United States v. Henry Cordon

USCA11 Case: 24-13852 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 08/12/2025 Page: 1 of 3 [DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-13852 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ SILAS MARTIN, Petitioner-Appellant, versus WARDEN, KILBY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Respondent-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 3:24-cv-00148-RAH-CSC ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-13852 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 08/12/2025 Page: 2 of 3 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13852 Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Silas Martin, an Alabama prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2554 petition for lack of jurisdiction. The district court determined that his petition was an unauthorized successive petition. On appeal, Martin reiterates the merits of the claims that he raised in his petition, contending that law enforcement lacked probable cause for his arrest. We review de novo whether a habeas corpus petition is suc- cessive. Ponton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 891 F.3d 950, 952 (11th Cir. 2018). Although we liberally construe a pro se brief, a pro se party may still abandon an issue by not briefing it. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). With certain exceptions not relevant here, a petitioner may file a second or successive § 2254 habeas petition only after obtain- ing an order from this Court authorizing the district court to con- sider the petition. Osbourne v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 1261, 1264 (11th Cir. 2020); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). “Absent authorization from this Court, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive habeas petition.” Osbourne, 968 F.3d at 1264. “[T]he bar on second or successive petitions ordinar- ily prevents a prisoner from twice contesting the judgment author- izing his confinement.” Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). USCA11 Case: 24-13852 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 08/12/2025 Page: 3 of 3 24-13852 Opinion of the Court 3 Here, Martin has failed to address the district court’s stated reason for dismissing his § 2254 petition, so he has abandoned the appeal. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Even liberally construing his brief on appeal, he challenges only the underlying state judgment authorizing his confinement, asserting that there was no probable cause for arrest. Because Martin has failed to challenge the ground on which the district court based its judgment—that he filed an un- authorized successive § 2254 petition—“it follows that the judg- ment is due to be affirmed.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). In any case, the district court’s judgment is also due to be affirmed because it is clearly correct. As the court observed, the instant § 2254 petition was Martin’s “fifth attempt to challenge, via habeas corpus, his 2007 Lee County conviction for attempted sod- omy and a 25-year sentence.” His first such § 2254 petition, filed in September 2009, was denied on the merits. His remaining chal- lenges have been dismissed as unauthorized successive § 2254 peti- tions. Because Martin is again attempting to contest the same “judgment authorizing his confinement,” his current § 2254 peti- tion plainly qualifies as successive. See Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1325. And since we have not granted authorization, and no other excep- tion applies, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. See Osbourne, 968 F.3d at 1264. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Martin’s § 2254 petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 24-12932 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 08/07/2025 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12932 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus QUNITARIOUS TAVARES GRANT, a.k.a. “Q”, a.k.a. big dawg, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida USCA11 Case: 24-12932 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 08/07/2025 Page: 2 of 6 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12932 D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20080-DPG-1 ____________________ Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Qunitarious Grant appeals the district court’s order denying his motion seeking a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He argues that he is entitled to a reduction based on Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The government has moved for summary affirmance. We GRANT the govern- ment’s motion. I. After Grant participated in two armed robberies, he pleaded guilty to two counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). For each count, Grant faced a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years, and the sentences had to be consecutive. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presen- tence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR explained that for con- victions under § 924(c), the applicable guidelines range is “the min- imum term of imprisonment required by statute.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2K2.4. The PSR thus reported that the appli- cable guidelines range for each count was seven years. And because the sentences had to run concurrently, Grant’s guidelines range was 14 years (or 168 months). At sentencing, the district court im- posed a total sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. USCA11 Case: 24-12932 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 08/07/2025 Page: 3 of 6 24-12932 Opinion of the Court 3 The government later filed a motion to reduce Grant’s sen- tence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. The court granted the motion and reduced Grant’s sentence to 154 months’ imprisonment. After Grant received a sentence reduction, the Sentencing Commission amended the guideline provision addressing criminal history status points. At the time Grant was sentenced, when a dis- trict court calculated a criminal history score under Chapter Four of the guidelines, a defendant received two additional criminal his- tory points if he committed his offense of conviction while under any criminal justice sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (2019). Amendment 821 altered the way “status points” were scored. After Amendment 821, if a defendant had seven or more criminal history points and committed the instant offense while under a criminal justice sentence, he received one additional criminal history point. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (2024). And if he had fewer than seven crim- inal history points and committed the instant offense while under a criminal justice sentence, he received no additional criminal his- tory points. Id. The Sentencing Commission made this portion of Amendment 821 retroactive. See id. § 1B1.10(d). After Amendment 821 went into effect, Grant filed a motion in the district court requesting a sentence reduction. The district court denied the motion. This is Grant’s appeal. The government has moved for summary affirmance. USCA11 Case: 24-12932 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 08/07/2025 Page: 4 of 6 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12932 II. Summary disposition is appropriate, in part, where “the po- sition of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as i

USCA11 Case: 24-14243 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 08/08/2025 Page: 1 of 2 [DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-14243 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus LAQUISHA MCFARLAND, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cr-00005-TKW-3 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-14243 Document: 18-1 Date Filed: 08/08/2025 Page: 2 of 2 2 Opinion of the Court 24-14243 Before BRANCH, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: The government has moved to dismiss this appeal as un- timely. Laquisha McFarland’s notice of appeal, deemed filed on December 18, 2024, under the prison mailbox rule, is untimely to challenge the district court’s August 20, 2024, order striking her third reply to the government’s response to her motion for com- passionate release. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (providing that in criminal cases, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days after the entry of the judgment or order being appealed); United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1312-14 (11th Cir. 2009) (hold- ing that we must apply Rule 4(b)’s 14-day time limit when the gov- ernment objects to an untimely notice of appeal); Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison authorities, and absent contrary evidence, we assume that a prisoner delivers a filing on the date he signs it). Accordingly, the government’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED.

DLD-156 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ Nos. 25-1426 & 25-1427 ___________ ERIC BARTOLI, Appellant v. DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; WARDEN LORETTO FCI ___________ ERIC BARTOLI, Appellant v. WARDEN LORETTO FCI ____________________________________ On Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action Nos. 3:23-cv-00204 & 3:23-cv-00057) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Patricia L. Dodge ____________________________________ Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 May 22, 2025 Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: June 10, 2025) _________ OPINION * * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not  _________ PER CURIAM Pro se Appellant Eric Bartoli appeals from District Court orders dismissing his two petitions for writ of habeas corpus that he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We will affirm. I Bartoli fled to Peru after a grand jury indicted him for crimes related to his running a Ponzi scheme. Years later, he was arrested and extradited to face those charges in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. He pled guilty in that Court to charges related to that Ponzi scheme. Bartoli received a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment and was ordered to pay $42 million in restitution. Bartoli’s direct appeal proved unsuccessful. See United States v. Bartoli, 728 F. App’x 424 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, Bartoli v. United States, 587 U.S. 925 (2019). Bartoli then sought collateral relief by filing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2255 See United States v. Bartoli, C.A. No. 23-3983, 2024 WL 4987352, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 2024) (discussing Bartoli’s collateral proceedings). While Bartoli’s § 2255 proceedings were pending, he filed two § 2241 habeas corpus petitions in the Western District of Pennsylvania (where he was incarcerated) in April 2023 and September 2023. In his April 2023 petition, Bartoli argued that his extradition to the United States from Peru constitute binding precedent. 2 prior to his conviction was illegal and violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, and that trial counsel’s failure to raise this issue constituted ineffective assistance. In his September 2023 petition, Bartoli challenged the validity of his sentence pursuant to the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses as well as the Eighth Amendment. On February 25, 2025, the District Court 1 dismissed both petitions for lack of jurisdiction. Bartoli appealed. This Court notified the parties that these appeals, which have since been consolidated, might be subject to summary action. Appellees filed responses to that notification. Bartoli did not. II We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing the District Court’s dismissals of Bartoli’s § 2241 habeas corpus petitions, we exercise plenary review over its legal conclusions and review findings of fact for clear error. See O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We may summarily affirm the District Court’s decisions if the appeals fail to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). III Section 2241 gives a District Court jurisdiction over “the petition of a federal prisoner who is [attacking] not the validity but the execution of his sentence.” Cardona v. 1 The parties consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) in both cases. 3 Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012). Here, however, Bartoli challeng

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0284n.06 Case No. 23-1640 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Jun 09, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF DANYELLE AMUND PHILLIPS, JR., ) MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Danyelle Phillips Jr. pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In his plea agreement, Phillips reserved the right to seek appellate review of the district court’s determination that section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Constitution on its face. He does so now. But our court recently held that section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional. United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 657 (6th Cir. 2024). As Phillips recognizes, this panel can’t overrule that decision, so we affirm.