Castaneda v. Planet Fitness

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0278n.06 No. 24-3811 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 06, 2025 DAWN MABRY-SCHLICHER, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) OHIO SECURITY, ) Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION ) Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges. JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Dawn Mabry-Schlicher applied for disability benefits based on severe anxiety and depression, among other disabilities. After the Social Security Administration (SSA) rejected the application, the district court remanded the application to the agency with instructions to further consider medical testimony regarding Mabry-Schlicher’s social impairments. On remand, the SSA again rejected Mabry-Schlicher’s application, and the district court affirmed. Mabry-Schlicher contends that the SSA failed to comply with the district court’s remand order and ignored important vocational testimony. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. I. BACKGROUND Mabry-Schlicher alleges disability secondary to various impairments, including, among other things, depression, anxiety, fibromyalgia, obesity, foot injury and degeneration, and recurrent migraines. Because of her mental disabilities and migraines, Mabry-Schlicher has difficulty No. 24-3811, Mabry-Schlicher v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. interacting with others and is wary of leaving her home. She also struggles with mobility and experiences frequent pain due to her physical disabilities. Mabry-Schlicher applied to the SSA for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) in May 2015. In evaluating her application, the agency reviewed copies of Mabry-Schlicher’s medical records, as well as various expert evaluations and opinions. These included a psychological evaluation from Dr. Giovanni M. Bonds, who found that Mabry-Schlicher “avoid[s] people and socializing with them” and “would have difficulty working around many people.” R. 7-7, PageID 407. Another psychologist, Dr. Karen Steiger, also conducted an evaluation, determining that Mabry-Schlicher’s ability to interact with coworkers was “[m]oderately limited,” and that any such interaction should be kept to “a superficial level,” while “contact with the general public should be kept to a limited basis.” R. 7-3, PageID 119. Two other psychologists, Dr. Joseph Edwards and Dr. Courtney Zeune, similarly determined that Mabry-Schlicher was “[m]oderately limited” in her ability to interact with coworkers, but remained capable of “infrequent, superficial interactions” with others. Id. at PageID 149, 182. The SSA denied the May 2015 claim, concluding that Mabry-Schlicher was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Seeking reversal of the denial, Mabry-Schlicher requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was held on October 3, 2017. At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Mabry-Schlicher, as well as a vocational expert, Karen Schneider. Schneider testified that it is “important” that all employees “respond appropriately to instructions and accept supervisor criticism,” and stated that she would not characterize supervisory criticism as “superficial.” R. 7-2, PageID 102. The ALJ denied the -2- No. 24-3811, Mabry-Schlicher v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. claim, and Mabry-Schlicher appealed to the district court. On the joint motion of the parties, the district court remanded the case to the SSA for further proceedings. On remand, the case was reassigned to a new ALJ, who held a second hearing on February 5, 2020. The ALJ again heard personal testimony from Mabry-Schlicher and vocational testimony from Schneider, and concluded that Mabry-Schlicher was not disabled. Notably, the ALJ’s decision discounted the opinions of the reviewing psychologists that Mabry-Schlicher maintained the ability to interact with coworkers and officials at only a “superficial” level, deeming th

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1934 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/06/2025 Pg: 1 of 3 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-1934 TED ACORD, as Administrator of the Estate of Michael Acord, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. CHAD STILLEY, Defendant – Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Elizabeth K. Dillon, Chief District Judge. (7:22-cv-00284-EKD-CKM) Argued: May 6, 2025 Decided: June 6, 2025 Amended June 6, 2025 Before KING, THACKER, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ARGUED: Seth Raven Carroll, COMMONWEALTH LAW GROUP, PLLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeremy E. Carroll, SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Julian F. Harf, SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1934 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/06/2025 Pg: 2 of 3 PER CURIAM: In this appeal from the Western District of Virginia, plaintiff Ted Acord, as Administrator of the Estate of Michael Acord, challenges the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Chad Stilley, a police officer with the Town of Narrows, Virginia. See Memorandum Opinion, Acord v. Stilley, No. 7:22-cv-00284 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2024), ECF No. 62 (the “Summary Judgment Opinion”).* Ted Acord filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Stilley used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, in that Stilley caused a fatal collision with Michael Acord, who was fleeing westbound through Stilley’s bailiwick — the Town of Narrows — on his motorcycle at a high rate of speed, by moving the police vehicle in which he sat into the public highway — that is, U.S. Route 460 — and blocking all lanes of escape. Acord also raised a claim of battery under Virginia state law. The court granted summary judgment to Stilley on both claims, concluding that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claim and good-faith immunity under Virginia law on the state law claim. On appeal, Acord argues that Stilley’s conduct violated Michael’s clearly established constitutional rights and that the court therefore erred in awarding summary judgment in Stilley’s favor on both the federal and state law claims. Having carefully assessed the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we are satisfied that the district court did not err in determining that Stilley The district court’s Summary Judgment Opinion is published at 749 F. Supp. 3d * 635 (W.D. Va. 2024). 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1934 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/06/2025 Pg: 3 of 3 was entitled to qualified immunity as to Acord’s § 1983 claim asserting a Fourth Amendment violation. See Somers v. Devine, 132 F.4th 689, 695 (4th Cir. 2025). We are also satisfied that the court correctly determined that Stilley was entitled to good-faith immunity as to Acord’s state law battery claim. See Amisi v. Brooks, 93 F.4th 659, 674- 75 (4th Cir. 2024) (recognizing “the Virginia’s immunity doctrine is congruent with the federal qualified immunity defense” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Wingate v. Fulford, 987 F.3d 299, 312 (4th Cir. 2021). Indeed, we readily adopt the court’s thorough and well-reasoned Summary Judgment Opinion. We therefore reject Acord’s appellate contentions and affirm the final judgment of the district court. See Acord v. Stilley, No. 7:22-cv-00284 (E.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2024), ECF No. 63. AFFIRMED 3

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 25a0146p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ JAIME B. NORRIS, │ Plaintiff-Appellant, │ > No. 24-3930 │ v. │ │ COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, │ Defendant-Appellee. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. No. 1:23-cv-01540—David A. Ruiz, District Judge. Decided and Filed: June 3, 2025 Before: COLE, READLER, and RITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Eric S. McDaniel, Matthew J. Kasper, MALYUK MCDANIEL KASPER LLC, Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, for Appellant. Brian C. Baak, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. _________________ OPINION _________________ COLE, Circuit Judge. An administrative law judge denied Jaime Norris’s application for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income after finding that Norris could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The district court agreed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the decision. We affirm.  No. 24-3930 Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 2 I. In October 2020, Norris, who was thirty-nine years old, applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income. Norris asserted that he was disabled and limited in his ability to work because he suffers from several mental and physical disorders, including anxiety, depression, hereditary hemorrhagic telangiectasia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, post- traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, irritable bowel syndrome, migraines, and agoraphobia. The Social Security Administration denied Norris’s claim, prompting him to seek a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). During the hearing, Norris and a vocational expert testified. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision, concluding that Norris was not disabled under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Considering the expert’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Norris could successfully adjust to other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Norris appealed the denial to the Appeals Council, which denied his request for review, finalizing the ALJ’s decision. Norris then filed this civil action, seeking judicial review of the decision. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Norris timely appealed. II. We review whether the ALJ “applied the correct legal standards and whether the[ir] findings . . . are supported by substantial evidence.” Hargett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 964 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A finding is supported by substantial evidence if there is “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (cleaned up). We do not resolve conflicting testimony or evaluate credibility. Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001). We affirm an ALJ’s decision if their findings are “reasonably drawn from the record  No. 24-3930 Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 3 or supported by substantial evidence, even if that evidence could support a contrary decision.” Elam ex rel. Golay v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003). III. To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must be disabled under the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). An ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof during the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Com