Caitlin R. Workman v. ACNR Resources, Inc. (Justice Armstead, dissenting, joined by Justice Bunn)
Court
West Virginia Supreme Court
Decided
June 6, 2025
Jurisdiction
S
Practice Areas
Case Summary
No. 23-638, Caitlin R. Workman v. ACNR Resources, Inc. Armstead, Justice, dissenting, and joined by Justice Bunn: I dissent as to the majority’s decision to reverse the decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals and to remand this case to the Board of Review with directions to award the petitioner temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and additional testing and treatment. Our standard of review is set forth in syllabus point three of Duff v. Kanawha County Commission, 250 W. Va. 510, 905 S.E.2d 528 (2024), which provides: On appeal of a decision of the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review from the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals is bound by the statutory standards contained in West Virginia Code § 23- 5-12a(b) (eff. Jan. 13, 2022). Questions of law are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact made by the Board of Review are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong. Based upon the record and West Virginia Code § 23-4-3(a)(1), the BOR’s finding that additional testing and treatment (EMG, MR arthrogram, additional physical therapy and orthopedic consultation) were not causally related to the compensable conditions of a laceration and a contusion was not clearly wrong, and therefore, should have been given deference and affirmed. I also would have accorded the BOR’s factual findings deference relating to its affirmance of the claim administrator closing the claim for TTD benefits, as the petitioner failed to show that the BOR’s factual findings that she 1 had reached her maximum degree of improvement were clearly wrong. See W. Va. Code § 23-4-7a. The petitioner’s claim was held compensable for a laceration without foreign body of the right back and contusion of the right shoulder. Following this decision, the petitioner made complaints about weakness, decreased grip strength and shaking in her right hand (“RUE complaints”), which led to requests for additional testing and treatment. Regarding her requests for additional treatment, the BOR found that “the evidence does not indicate that the complaints are the result of a laceration and a contusion,” and found the requested treatments were not “casually related to the current compensable conditions.” Further, as to closing the claim for TTD benefits, the BOR considered Dr. Mukkamala’s independent medical evaluation of the petitioner, noting that, as of the date of his evaluation, the petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) for her compensable conditions and did not require further treatment. The BOR explained its conclusion affirming the claim administrator closing the claim for TTD benefits, stating “the evidence does not indicate that the complaints are due to the current compensable conditions,” but instead, “the evidence establishes that at the time the TTD was suspended, the [petitioner] had reached MMI from the compensable conditions and could return to work with no restrictions.” 2 There appears to be no dispute that the petitioner made RUE complaints after her claim was held compensable for a laceration and a contusion. In fact, at the time of her independent medical evaluation, Dr. Mukkamala noted that she “complained of pain over the right shoulder, mostly in the scapular area” and “weakness in the right arm.” Those complaints, however, should not result in the reversal of the ICA’s decision because the BOR was not clearly wrong in its findings of facts, as petitioner failed to provide evidence that her RUE complaints were due to her compensable conditions. As the majority notes, the BOR performed a “thorough recitation of the evidence submitted by the parties.” The BOR did not ignore the reports of the petitioner’s treating physicians. Over half of the BOR’s findings of fact refer to medical records of the petitioner’s treating physicians. Following its review, the BOR concluded, and I agree, that the petitioner failed to establish that her requests for additional testing and treatment were medically necessary and reasonably related to her compensable conditions, and that she was at MMI from the compensable conditions and able to return to work. The BOR certainly was not clearly wrong, and indeed, was correct in its findings of fact, because the petitioner failed to supply any evidence that her RUE complaints were related to her compensable conditions, a laceration and a contusion. With respect to the evidence that is required, the majority relies upon the presumption articulated
Case Summary
Summary of the key points and legal principles
No. 23-638, Caitlin R. Workman v. ACNR Resources, Inc.
Armstead, Justice, dissenting, and joined by Justice Bunn:
I dissent as to the majority’s decision to reverse the decision of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals and to remand this case to the Board of Review with
directions to award the petitioner temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and additional
testing and treatment. Our standard of review is set forth in syllabus point three of Duff v.
Kanawha County Commission, 250 W. Va. 510, 905 S.E.2d 528 (2024), which provides:
On appeal of a decision of the West Virginia Workers’
Compensation Board of Review from the Intermediate Court
of Appeals of West Virginia to the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals is bound by
the statutory standards contained in West Virginia Code § 23-
5-12a(b) (eff. Jan. 13, 2022). Questions of law are reviewed
de novo, while findings of fact made by the Board of Review
are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the
findings to be clearly wrong.
Based upon the record and West Virginia Code § 23-4-3(a)(1), the BOR’s
finding that additional testing and treatment (EMG, MR arthrogram, additional physical
therapy and orthopedic consultation) were not causally related to the compensable
conditions of a laceration and a contusion was not clearly wrong, and therefore, should
have been given deference and affirmed. I also would have accorded the BOR’s factual
findings deference relating to its affirmance of the claim administrator closing the claim
for TTD benefits, as the petitioner failed to show that the BOR’s factual findings that she
1
had reached her maximum degree of improvement were clearly wrong. See W. Va. Code
§ 23-4-7a.
The petitioner’s claim was held compensable for a laceration without foreign
body of the right back and contusion of the right shoulder. Following this decision, the
petitioner made complaints about weakness, decreased grip strength and shaking in her
right hand (“RUE complaints”), which led to requests for additional testing and treatment.
Regarding her requests for additional treatment, the BOR found that “the evidence does
not indicate that the complaints are the result of a laceration and a contusion,” and found
the requested treatments were not “casually related to the current compensable conditions.”
Further, as to closing the claim for TTD benefits, the BOR considered Dr. Mukkamala’s
independent medical evaluation of the petitioner, noting that, as of the date of his
evaluation, the petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) for her
compensable conditions and did not require further treatment. The BOR explained its
conclusion affirming the claim administrator closing the claim for TTD benefits, stating
“the evidence does not indicate that the complaints are due to the current compensable
conditions,” but instead, “the evidence establishes that at the time the TTD was suspended,
the [petitioner] had reached MMI from the compensable conditions and could return to
work with no restrictions.”
2
There appears to be no dispute that the petitioner made RUE complaints after
her claim was held compensable for a laceration and a contusion. In fact, at the time of her
independent medical evaluation, Dr. Mukkamala noted that she “complained of pain over
the right shoulder, mostly in the scapular area” and “weakness in the right arm.” Those
complaints, however, should not result in the reversal of the ICA’s decision because the
BOR was not clearly wrong in its findings of facts, as petitioner failed to provide evidence
that her RUE complaints were due to her compensable conditions.
As the majority notes, the BOR performed a “thorough recitation of the
evidence submitted by the parties.” The BOR did not ignore the reports of the petitioner’s
treating physicians. Over half of the BOR’s findings of fact refer to medical records of the
petitioner’s treating physicians. Following its review, the BOR concluded, and I agree,
that the petitioner failed to establish that her requests for additional testing and treatment
were medically necessary and reasonably related to her compensable conditions, and that
she was at MMI from the compensable conditions and able to return to work.
The BOR certainly was not clearly wrong, and indeed, was correct in its
findings of fact, because the petitioner failed to supply any evidence that her RUE
complaints were related to her compensable conditions, a laceration and a contusion. With
respect to the evidence that is required, the majority relies upon the presumption articulated
Legal Topics
Areas of law covered in this case
Case Information
Detailed case metadata and classifications
Court Proceedings
Document Details
Legal Classification
Case Details
Legal case information
Status
Decided
Date Decided
June 6, 2025
Jurisdiction
S
Court Type
federal
Legal Significance
Case importance metrics
Metadata
Additional information
Quick Actions
Case management tools