Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
Primary Holding
The execution of individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
In the case of Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court ruled that it's unconstitutional to execute people who were under 18 when they committed a crime. This decision matters because it recognizes that young people are still developing and should not face the harshest punishment of death. This ruling helps protect the rights of minors and ensures that they are treated more fairly in the justice system, which is relevant if someone is involved in a case where a juvenile is facing serious charges.
AI-generated plain-language summary to help you understand this case
In 1993, Christopher Simmons, a 17-year-old high school junior, planned and committed the murder of Shirley Crook. Simmons, along with two friends, discussed his intent to commit murder and devised a plan to break into a home, tie up a victim, and dispose of the body by throwing it off a bridge. On the night of the crime, Simmons and one friend entered Crook's home, where they bound her with duct tape, transported her to a railroad trestle, and ultimately threw her into the Meramec River, resulting in her drowning. Following the murder, Simmons boasted about the crime to friends, which led to his arrest the next day. Simmons was charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder, burglary, and kidnapping. Since he was 17 at the time of the crime, he was tried as an adult in Missouri, where he was convicted and sentenced to death. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court after the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the death sentence, prompting Simmons to appeal on the grounds that executing a juvenile offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court's review of Simmons' case was significant as it revisited the constitutionality of capital punishment for juvenile offenders, specifically those who were between the ages of 15 and 18 at the time of their crimes. This case followed the precedent set in Stanford v. Kentucky, where the Court had previously ruled that the Constitution did not prohibit the execution of individuals in this age group. The Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons would ultimately address evolving standards of decency regarding juvenile punishment in the United States.
Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution permit the execution of a juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 at the time of committing a capital crime.
The judgment is reversed.
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Decision Date
- October 13, 2004
- Jurisdiction
- federal
- Case Type
- landmark
- Majority Author
- Kennedy
- Damages Awarded
- N/A
- Data Quality
- high
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
Consumer WonThe Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of child rape when the offense does not result in, and is not intended to result in, the death of the victim.
Roper v. Weaver, 550 U.S. 598 (2007)
Consumer LostThe Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not exceed its authority under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) when it set aside a capital sentence based on the prosecutor's "unfairly inflammatory" closing statement, emphasizing the need for a more stringent standard of review in such cases.
Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006)
Consumer LostA capital defendant's right to present mitigating evidence during sentencing is not violated when the jury is instructed to consider specific aggravating and mitigating factors, as long as the jury is not precluded from considering relevant evidence that may influence their decision.
Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6 (2005)
Consumer LostThe Ninth Circuit erred in requiring a jury trial to determine Smith's mental retardation claim, as states have the authority to develop their own procedures for adjudicating such claims, and the federal courts should not preemptively impose conditions on state proceedings.