Hinds v. Adams Motors, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 25-JUN-2025 08:09 AM Dkt. 56 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MEILING K. AKUNA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDY STEHL and JIM FALK MOTORS OF MAUI, Defendants-Appellees APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT WAILUKU DIVISION (CASE NO. 2DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and Guidry, JJ.) Self-represented Plaintiff-Appellant Meiling K. Akuna (Akuna) appeals from the District Court of the Second Circuit's (district court)1 May 3, 2023 Judgment, entered in favor of 1 The Honorable Blaine J. Kobayashi presided.  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Defendants-Appellees Andy Stehl (Stehl) and Jim Falk Motors of Maui (Falk Motors) (collectively, the Defendants). Akuna raises three issues on appeal,2 contending that the district court: (1) "erred in giving nominal concern in [Akuna's] case"; (2) "erred on the manner in which the trials were conducted"; and (3) "applied the wrong legal standard in finding [Akuna's] case unmerited." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Akuna's appeal as follows. In August 2021, Akuna filed the operative Amended Complaint, alleging that the Defendants committed fraud by selling her a "truck [that] was previously damaged in a rollover accident" that had been represented as being "a new truck." The case proceeded to a bench trial. After Akuna rested her case, the Defendants moved for a directed verdict. The district court ruled as follows, Ms. Akuna, the [c]ourt in this case has listened to the testimony of the witnesses that you've called to support your claim. 2 We note that Akuna's opening brief does not, among other things, include a statement of points of error or arguments on appeal as required by Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28. We will nevertheless address Akuna's contentions of error to the extent they are discernible. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Wright, Nos. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, & CAAP-20- 0000364, 2023 WL 4104953, at *2 (Haw. App. June 21, 2023) (SDO) ("[W]e interpret pleadings prepared by self-represented litigants liberally and attempt to afford them appellate review even though they fail to comply with court rules.") (citation omitted). 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Ah, the [c]ourt has also had the opportunity to review the exhibits which were received in evidence. You know, unfortunately the [c]ourt [cannot] see or find any evidence of your claim that the vehicle that was sold to you on April 4th, 2013 was, in fact, a used vehicle as opposed to a new vehicle. Ah, because of that, your claim fails and you have not proven by a preponderance of the evidence the claim set forth in your complaint. So unfortunately, at this time the [c]ourt has no alternative but to rule in favor of the [D]efendant[s]. The [c]ourt is granting the defense's motion for directed verdict. Judgment is entered in favor of the [D]efendants and against [Akuna]. (Emphasis added.) A motion for a directed verdict in a district court trial shall be considered as a motion to dismiss under District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 41(b).3 Cf. Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 66 Haw. 237, 252, 659 P.2d 734, 745 (1983) ("A motion for a directed verdict [under Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 50(a)4] in a nonjury case will be 3 DCRCP Rule 41(b) states, in relevant part, After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant, without waiving the defendant's right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ROBERT HILTON, Plaintiff, 24-CV-9829 (KMW) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL LINA GARCIA and MARYLAND AUTHORHOUSE USA, Defendants. KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action against individual Lina Garcia and Maryland Author House, a self-publishing company (“Defendants”). By Order dated January 7, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. (ECF No. 7.) On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 11). For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Although the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obligated to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” courts provide to pro se litigants, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[.]” Id. at 678-79. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 678. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the amended complaint.1 Plaintiff alleges that Lina Garcia, a senior publishing consultant, engaged in fraudulent activities by charging $150 to his credit card and not responding to his messages or calls. (ECF No. 11 at 2, 4, 5.) Garcia also advertised a Facebook promotion with misleading pricing, which increased from $300 to $600. 1 The Court quotes from the amended complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation appear as in the amended complaint, unless noted otherwise. (Id. at 6.) When Plaintiff called self-publishing company Maryland Author House, “they had no idea who Lina Garcia was.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff does not state the relationship, if any, between the two. Plaintiff asserts claims of “fraudulent activities, false doctrine, federal stolen funds, regulation . . . violations of fraudulent activities from credit card account security act violation.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff seeks unspecified relief. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff states that he is retired and receiving benefits from the Social Security Administration. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff also filed a motion requesting pro bono counsel. (ECF No. 5.)

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 25a0150p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ JASON COUNTS; DONALD KLEIN; OSCAR ZAMORA; │ JASON SILVEUS; JOHN MISKELLY; THOMAS HAYDUK; │ JOSHUA RODRIGUEZ; BASSAM HIRMIZ; CHRISTOPHER │ HEMBERGER; DEREK LONG, individually and on behalf > No. 24-1139 of themselves and all others similarly situated, │ Plaintiffs-Appellants, │ │ │ v. │ │ GENERAL MOTORS, LLC; ROBERT BOSCH LLC, │ Defendants-Appellees. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City. No. 1:16-cv-12541—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge. Argued: March 18, 2025 Decided and Filed: June 6, 2025 Before: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Garth Wojtanowicz, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Appellants. Jay P. Lefkowitz, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee General Motors. Patrick Swiber, CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON, LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee Robert Bosch LLC. ON BRIEF: Garth Wojtanowicz, Steve W. Berman, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP, Seattle, Washington, Christopher A. Seeger, SEEGER WEISS LLP, Ridgefield Park, New Jersey, Shauna B. Itri, SEEGER WEISS LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, James E. Cecchi, James A. O’Brien III, CARELLA, BRYNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C., Roseland, New Jersey, for Appellants. Jay P. Lefkowitz, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, New York, New York, Renee D. Smith, Jeffrey S. Bramson, Cole T. Carter, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee General Motors. Abena A. Mainoo, Carmine D. Boccuzzi Jr., CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON, LLP, New York, New York, Matthew D.  No. 24-1139 Counts, et al. v. General Motors, LLC, et al. Page 2 Slater, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, Washington, D.C., William R. Jansen, Jonathan E. Lauderbach, WARNER NORCROSS & JUDD LLP, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee Robert Bosch LLC. Jonathan S. Martel, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae. _________________ OPINION _________________ KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants as to their claims that GM and Bosch misled consumers regarding the emissions generated by certain Chevrolet Cruze vehicles. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. A. New motor vehicles generally cannot be sold in the United States without a “certificate of conformity,” which is the EPA’s certification that a vehicle complies with all federal emissions standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7522(a)(1), 7525(a); 40 C.F.R. § 86.1854-12(a)(1). As part of the certification process, manufacturers must disclose whether a vehicle has any “auxiliary emission control devices” (AECDs), which for various reasons can increase vehicle emissions under certain operating circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. § 7525; 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.127-12, 86.1844- 01(d)(11). AECDs use software to sense conditions like temperature, speed, or engine RPMs “for the purpose of activating, modulating, delaying, or deactivating the operation of any part of the emission control system.” 40 C.F.R. § 86.082-2. A manufacturer’s disclosures must provide “a detailed justification of each AECD that results in a reduction in the effectiveness of the emission control system, and rationale for why it is not a defeat device.” 40 C.F.R. § 86.1844- 01(d)(11). A “defeat device,” in turn, is an AECD that unjustifiably “reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which may reasonably be expect