Riley v. Bondi Revisions: 6/26/25
Riley
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
June 26, 2025
Jurisdiction
F
Importance
54%
Case Summary
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus RILEY v. BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 23–1270. Argued March 24, 2025—Decided June 26, 2025 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26, 2021, the DHS issued a “final administrative review order” (FARO) directing Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Under 8 U. S. C. §1228(b)(3), al- iens may petition courts of appeals for FARO review. While Riley did not contest his removal from the United States, he sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad- ing Treatment or Punishment (CAT), telling an immigration officer that he would likely be killed by a drug kingpin if he returned to Ja- maica. The officer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasona- ble fear of persecution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and concluded that Riley was entitled to relief under the CAT, which pro- hibits removal to countries where torture is likely. The IJ sent Riley’s case to a “withholding-only” proceeding to determine whether he could be removed to Jamaica. At that proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. The DHS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated the IJ’s order and allowed the FARO’s enforcement. Three days later, Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Cir- cuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that (1) aliens cannot obtain review of BIA decisions in “withholding-only” pro- ceedings by filing within 30 days of that decision, and (2) §1252(b)(1)’s 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a mandatory claims- processing rule. Held: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” pro- ceedings are not “final order[s] of removal” under §1252(b)(1). 2 RILEY v. BONDI Syllabus An “order of removal” includes an “order of deportation,” 110 Stat. 3009–627, which, in turn, is defined as an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” §1101(a)(47)(A). The FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021, is “the final order of re- moval” under the statute because it held that Riley was deportable and directed that he be removed from the United States. The order was also the Executive’s final determination on the question of removal. An order of removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) “a determination by the [BIA] affirming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for review of the order. §1101(a)(47)(B). Because an alien in streamlined removal proceedings cannot seek review of his FARO before an IJ or the BIA, the period to seek review “expire[s]” as soon as the FARO is issued—meaning that the order becomes final immediately upon issu- ance. The Court’s decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, and John- son v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523, buttress this conclusion. In Nasrallah, the Court noted that CAT orders are not final removal or- ders because they do not conclude that an alien is deportable or order deportation. 590 U. S., at 582. The Court held that CAT orders do not “disturb” or “affect the validity” of final removal orders, so they do not merge into final orders because only rulings affecting the validity of a final removal order will merge into the final order for purposes of judi- cial review. Ibid. Guzman Chavez addressed whether aliens could be released during the pendency of their withholding-only proceedings. The Court held that the directive that they be removed had become “administratively final” regardless of their pending CAT proceedings, and “the finality of [an] order of removal does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” 594 U. S., at 533, 539–540. The Government argues that the question in Guzman Chavez was whether the removal order in that ca
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Status
Decided
Date Decided
June 26, 2025
Jurisdiction
F
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supreme
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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
RILEY v. BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23–1270. Argued March 24, 2025—Decided June 26, 2025
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26, 2021, the DHS issued a “final administrative review order” (FARO) directing Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Under 8 U. S. C. §1228(b)(3), al- iens may petition courts of appeals for FARO review. While Riley did not contest his removal from the United States, he sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad- ing Treatment or Punishment (CAT), telling an immigration officer that he would likely be killed by a drug kingpin if he returned to Ja- maica. The officer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasona- ble fear of persecution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and concluded that Riley was entitled to relief under the CAT, which pro- hibits removal to countries where torture is likely. The IJ sent Riley’s case to a “withholding-only” proceeding to determine whether he could be removed to Jamaica. At that proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. The DHS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated the IJ’s order and allowed the FARO’s enforcement. Three days later, Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Cir- cuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that (1) aliens cannot obtain review of BIA decisions in “withholding-only” pro- ceedings by filing within 30 days of that decision, and (2) §1252(b)(1)’s 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a mandatory claims- processing rule. Held: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” pro- ceedings are not “final order[s] of removal” under §1252(b)(1). 2 RILEY v. BONDI
Syllabus
An “order of removal” includes an “order of deportation,” 110 Stat.
3009–627, which, in turn, is defined as an order “concluding that the
alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” §1101(a)(47)(A). The
FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021, is “the final order of re-
moval” under the statute because it held that Riley was deportable and
directed that he be removed from the United States. The order was
also the Executive’s final determination on the question of removal.
An order of removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) “a
determination by the [BIA] affirming such order,” or (2) “the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for
review of the order. §1101(a)(47)(B). Because an alien in streamlined
removal proceedings cannot seek review of his FARO before an IJ or
the BIA, the period to seek review “expire[s]” as soon as the FARO is
issued—meaning that the order becomes final immediately upon issu-
ance.
The Court’s decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, and John-
son v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523, buttress this conclusion. In
Nasrallah, the Court noted that CAT orders are not final removal or-
ders because they do not conclude that an alien is deportable or order
deportation. 590 U. S., at 582. The Court held that CAT orders do not
“disturb” or “affect the validity” of final removal orders, so they do not
merge into final orders because only rulings affecting the validity of a
final removal order will merge into the final order for purposes of judi-
cial review. Ibid. Guzman Chavez addressed whether aliens could be
released during the pendency of their withholding-only proceedings.
The Court held that the directive that they be removed had become
“administratively final” regardless of their pending CAT proceedings,
and “the finality of [an] order of removal does not depend in any way
on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” 594 U. S., at 533,
539–540.
The Government argues that the question in Guzman Chavez was
whether the removal order in that ca
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Status
Decided
Date Decided
June 26, 2025
Jurisdiction
F
Court Type
supreme
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