United States v. Kasprzyk
Kasprzyk
Court
U S Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals
Decided
February 5, 2009
Jurisdiction
MA
Importance
45%
Case Summary
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS Washington, D.C. UNITED STATES v. Kevin A. KASPRZYK Fireman (E-3), U.S. Coast Guard CGCMS 24376 Docket No. 1287 February 5, 2009 Special Court-Martial convened by Commander, Coast Guard Sector New York. Tried at New York, New York, on 3 April 2007. Military Judge: CDR Timothy G. Stueve, USCG Trial Counsel: LT John D. Cashman, USCG Defense Counsel: LT Allen E. Linken, JAGC, USN Appellate Defense Counsel: LT Robert M. Pirone, USCGR Appellate Government Counsel: LCDR Patrick M. Flynn, USCG BEFORE MCCLELLAND, KANTOR & MCGUIRE Appellate Military Judges MCCLELLAND, Chief Judge: Appellant was tried by special court-martial, military judge alone. Pursuant to his pleas of guilty, entered in accordance with a pretrial agreement, Appellant was convicted of one specification of conspiracy, in violation of Article 81, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); one specification of making a false official statement, in violation of Article 107, UCMJ; and one specification each of wrongful use of cocaine, wrongful introduction of cocaine onto an installation used by or under the control of the armed forces, wrongful distribution of cocaine, wrongful use of marijuana, and wrongful distribution of marijuana, all in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ. The military judge sentenced Appellant to confinement for eight months, reduction to E-1, and a bad-conduct discharge. The Convening Authority approved the sentence as adjudged but suspended all confinement in excess of four months until 8 July 2008, pursuant to the terms of the pretrial agreement. United States v. Kevin A. KASPRZYK, No. 1287 (C.G.Ct.Crim.App. 2009) Before this Court, Appellant has assigned the following four errors: I. Appellant should be given credit for his time spent in pretrial restriction because it was restriction tantamount to confinement, and a command representative informed Appellant that he would receive 1-for-2 credit for his time on restriction. II. Appellant’s plea to Charge I, Specification 1 is improvident because the military judge failed to inquire into contradictory statements made by Appellant as to whether a conspiracy actually existed. III. The adjudged sentence of eight months confinement, a bad-conduct discharge, and reduction to E-1 are inappropriately severe in this case, in light of the sentence adjudged to one of Appellant’s co-actors, FN Matthew Hazzard. IV. The evidence was neither factually nor legally sufficient to sustain the charges for distribution under Charge III, Specifications 3 and 6. Concerning credit for pretrial restriction, Appellant explicitly waived credit for restriction tantamount to confinement in the pretrial agreement, and, at trial, disavowed any expectation of credit for pretrial restriction notwithstanding having been told when the restriction began that he would receive one day of confinement credit for every two days of restriction. (Appellate Ex. V at 4; R. at 174-75.)1 Therefore, we reject the first issue.2 We address the other issues and affirm. Providence of conspiracy plea Appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine. His co-conspirator, SNOS Schatz, drove Appellant’s vehicle, with Appellant as passenger, to Harlem to get cocaine from another Coast Guard member. Appellant contends that this plea of guilty was improvident because he made contradictory statements about whether there was an agreement. The basis for this contention lies in the following statements by Appellant about the agreement. When the military judge asked how the agreement was arrived at, he said, “It was a common 1 He also enhanced the power of the idea that the military judge should credit his pretrial restriction in deciding on a sentence, based on the command representative’s statement that he would receive such credit. (R. at 176-77.) 2 It is true that one day of confinement is considered equivalent to two days of restriction for sentencing purposes. Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1003(b)(5), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2005 ed.) (MCM); Coast Guard Military Justice Manual, COMDTINST
Case Details
Case Details
Legal case information
Status
Decided
Date Decided
February 5, 2009
Jurisdiction
MA
Court Type
federal
Legal Significance
Case importance metrics
Metadata
Additional information
Quick Actions
Case management tools
Case Summary
Summary of the key points and legal principles
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS Washington, D.C.
UNITED STATES
v.
Kevin A. KASPRZYK
Fireman (E-3), U.S. Coast Guard
CGCMS 24376
Docket No. 1287
February 5, 2009
Special Court-Martial convened by Commander, Coast Guard Sector New York. Tried at New York, New York, on 3 April 2007.
Military Judge: CDR Timothy G. Stueve, USCG
Trial Counsel: LT John D. Cashman, USCG
Defense Counsel: LT Allen E. Linken, JAGC, USN
Appellate Defense Counsel: LT Robert M. Pirone, USCGR
Appellate Government Counsel: LCDR Patrick M. Flynn, USCG
BEFORE
MCCLELLAND, KANTOR & MCGUIRE
Appellate Military Judges
MCCLELLAND, Chief Judge:
Appellant was tried by special court-martial, military judge alone. Pursuant to his pleas
of guilty, entered in accordance with a pretrial agreement, Appellant was convicted of one specification of conspiracy, in violation of Article 81, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); one specification of making a false official statement, in violation of Article 107, UCMJ; and one specification each of wrongful use of cocaine, wrongful introduction of cocaine onto an installation used by or under the control of the armed forces, wrongful distribution of cocaine, wrongful use of marijuana, and wrongful distribution of marijuana, all in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ. The military judge sentenced Appellant to confinement for eight months, reduction to E-1, and a bad-conduct discharge. The Convening Authority approved the sentence as adjudged but suspended all confinement in excess of four months until 8 July 2008, pursuant to the terms of the pretrial agreement. United States v. Kevin A. KASPRZYK, No. 1287 (C.G.Ct.Crim.App. 2009)
Before this Court, Appellant has assigned the following four errors:
I. Appellant should be given credit for his time spent in pretrial restriction because it
was restriction tantamount to confinement, and a command representative
informed Appellant that he would receive 1-for-2 credit for his time on restriction.
II. Appellant’s plea to Charge I, Specification 1 is improvident because the military
judge failed to inquire into contradictory statements made by Appellant as to
whether a conspiracy actually existed.
III. The adjudged sentence of eight months confinement, a bad-conduct discharge,
and reduction to E-1 are inappropriately severe in this case, in light of the
sentence adjudged to one of Appellant’s co-actors, FN Matthew Hazzard.
IV. The evidence was neither factually nor legally sufficient to sustain the charges for
distribution under Charge III, Specifications 3 and 6.
Concerning credit for pretrial restriction, Appellant explicitly waived credit for restriction
tantamount to confinement in the pretrial agreement, and, at trial, disavowed any expectation of credit for pretrial restriction notwithstanding having been told when the restriction began that he would receive one day of confinement credit for every two days of restriction. (Appellate Ex. V at 4; R. at 174-75.)1 Therefore, we reject the first issue.2
We address the other issues and affirm.
Providence of conspiracy plea
Appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine. His co-conspirator, SNOS
Schatz, drove Appellant’s vehicle, with Appellant as passenger, to Harlem to get cocaine from another Coast Guard member. Appellant contends that this plea of guilty was improvident because he made contradictory statements about whether there was an agreement. The basis for this contention lies in the following statements by Appellant about the agreement. When the military judge asked how the agreement was arrived at, he said, “It was a common
1 He also enhanced the power of the idea that the military judge should credit his pretrial restriction in deciding on a sentence, based on the command representative’s statement that he would receive such credit. (R. at 176-77.) 2 It is true that one day of confinement is considered equivalent to two days of restriction for sentencing purposes. Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1003(b)(5), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2005 ed.) (MCM); Coast Guard Military Justice Manual, COMDTINST
Case Information
Detailed case metadata and classifications
Court Proceedings
Document Details
Legal Classification
Similar Cases
Cases with similar legal principles and precedents
Case Details
Legal case information
Status
Decided
Date Decided
February 5, 2009
Jurisdiction
MA
Court Type
federal
Legal Significance
Case importance metrics
Metadata
Additional information
Quick Actions
Case management tools