State v. M. B.

334 June 18, 2025 No. 546 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of M. B., aka M. N. B., a Youth. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. M. B., aka M. N. B., Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 22JU05222; A181836 Michele C. Rini, Judge. On youth’s petition for reconsideration filed April 9, 2025, respondent’s petition for reconsideration filed April 9, 2025, and youth’s response filed April 16, 2025. Opinion filed March 12, 2025. 338 Or App 736, 566 P3d 713 (2025). Christa Obold Eshleman and Youth, Rights & Justice, for petition and response. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, for petition. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Hellman, Judge. HELLMAN, J. State’s petition for reconsideration allowed; youth’s peti- tion for reconsideration denied; former opinion withdrawn; vacated in part and remanded for written findings under ORS 419C.478(1); otherwise affirmed. Cite as 341 Or App 334 (2025) 335 336 State v. M. B. HELLMAN, J. Youth and the state have petitioned for reconsid- eration of our opinion in this case, State v. M. B., 338 Or App 736, 566 P3d 713 (2025). Youth argues that the juve- nile court used “an incorrect legal standard” in making its best interest determination under ORS 419C.478(1) when it committed him to Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) legal cus- tody and urges us to “vacate and remand the commitment judgment for the juvenile court to * * * determine the ques- tion of [youth’s] best interests under ORS 419C.478(1) under the correct legal standard.” Specifically, youth repeats the argument from his briefing that “there was no evidence that would have allowed the juvenile court to determine that commitment was in [youth’s] best interests.” We reject that argument because, as we have explained, the record did contain such evidence. Moreover, we “disfavor[ ]” “[c]laims addressing legal issues already argued in the parties’ briefs” and those that we have already addressed. ORAP 6.25(1)(e). “The rule stating that repeating unsuccessful argu- ments on reconsideration is ‘disfavored’ is based not on jurisprudential stubbornness, but on considerations of fairness and economy. Parties already have a fair opportu- nity to make arguments in the ordinary course of briefing and oral argument. To permit multiple bites at the prover- bial apple is unfair to opposing parties, who are obliged to respond, and wastes scarce judicial resources that already have been expended in evaluating the same arguments.” Nakashima v. Board of Education, 206 Or App 568, 571, 138 P3d 854 (2006), aff’d, 344 Or 497, 185 P3d 429 (2008). We deny youth’s petition for reconsideration. However, we allow the state’s petition for reconsid- eration. Here, the state conceded that the juvenile court’s written findings did not comply with ORS 419C.478(1) and we accepted that concession. However, in so doing, we “observe[d] that the juvenile court’s written findings did not address the negative consequences that placement in an OYA correctional facility would impose on youth.” In its petition for reconsideration, the state argues that ORS 419C.478(1) “does not separately require the juvenile court to make writ- ten findings as to whether placement in a youth correctional Cite as 341 Or App 334 (2025) 337 facility is in a youth’s best interests” and that our opinion “appear[ed] to apply the written findings requirement pro- vided in ORS 419C.478(1) to the juvenile court’s recommen- dation under ORS 419C.495(1).”1 The state’s point is well taken. As a consequence, we must modify our opinion to reflect that, under ORS 419C.478(1), a juvenile court’s writ- ten findings must “describ[e] why it is in the best interests of the adjudicated youth to be placed” in OYA custody, not why it is in the youth’s best interests to be placed in a particular OYA facility. For the sake of clarity, rather than making those modifications by interlineation, we withdraw our for- mer opinion and restate the opinion as modified here. Youth appeals a dispositional judgment committing him to OYA legal custody for placement in a youth correctional facility. In a combined argument, youth argues both that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it committed him to OYA custody because that placement was not in his best inter- ests and that its written findings did not comply with ORS 419C.478(1). As explained below, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when