Caitlin R. Workman v. ACNR Resources, Inc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT CAROLEEN JAKMIAN, : No. 266 EAL 2024 : Petitioner : : Petition for Allowance of Appeal : from the Order of the v. : Commonwealth Court : : CITY OF PHILADELPHIA AND : SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA : TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, : : Respondents : ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW, this 11th day of June, 2025, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED. Justice Dougherty files a concurring statement.

No. 23-638, Caitlin R. Workman v. ACNR Resources, Inc. Armstead, Justice, dissenting, and joined by Justice Bunn: I dissent as to the majority’s decision to reverse the decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals and to remand this case to the Board of Review with directions to award the petitioner temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and additional testing and treatment. Our standard of review is set forth in syllabus point three of Duff v. Kanawha County Commission, 250 W. Va. 510, 905 S.E.2d 528 (2024), which provides: On appeal of a decision of the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review from the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals is bound by the statutory standards contained in West Virginia Code § 23- 5-12a(b) (eff. Jan. 13, 2022). Questions of law are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact made by the Board of Review are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong. Based upon the record and West Virginia Code § 23-4-3(a)(1), the BOR’s finding that additional testing and treatment (EMG, MR arthrogram, additional physical therapy and orthopedic consultation) were not causally related to the compensable conditions of a laceration and a contusion was not clearly wrong, and therefore, should have been given deference and affirmed. I also would have accorded the BOR’s factual findings deference relating to its affirmance of the claim administrator closing the claim for TTD benefits, as the petitioner failed to show that the BOR’s factual findings that she 1 had reached her maximum degree of improvement were clearly wrong. See W. Va. Code § 23-4-7a. The petitioner’s claim was held compensable for a laceration without foreign body of the right back and contusion of the right shoulder. Following this decision, the petitioner made complaints about weakness, decreased grip strength and shaking in her right hand (“RUE complaints”), which led to requests for additional testing and treatment. Regarding her requests for additional treatment, the BOR found that “the evidence does not indicate that the complaints are the result of a laceration and a contusion,” and found the requested treatments were not “casually related to the current compensable conditions.” Further, as to closing the claim for TTD benefits, the BOR considered Dr. Mukkamala’s independent medical evaluation of the petitioner, noting that, as of the date of his evaluation, the petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) for her compensable conditions and did not require further treatment. The BOR explained its conclusion affirming the claim administrator closing the claim for TTD benefits, stating “the evidence does not indicate that the complaints are due to the current compensable conditions,” but instead, “the evidence establishes that at the time the TTD was suspended, the [petitioner] had reached MMI from the compensable conditions and could return to work with no restrictions.” 2  There appears to be no dispute that the petitioner made RUE complaints after her claim was held compensable for a laceration and a contusion. In fact, at the time of her independent medical evaluation, Dr. Mukkamala noted that she “complained of pain over the right shoulder, mostly in the scapular area” and “weakness in the right arm.” Those complaints, however, should not result in the reversal of the ICA’s decision because the BOR was not clearly wrong in its findings of facts, as petitioner failed to provide evidence that her RUE complaints were due to her compensable conditions. As the majority notes, the BOR performed a “thorough recitation of the evidence submitted by the parties.” The BOR did not ignore the reports of the petitioner’s treating physicians. Over half of the BOR’s findings of fact refer to medical records of the petitioner’s treating physicians. Following its review, the BOR concluded, and I agree, that the petitioner failed to establish that her requests for additional testing and treatment were medically necessary and reasonably related to her compensable conditions, and that she was at MMI from the compensable conditions and able to return to work. The BOR certainly was not clearly wrong, and indeed, was correct in its findings of fact, because the petitioner failed to supply any evidence that her RUE complaints were related to her compensable conditions, a laceration and a contusion. With respect to the evidence that is required, the majority relies upon the presumption articulated

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS FILED State of West Virginia ex rel. West Virginia Department of Human Services, June 4, 2025 released at 3:00 p.m. Petitioner C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS v.) No. 24-582 (Berkeley County CC-02-2014-CIG-3) OF WEST VIRGINIA The Honorable Catie Delligatti,1 Judge of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County; Jill B., Petitioner Below and Party in Interest; and William Prentice Young, Guardian ad Litem of the child A.B.,2 Respondents MEMORANDUM DECISION Petitioner, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”),3 seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of Berkeley County from enforcing its September 26, 2024 order directing the DHS to pay $10,353.00 in vision care expenses for a child, A.B., who is not in the DHS’s physical or legal custody, is not the subject of any currently pending abuse and neglect 1 After the DHS filed this proceeding, the circuit court judge assigned to the case changed; the presiding judge is now the Honorable Catie Delligatti. Accordingly, the Court has substituted the proper party pursuant to Rule 41(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure. 2 The DHS lists as respondents to its petition only the circuit court judge and Jill B. The child A.B. is a real party in interest to this petition for writ of prohibition, which relates to an underlying guardianship proceeding. As such, we include A.B., by his guardian ad litem, as a respondent to this proceeding. 3 Petitioner appears by Attorney General John B. McCuskey and Assistant Attorney General Kristen E. Ross. Because a new Attorney General took office while this proceeding was pending, his name has been substituted as counsel. Respondent Jill B. is self-represented, and the guardian ad litem for A.B. is William P. Young. Additionally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 5F-2-1a, the agency formerly known as the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources was terminated. It is now three separate agencies—the Department of Health Facilities, the Department of Health, and the Department of Human Services. See W. Va. Code § 5F-1-2. For purposes of abuse and neglect proceedings, the agency is now the Department of Human Services. 1 proceeding, has guardians who were appointed by the circuit court in a private guardianship proceeding, and does not qualify for a subsidized guardianship.4 We find that this case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure for issuance of a memorandum decision rather than an opinion. For the reasons set forth below, we grant the requested writ of prohibition. The private guardianship proceeding underlying this original jurisdiction action was initiated by A.B.’s court-appointed guardians, Jill and Thomas B.5 To provide context for the circuit court’s decision that the DHS seeks to prohibit, we briefly describe the factual circumstances that led to Jill and Thomas B.’s court-appointed guardianship over A.B. Because of the limited record for this matter, the following facts are gleaned from the court’s order, the parties’ briefs, and the DHS’s “Objection to and Motion to Reconsider the Circuit Court’s June 12, 2024, Order,” that it filed in the circuit court. The tragic circumstances that ultimately led to A.B.’s guardianship began when he was conceived. A.B.’s mother, P.B., became pregnant at twelve years old after a family friend raped her. P.B.’s mother became aware of and reported the pregnancy when P.B. was about seven-and- a-half months pregnant. The DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition naming A.B.’s father as an offending parent and identifying his four children, including A.B., as abused and neglected children. P.B. was named in the abuse and neglect petition, but only as A.B.’s non-offending parent, and the court appointed counsel for her. A.B.’s father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to his children, including A.B. The DHS did not file an abuse and neglect petition against P.B.’s mother, S.B., because it determined that S.B. took appropriate action after learning of P.B.’s pregnancy by contacting police, cooperating with the investigation, and preventing contact between P.B. and her assailant. During P.B.’s pregnancy, she met Jill B. through a support program for teenage mothers. After A.B.’