Khalil Coleman v. Kentucky General Assembly

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 63 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MERVINA KAUKINI MAMO CASH-KAEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUY K. BARRETT; RONETTE BARRETT, Defendants-Appellants, DUSTIN K. BARRETT; SHEENA ANN BARRETT; RICHARD BARRETT; LEZLEY K. BARRETT aka LEZLEY BRADBURY, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAI‘ANAE DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.) Defendants-Appellants Guy K. Barrett and Ronette Barrett (collectively, the Barretts) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district court)1 May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. They raise three points of error, contending that the district court abused its discretion when: 1 The Honorable Darolyn H. Lendio entered the Judgment for Possession. The Honorable Michelle N. Comeau presided over the April 26, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Mervina Kaukini Mamo Cash-Kaeo's (Cash- Kaeo) motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (1) "it defaulted [the Barretts] for [their] non[-]appearance [at the MSJ hearing] where the facts show [the Barretts had] defended themselves in this action by retaining counsel" who "made eight court appearances at hearings in defense of [the Barretts]"; (2) "it applied the extreme sanctions methodology" by entering default judgment against the Barretts "for the failure of their counsel to appear at the hearing on [Cash- Kaeo's] [MSJ]"; and (3) "it allowed the hearing on [Cash-Kaeo's] [MSJ] to proceed without first addressing [counsel's] non[- ]appearance at this hearing." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the Barretts' appeal as follows. The Barretts contend that the district court entered default judgment against them pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 55. The record reflects, however, that the district court entered the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession against the Barretts because Cash-Kaeo demonstrated she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under DCRCP Rule 56. Pursuant to DCRCP Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawaiʻi 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The Barretts point to no evidence in the record indicating a genuine issue of material fact disputing that Cash- Kaeo is the sole surviving lessee of the subject property, and that Cash-Kaeo is therefore entitled to judgment of possession against the Barretts as a matter of law. The Barretts also cite no authority indicating the district court was required to address their counsel's non-appearance at the MSJ hearing before it could grant the MSJ. Even if the district court was required to do so, the Barretts fail to identify any legal theory or issue of fact that could have or would have been presented in opposition to the MSJ to defeat the motion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting the MSJ, and affirm the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 20, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Presiding Judge Barry L. Sooalo, for Defendants-Appellants. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge Jay T. Suemori, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS DESIREE DURGA and JUSTIN DURGA, UNPUBLISHED August 13, 2025 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 9:04 AM v No. 371891 Benzie Circuit Court MEMBERSELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 23-012025-CZ Defendant-Appellant. Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and BOONSTRA and WALLACE, JJ. PER CURIAM. This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in June 2023, when plaintiff Desiree Durga was driving a Chevrolet Silverado that was involved in a collision with another motor vehicle. This accident resulted in extensive damage to the Silverado, which was insured by defendant MemberSelect Insurance Company (MemberSelect). Plaintiffs alleged that defendant breached their automobile insurance contract when it rescinded their policy based upon an allegation that Desiree Durga made a fraudulent misrepresentation in the application process. The trial court entered a July 2, 2024 amended order granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition on their breach of contract claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and denying defendant’s cross-motion for summary disposition in which it had argued that it was entitled to rescind the policy. On July 9, 2024, the court entered an order of judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $82,476.04, and this appeal of right by defendant followed. We affirm. I. FACTS As a result of plaintiff Justin Durga having two or more substance abuse convictions in seven years, his Michigan operator’s license was mandatorily revoked from June 9, 2007 “until requirements have been met.” MCL 257.303(2)(c). -1-  In June 2012, plaintiff Justin Durga’s wife, Desiree, applied to obtain automobile insurance from defendant MemberSelect for a Jeep Grand Cherokee that she owned.1 According to plaintiff Desiree Durga, “[a]t that time I fully disclosed to AAA that my husband, Justin Durga, did not have a valid driver’s license.”2 Defendant’s insurance records reflect that plaintiffs have been “AAA Insured” since June 29, 2012. While defendant MemberSelect claims that Desiree Durga’s application for insurance contained a material misrepresentation, it has not produced a copy of her June 2012 application in this case. In response to a request for production of documents seeking to have defendant “[p]roduce the application for insurance that Plaintiff(s) filed with Defendants for the Policy,” defendant responded “This application for insurance no longer exists.” In the lower court, MemberSelect relied upon two documents, a “New Declaration Certificate” (certificate), and an “Automobile Application Addendum and Authorization” (addendum), the latter of which was only signed by AAA sales representative, Jeanine Michalski, at 9:53AM on February 25, 2013. Under a line item labeled “Driver Type,” the certificate states that Desiree Durga is “ASSIGNED”3 and Justin Durga is “NOT LICENSED”; and under another line item labeled “Years Licensed” it states “7” for Desiree Durga and “0” for Justin Durga. Contrarily, in the addendum, next to a line asking “Do all drivers have a valid driver’s license including drivers 16 years of age with a graduated license?” the box marked “Yes” is checked. Again, the addendum reflects a signature by Jeanine Michalski on the “Sales Representative” line, but the “Signature of Applicant” line above it is blank. In her affidavit, Desiree Durga’s avers that “I never stated that Justin Durga had a valid driver’s license, nor did I ever prepare or sign this Addendum.” The addendum indicates that the Durgas carried automobile insurance with Farmers Insurance Exchange through March 15, 2013, and consistent with the certificate, it appears MemberSelect first insured Desiree Durga’s Jeep for the February 25, 2013-August 25, 2013 policy term. This policy was renewed and continued for ten years through the February 25, 2023- August 25, 2023 term at issue in this litigation. Desiree Durga’s affidavit also avers that “every renewal from AAA or MemberSelect continued to state that Justin Durga was not licensed—as 1 The policy of insurance that was in effect on the date of the accident was issued by defendant MemberSelect. In various documents prepared by defendant in this matter, including documents sent to plaintiffs, it refers to itself as “MemberSelect Insurance Company,” “AAA In

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS NICK MERRIFIELD and MERRIFIELD UNPUBLISHED MACHINERY SOLUTIONS, August 12, 2025 10:19 AM Plaintiffs-Appellants, v No. 368355 Oakland Circuit Court ATS ADVISORS, JAMES SULLIVAN, and LC No. 2021-191816-NM SHANE RANDELL, Defendants-Appellees. Before: REDFORD, P.J., and RIORDAN and BAZZI, JJ. PER CURIAM. In this accounting malpractice action, plaintiffs, Nick Merrifield (“Merrifield”) and Merrifield Machinery Solutions (“MMS”) (collectively “plaintiffs”), appeal as of right from an October 18, 2023 order, which dismissed plaintiffs’ first-amended complaint in favor of defendants, ATS Advisors, James Sullivan (“Sullivan”), and Shane Randell (“Randell”) (collectively “defendants”). On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s July 12, 2023 order, which granted summary disposition in favor of defendants on plaintiffs’ original complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND In 2007, Merrifield opened MMS, which provided service and repair work for “CNC milling and turning machinery.” Richard Rohn (“Rohn”) later became part owner of MMS. According to Merrifield, Rohn had the primary responsibility for MMS’s finances and accounting, including a line of credit from Oxford Bank. In 2017, MMS hired defendants. According to Sullivan, ATS Advisors’ owner, ATS Advisors was hired to prepare tax returns based on information received from MMS’s representatives. Randell, a certified public accountant (CPA) who worked for ATS Advisors, helped prepare certain tax returns for MMS. He also served as MMS’s interim controller for a brief period of time. -1-  In late 2018, or early 2019, Merrifield decided that he no longer wanted to partner with Rohn. Merrifield, who admittedly was not “intimately familiar” with MMS’s “books,” did not consult with legal counsel, or other professionals, to determine MMS’s value. After Merrifield and Rohn entered into a purchase agreement, and Merrifield paid Rohn a portion of the agreed price for his ownership interest in MMS, Merrifield discovered that there were issues with MMS’s financial reports. It also was discovered that MMS fell “out of formula” on its line of credit with Oxford Bank. MMS hired a turnaround expert, Fred Leeb (“Leeb”), and CPA Ronald Schlaupitz (“Schlaupitz”) to address MMS’s accounting issues. Meanwhile, Rohn and Merrifield reached a new agreement concerning the amount Merrifield would pay Rohn for his ownership in MMS. In September 2021, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, alleging accounting malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs alleged that they sustained myriad damages, including: (1) tax penalties and interest; (2) an Internal Revenue Services (IRS) audit and associated expenses; (3) attorney fees and costs; (4) accounting fees; and (5) overpayment by Merrifield for Rohn’s ownership interest in MMS. Defendants answered the complaint, and they generally denied liability. Discovery commenced. In May 2023, defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiffs could not establish causation or damages. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that genuine issues of material fact existed for trial. In so arguing, plaintiffs generally referred to the entirety of Schlaupitz’s deposition transcript, which was 214 pages in length. After hearing oral arguments, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under MCR 2.116(G)(4) to set forth specific facts showing there was a genuine issue for trial. Citing Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 376; 775 NW2d 618 (2009), the trial court held that it was not obligated to “scour the lower court record in search of a basis for denying the moving party’s motion.” The trial court entered the July 12, 2023 order, granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. In doing so, they included page citations to the record evidence. Plaintiffs also filed a first amended complaint, the allegations of which are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Defendants opposed the motion for recons

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED August 12, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellee, 1:56 PM v No. 356714 Saginaw Circuit Court ADAM FERGUSON, also known as ADAM LC No. 91-004624-FC FERGERSON, Defendant-Appellant. Before: YATES, P.J., and YOUNG and WALLACE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Following a remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, defendant, Adam Ferguson,1 appeals as on leave granted an order denying a successive motion for relief from judgment. 2 He contends that his sentences violated the United States and Michigan Constitutions, that his sentences for drug offenses were improper, and that his waiver into adult court was unconstitutional. Ferguson argues that the sentencing court needed to consider the mitigating factors of youth and that Ferguson was improperly given a de facto life sentence for crimes he committed as a minor. We remand for resentencing. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This Court, in its 1997 opinion issued after Ferguson’s direct appeal of his convictions, set forth the crimes Ferguson committed and the sentences imposed: Defendant received concurrent sentences of six years, eight months to ten years in prison on the assault with intent to do great bodily harm convictions, 1 As then-appellate counsel mentioned in the 1994 Motion for New Trial, Ferguson’s name is Adam Fergerson but to be consistent with the trial court, we use “Ferguson” throughout these proceedings as well. 2 See People v Ferguson, 511 Mich 1020; 991 NW2d 576 (2023). -1-  twenty-five to fifty years in prison each for the armed robbery, kidnapping and conspiracy to commit murder and/or extortion convictions, thirteen to twenty years for extortion, as well as twenty to forty years on the delivery conviction and twenty to forty years on the possession with intent to deliver conviction, twenty to forty years on the conspiracy to deliver conviction, and . . . the mandatory two-year term on the felony-firearm conviction. The sentences for the delivery, possession with intent to deliver, and conspiracy to deliver convictions were to be consecutive to the concurrent terms on the other sentences as well as with each other. As required by statute, the sentence on the felony-firearm conviction was also consecutive, to be served prior to the remaining sentences. [People v Ferguson, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 10, 1996 (Docket No. 146333), p 1.] This Court affirmed Ferguson’s convictions but remanded for resentencing on one count, conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine. Id. at 4. At his earliest release date, Ferguson would be 74 years old.3 Ferguson was 17 years old when he committed the offenses at issue in this appeal. In 2020, after his first motion for relief from judgment was denied, Ferguson filed a successive motion for relief from judgment, asserting that his attorneys had been ineffective for failing to raise certain jurisdictional issues and also arguing that his sentences violated the constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles; he cited Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016).4 The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment, concluding that Ferguson had not established a retroactive change in the law to allow for a successive motion for relief from 3 Ferguson contends that if disciplinary credits are not considered, his earliest release date will actually be when he is 84 years old. Whether to consider disciplinary credits in a constitutional analysis of a sentence is a live question in our courts, particularly given the outcome in People v Nard, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d___ (2025) (Docket No. 369185), in which defendant’s parole status, afforded in part due to good time credits, led the Court to conclude that a 60-year minimum sentence was not a de facto life sentence. Here, appellant’s reply brief addresses this issue thoroughly, but we conclude that whether we consider good time credits or not, People v Eads (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 357332) would control and we

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-24-00228-CV Patrick Alan Powers, Appellant v. Teresa Seamon, Appellee On appeal from the County Court at Law No 2 of Johnson County, Texas Judge F. Steven McClure, presiding Trial Court Cause No. CC-P202325571-A JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Patrick Alan Powers, appeals from a July 10, 2024 order of dismissal. The pertinent part of that order states: As to Defendant’s Rule 91(a) Motion to Dismiss: X The Motion is GRANTED due to lack of capacity; and/or X The Motion is GRANTED due to lack of standing;  On May 29, 2025, the Clerk of this Court notified Powers that there does not appear to be a final judgment from which he can appeal to this Court, and the appeal is subject to dismissal. We specifically directed his attention to In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) in which the supreme court held that a Rule 11 agreement to dismiss all claims, which contained no decretal language, was not a final judgment. The Clerk of the Court further notified Powers that the Court may dismiss this appeal unless, within fourteen days from the date of the letter, a response is filed showing grounds for continuing the appeal. In his late-filed response, Powers asserts that the order he attempts to appeal disposes of all issues in the phase of the proceeding for which it was brought and is therefore final and appealable. Powers does not address the fact that the July 10, 2024 order of dismissal does not include any decretal language. Our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final judgments, except as explicitly allowed by statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.012; Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). An order merely granting a motion for judgment is nothing more than an indication of the trial court’s ruling on the motion itself and adjudicates nothing. Naaman v. Grider, 126 S.W.3d 73, 74 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam). An order or judgment that does Powers v. Seamon Page 2 not contain decretal language is not a final judgment. See In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d at 260. Because the order Powers attempts to appeal contains no decretal language, it is not an appealable judgment, and we have no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See id. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. STEVE SMITH Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 26, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Dismissed CV06 Powers v. Seamon Page 3