State Of Washington, V. N.e.m.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86464-5-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION N.E.M., Appellant. COBURN, J. — N.E.M. appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate and seal his juvenile convictions. N.E.M. contends that the trial court erred when it determined that it did not have discretion to vacate and seal his juvenile records pursuant to RCW 13.50.260(4)(a). As instructed by the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Garza, 200 Wn.2d 449, 518 P.3d 1029 (2022), we affirm. FACTS In 1996 N.E.M. was convicted in juvenile court for assault in the third degree, kidnapping in the second degree, and rape in the second degree. After having successfully petitioned the court to relieve him of his duty to register as a kidnapping offender the previous year, in 2024 N.E.M. moved to vacate and seal his juvenile convictions under RCW 13.50.260(3). N.E.M. made his request even though his conviction of rape in the second degree prevented him from meeting the requirements for mandatory sealing pursuant to RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v). The trial court denied the 86464-5-I/2 motion. The court ruled that because N.E.M. did not qualify for sealing under RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v), the court did not have discretion to vacate and seal his juvenile records. N.E.M. appeals. DISCUSSION This appeal involves the relationship between two provisions of RCW 13.50.260, the statute governing the vacatur and sealing of juvenile offender’s court records. Subsection (3) states: If a juvenile court record has not already been sealed pursuant to this section, in any case in which information has been filed pursuant to RCW 13.40.100 or a complaint has been filed with the prosecutor and referred for diversion pursuant to RCW 13.40.070, the person who is the subject of the information or complaint may file a motion with the court to have the court vacate its order and findings, if any; resolve the status of any debts owing; and, subject to RCW 13.50.050(13), order the sealing of the official juvenile court record, the social file, and records of the court and of any other agency in the case, with the exception of identifying information under RCW 13.50.050(13). The relevant portion of subsection (4) states: The court shall grant any motion to seal records for class A offenses made pursuant to subsection (3) of this section if: (i) Since the last date of release from confinement, including full- time residential treatment, if any, or entry of disposition, the person has spent five consecutive years in the community without committing any offense or crime that subsequently results in an adjudication or conviction; (ii) No proceeding is pending against the moving party seeking the conviction of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense; (iii) No proceeding is pending seeking the formation of a diversion agreement with that person; (iv) The person is no longer required to register as a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.130 or has been relieved of the duty to register under RCW 9A.44.143 if the person was convicted of a sex offense; (v) The person has not been convicted of rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, or indecent liberties that was actually committed with forcible compulsion; and (vi) The person has paid the full amount of restitution owing to the individual victim named in the restitution order, excluding restitution owed to any public or private entity providing insurance coverage or health care 2 86464-5-I/3 coverage. RCW 13.50.260(4)(a) (emphasis added). N.E.M. avers that meeting the conditions listed in RCW 13.50.260(4)(a) mandates sealing but does not otherwise limit a court’s discretion to consider and grant a juvenile offender’s motion to vacate and seal his juvenile records where the sealing conditions are not met. Because we are bound by express authority from the state supreme court, we are compelled to disagree. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Haggard, 195 Wn.2d 544, 547, 461 P.3d 1159 (2020). The court must interpret statutes to “best fulfill[] the legislative purpose and intent.” Id. at 547-48. Where the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, the court must give effect to the plain meaning “as an expression of legislative intent.” Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LL