Jaime Norris v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0278n.06 No. 24-3811 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 06, 2025 DAWN MABRY-SCHLICHER, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) OHIO SECURITY, ) Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION ) Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges. JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Dawn Mabry-Schlicher applied for disability benefits based on severe anxiety and depression, among other disabilities. After the Social Security Administration (SSA) rejected the application, the district court remanded the application to the agency with instructions to further consider medical testimony regarding Mabry-Schlicher’s social impairments. On remand, the SSA again rejected Mabry-Schlicher’s application, and the district court affirmed. Mabry-Schlicher contends that the SSA failed to comply with the district court’s remand order and ignored important vocational testimony. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. I. BACKGROUND Mabry-Schlicher alleges disability secondary to various impairments, including, among other things, depression, anxiety, fibromyalgia, obesity, foot injury and degeneration, and recurrent migraines. Because of her mental disabilities and migraines, Mabry-Schlicher has difficulty No. 24-3811, Mabry-Schlicher v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. interacting with others and is wary of leaving her home. She also struggles with mobility and experiences frequent pain due to her physical disabilities. Mabry-Schlicher applied to the SSA for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) in May 2015. In evaluating her application, the agency reviewed copies of Mabry-Schlicher’s medical records, as well as various expert evaluations and opinions. These included a psychological evaluation from Dr. Giovanni M. Bonds, who found that Mabry-Schlicher “avoid[s] people and socializing with them” and “would have difficulty working around many people.” R. 7-7, PageID 407. Another psychologist, Dr. Karen Steiger, also conducted an evaluation, determining that Mabry-Schlicher’s ability to interact with coworkers was “[m]oderately limited,” and that any such interaction should be kept to “a superficial level,” while “contact with the general public should be kept to a limited basis.” R. 7-3, PageID 119. Two other psychologists, Dr. Joseph Edwards and Dr. Courtney Zeune, similarly determined that Mabry-Schlicher was “[m]oderately limited” in her ability to interact with coworkers, but remained capable of “infrequent, superficial interactions” with others. Id. at PageID 149, 182. The SSA denied the May 2015 claim, concluding that Mabry-Schlicher was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Seeking reversal of the denial, Mabry-Schlicher requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was held on October 3, 2017. At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Mabry-Schlicher, as well as a vocational expert, Karen Schneider. Schneider testified that it is “important” that all employees “respond appropriately to instructions and accept supervisor criticism,” and stated that she would not characterize supervisory criticism as “superficial.” R. 7-2, PageID 102. The ALJ denied the -2- No. 24-3811, Mabry-Schlicher v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. claim, and Mabry-Schlicher appealed to the district court. On the joint motion of the parties, the district court remanded the case to the SSA for further proceedings. On remand, the case was reassigned to a new ALJ, who held a second hearing on February 5, 2020. The ALJ again heard personal testimony from Mabry-Schlicher and vocational testimony from Schneider, and concluded that Mabry-Schlicher was not disabled. Notably, the ALJ’s decision discounted the opinions of the reviewing psychologists that Mabry-Schlicher maintained the ability to interact with coworkers and officials at only a “superficial” level, deeming th

Case: 24-51017 Document: 28-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-51017 Summary Calendar FILED ____________ June 3, 2025 Lyle W. Cayce Rudy Castaneda, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Planet Fitness, Incorporated; John Hensley, Area Director; Uriel LNU, Unit Manager; John Doe, Clerk, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:24-CV-509 ______________________________ Before Davis, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Plaintiff-Appellant Rudy Castaneda, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued Planet Fitness, Inc. and several of its employees for refusing him access to their gym(s) and for terminating his membership. His suit arises under several civil-rights statutes and seeks damages and unspecified injunctive relief. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.  Case: 24-51017 Document: 28-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-51017 who recommended the case be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The district judge accepted the recommendation and dismissed the case. After careful review of the record, we agree with the district court and AFFIRM its judgment. Castaneda alleges he was denied access to Planet Fitness after he tried to workout in socks and sandals, rather than athletic shoes, to accommodate his diabetic peripheral neuropathy. He concedes he argued with the Planet Fitness clerk who advised him of the athletic-shoe policy, and that he threatened the clerk with a water bottle. In Castaneda’s words, he “motioned his water bottle towards the Clerk and made an empty threat with his bottle . . . as an intimidation.” We address his claims seriatim. First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addresses employment discrimination. Castaneda has not alleged an employment relationship with Planet Fitness or its employees, so he fails to state a viable Title VII claim. Second, the due-process provisions of the Texas and U.S. Constitutions generally govern state actors, not private ones like Planet Fitness and its employees. 1 Castaneda hasn’t alleged any state action or facts suggesting an exception to this general rule. Third, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) require proof of a race-based conspiracy. 2 Castaneda offers no allegation about race, aside from mentioning two disabled “Anglo” gym members. We note the magistrate judge gave Castaneda an opportunity to make a more definite statement on _____________________ 1 See Manhattan Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 808–810 (2019) (discussing state-action doctrine); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. 1997) (holding Texas’s Constitution regulates state conduct). 2 Bryan v. City Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 2000). 2  Case: 24-51017 Document: 28-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-51017 this claim, but he merely reiterated his prior allegations in response. He has not delineated an actionable race-based conspiracy under § 1985(3). Finally, Castaneda’s claim under the ADA’s Title III fails for two reasons. For one, Castaneda’s allegations suggest his membership was terminated because he physically threatened, or was perceived to have threatened, a Planet Fitness clerk, negating any connection between his disability and the revocation of his gym membership. Second, Castaneda initially sought only monetary relief, which is unavailable under Title III of the ADA. 3 When he was permitted to make a more definite statement, Castaneda responded he wanted injunctive relief “so that others do not come across equal distress.” He doesn’t explain what action