Gregory Dalzell, Jr. v. Arlington County Sheriff's Office

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 May 23, 2025 Before ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge No. 24-1524 CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY Appeal from the United States District Court OF AMERICA, for the Northern District of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, Eastern Division. v. No. 1:22-cv-01334 MULLINS FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Jorge L. Alonso, Defendant-Appellant. Judge. ORDER Plaintiff-Appellee, Citizens Insurance Company of America, filed a Petition for Rehearing on May 16, 2025. All members of the panel have voted to deny rehearing but to amend the opinion dated May 2, 2025, as follows: At page 2, first full paragraph, three lines from the bottom of the paragraph, immediately before the word “indemnify,” insert the words “potentially to”; At page 14, last paragraph, fourth line, again insert the words “potentially to” immediately before “indemnify”; At page 21, in the first and only paragraph of the main text, lines 5-6, replace “must also” with “may potentially be required to”; No. 24-1524 Page 2 At page 21, at the end of the same paragraph, insert the following sentence: “The duty to indemnify Mullins has not been briefed in this appeal and remains to be sorted out on remand.” At page 32, four lines from the bottom of the paragraph, insert the following sentence immediately prior to the sentence beginning “We therefore VACATE . . .”: “Also in the event the district court determines that timely notice was given to Citizens, the district court must resolve whether Citizens has a duty to indemnify Mullins.” The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NATIONWIDE LEGAL, LLC, No. 24-3059 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-00599-MEMF-MRW v. MEMORANDUM* JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a Nationally Chartered Bank, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 12, 2025** Pasadena, California Before: IKUTA, R. NELSON, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Nationwide Legal, LLC appeals the district court’s order dismissing its negligence claim against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Nationwide sued Chase after one of Nationwide’s employees stole company funds by changing the payee on * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). company checks and depositing the checks into personal checking accounts at Chase. Nationwide alleges that Chase acted negligently when it permitted Nationwide’s employee to deposit the checks.1 The district court dismissed Nationwide’s claim against Chase after finding that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Section 340(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo a district court’s dismissal based on statutes of limitations. Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm. California state law governs this diversity action, and the California Supreme Court “is the final arbiter of what is state law.” West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940). We “follow a published intermediate state court decision . . . unless we are convinced that the California Supreme Court would reject it.” Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 219 (9th Cir. 2013). 1. The plain language of Section 340(c) covers Nationwide’s claim. In California, an action “by a depositor against a bank for payment of a forged or raised check” must be filed within one year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(c). First, the 1 The district court also dismissed Nationwide’s other two claims against Chase: (1) violation of Section 4401 of the California Commercial Code and (2) breach of contract. Nationwide did not address either of those claims in its opening brief, so we conclude that Nationwide forfeited any arguments regarding those claims. See Ind. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). 2 24-3059 district court correctly found that the checks at issue in this case were “forged” such that Section 340(c) may apply, see Union Tool Co. v. Farmers’ & Merchs.’ Nat’l Bank of Los Angeles, 218 P. 424, 429 (Cal. 1923), and Nationwide does not challenge that finding on appeal. Second, Nationwide’s claim is an action “by a depositor against a bank.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(c). We must give the statutory language its “plain and commonsense meaning.” Smith v. LoanMe, Inc., 483 P.3d 869, 872 (Cal. 2021). The plain language of Section 340(c) covers an action brought by a depositor against the bank where the depositor deposits its funds. Nationwide is a depositor with Chase, so Section 340(c) applies to its claim against Chase for “payment of a forged or raised check.” Nationwide points us to a footnote in Roy Supply, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank that states Section 340(c) “applies only to an action by a depositor against a payor bank.” 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309, 321 n.20 (Ct. App. 1995). Here, Nationwide does not allege that Chase acted negligently in its role as “payor” bank by paying the forged checks. Rather, Nationwide claims Chase negligently accepted the checks from the employee for deposit as the “depositary” bank. But the footnote in Roy Supply stating that Section 340(c) applies only in actions against payor banks is dicta, see 46 Cal. Rptr. at 323 n.25 (explaining that “the statute of limitations issue was not resolved in the trial court and is not at issue 3 24-3059 in this appeal”), and a different lower court

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 25a0150p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ JASON COUNTS; DONALD KLEIN; OSCAR ZAMORA; │ JASON SILVEUS; JOHN MISKELLY; THOMAS HAYDUK; │ JOSHUA RODRIGUEZ; BASSAM HIRMIZ; CHRISTOPHER │ HEMBERGER; DEREK LONG, individually and on behalf > No. 24-1139 of themselves and all others similarly situated, │ Plaintiffs-Appellants, │ │ │ v. │ │ GENERAL MOTORS, LLC; ROBERT BOSCH LLC, │ Defendants-Appellees. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City. No. 1:16-cv-12541—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge. Argued: March 18, 2025 Decided and Filed: June 6, 2025 Before: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Garth Wojtanowicz, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Appellants. Jay P. Lefkowitz, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee General Motors. Patrick Swiber, CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON, LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee Robert Bosch LLC. ON BRIEF: Garth Wojtanowicz, Steve W. Berman, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP, Seattle, Washington, Christopher A. Seeger, SEEGER WEISS LLP, Ridgefield Park, New Jersey, Shauna B. Itri, SEEGER WEISS LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, James E. Cecchi, James A. O’Brien III, CARELLA, BRYNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C., Roseland, New Jersey, for Appellants. Jay P. Lefkowitz, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, New York, New York, Renee D. Smith, Jeffrey S. Bramson, Cole T. Carter, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee General Motors. Abena A. Mainoo, Carmine D. Boccuzzi Jr., CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON, LLP, New York, New York, Matthew D.  No. 24-1139 Counts, et al. v. General Motors, LLC, et al. Page 2 Slater, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, Washington, D.C., William R. Jansen, Jonathan E. Lauderbach, WARNER NORCROSS & JUDD LLP, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee Robert Bosch LLC. Jonathan S. Martel, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae. _________________ OPINION _________________ KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants as to their claims that GM and Bosch misled consumers regarding the emissions generated by certain Chevrolet Cruze vehicles. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. A. New motor vehicles generally cannot be sold in the United States without a “certificate of conformity,” which is the EPA’s certification that a vehicle complies with all federal emissions standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7522(a)(1), 7525(a); 40 C.F.R. § 86.1854-12(a)(1). As part of the certification process, manufacturers must disclose whether a vehicle has any “auxiliary emission control devices” (AECDs), which for various reasons can increase vehicle emissions under certain operating circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. § 7525; 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.127-12, 86.1844- 01(d)(11). AECDs use software to sense conditions like temperature, speed, or engine RPMs “for the purpose of activating, modulating, delaying, or deactivating the operation of any part of the emission control system.” 40 C.F.R. § 86.082-2. A manufacturer’s disclosures must provide “a detailed justification of each AECD that results in a reduction in the effectiveness of the emission control system, and rationale for why it is not a defeat device.” 40 C.F.R. § 86.1844- 01(d)(11). A “defeat device,” in turn, is an AECD that unjustifiably “reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which may reasonably be expect

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1934 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/06/2025 Pg: 1 of 3 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-1934 TED ACORD, as Administrator of the Estate of Michael Acord, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. CHAD STILLEY, Defendant – Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Elizabeth K. Dillon, Chief District Judge. (7:22-cv-00284-EKD-CKM) Argued: May 6, 2025 Decided: June 6, 2025 Amended June 6, 2025 Before KING, THACKER, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ARGUED: Seth Raven Carroll, COMMONWEALTH LAW GROUP, PLLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeremy E. Carroll, SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Julian F. Harf, SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1934 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/06/2025 Pg: 2 of 3 PER CURIAM: In this appeal from the Western District of Virginia, plaintiff Ted Acord, as Administrator of the Estate of Michael Acord, challenges the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Chad Stilley, a police officer with the Town of Narrows, Virginia. See Memorandum Opinion, Acord v. Stilley, No. 7:22-cv-00284 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2024), ECF No. 62 (the “Summary Judgment Opinion”).* Ted Acord filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Stilley used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, in that Stilley caused a fatal collision with Michael Acord, who was fleeing westbound through Stilley’s bailiwick — the Town of Narrows — on his motorcycle at a high rate of speed, by moving the police vehicle in which he sat into the public highway — that is, U.S. Route 460 — and blocking all lanes of escape. Acord also raised a claim of battery under Virginia state law. The court granted summary judgment to Stilley on both claims, concluding that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claim and good-faith immunity under Virginia law on the state law claim. On appeal, Acord argues that Stilley’s conduct violated Michael’s clearly established constitutional rights and that the court therefore erred in awarding summary judgment in Stilley’s favor on both the federal and state law claims. Having carefully assessed the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we are satisfied that the district court did not err in determining that Stilley The district court’s Summary Judgment Opinion is published at 749 F. Supp. 3d * 635 (W.D. Va. 2024). 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1934 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/06/2025 Pg: 3 of 3 was entitled to qualified immunity as to Acord’s § 1983 claim asserting a Fourth Amendment violation. See Somers v. Devine, 132 F.4th 689, 695 (4th Cir. 2025). We are also satisfied that the court correctly determined that Stilley was entitled to good-faith immunity as to Acord’s state law battery claim. See Amisi v. Brooks, 93 F.4th 659, 674- 75 (4th Cir. 2024) (recognizing “the Virginia’s immunity doctrine is congruent with the federal qualified immunity defense” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Wingate v. Fulford, 987 F.3d 299, 312 (4th Cir. 2021). Indeed, we readily adopt the court’s thorough and well-reasoned Summary Judgment Opinion. We therefore reject Acord’s appellate contentions and affirm the final judgment of the district court. See Acord v. Stilley, No. 7:22-cv-00284 (E.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2024), ECF No. 63. AFFIRMED 3

Case: 24-51017 Document: 28-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 24-51017 Summary Calendar FILED ____________ June 3, 2025 Lyle W. Cayce Rudy Castaneda, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Planet Fitness, Incorporated; John Hensley, Area Director; Uriel LNU, Unit Manager; John Doe, Clerk, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:24-CV-509 ______________________________ Before Davis, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Plaintiff-Appellant Rudy Castaneda, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued Planet Fitness, Inc. and several of its employees for refusing him access to their gym(s) and for terminating his membership. His suit arises under several civil-rights statutes and seeks damages and unspecified injunctive relief. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.  Case: 24-51017 Document: 28-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-51017 who recommended the case be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The district judge accepted the recommendation and dismissed the case. After careful review of the record, we agree with the district court and AFFIRM its judgment. Castaneda alleges he was denied access to Planet Fitness after he tried to workout in socks and sandals, rather than athletic shoes, to accommodate his diabetic peripheral neuropathy. He concedes he argued with the Planet Fitness clerk who advised him of the athletic-shoe policy, and that he threatened the clerk with a water bottle. In Castaneda’s words, he “motioned his water bottle towards the Clerk and made an empty threat with his bottle . . . as an intimidation.” We address his claims seriatim. First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addresses employment discrimination. Castaneda has not alleged an employment relationship with Planet Fitness or its employees, so he fails to state a viable Title VII claim. Second, the due-process provisions of the Texas and U.S. Constitutions generally govern state actors, not private ones like Planet Fitness and its employees. 1 Castaneda hasn’t alleged any state action or facts suggesting an exception to this general rule. Third, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) require proof of a race-based conspiracy. 2 Castaneda offers no allegation about race, aside from mentioning two disabled “Anglo” gym members. We note the magistrate judge gave Castaneda an opportunity to make a more definite statement on _____________________ 1 See Manhattan Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 808–810 (2019) (discussing state-action doctrine); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. 1997) (holding Texas’s Constitution regulates state conduct). 2 Bryan v. City Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 2000). 2  Case: 24-51017 Document: 28-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/03/2025 No. 24-51017 this claim, but he merely reiterated his prior allegations in response. He has not delineated an actionable race-based conspiracy under § 1985(3). Finally, Castaneda’s claim under the ADA’s Title III fails for two reasons. For one, Castaneda’s allegations suggest his membership was terminated because he physically threatened, or was perceived to have threatened, a Planet Fitness clerk, negating any connection between his disability and the revocation of his gym membership. Second, Castaneda initially sought only monetary relief, which is unavailable under Title III of the ADA. 3 When he was permitted to make a more definite statement, Castaneda responded he wanted injunctive relief “so that others do not come across equal distress.” He doesn’t explain what action