Legal Cases

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as it permits the government to accommodate religious practices without unlawfully fostering religion.

An individual who has obtained a state-law restraining order does not have a constitutionally protected property interest in having the police enforce the restraining order, even when there is probable cause to believe it has been violated.

A federal court in a diversity action may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims do not meet the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, as long as at least one named plaintiff satisfies that requirement and the claims are part of the same case or controversy.

The Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the penalty phase of a capital case, as it does during the guilt phase, unless justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant on trial, such as courtroom security.

The Supreme Court held that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance used in sentencing was not unconstitutionally vague, and thus the state court's findings were entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system, which allows only registered party members and Independents to vote in a party's primary, does not violate the First Amendment right to freedom of political association. States have broad authority to regulate the manner of elections, including the structure of their primary systems.

An individual may not enforce the limitations on local zoning authority set forth in §332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934 through an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Even when a capital defendant's family members and the defendant himself suggest that no mitigating evidence is available, defense counsel is required by the Sixth Amendment to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that the prosecution will likely use as evidence of aggravation during the sentencing phase of trial.

The period for the 1-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. §2255 begins when a petitioner receives notice of the order vacating a prior conviction used to enhance their federal sentence, provided that the petitioner has pursued the vacatur with due diligence in state court.

A private plaintiff claiming securities fraud must prove that the defendant's fraud caused an economic loss, and cannot satisfy this requirement merely by alleging that the security's price was inflated at the time of purchase due to misrepresentation.

A federal district court has the discretion to stay a mixed petition for habeas corpus to allow a petitioner to exhaust unexhausted claims in state court before returning to federal court for review.

The Oneida Indian Nation cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty over lands purchased in an open market, as they have long relinquished governmental authority, and such a revival would disrupt the established governance of local municipalities.

The Supreme Court held that the longstanding rule established in Totten v. United States prohibits suits against the government based on covert espionage agreements, thereby reversing the lower courts' decisions that allowed the respondents' claims to proceed.

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) pre-empts state-law claims for damages that would impose labeling or packaging requirements different from those mandated by FIFRA, as such claims would induce a manufacturer to alter its product label.

A state postconviction petition rejected by the state court as untimely is not considered "properly filed" under the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's tolling provision, and therefore does not toll the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition.

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to foreign-flag cruise ships operating in United States waters, provided there is a clear congressional intent to impose such requirements, particularly concerning the removal of physical barriers.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to cases where state-court losers seek to challenge state court judgments in federal court, and it does not extend to other situations that would override preclusion law or allow federal courts to dismiss cases in deference to state court actions.

Congress did not waive the United States' sovereign immunity for suits brought by third-party beneficiaries under the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, and therefore, individuals who are not parties to a government contract cannot sue the United States for breach of that contract.

The Supreme Court held that the government's use of eminent domain to transfer land from one private owner to another for the purpose of economic development qualifies as a "public use" under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This decision allows for a broader interpretation of public use to include economic benefits to the community.

The "substantially advances" formula established in Agins v. City of Tiburon is not an appropriate test for determining whether government regulation effects a taking under the Fifth Amendment.