Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005)

In Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005), the underlying dispute arose from Michael Donald Dodd's conviction for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, among other charges, which occurred after he was indicted on June 25, 1993. Dodd was convicted on all counts except for one related to cocaine and was sentenced to 360 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. His conviction was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on May 7, 1997, and became final on August 6, 1997, when he did not file a petition for certiorari. Dodd filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 on April 4, 2001, more than three years after his conviction became final, seeking to set aside his conviction based on the Supreme Court's decision in Richardson v. United States (1999). In Richardson, the Court held that a jury must unanimously agree on each specific violation constituting a continuing criminal enterprise. Dodd contended that his jury had not been instructed on this requirement. However, the District Court dismissed his motion as time-barred, determining that the limitation period began when the right was initially recognized in Richardson, which was more than one year prior to his filing. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the dismissal, stating that the limitation period under §2255, ¶6(3), began on the date the Supreme Court recognized the right in Richardson, rather than when it was made retroactively applicable. Dodd appealed this decision, prompting the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the start date for the limitation period in such cases.

Whether the limitation period for filing a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 begins to run on the date the Supreme Court initially recognizes a right or on the date that right is made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.

The judgment is reversed.