In Re Rita Elizabeth Jones, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Estela Tibuni Romano, A/K/ Estella Tibuni Romano, Stella Tibuni Romano v. the State of Texas

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 63 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MERVINA KAUKINI MAMO CASH-KAEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUY K. BARRETT; RONETTE BARRETT, Defendants-Appellants, DUSTIN K. BARRETT; SHEENA ANN BARRETT; RICHARD BARRETT; LEZLEY K. BARRETT aka LEZLEY BRADBURY, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAI‘ANAE DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.) Defendants-Appellants Guy K. Barrett and Ronette Barrett (collectively, the Barretts) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district court)1 May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. They raise three points of error, contending that the district court abused its discretion when: 1 The Honorable Darolyn H. Lendio entered the Judgment for Possession. The Honorable Michelle N. Comeau presided over the April 26, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Mervina Kaukini Mamo Cash-Kaeo's (Cash- Kaeo) motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (1) "it defaulted [the Barretts] for [their] non[-]appearance [at the MSJ hearing] where the facts show [the Barretts had] defended themselves in this action by retaining counsel" who "made eight court appearances at hearings in defense of [the Barretts]"; (2) "it applied the extreme sanctions methodology" by entering default judgment against the Barretts "for the failure of their counsel to appear at the hearing on [Cash- Kaeo's] [MSJ]"; and (3) "it allowed the hearing on [Cash-Kaeo's] [MSJ] to proceed without first addressing [counsel's] non[- ]appearance at this hearing." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the Barretts' appeal as follows. The Barretts contend that the district court entered default judgment against them pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 55. The record reflects, however, that the district court entered the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession against the Barretts because Cash-Kaeo demonstrated she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under DCRCP Rule 56. Pursuant to DCRCP Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawaiʻi 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The Barretts point to no evidence in the record indicating a genuine issue of material fact disputing that Cash- Kaeo is the sole surviving lessee of the subject property, and that Cash-Kaeo is therefore entitled to judgment of possession against the Barretts as a matter of law. The Barretts also cite no authority indicating the district court was required to address their counsel's non-appearance at the MSJ hearing before it could grant the MSJ. Even if the district court was required to do so, the Barretts fail to identify any legal theory or issue of fact that could have or would have been presented in opposition to the MSJ to defeat the motion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting the MSJ, and affirm the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 20, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Presiding Judge Barry L. Sooalo, for Defendants-Appellants. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge Jay T. Suemori, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge

RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1311-MR KHALIL COLEMAN APPELLANT APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00759 KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Khalil Coleman appeals from the Franklin Circuit Court’s order dismissing his complaint against Appellee, the Kentucky General Assembly. Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND Khalil Coleman, a state inmate, filed a pro se lawsuit seeking a declaration regarding certain sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. He named the General Assembly of Kentucky as the sole defendant. The General Assembly moved to dismiss the action, arguing Coleman failed to state a claim, and alternatively, if Coleman had stated a claim, the General Assembly is shielded by legislative immunity under Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Franklin Circuit Court granted the General Assembly’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and declined to assess the immunity defense. Coleman now appeals. ANALYSIS We review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Davenport Extreme Pools and Spas, Inc. v. Mulflur, 698 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Ky. App. 2024). Trial courts must construe pleadings “in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky. App. 1987) (citing Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1960)). In response to a pleading, a party to an action may present the defense of a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by a pre-answer motion. CR1 12.02(f). The General Assembly presented that defense, arguing Coleman’s complaint “does not state any cognizable legal theory related to the General Assembly and alleges no sufficient facts to support one. In fact, the Complaint 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -2- does not even allege any action or inaction by the General Assembly as a body or by its individual members.” (Record (R.) at 55.) Coleman argues his “declaration of rights petition did in fact state several claims, which should have rendered right to relief.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4.) However, even on appeal, Coleman fails to state any claims against the General Assembly. As he did before the Franklin Circuit Court, he again argues that certain statutes are unconstitutional but does not aver in his brief before this Court sufficient facts that would allow the General Assembly to respond with a rational, cogent answer. He asserts no specific wrongdoing by the General Assembly. Rather, he requests that this Court “evoke legislative intent [and] redact statute [sic] of controversy affecting [his] rights.” (Appellant’s Br. at 6.) Although the General Assembly did not submit an Appellee’s Brief, we take that non- response as an expression of its belief there is nothing warranting a response on appeal. While we respect Coleman’s activism, bringing an action against the General Assembly is not a means by which such change can be effectuated. Existence of an actual controversy is a fundamental component of an action. “The court will not decide speculative rights or duties which may or may not arise in the future, but only rights and duties about which there is a present actual controversy presented by adversary parties, and in which a binding judgment concluding the -3- controversy may be entered.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Veith v. City of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. 1962)). “An actual controversy . . . does not involve a question which is merely hypothetical or an answer which is no more than an advisory opinion.” Barrett v. Reynolds, 817 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ky. 1991). Coleman’s request that the Court redact certain statutes is not an actual controversy. Neither is his request that the Court actually issue an advisory opinion, which we are prohibited from rendering. Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Ky. 2007) (citations omitted) (“It is a fundamental tenet of Kentucky jurisprudence that courts cannot decide matters that have not yet ripened into concrete disputes. Courts are not permitted to render advisory opin

No. 549 June 18, 2025 363 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of the Estate of Wilbert H. Tressler, deceased. Barbi M. DOLL, Appellant, v. Donald Lee TRESSLER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Wilbert H. Tressler, Respondent. Washington County Circuit Court 21PB05510; A180067 Janelle F. Wipper, Judge. Submitted May 20, 2025. Jennifer J. Martin, Kevin O’Connell, and Law Offices of O’Connell Hval & Martin filed the briefs for appellant. Heather Cavanaugh, Julie R. Vacura, and Larkins Vacura Kayser, LLP, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. ORTEGA, P. J. Affirmed. 364 Doll v. Tressler ORTEGA, P. J. Petitioner Barbi Doll seeks reversal of an opinion and order concluding that decedent Wilbert Tressler lacked testamentary capacity when he executed a will in 2020, which made her the primary beneficiary of his estate and which also concluded that the will was the result of undue influence by petitioner. She seeks reversal of that opinion and order, which invalidated the 2020 will, and the findings and conclusions supporting it. We affirm. Petitioner has not asked this court to try the cause anew on the record under ORAP 5.40(8), and this is not an “exceptional case” warranting such review. ORAP 5.40(8)(c). Accordingly, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact that are supported by any evidence in the record and review the court’s dispositional conclusions for errors of law. See Williamson v. Zielinski, 326 Or App 648, 649, 532 P3d 1257 (2023). The trial court’s findings of historical fact are sup- ported by evidence in the record and are bolstered by its credibility findings. Those findings provide ample legal sup- port for its dispositional conclusions. We therefore conclude that petitioner has failed to show any basis for reversal of the opinion and order. Affirmed.

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-24-00228-CV Patrick Alan Powers, Appellant v. Teresa Seamon, Appellee On appeal from the County Court at Law No 2 of Johnson County, Texas Judge F. Steven McClure, presiding Trial Court Cause No. CC-P202325571-A JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Patrick Alan Powers, appeals from a July 10, 2024 order of dismissal. The pertinent part of that order states: As to Defendant’s Rule 91(a) Motion to Dismiss: X The Motion is GRANTED due to lack of capacity; and/or X The Motion is GRANTED due to lack of standing;  On May 29, 2025, the Clerk of this Court notified Powers that there does not appear to be a final judgment from which he can appeal to this Court, and the appeal is subject to dismissal. We specifically directed his attention to In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) in which the supreme court held that a Rule 11 agreement to dismiss all claims, which contained no decretal language, was not a final judgment. The Clerk of the Court further notified Powers that the Court may dismiss this appeal unless, within fourteen days from the date of the letter, a response is filed showing grounds for continuing the appeal. In his late-filed response, Powers asserts that the order he attempts to appeal disposes of all issues in the phase of the proceeding for which it was brought and is therefore final and appealable. Powers does not address the fact that the July 10, 2024 order of dismissal does not include any decretal language. Our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final judgments, except as explicitly allowed by statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.012; Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). An order merely granting a motion for judgment is nothing more than an indication of the trial court’s ruling on the motion itself and adjudicates nothing. Naaman v. Grider, 126 S.W.3d 73, 74 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam). An order or judgment that does Powers v. Seamon Page 2 not contain decretal language is not a final judgment. See In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d at 260. Because the order Powers attempts to appeal contains no decretal language, it is not an appealable judgment, and we have no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See id. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. STEVE SMITH Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 26, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Dismissed CV06 Powers v. Seamon Page 3

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS § MORRIS REID, III, No. 08-25-00155-CV § Appellant, Appeal from the § v. 112th District Court § HOLLOMAN CORPORATION, of Crockett County, Texas § Appellee. (TC# 21-02-08136-CV) § § MEMORANDUM OPINION This appeal is before the Court on its own motion to determine whether it should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Because we find that Appellant Morris Reid III did not timely perfect his appeal, we dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Appellate courts generally have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments filed within 30 days after the appealable order is signed, or within 90 days after the appealable order is signed if a party timely files one of the pleadings listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1 (providing deadlines to perfect an appeal in a civil case); Butts v. Capitol City Nursing Home, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 696. 697 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). A proper motion to reinstate under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a extends the deadline to file a notice of appeal from 30 days to 90 days. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(3). The Texas Supreme Court has held that a proper motion to reinstate must be verified and filed with the clerk within 30 days of the order of dismissal. McConell v. May, 800 S.W.2d 194, 194 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(3) (requiring the motion to be verified by the movant or his attorney). An unverified motion does not extend the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction or the deadlines for perfecting an appeal. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barnet, 589 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—El Paso, no pet.). On May 16, 2025, Reid filed a notice of appeal stating his desire to appeal from an order “rendered on April 17, 2025” granting Holloman Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss. However, upon further review of the clerk’s record, the order granting Holloman Corporation’s motion was signed by the trial court on March 4, 2025. The clerk’s record also contains Reid’s unverified motion to reinstate pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a, filed on March 21, 2025. Although filed within 30 days of the date of the judgment, because Reid’s motion was unverified, it did not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. Accordingly, Reid’s notice of appeal was due April 3, 2025—30 days after the trial court signed its dismissal order, and the notice of appeal filed May 16, 2025, is untimely. The Clerk of this Court sent notice to Reid that his appeal would be dismissed as untimely on or after June 15, 2025, unless he responded and established a basis for our jurisdiction. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). As of the date of this memorandum, we have received no response. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice June 25, 2025 Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox, J., and Rodriguez, C.J. (Ret.) Rodriguez, C.J. (Ret.) (Sitting by Assignment) 2