike conviction. On count 2 (robbery of the nail salon employee), the court imposed a consecutive term of one year, doubled to two years for the prior strike. On count 3 (robbery of second massage spa employee), the court imposed a consecutive term of one year and declined to apply the prior strike. On count 5 (possession of firearm), the court imposed a concurrent term of two years. The court then imposed an additional five years for the prior strike (§ 667, subd. (a)) but stayed the imposition of sentence on count 1 (conspiracy) under section 654. Finally, the court struck the arming enhancement pursuant to section 1385 and awarded Branner 359 days of custody credits. Branner timely appealed. B. Robberies On April 30, 2022, around 7:30 p.m., T.L. was working at the cash register of a nail salon in Daly City when he saw two men walk in with masks on.3 He testified that one man was “making the round[s]” while “the other one stay[ed] put just to observe.” The taller of the two men, who was wearing a black top and green pants, approached T.L. and pointed a gun at him. T.L. recalled that the gun was “camo” with a “tan slide

Filed 6/20/25 P. v. White CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, G062632 v. (Super. Ct. No. 17NF1416) SETH ALLEN WHITE, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Andre Manssourian, Judge. Affirmed. Justin Andrew Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley, Michael J. Patty and Sahar Karimi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. * * *  A homicide that would otherwise be murder may be reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed “upon a sudden quarrel or 1 heat of passion.” (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a).) Defendant Seth Allen White repeatedly hit his mother in the head with a baseball bat following an argument. She was rendered unconscious and died about a year later from catastrophic brain injuries. The People charged White with murder. At a jury trial, White testified that he hit his mother after she told him, “‘You are just like your father.’” The trial court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. The jury found White guilty of murder in the second degree. White argues there is insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction because no reasonable juror could have rejected his voluntary manslaughter defense. We disagree and affirm the judgment. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In December 2016, White turned 18 years old and lived with his mother (Mother) and his older sister (Sister) in an Anaheim mobile home park. White’s father (Father) had divorced Mother when he was about four years old, and there had been a lengthy and contentious court battle between them regarding White’s custody. On May 9, 2017, White sent a Facebook message to a friend stating, “I’m tired, but still really pissed and kind of want to start a mother murder epidemic like in the news today.” At some point, White told another 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 friend that he hated Mother and Sister, and he felt like a “house b*tch” because he was made to clean the house. White also told this friend that he wanted to kill Mother, but the friend felt White was just “venting.” On the evening of May 23, 2017, White was arguing with Mother and Sister. The argument had to do with White’s failure to clean his room. At about 8:00 p.m., Sister left and went to a restaurant because: “I needed to get out of there. There was a lot of tension.” At 8:45 p.m., a neighbor called 911, and reported that a female was “screaming” within the White’s home. The female was yelling, “‘Help me. Help me.’” The caller said that “the house was shaking like someone was getting beaten up or pushed around.” The neighbor’s son approached the home and heard three to five thumping noises and a heavy weight dropping to the floor. During the course of the 911 call, White closed all the windows and doors. White made a two-second video on his phone of Mother lying unconscious on the floor in a pool of blood as he stated, “Sleepy time, she comes.” White left the home carrying a baseball bat and unsuccessfully tried to start Mother’s van. White then walked to a nearby riverbed where he called a friend and said that he had “killed his mom.” White called 911 stating he had “just committed an act of assault, possible . . . manslaughter.” White said he hit Mother “a lot of times with the bat and I don’t know if she’s alive but she was like asleep when I left.” Police Investigation When officers arrived at the White’s home, they forced entry into the locked trailer and found Mother lying face up near the front door in a large pool of blood. She was gurgling blood, gasping for air, and was 3 unconscious