Lakenya McGhee-Twilley v. CoreCivic of Tenn., LLC

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus RILEY v. BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 23–1270. Argued March 24, 2025—Decided June 26, 2025 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26, 2021, the DHS issued a “final administrative review order” (FARO) directing Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Under 8 U. S. C. §1228(b)(3), al- iens may petition courts of appeals for FARO review. While Riley did not contest his removal from the United States, he sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad- ing Treatment or Punishment (CAT), telling an immigration officer that he would likely be killed by a drug kingpin if he returned to Ja- maica. The officer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasona- ble fear of persecution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and concluded that Riley was entitled to relief under the CAT, which pro- hibits removal to countries where torture is likely. The IJ sent Riley’s case to a “withholding-only” proceeding to determine whether he could be removed to Jamaica. At that proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. The DHS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated the IJ’s order and allowed the FARO’s enforcement. Three days later, Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Cir- cuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that (1) aliens cannot obtain review of BIA decisions in “withholding-only” pro- ceedings by filing within 30 days of that decision, and (2) §1252(b)(1)’s 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a mandatory claims- processing rule. Held: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” pro- ceedings are not “final order[s] of removal” under §1252(b)(1). 2 RILEY v. BONDI Syllabus An “order of removal” includes an “order of deportation,” 110 Stat. 3009–627, which, in turn, is defined as an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” §1101(a)(47)(A). The FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021, is “the final order of re- moval” under the statute because it held that Riley was deportable and directed that he be removed from the United States. The order was also the Executive’s final determination on the question of removal. An order of removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) “a determination by the [BIA] affirming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for review of the order. §1101(a)(47)(B). Because an alien in streamlined removal proceedings cannot seek review of his FARO before an IJ or the BIA, the period to seek review “expire[s]” as soon as the FARO is issued—meaning that the order becomes final immediately upon issu- ance. The Court’s decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, and John- son v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523, buttress this conclusion. In Nasrallah, the Court noted that CAT orders are not final removal or- ders because they do not conclude that an alien is deportable or order deportation. 590 U. S., at 582. The Court held that CAT orders do not “disturb” or “affect the validity” of final removal orders, so they do not merge into final orders because only rulings affecting the validity of a final removal order will merge into the final order for purposes of judi- cial review. Ibid. Guzman Chavez addressed whether aliens could be released during the pendency of their withholding-only proceedings. The Court held that the directive that they be removed had become “administratively final” regardless of their pending CAT proceedings, and “the finality of [an] order of removal does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” 594 U. S., at 533, 539–540. The Government argues that the question in Guzman Chavez was whether the removal order in that ca

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-3091 GURKIRAT SINGH, Petitioner, v. PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. ____________________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A216-183-486 ____________________ ARGUED APRIL 14, 2025 — DECIDED JUNE 23, 2025 ____________________ Before BRENNAN, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Gurkirat Singh, a citizen of India, fled his home in Punjab for the United States after being beaten and threatened for his political activities. Upon his ar- rival, Singh applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Singh’s requests for relief on multiple grounds, including because Singh could 2 No. 24-3091 reasonably relocate within India to avoid persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) affirmed. Be- cause substantial evidence supports the IJ and Board’s reloca- tion determination, we deny Singh’s petition for review. I. Background Petitioner Gurkirat Singh is an Indian national and a mem- ber of the Sikh ethnoreligious group. While residing in his home state of Punjab, Singh joined a Sikh separatist party, commonly known as the Mann Party. His political participa- tion rapidly attracted the attention of members of the compet- ing Congress Party, who approached Singh and told him that it “would be good for him” to switch parties. Singh was un- swayed. A year later, Singh had a more serious run-in with the Congress Party. While hanging up flyers for a Mann Party- sponsored blood donation event, a small group of men con- fronted Singh and beat him with baseball bats and hockey sticks for ten to twelve minutes. The men reminded Singh that they had told him to join the Congress Party. Singh attempted to report the attack to the local police, but they refused to ac- cept his report and advised him that he ought to join the Con- gress Party. Congress Party members beat Singh for a second time a few months later. His attackers also threatened him, warning: “we told you to quit you [sic] party and join our party, but this time we will kill you, we will take your life.” The beating ended when Singh’s cries drew the attention of nearby resi- dents. Again, local police refused to investigate, instead in- structing Singh to join the Congress Party. No. 24-3091 3 Following this second attack, Singh left India for the United States, entering the country without authorization or inspection. Within a month of his arrival, the Government commenced removal proceedings against him. Singh con- ceded his inadmissibility but filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. At an Immigration Court hearing, Singh testified to the above facts. The IJ found his testimony credible but denied his applications because he had not suffered persecution, would not face a “substantial risk” of torture if deported, and could relocate to safety within India. Expecting Singh to internally relocate was reasonable, the IJ elaborated, because “he is a twenty-five-year-old male in good health” and he “was able to relocate to the United States, a predominately English- speaking nation, and maintain a livelihood.” Singh appealed and the Board affirmed the IJ’s decision pursuant to Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), explaining that it discerned no clear error in the IJ’s relocation or past persecu- tion findings. II. Discussion Singh now petitions our court for review. He presses three principal arguments: (1) the Board improperly deferred to the IJ when deciding his appeal, (2) the IJ and Board erred by finding he could reasonably relocate to safety within India, and (3) the IJ and Board erred by finding that he had not suf- fered past persecution. We reach only Singh’s first two con- tentions, as they resolve the petition. A. Scope of the Board’s Review We begin with Singh’s charge that the Board examined the IJ’s decision under an erroneous standard of review. Whether 4 No. 24-3091 the Board applied the correct standard of review is a legal question we consider de novo. F.J.A.P. v. Garland, 94 F.4th 620, 638 (7th Cir. 2024). Board precedent mandates that the Board apply a dual review standard for mixed questions of law and fact. See Matter of R-A-F, 27 I. & N. Dec. 778, 779–80 (A.G. 2020). So

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________ No. 22-2064 _______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTHONY JONES a/k/a EARS, Appellant _______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00193-003) District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro _______________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 9, 2025 Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges (Filed: June 16, 2025) _______________ OPINION * _______________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. Appellant Anthony Jones appeals his convictions for several counts of sex trafficking and conspiracy to do the same. We will affirm. I. BACKGROUND Between 2012 and 2017, Anthony Jones joined his brother, Kristian Jones, and Dkyle Bridges to traffic several minors and adults in Delaware and Pennsylvania. As relevant to this case, Jones, Bridges, and Kristian Jones trafficked three victims, B.T., N.G., and L.C., beginning when they were minors. All three victims were recovered by undercover agents posing as customers, after which Jones, Bridges, and Kristian Jones were arrested. A grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a superseding indictment charging Jones with one count of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) (Count One); one count of sex trafficking by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Three); and three counts (one for each of B.T., N.G., and L.C.) of sex trafficking of a minor and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (c), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Counts Four, Five, and Six). 1 The three were jointly tried and the jury convicted Jones on Counts One, Four, 1 Count Two of the indictment charged Bridges with a separate count of sex trafficking with force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 2 Five, and Six, and acquitted him on Count Three. 2 Jones timely appealed. II. DISCUSSION 3 Jones challenges his convictions on several bases. We disagree with each. A. Grand Jury Testimony First, Jones contends on appeal that the Government knowingly presented false testimony to the grand jury. But Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) requires a defendant to raise any “error in the grand-jury proceeding or preliminary hearing” in a “pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available and the motion can be determined without a trial on the merits.” Thus, when a defendant fails to raise a challenge to the grand jury proceedings in a pretrial motion, we may review his claim only where he demonstrates “good cause” for the delay. 4 United States v. Sok, 115 F.4th 251, 259 (3d Cir. 2024). While “good cause” is “a flexible standard,” its flexibility is not limitless, and Jones does not satisfy it here. Id. at 263. He makes only conclusory arguments that his 2 The jury also convicted Bridges and Kristian Jones, whose convictions we later affirmed. See United States v. Bridges, No. 21-1679, 2022 WL 4244276 (3d Cir. Sep. 15, 2022). 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 The Government urges that if we reach the merits of Jones’s unpreserved claims despite Rule 12’s timeliness requirements, “it is the defendant’s burden to establish plain error, as the claim was not presented to the district court.” Answering Br. 24. But we have explained that Rule 52(b)’s plain-error standard yields to Rule 12’s good-cause standard in this context because “[n]othing in the text of Rule 12 . . . supplants its good-cause standard of review in favor of Rule 52(b)’s plain-error standard.” United States v. Sok, 115 F.4th 251, 261 (3d Cir

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-3268 MICHAEL WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. MICHAEL MEISNER, * Respondent-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 2:21-cv-1066 — Stephen C. Dries, Magistrate Judge. ____________________ ARGUED OCTOBER 21, 2024 — DECIDED JUNE 16, 2025 ____________________ Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and LEE, Circuit Judges. * We substitute Michael Meisner, the warden of the correctional facil- ity where Williams is currently incarcerated, for Dylan Radtke, the warden where he was incarcerated when he filed his habeas corpus petition. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). 2 No. 23-3268 LEE, Circuit Judge. A Wisconsin jury convicted Michael Williams of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He appealed his convictions to the Wiscon- sin Court of Appeals, contending that one of the jury instruc- tions unconstitutionally lowered the government’s burden of proof and that the prosecutor’s closing arguments improperly imposed on him the burden of proving his innocence. The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed the convictions, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied his petition for review. Williams then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. The district court held that the state appellate court rea- sonably applied Supreme Court precedent when concluding it was not reasonably likely that the jury had applied the rel- evant instruction in an unconstitutional manner. The court also held that Williams had not demonstrated that the prose- cutor’s remarks violated clearly established Supreme Court precedent. On appeal, Williams raises the same two argu- ments, 1 and we affirm. I Williams does not challenge the Wisconsin Court of Ap- peals’s statement of facts. In light of this, we adopt those facts as presumptively correct. See Pierce v. Vanihel, 93 F.4th 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 2024); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The charges in this case arose from the shooting death of Frederick Martin at a gas station in Milwaukee in July 2015. The prosecution’s theory at trial was that Williams shot 1 Although Williams’s opening brief also contended that the cumula- tive effect of the errors deprived him of a fair trial, he has withdrawn that argument. No. 23-3268 3 Martin and fled the gas station in a car driven by Tony Madi- son. Just a short time later, Williams and Madison were them- selves shot on a nearby street in retaliation for the Martin shooting (or so the government posited). At trial, the prosecu- tion introduced the following evidence. Miguel Henderson met Martin at a gas station on Center Street in Milwaukee and got into the front passenger seat of Martin’s car. According to Henderson, a man then entered the backseat of Martin’s car and shot Martin, who was sitting in the driver’s seat. Surveillance footage at the gas station showed a man wearing camouflage pants enter the backseat of Martin’s car immediately before Martin was shot. The man then fled in a red truck driven by another man wearing a white, blue, and red sweatshirt. As the red truck was leaving the gas station, a silver car that had arrived before the shooting began following it. About fifteen minutes later, a second shooting was reported about five miles away on 54th Street. Surveillance footage of the sec- ond shooting showed a silver car similar to the one that had followed the red truck out of the gas station. Police found the red truck on 54th Street abandoned; it had smeared blood stains on the driver’s side. They also found a maroon minivan with bullet holes. Both vehicles were located near Tiffany McAffee’s residence. At the trial, McAffee testified that she heard shots fired outside of her house that day. She also stated that Madison had been at her house earlier and had left about an hour be- fore the shooting. Furthermore, McAffee identified the ma- roon minivan as belonging to Madison. And, when shown a 4 No. 23-3268 photograph of Williams, McAffee said that she did not know him but had seen him with Madison in the past. After the shooting on 54th Street, emergency responders found Madison suffering from a gunshot wound several blocks from the two cars. They transported him to the hospi- tal. Madison was wearing a white, blue, and red sweatshirt that matched the shirt worn by the driver of the red truck that had fled from the gas station after the Martin

NOTE: This order is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES AND PRODUCTS, LLC, dba Genova Pipe, MICROKITS, LLC, FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as Pres- ident of the United States, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES, PETE R. FLORES, Acting Commissioner for United States Customs and Border Protection, in his official ca- pacity as Acting Commissioner of the United States Customs and Border Protection, JAMIESON GREER, in his official capacity as United States Trade Representative, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK, in his official capacity as Secretary of Commerce, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Defendants-Appellants ______________________ 2025-1812 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-TMR-JAR, Judge Gary S. 2 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP Katzmann, Judge Timothy M. Reif, and Senior Judge Jane A. Restani. ------------------------------------------------- STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE OF COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF MAINE, STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF NEW MEXICO, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE OF VERMONT, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Homeland Security, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PETE R. FLORES, Acting Commissioner for United States Customs and Border Protection, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, UNITED STATES, Defendants-Appellants ______________________ 2025-1813 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:25-cv-00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Judge Gary S. Katzmann, Judge Timothy M. Reif, and Senior Judge Jane A. Restani. ______________________ ON MOTION ______________________ V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP 3 Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE, DYK, PROST, REYNA, TARANTO, CHEN, HUGHES, STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges. 1 PER CURIAM. ORDER The United States’s motions for a stay of the United States Court of International Trade’s rulings enjoining cer- tain Executive Orders imposing tariffs, the Plaintiffs-Ap- pellees’ oppositions, and the United States’s reply were presented to all circuit judges of this court in regular active service who are not recused or disqualified. Both sides have made substantial arguments on the merits. Having considered the traditional stay factors, see Fed. R. App. P. 8; Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009), the court con- cludes a stay is warranted under the circumstances. See also Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025) (per curiam) (“The purpose of . . . interim equitable relief is not to conclusively determine the rights of the par- ties, but to balance the equities as the litigation moves for- ward.” (quoting Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 580 (2017)). The court also concludes that these cases present issues of exceptional importance war- ranting expedited en banc consideration of the merits in the first instance. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT: (1) The motions for a stay pending appeal are granted. (2) All motions for leave to file briefs amicus curiae re- garding the stay motions are granted. (3) These consolidated cases will be heard en banc un- der 28 U.S.C. § 46 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 1 Circuit Judge Newman did not participate. 4 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP 40(g). The court en banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service who are not recused or disqualified in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). (4) Within two business days from the issuance of this order, the parties are directed to jointly file a proposed ex- pedited briefing schedule. The proposed briefing schedule should allow for this court to hold oral argument on July 31, 2025 at 10:00 A.M. in Courtroom 201. If the parties cannot agree upon a schedule, the joint submission should include the parties’ alternative proposals.