Rita Keith v. James Griffiths

NOTE: This order is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES AND PRODUCTS, LLC, dba Genova Pipe, MICROKITS, LLC, FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as Pres- ident of the United States, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES, PETE R. FLORES, Acting Commissioner for United States Customs and Border Protection, in his official ca- pacity as Acting Commissioner of the United States Customs and Border Protection, JAMIESON GREER, in his official capacity as United States Trade Representative, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK, in his official capacity as Secretary of Commerce, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Defendants-Appellants ______________________ 2025-1812 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-TMR-JAR, Judge Gary S. 2 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP Katzmann, Judge Timothy M. Reif, and Senior Judge Jane A. Restani. ------------------------------------------------- STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE OF COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF MAINE, STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF NEW MEXICO, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE OF VERMONT, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Homeland Security, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PETE R. FLORES, Acting Commissioner for United States Customs and Border Protection, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, UNITED STATES, Defendants-Appellants ______________________ 2025-1813 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:25-cv-00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Judge Gary S. Katzmann, Judge Timothy M. Reif, and Senior Judge Jane A. Restani. ______________________ ON MOTION ______________________ V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP 3 Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE, DYK, PROST, REYNA, TARANTO, CHEN, HUGHES, STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges. 1 PER CURIAM. ORDER The United States’s motions for a stay of the United States Court of International Trade’s rulings enjoining cer- tain Executive Orders imposing tariffs, the Plaintiffs-Ap- pellees’ oppositions, and the United States’s reply were presented to all circuit judges of this court in regular active service who are not recused or disqualified. Both sides have made substantial arguments on the merits. Having considered the traditional stay factors, see Fed. R. App. P. 8; Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009), the court con- cludes a stay is warranted under the circumstances. See also Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025) (per curiam) (“The purpose of . . . interim equitable relief is not to conclusively determine the rights of the par- ties, but to balance the equities as the litigation moves for- ward.” (quoting Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 580 (2017)). The court also concludes that these cases present issues of exceptional importance war- ranting expedited en banc consideration of the merits in the first instance. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT: (1) The motions for a stay pending appeal are granted. (2) All motions for leave to file briefs amicus curiae re- garding the stay motions are granted. (3) These consolidated cases will be heard en banc un- der 28 U.S.C. § 46 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 1 Circuit Judge Newman did not participate. 4 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC. v. TRUMP 40(g). The court en banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service who are not recused or disqualified in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). (4) Within two business days from the issuance of this order, the parties are directed to jointly file a proposed ex- pedited briefing schedule. The proposed briefing schedule should allow for this court to hold oral argument on July 31, 2025 at 10:00 A.M. in Courtroom 201. If the parties cannot agree upon a schedule, the joint submission should include the parties’ alternative proposals.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0284n.06 Case No. 23-1640 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Jun 09, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF DANYELLE AMUND PHILLIPS, JR., ) MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Danyelle Phillips Jr. pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In his plea agreement, Phillips reserved the right to seek appellate review of the district court’s determination that section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Constitution on its face. He does so now. But our court recently held that section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional. United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 657 (6th Cir. 2024). As Phillips recognizes, this panel can’t overrule that decision, so we affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MICHAEL DEUSCHEL, No. 24-3129 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-03458-MMC v. MEMORANDUM* CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY; Doctor MARK GHALY, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 23, 2025 ** Pasadena, California Before: WARDLAW and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and HINDERAKER, District Judge.*** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable John Charles Hinderaker, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.  Michael Deuschel appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his First Amended Complaint (FAC). The district court dismissed the FAC, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because the FAC did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and dismissal under Rule 8. Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); In re Dominguez, 51 F.3d 1502, 1508 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal under Rule 8). We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend. United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1172 (9th Cir. 2016). The district court did not err in dismissing the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because the FAC did not comply with Rule 8. See Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases affirming dismissal without leave to amend under Rule 8(a) where the complaint is unnecessarily long, repetitive, or confusing). The FAC fails to specify what actions taken by each defendant caused injury in violation of which laws. With respect to dismissal without leave to amend, “court[s] consider[] five 2 24-3129 factors in assessing the propriety of leave to amend—bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). As to the fourth factor, futility of amendment, we have explained that “[l]eave to amend is warranted if the deficiencies can be cured with additional allegations that are ‘consistent with the challenged pleading’ and that do not contradict the allegations in the original complaint.” Id. (quoting Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296–97 (9th Cir. 1990)). In dismissing the FAC without leave to amend, the district court failed to explicitly consider all the factors for dismissal without leave to amend. With respect to futility, the district court cited the standard set forth in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)—that leave to amend should be granted unless a pleading “could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”— but failed to identify any reasons for concluding that the FAC could not be cured with additional allegations. See DCD Programs v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (“If a district court believes the plaintiff is not able to state a claim, it should provide written findings explaining this. . . . [I]n the absence of written findings or a record which clearly indicates reasons for the district court’s denial, this court will reverse a denial of leave to amend.”). The district court’s 3 24-3129 observation that it was “unable to discern any attempt in the FAC to revise the complaint in such a way as to cure or even address the deficiencies identified in the Court’s prior screening order” does not suffice as consideration of futility becau

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ____________ No. 25-5217 September Term, 2024 1:25-cv-00766-JEB Filed On: June 10, 2025 J.G.G., et al., Appellees v. Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States, et al., Appellants BEFORE: Katsas, Rao, and Walker, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of the emergency motion for a stay pending appeal and an administrative stay, it is ORDERED that those portions of the district court’s order entered on June 4, 2025, granting in part appellees’ motion for a preliminary injunction, granting in part their motion for class certification, and ordering appellants to file a notice by June 11, 2025, be administratively stayed pending further order of the court. The purpose of this administrative stay is to give the court sufficient opportunity to consider the emergency motion for a stay pending appeal and should not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of that motion. See D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 33 (2024). It is FURTHER ORDERED that appellees file a response to the emergency motion by 5:00 p.m. on Monday, June 16, 2025. Any reply is due by 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, June 18, 2025. Per Curiam FOR THE COURT: Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk BY: /s/ Lynda M. Flippin Deputy Clerk

Case: 24-11021 Document: 47-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/10/2025 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED June 10, 2025 No. 24-11021 Lyle W. Cayce ____________ Clerk Ruth Torres, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Bonnie Lee Goldstein, In Official Capacity 44th District Court Judge Dallas; Raymond G. Wheless, In Official Capacity, Presiding Judge First Administrative Judicial Region; Robert D. Burns, In Official Capacity, Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals-Dallas; Amanda L. Reichek, In Official Capacity, Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals-Dallas; Ken Molberg, In Official Capacity, Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals- Dallas; Dennise Garcia, In Official Capacity, Chief Justice, Fifth Court of Appeals-Dallas; Robbie Partida-Kipness, In Official Capacity, Justice Place 2 Fifth Court of Appeals-Dallas; Honorable Dale Tillery, In Official Capacity, 134th District Court Judge Dallas, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:24-CV-1843 ______________________________ Case: 24-11021 Document: 47-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/10/2025 No. 24-11021 Before Smith, Graves, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Ruth Torres, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint against several members of the Texas judiciary seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. Torres alleged that the defendants violated her constitu- tional rights by issuing improper rulings and orders in a lawsuit initiated against her in retaliation for being a whistleblower, as well as in related legal proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 915(e)(2)(B). Torres moves to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal, which constitutes a challenge to the district court’s certification that any appeal would not be taken in good faith because Torres will not present a nonfrivolous appellate issue. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). As an initial matter, Torres does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal regarding her contention that the district court failed to conduct de novo review as demonstrated by the court’s failure separately to provide find- ings and conclusions for overruling her objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Rather, the record reflects that in accepting the report and recommendation, the district court conducted the requisite de novo review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In addition, the district court’s decision to consider sua sponte the applicability of the judicial immunity doctrine does not present a non- frivolous issue for appeal. See Boyd v Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994). Further, Torres’s conclusory assertions, without more, that judicial immun- ity does not apply because the defendants’ actions were without jurisdiction _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 2 Case: 24-11021 Document: 47-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/10/2025 No. 24-11021 and they were disqualified “due to ultra-vires acts/or crime-fraud excep- tion,” does not arguably state a constitutional violation. See Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir. 1990). Rather, her allegations all stem from orders the defendants issued in litigation involving Torres. See Davis v. Tar- rant Cnty., 565 F.3d 214, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2009). Further, Torres does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that she could not bring a private criminal action against the defendants. Nor does she challenge the decision denying her leave to amend her complaint. Thus, these claims are deemed abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Torres also maintains that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for appointment of counsel. However, Torres’s numer- ous filings in the district court and this court indicate that she has the