Lori Keaton v. Linda S. Nowlin

Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 12, 2025. In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-25-00092-CV BRIGHT HEALTH MANAGEMENT, INC., Appellant V. CANTILO & BENNETT, L.L.P., SPECIAL DEPUTY RECEIVER OF BRIGHT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 455th District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-23-008361 MEMORANDUM OPINION The underlying case is an insurance receivership proceeding under Chapter 443 of the Texas Insurance Code, in which the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) sought and placed Appellant Bright Health Management, Inc.’s subsidiary, Bright Health Insurance Company of Texas (BHICOT), into liquidation. Bright Health Management attempts to appeal the trial court’s May 6, 2025, order (the Order) that enforces a permanent injunction that was entered over two years ago and that requires Bright Health Management to produce certain books and records of BHICOT to the Special Deputy Receiver, Appellee Cantilo & Bennett, LLP (the Receiver). We issued a letter notifying the parties this appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction because the record does not contain either a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order unless any party filed a response showing meritorious grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Both parties submitted briefing on jurisdiction. After reviewing the parties’ briefing, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude we do not have jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. BACKGROUND In November 2023, the trial court signed an order appointing the Commissioner of the TDI as Liquidator of BHICOT and entered a permanent injunction ordering Bright Health Management to, among other things, promptly surrender BHICOT’s property to the Liquidator. The November 2023 order further authorized appointment of the Receiver to perform the Liquidator’s functions. Bright Health Management did not appeal the November 2023 order or the permanent injunction. A dispute later ensued regarding the practicalities and cost of turning over electronically stored documents that relate to BHICOT to the Receiver. The Receiver eventually filed a Motion to Enforce the Permanent Injunction and Bright Health Management filed a Response and Cross-Motion for Entry of Order 2 Governing Electronically Stored Information (ESI Cross-Motion). A hearing was held before the court-appointed Special Master, who issued a recommendation to the trial court. On May 6, 2025, the trial court confirmed the Special Master’s recommendation, granted the Receiver’s Motion to Enforce, denied Bright Health Management’s ESI-Cross Motion, and ordered Bright Health Management to produce certain categories of BHICOT documents to the Receiver. This appeal followed.1 DISCUSSION Bright Health Management first argues the Order is an appealable, interlocutory order because it “functions as a temporary injunction,” or alternatively, is an order that modifies an order appointing a receiver. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 51.014(a)(1), (a)(4). We disagree. The Order simply enforces the November 2023 permanent injunction that requires Bright Health Management to promptly surrender BHICOT’s property. It does not grant any modified or additional authority to the Receiver. Bright Health Management next argues the Order is a final judgment because it resolves all issues between Bright Health Management and the Receiver regarding production of documents. We disagree that this characterization of the Order, even if correct, renders the Order a final, appealable judgment. The underlying proceeding is an insurance receivership, and the Order does not dispose of all parties and claims in the receivership action. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 1 Bright Health Management contemporaneously filed a mandamus action challenging the Order, which we denied. In re Bright Health Mgmt., Inc., No. 15–25–00108–CV, 2025 WL 1872554, at *1 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. July 8, 2025, orig. proceeding). 3 195. There are certain discrete decisions by insurance receivership courts that are considered final, appealable judgments, but the Order at issue here is not one of those. See Tex. Ins. Code §§ 443.055 (order on petition commencing delinquency proceedings); 443.257(c) (final disposition of a disputed claim). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00240-CR Bradley Oliver, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Thomas C. West, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2021-499-C1 JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant appeals from a judgment revoking community supervision which was imposed on May 15, 2025 and signed by the trial court on that same date. Appellant wrote a pro se letter to the trial court asking to appeal the judgment which was mailed on July 16, 2025 and filed by the trial court clerk on July 18, 2025. Appellant was represented by court-appointed counsel prior to the imposition of sentence, and nothing in the clerk’s record indicates that his attorney withdrew from his representation of Appellant after his sentence was imposed. The trial court appointed appellate counsel for Appellant on July 25, 2025, and counsel promptly filed a notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal. However, a motion for extension of time may be granted only if it is filed within 45 days of the imposition of sentence. Therefore, the pro se notice of appeal filed by Appellant on July 18, 2025 and later motion to extend and amended notice of appeal were not timely and this Court is unable to grant the motion for extension of time because we lack jurisdiction to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1), 26.3. See also Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. See id. Appellant’s motion to extend time to file the notice of appeal is dismissed. STEVE SMITH Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: August 14, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Appeal dismissed; motion dismissed Do not publish CR25 Oliver v. State Page 2

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas JUDGMENT No. 04-25-00056-CR Alicia Angelita ARREDONDO, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022CR11898 Honorable Catherine Torres-Stahl, Judge Presiding BEFORE JUSTICE RIOS, JUSTICE VALENZUELA, AND JUSTICE BRISSETTE In accordance with this court’s memorandum opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED. SIGNED August 6, 2025. _________________________________ Irene Rios, Justice

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAOT-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:59 AM Dkt. 5 ODSLJ NO. CAOT-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I JASON FLETCHER, Petitioner, v STATE OF HAWAI I, Respondent. ORDER (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka, Wadsworth, JJ.) Upon review of the record, the court finds that self- represented Petitioner Eric Fletcher's (Fletcher) April 25, 2025 Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody appears to seek affirmative relief in the nature of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, which this court lacks jurisdiction to decide. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that case No. CAOT-XX-XXXXXXX is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to Fletcher seeking relief from the appropriate court having jurisdiction. Dated: Honolulu, Hawai i June 20, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Acting Chief Judge /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth Associate Judge

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 63 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MERVINA KAUKINI MAMO CASH-KAEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUY K. BARRETT; RONETTE BARRETT, Defendants-Appellants, DUSTIN K. BARRETT; SHEENA ANN BARRETT; RICHARD BARRETT; LEZLEY K. BARRETT aka LEZLEY BRADBURY, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAI‘ANAE DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.) Defendants-Appellants Guy K. Barrett and Ronette Barrett (collectively, the Barretts) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district court)1 May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. They raise three points of error, contending that the district court abused its discretion when: 1 The Honorable Darolyn H. Lendio entered the Judgment for Possession. The Honorable Michelle N. Comeau presided over the April 26, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Mervina Kaukini Mamo Cash-Kaeo's (Cash- Kaeo) motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (1) "it defaulted [the Barretts] for [their] non[-]appearance [at the MSJ hearing] where the facts show [the Barretts had] defended themselves in this action by retaining counsel" who "made eight court appearances at hearings in defense of [the Barretts]"; (2) "it applied the extreme sanctions methodology" by entering default judgment against the Barretts "for the failure of their counsel to appear at the hearing on [Cash- Kaeo's] [MSJ]"; and (3) "it allowed the hearing on [Cash-Kaeo's] [MSJ] to proceed without first addressing [counsel's] non[- ]appearance at this hearing." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the Barretts' appeal as follows. The Barretts contend that the district court entered default judgment against them pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 55. The record reflects, however, that the district court entered the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession against the Barretts because Cash-Kaeo demonstrated she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under DCRCP Rule 56. Pursuant to DCRCP Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawaiʻi 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The Barretts point to no evidence in the record indicating a genuine issue of material fact disputing that Cash- Kaeo is the sole surviving lessee of the subject property, and that Cash-Kaeo is therefore entitled to judgment of possession against the Barretts as a matter of law. The Barretts also cite no authority indicating the district court was required to address their counsel's non-appearance at the MSJ hearing before it could grant the MSJ. Even if the district court was required to do so, the Barretts fail to identify any legal theory or issue of fact that could have or would have been presented in opposition to the MSJ to defeat the motion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting the MSJ, and affirm the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 20, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Presiding Judge Barry L. Sooalo, for Defendants-Appellants. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge Jay T. Suemori, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge