Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005)

In Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005), the underlying dispute arose from the conviction of Ivan Eberhart for conspiring to distribute cocaine. Following his conviction, Eberhart filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial on the last day permitted for post-trial motions. His initial motion cited a flaw in a jury transcript as the sole ground for relief. However, nearly six months later, he submitted a "supplemental memorandum" that introduced two additional grounds: the admission of potential hearsay testimony and the District Court's failure to provide a "buyer-seller instruction" to the jury. The Government did not contest the timeliness of this supplemental filing but instead opposed the motion on its merits. The District Court ultimately granted Eberhart's motion for a new trial, acknowledging the three grounds he raised. The judge expressed that while none of the issues alone warranted a new trial, their cumulative effect necessitated one in the interest of justice. The Government appealed this decision, arguing that the District Court had abused its discretion due to the untimeliness of the supplemental memorandum. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial because Eberhart's supplemental memorandum was filed outside the seven-day limit established by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. The procedural history of the case reflects a significant tension between the rigid deadlines imposed by Rule 33 and the District Court's discretion to grant a new trial. The Seventh Circuit had previously interpreted the time limitations of Rule 33 as jurisdictional, meaning that the court could not consider motions filed beyond the specified timeframe unless there was a timely extension or newly discovered evidence. This interpretation was pivotal in the appellate court's decision to reverse the lower court's ruling, underscoring the strict adherence to procedural rules in federal criminal proceedings.

Whether the time limitations set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 for filing a motion for a new trial are jurisdictional, thereby preventing a district court from considering untimely motions or amendments to motions for a new trial.

The judgment of the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.