Hilton v. Penguin Book Writers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ROBERT HILTON, Plaintiff, 24-CV-9829 (KMW) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL LINA GARCIA and MARYLAND AUTHORHOUSE USA, Defendants. KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action against individual Lina Garcia and Maryland Author House, a self-publishing company (“Defendants”). By Order dated January 7, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. (ECF No. 7.) On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 11). For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Although the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obligated to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” courts provide to pro se litigants, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[.]” Id. at 678-79. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 678. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the amended complaint.1 Plaintiff alleges that Lina Garcia, a senior publishing consultant, engaged in fraudulent activities by charging $150 to his credit card and not responding to his messages or calls. (ECF No. 11 at 2, 4, 5.) Garcia also advertised a Facebook promotion with misleading pricing, which increased from $300 to $600. 1 The Court quotes from the amended complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation appear as in the amended complaint, unless noted otherwise. (Id. at 6.) When Plaintiff called self-publishing company Maryland Author House, “they had no idea who Lina Garcia was.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff does not state the relationship, if any, between the two. Plaintiff asserts claims of “fraudulent activities, false doctrine, federal stolen funds, regulation . . . violations of fraudulent activities from credit card account security act violation.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff seeks unspecified relief. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff states that he is retired and receiving benefits from the Social Security Administration. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff also filed a motion requesting pro bono counsel. (ECF No. 5.)