United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)
Primary Holding
The statute criminalizing the pandering or solicitation of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(3)(B) is not overbroad under the First Amendment and is not impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In the case of United States v. Williams, the Supreme Court decided that a law making it illegal to promote or sell child pornography is not too broad or confusing. This matters because it helps ensure that laws can effectively protect children from exploitation without infringing on free speech rights for other types of content. If someone is involved in situations related to child pornography, this ruling reinforces that they can be prosecuted under this law, which helps safeguard the rights and safety of consumers, especially children.
AI-generated plain-language summary to help you understand this case
In the case of United States v. Williams, the underlying dispute centers around the interpretation of Section 2252A(a)(3)(B) of Title 18 of the United States Code, which criminalizes the pandering or solicitation of child pornography. The case arose when Michael Williams was charged under this statute. The legal question presented to the Supreme Court was whether this statute was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment or impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The procedural history of the case began with Williams being convicted in a lower court for violating the pandering provision. Following his conviction, Williams appealed the decision, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately ruled in his favor, leading the United States to petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case to resolve the constitutional questions raised. The relevant background context includes the Supreme Court's previous rulings on child pornography and obscenity. Notably, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002), the Court had previously struck down certain provisions of the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 for being overbroad. In response to that ruling, Congress enacted new legislation in 2003, which included the amended pandering provision at issue in this case. This legislative history highlights the ongoing legal and societal challenges surrounding the regulation of child pornography and the balance between protecting children and safeguarding free speech rights.
Whether Section 2252A(a)(3)(B) of Title 18, United States Code, which criminalizes the pandering or solicitation of child pornography, is overbroad under the First Amendment or impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The judgment is reversed.
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Decision Date
- October 30, 2007
- Jurisdiction
- federal
- Case Type
- landmark
- Majority Author
- Scalia
- Damages Awarded
- N/A
- Data Quality
- high
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