State v. Alatorre

470 June 25, 2025 No. 574 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSE GUADALUPE ALATORRE, Defendant-Appellant. Linn County Circuit Court 21CR55912; A182131 Brendan J. Kane, Judge. Submitted May 20, 2025. George W. Kelly filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. HELLMAN, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 470 (2025) 471 HELLMAN, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a marijuana item, ORS 475B.337(3)(c). In two assignments of error, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm. We briefly recite the background facts here and sup- plement them in each assignment of error. Defendant was driving a U-Haul truck that police stopped for speeding. The truck contained marijuana. The state charged defen- dant and codefendant—the passenger—with several crimes, and the cases were consolidated. As relevant here, defen- dant joined codefendant’s motion to suppress evidence from the U-Haul and statements that he had made to police. The trial court denied the motion, determining that defendant and codefendant had consented to the search and that police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. After the trial court denied defendant’s renewed motion to suppress evi- dence, he entered a conditional no contest plea that reserved his right to appeal the denial. This appeal followed. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. “We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for legal error, and we are bound by the trial court’s factual findings if there is any constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them.” State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or 163, 165-66, 389 P3d 1121 (2017). If the trial court “did not make express findings and there is evidence from which the trial court could have found a fact in more than one way, we will presume that the trial court decided the facts consistently with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion.” Id. at 166. Consent to search. In his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion because the state did not establish that defen- dant or codefendant had consented to the search. According to defendant, because “[t]he key language apparently was given to the defendants in Spanish, as presented by the translation application,” “we cannot know that whatever it is they expressed to give their consent was done voluntarily.” We reject defendant’s argument. 472 State v. Alatorre Under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, “the state has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that someone having the authority to do so volun- tarily gave the police consent to search the defendant’s per- son or property.” State v. Jordan, 308 Or App 547, 552, 481 P3d 1017 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In reviewing the voluntariness of defendant’s consent, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact if there is evidence in the record to support them. Ultimately, the determination about whether a consent to search is voluntary is a legal issue that we review independently, based on the trial court’s findings that are supported by the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). At the suppression hearing, the trooper who stopped the U-Haul, King, testified that he could tell when “there’s a little bit of an English language barrier” but that he “was confident that * * * they understood enough of * * * the ini- tial basic questions.” When King was called away, Trooper Nelson and Deputy Newman continued the investigation. Newman testified that he used a translator application on his cell phone to provide the Miranda warnings to defendant and codefendant and that they indicated that they under- stood. Newman further testified that, after giving that warning, he asked if he could look in the back of the U-Haul and that defendant and codefendant consented. In determining that defendant and codefendant consented to the search, the trial court found that King “was somehow able to communicate on a nominal level without speaking any Spanish” and that the two men understood King’s questions. “[THE COURT]: [King] is somehow able to procu