Legal Case

People of Michigan v. Adam Ferguson

Court

Michigan Court of Appeals

Decided

August 12, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Importance

45%

Significant

Practice Areas

Criminal Law
Juvenile Law
Constitutional Law
Sentencing Law

Case Summary

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED August 12, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellee, 1:56 PM v No. 356714 Saginaw Circuit Court ADAM FERGUSON, also known as ADAM LC No. 91-004624-FC FERGERSON, Defendant-Appellant. Before: YATES, P.J., and YOUNG and WALLACE, JJ. YATES, P.J. (concurring). Defendant was sentenced for a wide variety of crimes he committed in January 1991, when he was 17 years old. Defendant’s concurrent sentences for a collection of violent crimes were not especially lengthy, but his convictions for quotidian drug offenses resulted in consecutive terms of imprisonment that extended his earliest release date from prison to October 8, 2047. Because that aggregate term of imprisonment cannot withstand a challenge under the constitutional prohibition of “cruel or unusual punishment” in Const 1963, art 1, § 16, insofar as it is not “something that is reasonably possible for . . . defendant actually to serve,” People v Moore, 432 Mich 311, 329; 439 NW2d 684 (1989), I join my colleagues in affording relief to defendant. But I write separately to describe the perils of invoking the proscription of “cruel or unusual punishment” to set universally applicable limits on indeterminate sentences, which under established precedent must be tailored in each case to the offender and the offense. See, e.g., id. I. LEGAL BACKGROUND In most felony cases in Michigan, if incarceration is ordered, the sentencing court imposes either a jail term or an indeterminate prison sentence. To establish the lower and upper boundaries of an indeterminate prison sentence, the sentencing court must consider sentencing guidelines that our Legislature has prescribed in setting the minimum prison term, and then mechanically set the maximum term of imprisonment just as our Legislature has defined it. The minimum prison term selected by the sentencing court determines the defendant’s earliest release date from prison. Thus, the sentencing court has a great deal of latitude in choosing the minimum prison term, and thereby -1- dictating the defendant’s earliest release date, but virtually no discretion in setting the maximum term of imprisonment. A sentencing court does not have unfettered discretion in choosing a minimum prison term. First, a sentencing court must be informed by a correctly scored sentencing guidelines range, and an incorrect scoring decision on a sentencing guidelines variable ordinarily warrants resentencing. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89-91; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). Second, its sentence must satisfy the “principle of proportionality,” which mandates consideration of both the nature of the offense and the background of the offender. See People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 472-473; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). Third, because of a constitutional imperative, a sentencing court cannot impose a term of imprisonment that constitutes “cruel or unusual punishment.” See Const 1963, art 1, § 16. The universe of sentences characterized as “cruel or unusual punishment” expanded in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), which held that the imposition of a mandatory prison term of life without parole on a juvenile “violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” Id. at 465. Ten years after the ruling in Miller, our Supreme Court combined that holding with an analysis of the Michigan Constitution’s ban on “cruel or unusual punishment” and its own opinion in People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15; 485 NW2d 866 (1992),1 to hold that a term of imprisonment of life with the possibility of parole for second-degree murder imposed on a juvenile constitutes “cruel or unusual punishment” in contravention of Const 1963, art 1, § 16. See People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 307-308; 987 NW2d 85 (2022). Significantly, however, those cases did not involve indeterminate sentences like the one at issue in the instant case. Relying on the ruling in Stovall, this Court recently decided that an indeterminate sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder imposed upon a 16-year-old defendant was “invalid for two related but distinct reasons: it violates the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition of cruel or unusual punis

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Case Details

Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

August 12, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Court Type

federal

Legal Significance

Case importance metrics

Importance Score
Significant
Score45%
Citations
0
Legal Topics
Sentencing
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Juvenile Justice
Proportionality
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AddedAug 13, 2025
UpdatedAug 13, 2025

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Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Sentencing
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Juvenile Justice
Proportionality
Sentencing Discretion
Appellate Review
Trial Court Authority

Case Information

Detailed case metadata and classifications

Court Proceedings

Date FiledAugust 12, 2025
Date DecidedAugust 12, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
0
Importance Score
0.5

Legal Classification

JurisdictionSA
Court Type
federal
Judicial Panel
Christopher P. Yates
Opinion Author
Christopher P. Yates

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80% match
Court of Appeals of Texas
Aug 2025

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80% match
Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Jun 2025

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80% match
Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Jun 2025

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