Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
Primary Holding
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of child rape when the offense does not result in, and is not intended to result in, the death of the victim.
In the case of Kennedy v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the death penalty cannot be used for someone convicted of child rape if the victim did not die as a result of the crime. This ruling is important because it protects individuals from facing the harshest punishment for crimes that do not involve taking a life, reinforcing the idea that punishments should fit the crime. If you or someone you know is involved in a legal situation regarding serious crimes against children, this case is relevant because it sets limits on the types of punishments that can be imposed.
AI-generated plain-language summary to help you understand this case
Louisiana permitted capital punishment for the rape of a child under 12 years old. Patrick Kennedy was convicted of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter in so violent a manner that she needed invasive emergency surgery to correct her injuries. Unwisely refusing to plead guilty in exchange for avoiding the death penalty, Kennedy maintained his innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. He was sentenced to death and was unsuccessful in persuading the Louisiana Supreme Court on appeal that child rape was not a sufficiently serious crime to warrant capital punishment. At the time, five states in addition to Louisiana still had laws permitting capital punishment for defendants convicted of this crime. However, only one other individual in the United States, also in Louisiana, was facing a death sentence for child rape. Not since 1964 had anyone in the U.S. been executed for any form of rape.
Whether the Constitution bars the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape of a child where the offense did not result, and was not intended to result, in the death of the victim, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The judgment is reversed.
Only the most extreme offenders should be sentenced to death, when the goals of retribution and deterrence are most strongly implicated. Also, children may not benefit from a harsh law against abusers, since people may be less likely to disclose the conduct when the potential penalties are so severe. This decision was harshly criticized by politicians on both sides of partisan lines, including President Barack Obama. A Republican Senator introduced a resolution designed to expressly state the Senate's disapproval of Kennedy v. Louisiana and urge overruling it, but it was not passed. Kennedy's case was remanded for resentencing, and he is now serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, which has become the mandatory penalty for this crime.
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Decision Date
- April 16, 2008
- Jurisdiction
- federal
- Case Type
- landmark
- Majority Author
- Kennedy
- Damages Awarded
- N/A
- Data Quality
- high
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
Consumer WonThe execution of individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006)
Consumer LostThe Kansas capital sentencing statute, which mandates the imposition of the death penalty when aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances, does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006)
Consumer LostA capital defendant's right to present mitigating evidence during sentencing is not violated when the jury is instructed to consider specific aggravating and mitigating factors, as long as the jury is not precluded from considering relevant evidence that may influence their decision.
Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005)
Consumer LostThe Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit's decision granting habeas relief was contrary to the limits on federal habeas review imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), affirming that the jury instructions in the penalty phase of Payton's trial were not constitutionally deficient and did not prevent the jury from considering all relevant mitigation evidence.