Legal Case

State v. Cockrell

Cockrell

Citation

341 Or. App. 465

Court

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided

June 25, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Importance

46%

Significant

Practice Areas

Criminal Law
Appellate Law

Case Summary

No. 573 June 25, 2025 465 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TAMMY LYNN COCKRELL, Defendant-Appellant. Klamath County Circuit Court 21CR42342; A181547 Marci Warner Adkisson, Judge. Argued and submitted April 21, 2025. Erik Blumenthal, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission. Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. HELLMAN, J. Judgment of dismissal on count of unlawful use of a weapon reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal; otherwise affirmed. 466 State v. Cockrell HELLMAN, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for men- acing, ORS 163.190, and raises three assignments of error.1 First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refus- ing to give her requested special jury instruction. Second, defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it refused to answer a jury question and instead referred the jury to the instructions that were already given. Third, defendant argues that the trial court erred in entering a judgment of dismissal, instead of a judgment of acquittal, after the jury acquitted her of unlawful use of a weapon, ORS 166.220(1)(a).2 The state concedes that error and we accept the concession. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of dismissal on defendant’s unlawful use of a weapon charge, and remand for an entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge. We otherwise affirm. Special jury instruction. Defendant first assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to give her proposed special jury instruction. We review “the trial court’s ruling for legal error,” “view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to * * * the party that requested the instruction.” State v. North, 333 Or App 187, 190, 552 P3d 152 (2024), rev den, 373 Or 305 (2025). At trial, the state presented evidence that, while on her Klamath County property, defendant fired a .22 cali- ber rifle in the direction of a firefighter who was working on the nearby Bootleg Fire. Defendant testified that she saw a “very dark shadow” of a person “way up on the ridge” that was about a 30-minute hike away. She further testi- fied that, because the person was “not responding to [her],” she acted in self-defense by firing “an attention round” into the sand. Defendant told police that the round landed 20 feet in front of her. Although the trial court instructed the jury on the “Use of Physical Force in Defense of Property,” 1 “A person commits the crime of menacing if by word or conduct the person intentionally attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious phys- ical injury.” ORS 163.190(1). 2 ORS 166.220(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits the crime of unlawful use of a weapon if the person * * * [a]ttempts to use unlawfully against another, or carries or possesses with intent to use unlawfully against another, any dangerous or deadly weapon as defined in ORS 161.015[.]” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 465 (2025) 467 “Physical Force Defense of a Person,” and the limitations on using deadly physical force to defend property, the trial court declined defendant’s requested instruction that “the threat of deadly force does not constitute the use of deadly force.” The jury convicted her of menacing. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, we conclude that the trial court did not err because the substance of defendant’s requested jury instruc- tion was “covered fully” by other instructions. State v. Harryman, 277 Or App 346, 356, 371 P3d 1213, rev den, 360 Or 401 (2016) (“[A] trial court does not err in refusing to give a proposed instruction—even if legally correct—if the sub- stance of the requested instruction is covered fully by other jury instructions given by the trial court or if the requested instruction is not necessary to explain the particular issue or point of law to the jury.” (Internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted)); see also State v. Roberts, 293 Or App 340, 346, 427 P3d 1130 (2018) (“A defendant is not entitled, in every case, to a special instruction that is tailored to the particular facts at issue.”). Here, the trial court gave

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Case Details

Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

June 25, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Court Type

federal

Legal Significance

Case importance metrics

Importance Score
Significant
Score46%
Citations
0
Legal Topics
Jury Instructions
Self-Defense
Menacing Charges

Metadata

Additional information

AddedJun 28, 2025
UpdatedJun 28, 2025

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Case Summary

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Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Jury Instructions
Self-Defense
Menacing Charges

Case Information

Detailed case metadata and classifications

Court Proceedings

Date FiledJune 25, 2025
Date DecidedJune 25, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
0
Importance Score
0.5

Legal Classification

JurisdictionSA
Court Type
federal
Judicial Panel
Hellman
Opinion Author
Hellman

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80% match
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Jun 2025

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