Legal Case

State v. Bailey

Bailey

Citation

341 Or. App. 371

Court

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided

June 18, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Importance

45%

Significant

Practice Areas

Criminal Law
Child Exploitation Law

Case Summary

No. 552 June 18, 2025 371 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MAURICE ANTONIO BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 20CR19440; A179000 R. Curtis Conover, Judge. Submitted February 26, 2024. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Kristin Carveth, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. POWERS, J. Affirmed. 372 State v. Bailey POWERS, J. In this criminal case, defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for, among other crimes, one count of using a child in a display of sexually explicit conduct, ORS 163.670, raising two assignments of error.1 In his first assignment, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to prove that he directed the vic- tim for the purpose of enabling him to observe her sexu- ally explicit conduct. In his second assignment, defendant asserts that the court erred in imposing a sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment on the display count because it was disproportionate under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. We disagree with both of defendant’s argu- ments and, accordingly, we affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the proce- dural and factual background, we do not set forth a detailed recitation of the facts in this nonprecedential memorandum opinion. With respect to the first assignment of error, we review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accept- ing reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). Defendant argues that there is insufficient evi- dence that defendant’s observation of the victim, D’s, gen- itals was distinct from his subsequent act of touching her. Relying on our opinion in State v. Clay, 301 Or App 599, 457 P3d 330 (2019), defendant contends that he observed D’s genitals immediately before touching her and, thus, that “the viewing was so closely intertwined with the touching” that no reasonable juror could find that his observation was anything other than incidental to the touching. Id. at 612. Defendant’s argument offers a plausible way to view the 1 ORS 163.670 has been amended since the underlying conduct in this case. Or Laws 2023, ch 407, § 2. Because the amendments do not affect our analysis, we refer to the current version of the statute in this nonprecedential memorandum opinion. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 371 (2025) 373 evidence; however, it is not the only way to do so, especially in light of our standard of review that applies to a challenge to the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. Although defendant’s observation of D’s genitals lasted for only “a couple of seconds,” and the touching occurred immediately after and lasted for more than a min- ute, the temporal connection between the acts is not the only factor in determining whether a defendant’s observation was incidental to the touching. See State v. Zamora, 326 Or App 140, 147, 530 P3d 914, rev den, 371 Or 477 (2023) (explaining that, although “the temporal connection between the sexual abuse and the observation of the child’s intimate parts is relevant to that determination, it is not the only relevant fact, and it may not be dispositive”). The primary consider- ation is whether the factfinder could reasonably infer that the “observation of the child was an end in itself,” even if it was not the only end. Id. at 146-47. Here, a reasonable factfinder could have inferred that defendant’s observation of D’s genitals was an end in itself. Defendant specifically asked D to undress, lay on the bed, spread her legs, and spread her labia for defendant to be able to look at her genitals for a couple of seconds. Only after those instructions and that observation did defen- dant touch D. Thus, a reasonable finder of fact could infer that defendant induced D to spread her legs and labia for the purpose of observing her genitals and that defendant dec

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Case Details

Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

June 18, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Court Type

federal

Legal Significance

Case importance metrics

Importance Score
Significant
Score45%
Citations
0
Legal Topics
Sufficiency of Evidence
Sentencing Proportionality
Child Sexual Abuse

Metadata

Additional information

AddedJun 25, 2025
UpdatedJun 25, 2025

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Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Sufficiency of Evidence
Sentencing Proportionality
Child Sexual Abuse

Case Information

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Court Proceedings

Date FiledJune 18, 2025
Date DecidedJune 18, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
0
Importance Score
0.5

Legal Classification

JurisdictionSA
Court Type
federal
Judicial Panel
Powers
Opinion Author
Powers

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